Bhakta Don Muntean

This is not true! Your servant,

All Glories to Srila Prabhupada I do not have anything against buddhists but it is a fact that they are a load of you know what these days. It is an streched and evil calculation to say that hindus are somehow like taliban in the treatment of the buddhists -- as you can see from the following texts. Sri Chaitanya Caritamrita, Madhya 9.48-49: "Although the Buddhists are unfit for discussion and should not be seen by Vaishnavas, Caitanya Mahaprabhu spoke to them just to decrease their false pride. The scriptures of the Buddhist cult are chiefly based on argument and logic, and they contain nine chief principles. Because Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu defeated the Buddhists in their argument, they could not establish their cult." The Buddhists could understand that Lord Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu was a Vaishnava, and they returned home very unhappy. Later, however, they began to plot against the Lord. Madhya 9.52 Having made their plot, the Buddhists brought a plate of untouchable food before Lord Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu and called it maha-prasadam. Madhya 9.53 When the contaminated food was offered to Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu, a very large bird appeared on the spot, picked up the plate in its beak and flew away. Madhya 9.54 Indeed, the untouchable food fell upon the Buddhists, and the large bird dropped the plate on the head of the chief Buddhist teacher. When it fell on his head, it made a big sound. Madhya 9.55 The plate was made of metal, and when its edge hit the head of the teacher, it cut him, and the teacher immediately fell to the ground unconscious. Madhya 9.56 So from these texts we can see some very interesting perspective on this matter. Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Srila Prabhupada I do not have anything against buddhists but it is a fact that they are a load of you know what these days. It is an streched and evil calculation to say that hindus are somehow like taliban in the treatment of the buddhists -- as you can see from the following texts. Sri Chaitanya Caritamrita, Madhya 9.48-49: "Although the Buddhists are unfit for discussion and should not be seen by Vaishnavas, Caitanya Mahaprabhu spoke to them just to decrease their false pride. The scriptures of the Buddhist cult are chiefly based on argument and logic, and they contain nine chief principles. Because Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu defeated the Buddhists in their argument, they could not establish their cult." The Buddhists could understand that Lord Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu was a Vaishnava, and they returned home very unhappy. Later, however, they began to plot against the Lord. Madhya 9.52 Having made their plot, the Buddhists brought a plate of untouchable food before Lord Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu and called it maha-prasadam. Madhya 9.53 When the contaminated food was offered to Sri Caitanya Mahaprabhu, a very large bird appeared on the spot, picked up the plate in its beak and flew away. Madhya 9.54 Indeed, the untouchable food fell upon the Buddhists, and the large bird dropped the plate on the head of the chief Buddhist teacher. When it fell on his head, it made a big sound. Madhya 9.55 The plate was made of metal, and when its edge hit the head of the teacher, it cut him, and the teacher immediately fell to the ground unconscious. Madhya 9.56 So from these texts we can see some very interesting perspective on this matter. Your Servant, Bhakta don

Bhakta bionic: >>>>"Live Long And Prosper" Reply: I wonder where we heard that before........

This would be one topic you can work out WHEN YOU GO BACK TO VAIKUNTHA--it really is a dangerous thing to start on that here. I myself do believe that one does change relationships in Vaikuntha--yet it cannot be our focus here. Srila Prabhupada rightly did not spend much energy into it--talking about what we are going to do a week from the time we escape a burning house--it makes little difference till you are out.

Dear Friends: All Glories to Srila Prabhupada This is a good idea--we need to start to devlope as a community these things--I know that I despise working for demons--all karmis are not demons--but too many are--all too often it is not until one has the job that it becomes clear that that is the case. We are so dependant on the Kali Yuga world--exactly the opposite of what Srila Prabhupada wants. Your Servant, Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 01-21-2002).]

Dear Darwin: All Glories to Srila Prabhupada Here other 'to the point' advice for us to think about: Shrimad Bhagavatam 6.1.63 Purport: Unless one is very strong in knowledge, patience and proper bodily, mental and intellectual behavior, controlling one's lusty desires is extremely difficult. Thus after seeing a man embracing a young woman and practically doing everything required for sex life, even a fully qualified brahmana, as described above, could not control his lusty desires and restrain himself from pursuing them. Because of the force of materialistic life, to maintain self-control is extremely difficult unless one is specifically under the protection of the Supreme Personality of Godhead through devotional service. Now of course our situation is much much worse than that of Ajamila--just see the struggle to pollute--even animated tv shows with a so-called rating of 14+ like Family Guy insert horrible smut inuendo into almost every scene. What to speak of this internet... So we have much more need to: As far as possible he patiently tried to remember the instructions of the Shastras... [sB 6.1.62] So this is like the crux of it: ...Because of the force of materialistic life, to maintain self-control is extremely difficult unless one is specifically under the protection of the Supreme Personality of Godhead through devotional service... Your Servant, Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 01-16-2002).]

Dear Darwin All Glories to Srila Prabhupada So you are searching for help from a--well I won't say that...how bout "something outside"--Please be carefull with this 'outside'--as you have noted in your past experiance--these problem solvers can be a problem--actually if truth be told there may well be no benefit [especially these days!] to see these kinds of "Medical" Healers--as Srila Prabhupada says: ...So psychiatrists generally their patients are crazy fellows. Generally they treat crazy fellows. Is it not? No sane man goes to a psychiatrist. [laughter] Is it not a fact? So all these crazy men sometimes makes the psychiatrist a crazy also. So more or less, everyone is crazy. That is the... It is not my layman's opinion... Gita Lecture April 1976 We share a collective Craziness in our material world--that we all are 'crazy'--is confirmed by so many factors now--if you have a brain chemical imballace that is another matter--but I think your issue is that you are struggling with the modes and maya and you are not getting enough association outside this virtual world--and that must change. One thing to consider is that offences can have the same effects as mental imballance. We have to be sure to not be creating offences to the Shastra by wanting to "amend it" and of course offences to the Holy Name--but, if you do some Real Service [cleaning etc.] at the Temple on a regular basis then you will begin to see that you have a 'Shelter' in that Service. Bhagavad Gita--Chapter 2 Text 51: The wise, engaged in devotional service, take refuge in the Lord, and free themselves from the cycle of birth and death by renouncing the fruits of action in the material world. In this way they can attain that state beyond all miseries. From the Preface to the Gita: A living entity is happily the part and parcel of the Lord, and thus his natural function is to render immediate service to the Lord. By the spell of illusion one tries to be happy by serving his personal sense gratification in different forms which will never make him happy. In a Letter to a Ms. Hochner in 1967 Srila Prabhupada clearly explained: ...Devotional service means to apply one's energy in the service of Krishna. That is the instruction of the Bhagavad-gita... So we can expect problems--if we do not have a fixed Shelter of 'Service' in Krishna Conciousness--we will be tossed in the waves of the lower Gunas. So your first priority--if at all possible--is to take this kind advice: "For you personally I would advise contacting, and visting if at all possible, HH Tripurari Swami." Darwin--could you ask for a better Lead--just leave preconceptions behind--and contact that devotee to send a message... Your Servant, Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 01-16-2002).]

Hare Krishna! [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 01-12-2002).]

Dear Gauracandra and ghari: All Glories to Srila Prabhupada Thank you for you kind comments! I did have the inspiration of the Lord to do the Narahari--the project took months to complete--in all there is nearly 10 Mega-bytes of 'Paint' which make up that 'file'. The McDemon Pic was less time, I was thinking of the guy called "Geoffrey Guilliano" his initiated name was "Juganatha Dasa". The guy is off the wall in a serious way--his claims of attaining 'Prema' are a riot. I did the re-painting of the Killing of Kangsa thinking of GG's Cheating of Prabhupada and Exploiting Sriman George Harrison. Of course I was also drawing heavy on a comparison of the Lord's Fame as a Demon Killer--this McDeath Corp is one of the Biggest Demons on the Planet--a demon only God can 'check'. We see hundreds and millions on a collective basis--forced by billion dollar budgets--Images of this corperation's icon demon clown every day--it is so sick--I am not an artist and I did in a way calculate the changes to the Picture--it was easier than painting one of Krishna myself--something I cannot do--putting it on the internet was only to help people see a wonderfully painted form of Lord Krishna take-out this demon--in what looks like a public arena. It is hoped that the artist is not offened! Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Srila Prabhupada Dear Stone: >>>Is that "Srila Puripada" on the mat? Reply: Forgive me Stone, I am not sure what you mean; who is "Puripada"? I think the only person I heard called that was Kirtanananda? I had "Mc Demons" incessant adverts in mind when I changed the picture--yet this might speak to that dude [G.G.] who was the first McDemon--and then he was 'saved' by Lord Krishna--now we are not sure "what" he is.... >>>I like the old Brijbasi prints, especially Gopal Krishna and Murali-manohara. They captured my mind in 1969 and '70, when I first joined the movement. I also like much of B. G. Sharma's work, as well as Indra Sharma's. There's really a lot of good work by artists form ISKCON and beyond. Reply: Yes, I like that traditional style as well, we have some pictures by T.K. Sharma that are very well done. What did you think of the Lord Narahari Re-painting? Your Servant, Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 01-10-2002).]

All Glories to Srila Prabhupada One more pic--I changed it some--what does everyone think? Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Srila Prabhupada My favorite painting is of Lord Narahari--I do like Him much more 'after' I colored Him to look like this. This Painting is Jadurani's best work--I pray to Him everyday that she come home... Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Shvu: So what are you saying? You want a big old hunk of dead animal? Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Gaurachandra: Please accept my respectfull obeisances! I did see the program--it was full of apologetics--yet it did portray the hidden 'mundane' side of this 'History' very nice-like! On A&E last night there was another Program: The Rise of Christianity it was also very subtle in its presentation of the 'mundane' and dark-side of that 'History'. I shiver when I think of the many many 'changes' within the so-called Biblical Faiths in the last 2000 years of Kali Yuga History! When people see Programs as were presented on A&E last night--they have an undeniable need to understand Karma--and they don't, thus the mistakes of Yesterday--become the building blocks of Today. Watching the News these days in connection to these Groups is like watching one of these History Programs--it will end-up at the same old 'Cycle of Issues' until they sincerely Embrace the Truth of Karma! I would like to say that having read many of your Postings--you are a cool Devotee! "gHari" is also a very Cool Devotee! PS: DID you happen to watch the Pope Celebrate Midnight Mass from the Vatican? The Pope appeared to be very upset--I watch the Mass every Year--this is the first time that I was getting some very odd impressions from the Holy Father--it was the way He was looking at His Cardinals.... [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 12-25-2001).]

Originally posted by valaya: Hinduism: This is the sum of duty--do not do to others what would cause pain if done to you. Mahabharata 5:1575 Buddhism: Treat not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful. Udana-Varga 5.18 Confucianism: One word which sums up the basis of all good conduct...loving kindness. Do not do to others what you do not want done to yourself. Confucius Analects 15.23 Taoism: Regard your neighbour's gain as your own gain, and your neighbour's loss as your own loss. T'ai Shang Kan Ying P'ien, 213-218 Sikhism: I am a stranger to no one; and no one is a stranger to me. Indeed, I am a friend to all. Guru Granth Sahib, pg.1299 Christianity: In everything, do to others what you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets. Jesus, Matthew 7:12 Unitarianism: We affirm and promote respect for the independent web of existence of which we are a part. Unitarian principle Native Spirituality: We are as much alive as we keep the earth alive. Chief Dan George Zoroastrianism: Do not do unto others whatever is injurious to yourself. Shayast-na-Shayast 13.29 Jainism: One should treat all creatures in the world as one would like to be treated. Mahavira, Sutrakritanga Judaism: What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour. This is the whole Torah; all the rest is commentary. Hillel, Talmud, Shabbat 31a Islam: Not one of you truly believes until you wish for others what you wish for yourself. The Prophet Muhammad, Hadith Baha'i Faith: Lay not on any soul a load that you would not wish to be laid upon you, and desire not for any one the things you would not desire for yourself. Baha'u'llah, Gleanings All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Very Nice Indeed Prabhu! Your servant, Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 12-25-2001).]

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Here is a Article I found: Jesus: History or Myth? Can Jesus be confirmed historically? In all the years I was a Christian minister, I never preached a sermon about the evidence for a historic Jesus. There was no need for such a sermon. I stood before many congregations and associated with many ministers, evangelists and pastors, and not one of us ever spoke about the possibility that Jesus was a fable, or that his story is more myth than history. We had heard, of course, that there were academic skeptics, but we dismissed them as a tiny minority of quacks and atheists. In my four years of religious study at Azusa Pacific College, I took many bible classes - an entire course about the book of Romans, another class about Hebrew wisdom literature, and so on - but I was offered only one course in Christian apologetics. It was called "Christian Evidences," and I found it to be the least useful of all my studies. Since I preferred evangelism to academics, I found the information interesting, but irrelevant. The class did not delve deeply into the documents or arguments. We recited the roster of early historians and church fathers, and then promptly forgot them all. I figured that Christian scholars had already done the homework and that our faith rested on a firm historical foundation, and that if I ever needed to look it up I could turn to some book somewhere for the facts. I never needed to look it up. As a freethinker, I decided to "1ook it up." I am now convinced that the Jesus story is just a myth. Here's why: There is no external historical confirmation for the New Testament stories. The New Testament stories are internally contradictory. There are natural explanations for the origin of the Jesus legend. The miracle reports make the story unhistorical. Can Jesus be confirmed historically? At face value the Christian evidences appear to be overwhelming. Looking outside of the New Testament, many texts in apologetics will include a long list of names and documents that claim to confirm historically the existence of Jesus: Josephus, Suetonius, Pliny, Tacitus, Thallus, Mara Bar-Serapion, Lucian, Phlegon, Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus, Origen, Cyprian, and others. Some of these names are church fathers writing in the second to fourth centuries and are therefore too late to be considered reliable first-century confirmation. Being church leaders, their objectivity is also questionable. These facts were not important to us evangelists nor would they cause any red flags to raise in the minds of the average believer reading the average book of Christian "proofs." However, the list does include some nonbelievers - Jewish and Roman writers who were likely not biased towards Christianity - so it would appear that there can be no question about the historical existence of Jesus. Who could possibly doubt it? It is rarely if ever pointed out that none of these evidences date from the time of Jesus. Jesus supposedly lived sometime between 4 BC and 30 AD, but there is not a single contemporary historical mention of Jesus, not by Romans or by Jews, not by behevers or by unbelievers, not during his entire lifetime. This does not disprove his existence, but it certainly casts great doubt on the historicity of a man who was supposedly widely knovm to have made a great impact on the world. Someone should have noticed. One of the writers who was alive during the time of Jesus was Philo Judaeus. John E. Remsburg, in The Christ, writes: "Philo was born before the beginning of the Christian era, and lived until long after the reputed death of Christ. He wrote an account of the Jews covering the entire time that Christ is said to have existed on earth. He was living in or near Jerusalem when Christ's miraculous birth and the Herodian massacre occurred. He was there when Christ made his triumphal entry into Jerusalem. He was there when the crucifixion with its attendant earthquake, supernatural darkness, and resurrection of the dead took placewhen Christ himself rose from the dead, and in the presence of many witnesses ascended into heaven. These marvelous events which must have filled the world with amazement, had they really occurred, were unknown to him. It was Philo who developed the doctrine of the Logos, or Word, and although this Word incarnate dwelt in that very land and in the presence of multitudes revealed himself and demonstrated his divine powers, Philo saw it not." There was a historian named Justus of Tiberius who was a native of Galilee, the homeland of Jesus. He wrote a history covering the time when Christ supposedly lived. This history is now lost, but a ninth-century Christian scholar named Photius had read it and wrote: "He [Justus] makes not the least mention of the appearance of Christ, of what things happened to him, or of the wonderful works that he did." (Photius' Bibliotheca, code 33) Josephus My Dad's birthday present to me when I turned nineteen was a copy of the complete works of Flavius Josephus. When it comes to hard evidence from outside the bible, this is the most common piece of historical documentation offered by Christian apologists. Outside of the New Testament, Josephus presents the only possible confirmation of the Jesus story from the first century. At face value, Josephus appears to be the answer to the Christian apologist's dreams. He was a messianic Jew, not a Christian, so he could not be accused of bias. He did not spend a lot of time or space on his report of Jesus, showing that he was merely reporting facts, not spouting propaganda like the Gospel writers. Although he was born in 37 AD and could not have been a contemporary of Jesus, he lived close enough to the time to be considered a valuable second-hand source. Josephus was a highly respected and much-quoted Roman historian. He died sometime after the year 100. His two major tomes were The Antiquities of the Jews and The Wars of the Jews. Antiquities was written sometime around the year 90 AD. It begins, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," and arduously parallels the Old Testament up to the time when Josephus is able to add equally arduous historical details of Jewish life during the early Roman period. In Book 18, Chapter 3, this paragraph is encountered (Whiston's translation): "Now, there was about this time, Jesus, a wise man, if it be lawful to call him a man, for he was a doer of wonderful works,a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew over to him both many of the Jews, and many of the Gentiles. He was [the] Christ; and when Pilate, at the sug- gestion of the principal men amongst us, had condemned him to the cross, those that loved him at the first did not forsake him, for he appeared to them alive again the third day, as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him; and the tribe of Christians, so named from him, are not extinct at this day." This truly appears to give historical confirmation for the existence of Jesus. But is it authentic? Most scholars, including most fundamentalist scholars, admit that at least some parts of this paragraph cannot be authentic. Many are convinced that the entire paragraph is a forgery, an interpolation inserted by Christians at a later time. There are many reasons for this: The paragraph is absent from early copies of the works ofJosephus. For example, it does not appear in Origen's second-century version ofJosephus, contained in Origen Contra Celsum where Origen fiercely defended Christianity against the heretical views ofCelsus. Origen quoted freely from Josephus to prove his points, but never once used this paragraph, which would have been the ultimate ace up his sleeve. In fact, the Josephus paragraph about Jesus does not appear until the beginning of the fourth century, at the time ofConstantine. Bishop Eusebius, a close ally of emperor Constantine, was instrumental in crystallizing and defining the version of Christianity which was to become orthodox, and he is the first person known to have quoted this paragraph of Josephus. Eusebius said that it was permissible for Christians to tell lies if it furthered the kingdom of God. The fact that the Josephus-Jesus paragraph shows up at this time of history, at a time when interpolations and revisions were quite common, makes the passage quite dubious. Many scholars beheve that Eusebius was the forger. The passage is out of context. In Book 18, which contains the paragraph about Jesus, Josephus starts with the Roman taxation under Cyrenius in 6 AD, talks about various Jewish sects at the time, including the Essenes, and a sect of Judas the Galilean. He discusses Herod's building of various cities, the succession of priests and procurators, and so on. Chapter 3 starts with a sedition against Pilate who planned to slaughter all the Jews but changed his mind. Pilate then used sacred money to supply water to Jerusalem, and the Jews protested. Pilate sent spies into the Jewish ranks with concealed weapons, and there was a great massacre. Then comes the paragraph about Jesus, and immediately after it, Josephus continues: "And about the same time another terrible misfortune confounded the Jews . . ." Josephus, an orthodox Jew, would not have thought the Christian story to be "another terrible misfortune." It is only a Christian (someone like Eusebius) who would have considered this to be a Jewish tragedy. Paragraph 3 can be lifted out of the text with no damage to the chapter. It flows better without it. Josephus would not have called Jesus "the Christ" or "the truth." Whoever wrote these phrases was a Christian. Josephus was a messianic Jew and never converted to Christianity. Origen reported that Josephus was "not believing in Jesus as the Christ." The phrase "to this day" shows that this is a later interpolation. There was no "tribe of Christians" during Josephus's time. Christianity did not get off the ground until the second century. Josephus appears not to know anything else about Jesus outside of this tiny paragraph and a reference to James, the "brother of Jesus" (see below). He is silent about the miracles of Jesus, although he reports the antics of other prophets in great detail. He adds nothing to the Gospel narratives, and says nothing that would not have been known by Christians already, whether in the first or fourth century. In all of Josephus's voluminous works, there is not a single reference to Christianity anywhere outside of this tiny paragraph. He relates much more about John the Baptist than about Jesus. He lists the activities of many other self-proclaimed Messiahs, including Judas ofGalilee, Theudas the magician, and the Egyptian Jew Messiah, but is mute about the life of one whom he claims is the answer to his messianic hopes. The paragraph mentions that the life of Jesus was foretold by the divine prophets, but Josephus neglects to mention who these prophets were or what they said. In no other place does Josephus connect any Hebrew prediction with the life of Jesus. If Jesus truly had been the fulfillment of divine prophecy, Josephus would have been the one learned enough to confirm it. The hyperbolic language is uncharacteristic of a careful historian: " . . . as the divine prophets had foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things concerning him . . ." This sounds more like the stuff of sectarian propaganda. Christians should be careful when they refer to Josephus as historical confirmation for Jesus. It turns around and bites them. If we remove the forged paragraph, the works of Josephus become evidence against historicity. If the life of Jesus was historical, why did Josephus know nothing of it? There is one other passage in the Antiquities that mentions Jesus. It is in Book XX, Chapter 9: "Festus was now dead, and Albinus was put upon the road; so he assembled the sanhedrin of judges, and brought before them the brother of Jesus, who was called Christ, whose name was James, and some others, (or some of his companions). When he had formed an accusation against them as breakers of the law, he delivered them to be stoned . . ." (Whiston's translation) This is flimsy, and even Christian scholars widely consider this to be a doctored text. The stoning of James is not mentioned in Acts. Hegesippus, a Jewish Christian, in 170 AD wrote a history of the church saying that James the brother of Jesus was killed in a riot, not by sentence of a court, and Clement confirms this (quoted by Eusebius). Most scholars agree that Josephus is referring to another James here, possibly the same one that Paul mentions in Acts, who led a sect in Jerusalem. Instead of strengthening Christianity, this "brother of Jesus" interpolation contradicts history. Again, if Josephus truly thought Jesus was "the Christ," he would have added more about him than a casual aside in someone else's story. So it turns out that Josephus is silent about Jesus. If Jesus had truly lived and had accomplished all of the deeds and miracles reported in the Gospels, Josephus should have noticed. Josephus was a native ofJudea, a contemporary of the Apostles. He was Governor of Galilee for a time, the province in which Jesus allegedly lived and taught. "He traversed every part of this province," writes Rernsburg, "and visited the places where but a generation before Christ had performed his prodigies. He resided in Cana, the very city in which Christ is said to have wrought his first miracle. He mentions every noted personage of Palestine and describes every important event which occurred there during the first seventy years of the Christian era. But Christ was of too little consequence and his deeds too trivial to merit a line from this historian's pen." The second century and later after Josephus, there are other writers who mention Christianity, but even if they are reliable, they are too late to claim the confirming impact of a first-century witness. Suetonius wrote a biography called Twelve Caesars around the year 112 AD, mentioning that Claudius "banished the Jews from Rome, since they had made a commotion because ofChrestus," and that during the time of Nero "punishments were also inflicted on the Christians, a sect professing a new and mischievous religious belief. . ." Notice that there is no mention of Jesus by name. It is unlikely that Christianity had spread as far as Rome during the reign of Claudius, or that it was large enough to have caused a revolt. "Chrestus" does not mean "Christ." It was a common name meaning "good," used by both slaves and free people, and occurring more than eighty times in Latin inscriptions. Even if Suetonius truly meant "Christus" (Christ), he may have been referring only to the Jews in Rome who were expecting a Messiah, not to Jesus of Nazareth. It could have been anybody, maybe a Roman Jew who stepped forward. It is only eager believers who will to jump to the conclusion that this provides evidence for Jesus. Nowhere in any of Suetonius's writings did he mention Jesus of Nazareth. Even if he had, his history would not necessarily have been reliable. He reported, for example, that Caesar Augustus bodily rose to heaven when he died, an event that few modern scholars consider historical. In 112 AD, Pliny (the younger) said that "Christians were singing a hymn to Christ as to a god . . ." Again, notice the absence of the name Jesus. This could have referred to any of the other "Christs" who were being followed by Jews who thought they had found a Messiah. Pliny's report hardly counts as history since he is only relaying what other people believed. Even if this sentence referred to a group of followers of Jesus, no one denies that Christianity was in existence at that time. Pliny, at the very most, might be useful in documenting the region, but not the historic Jesus. Sometime after 117 AD, the Roman historian Tacitus wrote in his Annals (Book 15, chapter 44): "Nero looked around for a scapegoat, and inflicted the most fiendish tortures on a group of persons already hated for their crimes. This was the sect known as Christians. Their founder, one Christus, had been put to death by the procurator, Pontius Pilate in the reign of Tiberius. This checked the abominable superstition for a while, but it broke out again and spread, not merely through Judea, where it originated, but even to Rome itself, the great reservoir and collecting ground for every kind of depravity and filth. Those who confessed to being Christians were at once arrested, but on their testimony a great crowd of people were convicted, not so much on the charge of arson, but of hatred of the entire human race." In this passage, Tacitus depicts early Christians as "hated for their crimes" and associated with "depravity and filth," not a flattering picture. But even if it is valid, it tells us nothing about Jesus of Nazareth. Tacitus claims no first-hand knowledge of Christianity. He is merely repeating the then common ideas about Christians. (A modern parallel would be someone reporting that Mormons believe that Joseph Smith was visited by the angel Moroni, which would hardly make it historical proof, even though it is as close as a century away.) There is no other historical confirmation that Nero persecuted Christians. Nero did persecute Jews, and perhaps Tacitus was confused about this. There certainly was not a "great crowd" of Christians in Rome around 60 AD, and the term "Christian" was not in use in the first century. Tacitus is either doctoring history from a distance or repeating a myth without checking his facts. Historians generally agree that Nero did not burn Rome, so Tacitus is in error to suggest that he would have needed a scapegoat in the first place. No one in the second century ever quoted this passage of Tacitus, and in fact it appears almost word-for-word in the writings of someone else, Sulpicius Severus, in the fourth century, where it is mixed in with other myths. The passage is therefore highly suspect and adds virtually no evidence for a historic Jesus. In the ninth century a Byzantine writer named George Syncellus quoted a third-century Christian historian named Julius Africanus who quoted an unknown writer named Thallus who referred to the darkness at the crucifixion: "Thallus in the third book of his history calls this darkness an eclipse of the sun, but in my opinion he is wrong." All of the works of Africanus are lost, so there is no way to confirm the quote or to examine its context. We have no idea who Thallus was, or when he wrote. Eusebius (fourth century) mentions a history of Thallus in three books ending about 112 BC, so the suggestion is that Thallus might have been a near contemporary of Jesus. (Actually, the manuscript is damaged, and "Thallus" is merely a guess from "_allos Samaritanos.") There is no evidence of an eclipse during the time Jesus was supposedly crucified. The reason Africanus doubted the eclipse is because Easter happens near the full moon, and a solar eclipse would have been impossible at that time. There is a fragment of a personal letter from a Syrian named Mara Bar-Serapion to his son in prison, of uncertain date, probably second or third century, that mentions that the Jews of that time had killed their "wise king." However, the New Testament reports that Jesus was killed by the Romans, not the Jews. The Jews had killed other leaders, for example, the Essene Teacher of Righteousness. If this truly is a report of a historical event rather than the passing on of folklore, it could have been a reference to someone else. It is worthless as evidence for Jesus of Nazareth, yet it can be found on the lists of some Christian scholars as proof that Jesus existed. A second-century satiricist named Lurian wrote that the basis for the Christian sect was a "man who was crucified in Palestine," but this is equally worthless as historical evidence. He is merely repeating what Christians believed in the second century. Lucian does not mention Jesus by name. This refer- ence is too late to be considered historical evidence, and since Lucian did not consider himself a historian, neither should we. Bottom of the Barrel. In addition to Josephus, Suetonius, Tacitus, and the others, there is a handful of other so-called evidences and arguments that some Christians put forward. One very silly attempt is the Archko Volume containing supposedly authentic first-hand accounts of Jesus from the early first century, including letters from Pilate to Rome, glowing eye-witness testimony from the shepherds outside Bethlehem who visited the baby Jesus at the manger after being awakened by angels, and so on. Its flowery King-James prose makes entertaining reading, but it is not considered authentic by any scholar, although an occasional Christian has been duped into swallowing it. It was written in the nineteenth century by a traveling salesman who said he translated it from original documents found in the basement of the Vatican, although no such documents have ever been found. Some of the other highly questionable confirmation attempts include Tertullian (197 AD), Phlegon (unimown date), Justin Martyr (about 150 AD), and portions of the Jewish Talmud (second through fifth centuries) that mention Jesus in an attempt to discredit Christianity, supposedly showing that even the enemies of Jesus did not doubt his existence. Though all of these so-called evidences are flimsy, some Christians make a showy point of listing them with little elaboration in their books of apologetics. Ministers can rattle off these "historical confirmations" with little fear that their congregations will take the time to investigate their authenticity. In Evidence That Demands a Verdict, Josh McDowell makes an argument that is common among apologists: "There are now more than 5,300 known Greek manuscripts of the New Testament. Add over 10,000 Latin Vulgate and at least 9,300 other early versions (MSS) and we have more than 24,000 manuscript copies of portions of the New Testament in existence today. No other document of antiquity even begins to approach such numbers and attestation. In comparison, the Iliad by Homer is second with only 643 manuscripts that still survive." This information might cause believers to applaud with smugness, but it misses the point: What does the number of copies have to do with authenticity? If a million copies of this book you are reading are printed, does it make it any more truthful? Are the "historical" facts reported in the Iliad considered reliable? There are currently hundreds of millions of copies of the Koran in existence, in many forms and scores of translations. Does the sheer number of copies make it more reliable than, say, a single inscription on an Egyptian sarcophagus? This argument is a smokescreen. There are no original manuscripts (autographs) of the bible in existence, so we all agree that we are working from copies. Critics might agree that the current translations of the bible are based on a reasonably accurate transcription of an early form of the New Testament, but what does this have to do with authenticity, reliability, or truthfulness? Another argument made by McDowell and others is the close interval of time between the events or original writing and the earliest copies in our possession. Homer wrote the Iliad in 900 BC, but the our earliest copy is from 400 BC - a span of five hundred years. Aristotle wrote in 384-322 BC and the earliest copy dates from 1100 AD a gap of fourteen hundred years. In contrast, the New Testament was written (McDowell says) between 40 and 100 AD, and the earliest copy dates from 125 AD, a time span of twenty-five years. This is important when considering the reliability of the text itself. A shorter interval of time allows for fewer corruptions and variants. But it has no relevance to the reliability of the content. If the New Testament should be considered reliable on this basis, then so should the Book of Mormon, which was supposedly written (copied by Joseph Smith) in 1823 and first published in 1830, a gap of only seven years. In addition to Joseph Smith, there are signed testimonies of eleven witness who claimed to have seen the gold tablets on which the angel Moroni wrote the Book of Mormon. We are much closer in history to the origin of Mormonism than to the origin of Christianity. There are millions of copies of the Book of Mormon and a thriving Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (with millions of members and billions of dollars in assets) to prove its veracity. Though most scholars (pro and con) agree that the current edition of the Book of Mormon is a reliable copy of the 1830 version, few Christian scholars consider it to be reliable history. Not The Gospel Truth. If we stick to the New Testament (we have no choice) how much can we know about the Jesus of history? Although the four Gospels (Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John) have been placed first in the current New Testament, they were not the first books written. The earliest writings about Jesus are those of Paul, who produced his epistles no earlier than the mid 50s. Strangely, Paul mentions very little about the life of the historical Jesus. The Jesus of whom Paul writes is a disembodied, spiritual Christ, speaking from the sky. He never talks about Jesus's parents or the virgin birth or Bethlehem. He never mentions Nazareth, never refers to Jesus as the "Son of man" (as commonly used in the Gospels), avoids recounting a single miracle committed by Jesus, does not fix any historical activities of Jesus in any time or place, makes no reference to any of the twelve apostles by name, omits the trial, and fails to place the crucifixion in a physical location (Jerusalem). Paul rarely quotes Jesus, and this is odd since he used many other devices of persuasion to make his points. There are many places in the teachings of Paul where he could have and should have invoked the Teachings of Jesus, but he ignores them. He contradicts Jesus's teachings on divorce (I Corinthians 7:10) allowing for none while the Gospel Jesus permitted exceptions. Jesus taught a trinitarian baptism ("in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost"), but Paul and his disciples baptized in Jesus's name only, which makes perfect sense if the concept of the trinity was developed later. Paul never claims to have met the pre-resurrected Jesus. In fact, one of the most glaring contradictions of the bible appears in two different accounts of how Paul supposedly met the disembodied Christ for the first time. When Paul was traveling to Damascus one day in order to continue persecuting Christians, he was knocked to the ground and blinded by a great light (struck by lightning?). In both versions of this story, Paul heard the voice of Jesus, but in one account the men who were with Paul heard the voice (Acts 9:7), and in the other his men specifically "heard not the voice" (Acts 22:9). Did Paul's men hear the voice, or didn't they? There have been many ad hoc attempts by apologists to reconcile this contradiction (for example, pretending that the different declensions imply "voice" vs. "sound," or that "hear" means "understand" in one passage - a dishonest lactic employed by some modern translations, such as the popular New International Version), but they are defensive and unsatisfactory. The "silence of Paul" is one of the thorny problems confronting defenders of a historical Jesus. The Christ in Paul's writings is a different character from the Jesus of the Gospels. Paul adds not a speck of historical documentation for the story. Even Paul's supposed confirmation of the resurrection in I Corinthians 15:3-8 contradicts the Gospels when it says that Jesus first was seen of "Cephas [Peter], then of the twelve." The Gospels were written no earlier than 70 AD, most likely during the 90s and later. They all pretend to be biographies of Jesus. No one knows who wrote these books, the names having been added later as a matter of convenience. The writer of Matthew, for example, refers to "Matthew" in the third person. Neither Mark nor Luke appear in any list of the disciples of Jesus, and we have no way of knowing where they got their information. The general scholarly consensus is that Mark was written first (based on an earlier "proto-Mark" now lost) and that the writers of Matthew and Luke borrowed from Mark, adapting and adding to it. Matthew, Mark, and Luke are commonly known as the "synoptic Gospels" since they share much common material. The writer of John appears to have written in isolation, and the Jesus portrayed in his story is a different character. John contains little in common with the other three, and where it does overlap, it is often contradictory. There is very little that can be ascertained from the four Gospels about the historic Jesus. His birthday is unknown. In fact, the year of Jesus's birth cannot be known. The writer of Matthew says Jesus was born "in the days of Herod the king." Herod died in 4 BC. Luke reports that Jesus was born "when Cyrenius [Quirinius] was governor of Syria." Cyrenius became governor of Syria in 6 AD. That is a discrepancy of at least nine years. Luke says Jesus was born during a Roman census, and it is true that there was a census in 6 AD. This would have been when Jesus was at least nine years old, according to Matthew. There is no evidence of any earlier census during the reign of Augustus; Palestine was not part of the Roman Empire until 6 AD. Perhaps Matthew was right, or perhaps Luke was right, but both could not have been right. Matthew reports that Herod slaughtered all the first-born in the land in order to execute Jesus. No historian, contemporary or later, mentions this supposed genocide, an event which should have caught someone's attention. None of the other biblical writers mention it. The genealogies of Jesus present a particularly embarrassing example of why the Gospel writers are not reliable historians. Matthew gives a genealogy of Jesus consisting of twenty-eight names from David down to Joseph. Luke gives a reverse genealogy of Jesus consisting of forty-three names from Joseph back to David. They each purport to prove that Jesus is of royal blood, though neither of them explains why Joseph's genealogy is relevant if he was not Jesus's father: Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary and the Holy Ghost. Matthew's line goes from David's son Solomon, while Luke's goes from David's son Nathan. The two genealogies could not have been for the same person. Matthew's line is like this: David, Solomon, eleven other names, Josiah, Jechoniah, Shealtiel, Zerubbabel, Abiud, six other names, Matthan, Jacob, and Joseph. Luke's line is like this: David, Nathan, seventeen other names (none identical to Matthew's list), Melchi, Neri, Shealtiel, Zerubbabel, Rhesa, fifteen other names (none identical to Matthew's list), Matthat, Heli, and Joseph. Some defenders of Christianity assert that this is not contradictory at all because Matthew's line is through Joseph and Luke's line is through Mary, even though a simple glance at the text shows that they both name Joseph. No problem, say the apologists: Luke named Joseph, but he really meant Mary. Since Joseph was the legal parent of Jesus, and since Jewish genealogies are patrilineal, it makes perfect sense to say that Heli (their choice for Mary's father) had a son named Joseph who had a son named Jesus. Believe it or not, many Christians can make these statements with a straight face. In any event, they will not find a shred of evidence to support such a notion. However, there is a more serious problem to this argument: the two genealogies intersect. Notice that besides starting with David and ending with Joseph, the lines share two names in common: Shealtiel and Zerubbabel, both commonly known from the period of the Babylonian captivity. If Matthew and Luke present two distinct parental genealogies, as the apologists assert, there should be no intersection. In a last-ditch defense, some very creative apologists have hypothesized that Shealtiel's grandmother could have had two husbands and that her sons Jechoniah and Neri represent two distinct paternal lines, but this is painfully speculative. The two genealogies are widely different in length. One would have to suppose that something in Nathan's genes caused the men to sire sons fifty percent faster than the men in Solomon's line. Matthew's line omits four names from the genealogy given in the Old Testament (between Joram and Jotham), and this makes sense when you notice that Matthew is trying to force his list into three neat groups of fourteen names each. (Seven is the Hebrew's most sacred number.) He leaves out exactly the right number of names to make it fit. Some have argued that it was common to skip generations and that this does not make it incorrect. A great-great grandfather is just as much an ancestor as a grandfather. This might be true, except that Matthew explicitly reports that it was exactly fourteen generations: "So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations; and from David until the carrying away into Babylon are fourteen generations; and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations." (Matthew 1:17) Matthew is caught tinkering with the facts. His reliability as a historian is severely crippled. Another problem is that Luke's genealogy of Jesus goes through Nathan, which was not the royal line. Nor could Matthew's line be royal after Jeconiah because the divine prophecy says of Jeconiah that "no man of his seed shall prosper sitting upon the throne of David, and riding any more in Judah." (Jeremiah 22:30) Even if Luke's line is truly through Mary, Luke reports that Mary was a cousin to Elizabeth, who was of the tribe of Levi, not the royal line. (Some Christians desperately suggest that the word "cousin" might allowably be translated "countrywoman," just as believers might call each other "brother" or "sister," but this is ad hoc.) Since Jesus was not the son of Joseph, and since Jesus himself appears to deny his Davidic ancestry (Matthew 22:41-46), the whole genealogy is pointless. Instead of rooting Jesus in history, it provides critics with an open window on the myth-making process. The Gospel writers wanted to make of their hero nothing less than what was claimed of saviors of other religions: a king born of a virgin. The earliest Gospel written was Mark. Matthew and Luke based their stories on Mark, editing according to their own purposes. All scholars agree that the last twelve verses of Mark, in modern translations, are highly dubious. Most agree that they do not belong in the bible. The earliest ancient documents of Mark end right after the women find the empty tomb. This means that in the first biography, on which the others based their reports, there is no post-resurrection appearance or ascension of Jesus. Noticing the problem, a Christian scribe at a much later time inserted verses 9-20. The Gospel accounts cannot be considered historical, but even if they were, they tell us that the earliest biography of Jesus contains no resurrection! They tell us that the Gospels were edited, adapted, altered, and appended at later times in order to make them fit the particular sectarian theology of the writers. The Gospels themselves are admittedly propagandistic: "And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book: But these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name." (John 20:30-31) This hardly sounds like the stuff of objective historical reporting. This verse sends up a red flag that what we are reading should be taken with a very large grain of salt. How did the myth originate? If Jesus is a fable, how did the story originate? How did there come to be a worldwide following of billions of Christians spanning two millennia if the story is not true? An idea does not need to be true in order to be believed, and the same could be asked about any other myth: Santa Claus, William Tell, or Zeus. Nevertheless, it is not an unfair challenge to ask skeptics to suggest an alternative to historicity. There are a number of plausible explanations for a natural origin of the Jesus myth, none of which can be proved with certainty. Unbelievers are not in agreement, nor need they be. Some skeptics think that Jesus never existed at all and that the myth came into being through a literary process. Others deny that the Jesus character portrayed in the New Testament existed, but feel that there could have been a first-century personality after whom the exaggerated myth was patterned. Still others believe that Jesus did exist, and that some parts of the New Testament are accurate, although the miracles and the claim to deity are due to later editing of the original story. Yet still others claim that the New Testament is basically true in all of its accounts except that there are natural explanations for the miracle stories. It is not just atheists who possess these views. Many liberal Christians, such as Paul Tillich, have "de-mythologized" the New Testament. None of these views can be proved, any more than the orthodox position can be proved. What they demonstrate is that since there do exist plausible natural alternatives, it is irrational to jump to a supernatural conclusion. One of the views, held by J. M. Robertson and others, is that the Jesus myth was patterned after a story found in the Jewish Talmudic literature about the illegitimate son of a woman named Miriam (Mary) and a Roman soldier named Pandera, sometimes called Joseph Pandera. In Christianity and Mythology, Robertson writes: ". . . we see cause to suspect that the move- ment really originated with the Talmudic Jesus Ben Pandera, who was stoned to death and hanged on a tree, for blasphemy or heresy, on the eve of a Passover in the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (B.C. 106-79). Dr. Low, an accomplished Hebraist, is satisfied that this Jesus was the founder of the Essene sect, whose resemblances to the legendary early Christians have so greatly exercised Christian speculation." Another view is that the Jesus myth grew out of a pre-Christian cult of Joshua. Some suggest that the New Testament story about swapping Jesus for Barabbas (meaning "son of the father") arose from the tension between two different Joshua factions. Origen mentioned a "Jesus Barabbas." The name "Jesus" is the Greek for Joshua ("Yeshua" in Hebrew). In Mark 9:38 the disciples of Jesus saw another man who was casting out devils in the name of Jesus (Joshua). The Sibyllene Oracles identify Jesus with Joshua, regarding the sun standing still. Other scholars suggest that the Jesus story is simply a fanciful patchwork of pieces borrowed from other religions. Pagan mythical parallels can be found for almost every item in the New Testament: the Last Supper, Peter's denial, Pilate's wife's dream, the crown of thorns, the vinegar and gall at the crucifixion, the mocking inscription over the cross, the Passion, the trial, Pilate's washing of hands, the carrying of the cross, the talk between the two thieves hanging beside Jesus, and so on. There were many crucified sun gods before Jesus. There was the crucifixion of Antigonus, the "King of the Jews," and Cyrus, a Messianic figure. Prometheus and Heracles wear mock crowns, and in some versions of the story, Prometheus is executed by crucifixion. Babylonian prisoners dressed as kings for five days, then they were stripped, scourged, and crucified. Attis was a self-castrated god-man who was born of a virgin, worshipped between March 22 and 27 (vernal equinox), and hanged on a cut pine tree. He escaped, fled, descended into a cave, died, rose again, and was later called "Father God." Dionysus was a savior sacrifice who descended into hell. There is the story about Simon the Cyrenian sun God who carried pillars to his death. (Compare with Simon the Cyrene who carried the cross of Jesus in the New Testament.) Before Jesus there were many ascension myths: Enoch, Elijah, Krishna, Adonis, Heracles, Dionysus, and later Maiy. Mithra was a virgixl-born Persian god. In 307 A.D. (just before Constantine institutionalized Christianity), the Roman emperor officially designated that Mithra was to be the "Protector of the Empire." Historian Barbara Walker records this about Mithra: "Mithra was born on the 25th of December . . . which was finally taken over by Christians in the 4th century as the birthday of Christ. Some say Mithra sprang from an incestuous union between the sun god and his own mother . . .. Some claimed Mithra's mother was a mortal virgin. Others said Mithra had no mother, but was miraculously born of a female Rock, thepetra genetrix, fertilized by the Heavenly Father's phallic lightning. "Mithra's birth was witnessed by shepherds and by Magi who brought gifts to his sacred birth-cave of the Rock. Mithra performed the usual assortment of miracles: raising the dead, healing the sick, making the blind see and the lame walk, casting out devils. As a Peter, son ofthepetra, he carried the keys of the kingdom of heaven . . .. His triumph and ascension to heaven were celebrated at the spring equinox (Easter) . . .. "Before returning to heaven, Mithra celebrated a Last Supper with his twelve disciples, who represented the twelve signs of the zodiac. In memory of this, his worshippers partook of a sacramental meal of bread marked with a cross. This was one of seven Mithraic sacraments, the models for the Christians' seven sacraments. It was called mizdy Latin missa, English mass. Mithra's image was buried in a rock tomb . . .. He was withdrawn from it and said to live again. "Like early Christianity, Mithraism was an ascetic, anti-female religion. Its priesthood consisted of celebate men only. . . . "What began in water would end in fire, according to Mithraic eschatology. The great battle between the forces of light and darkness in the Last Days would destroy the earth with its upheavals and burnings. Virtuous ones . . . would be saved. Sinful ones . . . would be cast into hell . . .. The Christian notion of salvation was almost wholly a product of this Persian eschatology, adopted by Semitic eremites and sun-cultists like the Essenes, and by Roman military men who thought the rigid discipline and vivid battle-imagery of Mithraism appropriate for warriors. "After extensive contact with Mithraism, Christians also began to describe themselves as soldiers for Christ;. . . to celebrate their feasts on Sun-day rather than the Jewish sabbath; . . .. Like Mithraists, Christians practiced baptism to ascend after death through the planetary spheres to the highest heaven, while the wicked (unbaptized) would be dragged down to darkness." (The Woman's Encyclopedia Of Myths And Secrets, pages 663-665) The name "Mary" is common to names given to mothers of other gods: the Syrian Myrrha, the Greek Maia, and the Hindu Maya, all derived from the familiar "Ma" for mother. The phrases "Word of God" and "Lamb of God" are probably connected, due to a misunderstanding of words that are similar in different languages. The Greek word "logos," which means "word" and was used originally by the gnostics, is translated "imerah" in Hebrew; but the word "immera" in Aramaic means "lamb." It is easy to see how some Jews, living at the intersection of so many cultures and languages, could be confused and influenced by so many competing religious ideas. In the fourth century a Christian scholar named Fermicus attempted to establish the uniqueness of Christianity, but he was met at every turn by pagan precedents to the story of Jesus. He is reported to have said: "Habet Diabolus Christos sous!" ("The Devil has his Christs!") W. B. Smith thinks there was a pre-Christian Jesus cult of gnosticism. There is an ancient papyrus which has these words: "I adjure thee by the God of the Hebrews, Jesus." G. A. Wells is one scholar who believes Jesus never existed as a historical person. He, and others, see Jesus as the personification of Old Testament "wisdom." The Dead Sea Scrolls have Essene commentary on the Old Testament wisdom literature, and Wells has found many parallels with the life of Jesus. The book of Proverbs depicts "Wisdom" as having been created by God first, before heaven and earth. Wisdom mediates in creation and leads humans into truth. Wisdom is the governor and sustainer of the universe. Wisdom comes to dwell among men and bestows gifts. Most people reject wisdom and it returns to heaven. Solomon's idea of a just man is one who is persecuted and condemned to a shameful death, but then God gives him eternal life, counting him as one of the "sons of God," giving him a crown, calling him the "servant of the Lord." He is despised and rejected. In The Jesus of History and Myth, R. J. Hoffinan writes: "In sum, musing on the Wisdom and on other Jewish literature could have prompted the earliest Christians to suppose that a preexistent redeemer had suffered crucifixion, the most shameful death of all, before being exalted to God's right hand." Another view is presented by Randall Helms in an article, "Fiction in the Gospels" in Jesus in History and Myth. Helms notices that there are many literary parallels between Old Testament and New Testament stories. He calls this "self-reflexive fiction." It is as if there are some skeletal templates into which the Jews placed their stories. One example is the comparison between the raising of the son of the widow of Nain in Luke 7:11-16 and the raising of the son of a widow of Zarephath in I Kings 17. Not only is the content similar, but the structure of the tale is almost identical. Other examples are the storm stories in Psalms and Jonah compared with the New Testament storm story in Mark 4:37-41, and the story of Elijah's food multi- plication with that of Jesus. The first-century Jews were simply rewriting old stories, like a movie remake. This view, in and of itself, does not completely account for the entire Jesus myth, but it does show how literary parallels can play a part in the elaboration of a fable. John Allegro suggested that the Jesus character was patterned after the Essene Teacher of Righteousness, who was crucified in 88 BC. He wrote that the Dead Sea Scrolls prove that the Essenes interpreted the Old Testament in a way to make them fit their own Messiah. Allegro writes: "When Josephus speaks of the Essences reverence for their 'Lawgiver' . . . we may assume reasonably that he speaks of their Teacher, the 'Joshua/Jesus' of the Last Days. By the first century, therefore, it seems that he was being accorded semi-divine status, and that his role of Messiah, or Christ, was fully appreciated." (The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Christian Myth) An example of one of the many naturalistic attempts to explain the miracles is the "swoon theory," found in The Passover Plot by Dr. Hugh J. Schonfield. This is the idea that the resurrection story is basically historically accurate but that Jesus merely fainted, and was presumed to be dead, coming back to consciousness later. Some of these explanations turn out to bejust as difficult to believe as the miracle reports themselves, in my opinion; but they are, nevertheless, viable hypotheses that show that even if the docu- ments are entirely reliable, the story itself can be explained in other ways. If it is possible for part of a story to be misunderstood or exaggerated, then why not the whole thing? Prudent history demands that until all natural explanations for the origin of an outrageous tale are completely ruled out, it is irresponsible to hold to the literal, historical truth of what appears to be just another myth. Are the miracles historical? During a debate at the University of Northern Iowa, I asked my opponent, "Do you believe that a donkey spoke human language?" "Yes, I do," he responded. "Yesterday, I visited the zoo," I continued, "and a donkey spoke to me in perfect Spanish, saying, "A'la es el unico Dios uerdadero" Do you believe that?" "No, I don't," he answered without hesitation. "How can you be so quick to doubt my story and yet criticize me for being skeptical of yours?" "Because I believe what Jesus tells me, not what you tell me." In other words, miracles are true if the bible says so, but they are not true if they appear in any other source. When questioning the miracle reports of the New Testament, this become circular reasoning. The presence of miracle stories in the New Testament makes the legend highly suspect. But it is important to understand what skeptics are saying about miracles. Skeptics do not say that the miracle reports should be automatically dismissed, a priori. After all, there might be future explanations for the stories, perhaps something that we yet do not understand about nature. What skeptics say is that if a miracle is defined as some kind of violation, suspension, overriding, or punctuation of natural law, then miracles cannot be historical. Of all of the legitimate sciences, history is the weakest. History, at best, produces only an approximation of truth. In order for history to have any strength at all, it must adhere to a very strict assumption: that natural law is regular over time. Without the assumption of natural regularity, no history can be done. There would be no criteria for discarding fantastic stories. Everything that has ever been recorded would have to be taken as literal truth. Therefore, if a miracle did happen, it would pull the rug out from history. The very basis of the historical method would have to be discarded. You can have miracles, or you can have history, but you can't have both. However, if a miracle is defined as a "highly unlikely" or "wonderful," event, then it is fair game for history, but with an important caveat: outrageous claims require outrageous proof. A skeptic who does allow for the remote possibility of accurate miracle reporting in the Gospels nevertheless must relegate it to a very low probability. Since the New Testament contains numerous stories of events that are either outrageous (such as the resurrection of thousands of dead bodies on Good Friday) or impossible, the story must be considered more mythical than historical. Conclusion Either in ignorance or in defiance of scholarship, preachers such as tel-evangelists continue to rattle off the list of Christian "evidences," but most bible scholars, including most non-fundamentalist Christians, admit that the documentation is very weak. In The Quest of the Historical Jesus, Albert Schweitzer, wrote: "There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the life of Jesus. . . . The historical Jesus will be to our time a stranger and an enigma . . ." To sum up: There is no external historical confirmation for the Jesus story outside of the New Testament. The New Testament accounts are internally contradictory. There are many other plausible explanations for the origin of the myth which do not require us to distort or destroy the natural world view...Taking all of this into account, it is rational to conclude that the New Testament Jesus is a myth. One would think that these things would be 'sobering' to those Christians who attack us calling us Heathen Idol carvers--but in too many cases it is not sobering to them at all... At leaast We understand what Shrila Prabhupada states about Lord Jesus. Can we really estimate and seperate the influence of all the Kali Yuga transformations of this noted Tradition? They need to take a look at the way the Teachings were before the First Council convened at Nicea. It is interesting to speculate that the first Pope and the Roman Dictator Constantine II may well be the Anti-Christ and False Prophet spoken of in the book of Revelation. It has even been speculated [by the church!!] that the Anti-Christ of Revelation was Ceaser Nero--based on a mathamatical interpretation of 666 and 777. Really--It is all Stinks of Endless Paths to Maya! Look at Ireland--last night in the A&E Program we learned that they were very resistant to the conversion--then there was So-called St. Patrick--who Converted the Druid Priests into 'monks'. Now what has been the Situation on that wonderfull Island? All the Protestant and Catholic Violence... Then there were the Pagans from "Saxony" or "Germany" as we call it today... For Sure--there is much to History and especially the Kali Yuga Twists... Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Mark: You were seeking a Gathering in Montana--here is a contact Number: MONTANA: Bozeman Laura Marino, 406-586-1699 If you like you can contact this Devotee and find out the particular Schedual. Your Servant, Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear "Village Idiot": >>>How much Swamijiraja was worth, $2Billion? Where do you get this "Swamijraja" from? Why are you even discussing this? Why are you here? What are you doing for Krishna? What are you doing for your liberation? Sso many things to be concerned with--yet you pick what instead? Please start Chanting Hare Krishna Hare Krishna Krishna Krishna Hare Hare Hare Rama Hare Rama Rama Rama Hare Hare so you can understand and be happy. Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear jijaji: Clear and to the point. You are correct--they have their Place these Teachers yet I do not Encourage People to become involved in any Chopra, Programs--as they are a Commercial Mayavadisim as is the Movement of his Original mentor--"maharishi whatever Yogi". One thing is that these programs can be a Spring Board for Sincere Souls. His "Mantra" Program is totally Mental Concocton--"Primordial Sound"--Gheesh! Yet as you very aptly pointed out he has his place... Your Servant, Bhakta don ps: The Mahamantra--that is where its at!

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear jijaji: Clear and to the point. You are correct--they have their Place these Teachers yet I do not Encourage People to become involved in any Chopra, Programs--as they are a Commercial Mayavadisim as is the Movement of his Original mentor--"maharishi whatever Yogi". One thing is that these programs can be a Spring Board for Sincere Souls. His "Mantra" Program is totally Mental Concocton--"Primordial Sound"--Gheesh! Yet as you very aptly pointed out he has his place... Your Servant, Bhakta don ps: The Mahamantra--that is where its at!

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Tarun: If you think that Imagine has 'Trancended' Gita--you really are an id... Bhakta don [This message has been edited by Bhakta Don Muntean (edited 12-15-2001).]

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada This is foolish! Junor Member may be a detractor? How long you been a member? Where would you get a crazy idea like that? Please be serious about this human life you have got. Bhakta don

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Brothers and Sisters: Here is an excellent paper on the Taliban... The Foreign Policy of the Taliban by Dr. William Maley Winston Churchill once observed that the people of Germany had done enough for the history of the world. A similar observation could appropriately have been made about the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The shattering events of a bright September morning in New York and Washington DC highlighted even for those who had never heard of the Taliban that something dreadful was at loose in the world. For those who had followed the rise of the Taliban, and the flourishing under their protection of networks such as Usama Bin Laden's Al-Qaida, there was in most cases a deeper poignancy: the sense of having been unable to avert a slide to disaster. For in both the constitution of the Taliban, and the detail of their foreign policy, the warning signs were written in prominent script. It is with these signs that this study is concerned. For movements which ground their legitimacy on claims of transcendent universality, the notion of 'foreign policy' is in some ways a curious one. It implies a degree of accommodation with a world in which the fruits of universal good have yet to be exploited. When Stalin put forward the policy of 'Socialism in One Country' in 1924, it came as a shock to a number of his Bolshevik colleagues, for whom Marxism had provided a 'scientific' demonstration of the marginality of national identifications in a world in which the great boundary between peoples was set by class.[1] In the realm of religion, such compromises could be equally controversial. When the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 put an end to the hopes of an undivided Christendom, the Pope responded by labeling it 'null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, and devoid of meaning for all time'.[2] Yet on closer scrutiny, the fact that transcendent movements should also pursue foreign policies is not quite so strange. Religious movements are fashioned from what Kant called 'the crooked timber of humanity'[3], and as a result they are bearers of particularity as well as universality. It is rarely illuminating to speak of 'civilizations' as political entities, although shared cultural norms and values may provide a certain amount of context within which political actors function. It is even less illuminating to treat religions as monolithic determinants of political behavior. This is true of Christianity, and it is also true of Islam. As James P. Piscatori has observed, 'the seamless unity of dar al-islam has been as great a legal fiction as the bifurcation of the world into hostile camps'.[4] And few Islamic movements have demonstrated this as potently as the Taliban in Afghanistan. The aim of this study is to explore the challenges which the Taliban faced in coming to terms with the wider world, particularly in the period after they occupied the Afghan capital Kabul following the retreat of the Rabbani Government in September 1996 and began to claim for themselves a status defined not simply by Islam, but by the structures of international society which had developed in the aftermath of the establishment in 1945 of the United Nations as an organization of sovereign states. It is divided into seven sections. In the first, I discuss some general problems in analyzing foreign policy. In the second, I give a brief account of the contexts within which Afghan foreign policy has historically been devised. In the third, I note some of the specific characteristics of the Taliban movement. The fourth deals with the Taliban's broad international objectives, and traces the relationship of these objectives to concerns to achieve regime consolidation. The fifth examines the tensions between developing international norms of conduct, and Taliban domestic policies, which thwarted Taliban efforts to secure widespread acceptance. The sixth addresses Taliban policy towards a number of important states. The seventh deals with the radicalisation of the Taliban, and the circumstances which led to the September 2001 crisis in the Taliban's relations with the wider world, and offers some recommendations for U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and its region. I 'The Taliban', Olivier Roy has argued, 'have no foreign policy'.[5] If foreign policy is viewed in purely programmatic terms this is certainly the case, but the proposition does not hold if one accepts that behavior offers a window through which policy orientations can be discerned. Those who write about foreign policy usually direct their attention to the foreign policy of states, and this considerably reduces the complexity of the task which they confront. It is commonly the case that within states one can find bureaucratic agencies charged with the task of producing programmatic documents dealing with the relations of their state with the wider world. However, such documents can at best be a starting point for serious foreign policy analysis, since the discrepancies between 'declared' policy and steps actually taken by a state can be massive. For a more nuanced account, one will need to examine the behavior of the state, in the hope of finding patterns of action from which a disposition to act in particular ways might be inferred.[6] That said, two qualifications are in order. First, the distinction between statements and 'behavior' should not be drawn too sharply, since some types of statement are also actions[7] -or as a shrewd diplomat once put it, 'words are bullets'. Second, it is by no means the case that all states will be capable of articulating or enacting a 'policy' sufficiently coherent to merit the title. Different bureaucratic agencies may be free to pursue their own agendas, free from the discipline imposed by a superordinate authority, in which case discerning a clear foreign policy line may be very difficult indeed. Similar challenges can arise when one discusses the foreign policy of movements. In part this reflects the diversity of the phenomena which such a label can embrace. At its most basic the word 'movement' may simply be a synonym for 'party'. This usage is well established in Persian, where the Arabic word Harakat ('movement') has been used to designate organisations which might just as easily have carried the Arabic label Hezb ('party'). Movements in this sense may well produce programmatic documents on foreign policy issues, and if they are oppositional movements with no access to state power, these may provide the only basis upon which their foreign policies can be identified and evaluated. Unfortunately, matters become a good deal messier when 'movement' means more than just 'party'. This is partly because at this point, the exact meaning of 'social movement' proves hard to pin down: Paul Wilkinson has rightly pointed to the 'diversity and confusion of conceptualizations' of the term.[8] For the purposes of this study of the Taliban movement, I take as a starting point the definition of movement offered by Sidney Tarrow: movements are 'collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities'.[9] But even once such a precise definition of 'movement' is accepted, movements which are captured by the definition are likely to prove so inchoate that to depict them as authors of 'policy' (of any kind) is to speak metaphorically rather than empirically. This problem has been neatly captured by Tarrow: 'Internally, a good part of the power of movements comes from the fact that they activate people over whom they have no control. This power is a virtue because it allows movements to mount collective actions without possessing the resources that would be necessary to internalize a support base. But the autonomy of their supporters also disperses the movement's power, encourages factionalism and leaves it open to defection, competition and repression'.[10] This is not to deny that movements typically have leaders whose utterances can be analyzed. But they are likely also to contain a large number of undisciplined followers-some of them potential leaders-who offer their views freely on a wide range of topics, including foreign policy. The low level of institutionalization of movements can make it very difficult to tell into which category some particular 'spokesman' falls. It is extremely rare for consolidated, highly institutionalized states to be successfully taken over by movements of this variety. A crisis in the legitimacy of a ruling elite is likely to lead to its displacement by some counter-elite, such as the military through a coup d'état, or some defecting fragment of the old elite. Where the institutions of the state have crumbled or collapsed,[11] the situation is quite different. In such circumstances, political dominance will be claimed by those who can control the symbols of the state: they need not be capable of administering complex state institutions with complex roles, for such institutions have effectively ceased to exist. In the short-to-medium term, movements which find themselves in this position are unlikely to be able to take more than symbolic steps in domestic politics, for they lack the instruments to do so, most importantly revenues, and bureaucracies to collect and spend them. In the sphere of foreign policy, it is easier to make a mark, since much can be done with words alone. However, which words matter may again be difficult to determine, for two reasons. First, a movement may not control all the symbols of the state, but only some: its foreign policy pronouncements may be contested by other political forces. Second, within the movement, too many words may flow from too many mouths, creating a cacophony of signals which defy ready interpretation by the wider world. Both these problems confronted the Taliban after they overran Kabul. One final point. Since the foreign policy of a state is made up of a complex mixture of declarations and actions, the boundaries of foreign policy are not fixed: they are flexible and contestable, involving interaction with a wider world and feedback from it. While a regime may protest that what occurs within its frontiers is a matter of sovereign responsibility and no business of other states, to the extent that those states make it their business, it becomes a foreign policy problem for the regime. And to a far greater extent than the Taliban seem to have anticipated, their domestic policies played a significant role in shaping their foreign policy dilemmas. Those Taliban charged with attempting to present an acceptable face to the wider world rapidly found themselves entangled in a particularly awkward two-level game.[12] II Viscount Palmerston's nostrum that there are no eternal allies, only eternal interests, serves as a useful reminder that the foreign policy moves of the Taliban are to some extent the product of context. In the following remarks, I wish to identify some of the constraints which the Taliban faced as a result of Afghanistan's geopolitical position, and the attitudinal legacies in both Afghanistan and its region which continue to limit the freedom of action of Afghan policy makers. What is now the state of Afghanistan emerged in the nineteenth century as a landlocked buffer between the Russian Empire and British India, dominated in the last two decades of the century by the British-backed Mohammadzai Pushtun Amir Abdul Rahman Khan,[13] and ruled almost uninterruptedly thereafter by Mohammadzai Pushtun dynasties until the communist coup of April 1978. The desire to avoid domination by its immediate neighbors prompted a search at different times for friendship and support from more remote 'countervailing powers'-including pre-war Germany, and the postwar United States[14]-in order to reinforce a stated policy of 'neutrality' (bi tarafi).[15] And its landlocked character has helped shape Afghan foreign policy ever since. The most dramatic manifestation of this surfaced during the so-called 'Pushtunistan dispute', a territorial conflict which arose, following the partition of India, from Afghanistan's refusal to accept the 1893 'Durand Line' as an international border separating ethnic Pushtuns in Afghanistan from ethnic Pushtuns in the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan.[16] When diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were suspended between September 1961 and May 1963, Afghanistan's foreign trade was hard hit as well, and laborious maneuverings were required to secure the export of perishable commodities via India and the USSR. Indeed, the economic costs to Afghanistan of its isolation undoubtedly played a role in the resignation in March 1963 of Prime Minister Daoud, who had been a leading figure agitating on the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan's geopolitical vulnerability was plain for all to see. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 exposed another kind of geopolitical dilemma which Afghanistan faced, as a victim of deteriorating relations between the superpowers. In the United States, President Carter took the lead in construing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a possible 'stepping stone' towards the oil resources of the Persian Gulf,[17] but the subsequent release of Soviet archival material has not lent support to this interpretation.[18] Rather, reported comments in January 1998 of Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, to the effect that the Carter Administration approved support for anti-communist groups before the invasion in order to 'increase the probability' of a Soviet plunge into what would become a quagmire,[19] suggest that the Afghans may have fallen victim to Washington's perception that Afghanistan was simply a pawn on a geopolitical chessboard. It is by now a commonplace proposition that post-communist Afghanistan has been destabilized by the self-interested meddling of its self-styled 'friends', but it seems that this is not as novel a development as one might have thought. The disintegration of the Soviet Union extracted Afghanistan from one set of geopolitical complexities but enmeshed it in another. In developmental terms, Soviet Central Asia had long been treated as a backwater, both by Moscow and by the wider world. Corrupted local cliques enjoyed considerable power, especially in Uzbekistan,[20] but played no significant role in shaping Soviet foreign policy. As a result of the chain of events which followed the failed coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991, the Central Asian Republics found themselves thrust into independent statehood after a mere four months. While the exact scope of this 'independence' was debatable, given the continued military presence of Russian troops through the mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the post-independence leaderships were faced with the problem of finding ways of securing their own positions, and with the need to address issues which previously had not fallen within their purview, such as the management of foreign political and economic relations.[21] While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan abut the Caspian Sea, in economic terms all five new states face problems of isolation similar to those which afflict landlocked Afghanistan. They control very significant energy resources, but require outlets for these resources if they are to be able to secure rentier income of the kind which could both detach them from the domination of their Russian neighbor, and secure social-eudæmonic legitimation for ruling elites. Afghanistan straddles a major route for the transport of energy resources to viable markets, and this has thrust Afghanistan into the vortex of international oil and gas politics, in a way which would have been unthinkable had the USSR not collapsed. Finally, it is important to note that Afghanistan is also positioned between two other troubled regions, South Asia to its east, and the Middle East to its west. The poisonous character of relations between India and Pakistan-two nuclear-weapons states themselves exposed to significant domestic strains[22]-has prompted Pakistan to look to Afghanistan as a source for the strategic depth which Pakistan lacks.[23] This has made Afghanistan a secondary theatre in which Indo-Pakistani rivalry has been played out. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the antagonism between the Shiite rulers of Iran and the conservative Sunni elite in Saudi Arabia has also been played out to some extent in Afghanistan, although in different ways at different times.[24] All in all, from a geopolitical point of view Afghanistan could hardly be in a worse position. Afghan foreign policy is also significantly affected by attitudes prevalent amongst its neighbors as a result of events in recent decades. In Russia, on the one hand, the recollection of the disaster which its 1979 invasion became is so strong that fear of further contamination spreading from present-day Afghanistan into the Russian-protected states of Central Asia is potent in Moscow. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the memory of the Pushtunistan dispute has haunted Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan's role as a 'frontline state' during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, during which its Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) sought to promote what it saw as pro-Pakistan Pushtun elements within the Afghan resistance,[25] has left a dangerous legacy, most markedly in 'the extent to which Pakistan's military establishment has been transfixed by the conviction that in some obscure manner Pakistan's role in aiding the victory of the Mujahideen over Moscow's placemen has earned Islamabad the right to decide who should or should not rule in Kabul'.[26] The Taliban have been the most recent beneficiaries of such Pakistani 'generosity'. III Who, then, are the Taliban? The answer to this question is not straightforward: supporters paint them as simply a collection of innocent students on a mission of purification, while opponents depict them as at best, agents of the Pakistani ISI, and at worst, Pakistani officers disguised as Afghans. Unfortunately, while neither of these extremes properly captures the complexity of the movement, for reasons of space the following remarks can only go a little further in exposing these complexities.[27] The figure of the talib, or religious student, has been a familiar one for centuries in the region of the Frontier, and during the 1980s, talibs were involved in combat against Soviet forces, often under the direction of mullahs affiliated with the Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami Afghanistan, a largely Pushtun party led by Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. The Taliban movement, on the other hand, emerged as an organized military force only in 1994, and with substantial backing from the Pakistani Interior Minister, General Naseerullah Babar. In securing a foothold in Afghanistan, the Taliban were able to draw on massive disaffection in the Kandahar area with the local Mujahideen rulers, who in the period following the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul in April 1992 had not won distinction for either honesty or competence. Pakistan played a key role in turning the Taliban into a functioning military force through the provision of training, logistical support, and equipment,[28] and this was one factor which enabled them to seize the western city of Herat in September 1995, and then the ultimate prize, Kabul, in September 1996. The scale of Pakistan's involvement was documented in a June 2001 report by Human Rights Watch: "Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting, Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and on several occasions apparently directly providing combat support."[29] The most revered figure in the Taliban movement is an ethnic Pushtun named Mohammad Omar, identified by the traditional title Amir al-Momineen ('Lord of the Believers'). His base is Kandahar, also the base of the ruling shura (council) of the Taliban movement, a body heavily dominated by Durrani Pushtuns. Indeed, the entire movement is Pushtun-dominated, with only a nominal presence from deracinated members of other ethnic groups. The Taliban leaders preach a fundamentalist form of Islam derived from the Deobandi tradition which originated at the famous Dar ul-Ulum Deoband in British India.[30] In the hands of at least some of the Afghan 'Deobandi' ulema, however, the tradition was distinctively influenced by Pushtun tribal values, and it again received a distinctive twist when Afghan refugees were inducted into Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan run by a Pakistani political party, the Jamiat-e Ulema-i Islam. As a result, the 'Islam' of the Taliban is neither endorsed by the contemporary Deobandi sheikhs,[31] nor a reflection of the pragmatic traditions of normal Afghan village life, which few of the young talibs ever experienced. This helps explain how these Taliban could engage in activities which would be unthinkable in normal circumstances in Afghanistan, such as the beating of women in the street; in this respect there are few precedents in Afghanistan's history for such a movement, and only a few elsewhere, including perhaps the Boxer Movement in turn-of-the-century China, and later the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, which reflected a similar mixture of social alienation and ideologization. While the Taliban have sometimes been labeled 'ultra-conservative', there is a radical dimension to the enterprise of their more religiously-inclined elements, since what they wish to 'conserve' is more an imagined community, governed by the Shariah alone, rather than a community with any actual referent in recent Afghan history. Apart from its Kandahar-based leadership, and its youthful shock-troops, the Taliban movement has drawn on three other important elements. First, as it moved through Afghanistan, it opened its doors to a wide range of ethnic Pushtuns who 'reflagged' themselves as Taliban, either for reasons of prudence, as seems to have been the case with assorted local rulers in the south of the country, or for reasons of ethnic solidarity, as occurred when various Pushtun communities in the north, descendants of settlers despatched to the north by Abdul Rahman Khan in the late nineteenth century,[32] rallied to the Taliban during the 1997 and 1998 pushes into northern Afghanistan. Second, it contains a significant number of former members of the Khalq ('Masses') faction of the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. These made their way into the Taliban by a somewhat circuitous route: in March 1990, the Khalqi Defense Minister in the Soviet-backed regime of President Najibullah, General Shahnawaz Tanai, had mounted a factional revolt against the regime. While this enjoyed the support of Pakistan's ISI, it failed, and Tanai and many of his supporters fled to Pakistan. It was from this group that the Taliban derived some of their key military capacities.[33] While a number of Khalqis were purged from Taliban ranks in a 1998 crackdown, others remained. The presence of such figures in the Taliban's ranks did much to fuel the suspicion that they were agents of Pakistani interests. Third, it has made use of Arab combatants from Saudi extremist Usama Bin Laden's 055 Brigade, who together with disaffected Muslim militants from other parts of the world had gravitated to areas of Afghanistan under Taliban control[34]-a development which the UN envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, in July 1999 described as an 'extremely dangerous' development.[35] While the exact process of Taliban decision making remains quite extraordinarily mysterious, not least because leaders such as Mullah Omar are uncomfortable with foreigners and avoid meeting them, it is clear that the Taliban lack competent bureaucratic support and sophisticated, highly-educated cadres. As a result, they have little understanding of the evolved practices of modern diplomacy; virtually no comprehension of the politics of states outside the Muslim world; and a limited capacity to develop and maintain a consistent stance when dealing with their interlocutors, something which prompted one observer to compare negotiating with the Taliban to 'grasping smoke'.[36] One doubts that in the crisis of September 2001 they have had much inkling of what could befall them. The Taliban have not produced any comprehensive foreign policy manifesto; and foreign policy attitudes and initiatives are often to be detected only from radio broadcasts, or from letters sent to international agencies such as the UN. To speak of a Taliban 'foreign policy establishment' would imply an absurdly greater degree of organizational coherence than the movement manifests. Nonetheless, a number of individuals have played a role in articulating what might broadly be regarded as 'foreign policy concerns'. Mullah Omar has on occasion expressed views on foreign policy issues; various officials held the position of 'Acting Foreign Minister', notably Mullah Mohammad Ghaus and Mullah Haji Mohammad Hassan; and eventually Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil was appointed 'Foreign Minister' and represented a point of contact for foreign officials visiting Afghanistan, although it rapidly became clear that he lacked any power of his own. In addition, foreign policy statements were on occasion issued by those Taliban despatched to New York to seek the Afghanistan seat in the UN General Assembly, a prize which eluded them, and by Taliban-appointed Ambassadors in Pakistan, one of only three statesfrom which the Taliban received diplomatic recognition. [37] IV The first broad foreign policy objective of the Taliban was to win acceptance as a government. Yet the issue of recognition proved one of the most frustrating with which the Taliban had to cope.In order to explain the nature of the Taliban's problem, it is necessary to go into rather more detail about the nature of recognition, and about the events which accompanied the Taliban's occupation of Kabul. Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state that the recognized body possesses international legal personality and the rights and privileges which flow from it, or is the exclusive representative of a body with international legal personality. The decision to grant or not to grant recognition is a political decision within the sovereign discretion of individual states. Recognition in principle can be accorded to either states or governments.[38] As to the former, it need only be noted that the state of Afghanistan has been recognized by a wide number of states, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council, for many years. However, where political power has fragmented to the extent as has occurred in Afghanistan in recent years, there may well be more than one group claiming to be the government. Deciding how best to press such claims is a serious foreign policy matter for the claimants. Deciding how to respond to such claims is a serious foreign policy matter for the governments to which they are made. A distinct, if at some levels similar, issue arises when more than one 'government' sends a delegation to represent a single state in an international organization such as the UN. Here, the problem is one of how an organization of states can devise a collective response to such a dilemma. The UN General Assembly responds by appointing a Credentials Committee to make recommendations to the General Assembly about credentials offered by the various delegations of member states. The Taliban, upon taking Kabul, immediately demanded both recognition from other states as the government of Afghanistan, and Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly. However, they received neither. As far as recognition was concerned, the explanation was largely political. On the night the Taliban took Kabul, 26-27 September 1996, the former communist president Najibullah was dragged from UN premises (in which he had been living since April 1992) and murdered; his body was hung from a pylon in Ariana Square. This gruesome spectacle attracted a large contingent of international media representatives, who were then in place to report the imposition of harsh restrictions on the population of Kabul.[39] The reactions in Western states to these reports were extremely adverse, both at mass and elite levels. As a result, states such as the USA, France, the United Kingdom, and Australia in which the Rabbani Government had diplomatic or consular agents opted in the first instance to leave the status quo in place. There was a sound legal basis for this: as Lauterpacht observed of revolutionary forces, 'So long as the revolution has not been fully successful, and so long as the lawful government, however adversely affected by the fortunes of the civil war, remains within national territory and asserts its authority, it is presumed to represent the State as a whole'. [40] The Taliban faced similar problems at the UN. The UN General Assembly on 14 December 1950 adopted Resolution 396(V), which provided that 'wherever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case'. This has not prevented disputes over credentials in the intervening period, but it worked to the disadvantage of the Taliban, whose invasion of UN premises in Kabul hardly bespoke a firm commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter, and whose treatment of women shocked many member states. But two other factors worked to the disadvantage of the Taliban. First, as the authors of the main commentary on the UN Charter have observed, in practice a government will be regarded by the General Assembly 'as being authorized to represent a member state as long as it has not been replaced by a rival claimant who has established effective control over the state independently of the support of a foreign power'.[41] The widespread suspicion that Pakistan had backed the Taliban in its campaign to overthrow the Rabbani Government seems to have brought this latter qualification into play in the minds of at least some of the members of the Credentials Committee in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000, since the Committee on each occasion opted to preserve the status quo. Pakistan's persistent attempts to induce the UN to adopt a 'vacant seat' formula over Afghanistan[42]-something for which Pakistan had successfully pushed during the 1996 Jakarta meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)-failed ignominiously. Second, the Taliban's nominees charged with seeking the Afghanistan seat at the UN were no match as diplomats for the Rabbani Government's representative, Dr Ravan Farhadi, a French-trained scholar who during the rule of King Zahir had served as Head of the UN and International Conferences Division of the Foreign Ministry, Counselor in the Afghan Embassy in Washington, Secretary to the Cabinet, and Afghan Ambassador to France. The second broad foreign policy objective of the Taliban was to obtain revenue from international sources. Afghanistan before the 1978 communist coup had many of the characteristics of a rentier state: at the time of the coup, over a third of total state expenditure was financed by foreign aid.[43] By the time the Taliban took Kabul, years of disorder had destroyed any central state capacity to raise taxes in an orderly fashion. Yet with their legitimacy as rulers still contested in significant parts of the country, monies could play a valuable role in buying the prudential support of strategically-placed local power holders. This made obtaining external financial support a major aim of the regime. 'Saudi Arabia', Rashid has argued of the period before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, 'was to become the principal financial backer of the Taliban'.[44] However, the Taliban-perhaps recalling how fickle had been the support of external backers for the Mujahideen at different times-sought to diversify their income sources. Their efforts had mixed results at best. Three particular spheres of activity merit attention. The first related to the cultivation of international energy companies[45]. In October 1995, the US corporation UNOCAL and the Saudi corporation Delta Oil signed a memorandum of intent with the government of Turkmenistan, which anticipated the construction of a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan. When the Taliban took Kabul, a UNOCAL Vice-President, Chris Taggart, reportedly termed it a 'positive development'.[46] However, for both UNOCAL and the Taliban, the relationship proved frustrating. For the Taliban, the relationship with UNOCAL delivered neither revenue nor wider American support. Their expectations were extremely unrealistic: according to Rashid, they expected 'the company which wins the contract to provide electricity, gas, telephones, roads-in fact, virtually a new infrastructure for a destroyed country'[47]. From UNOCAL's point of view, the Taliban proved unable to deliver the level of security which would be required to permit such a project to go ahead-and given the vulnerability not only of the pipeline itself but also the expatriate staff who would inevitably be involved in its construction, that level of security is extremely high. As a result, according to another UNOCAL Vice-President, Marty Miller, 'lenders have said the project at this moment is just not financeable'[48], and in August 1998, the company suspended its involvement in the project following US Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against alleged terrorist training camps operated in eastern Afghanistan by Usama Bin Laden.[49] In the face of these problems, the Taliban sought to maintain lines of communication with one of UNOCAL's competitors, the Argentinian company Bridas, but ultimately that avenue proved unrewarding as well and, the Taliban's hopes of securing a free revenue stream through bargaining with major multinational consortia simply slipped away. [50] The second related to the exploitation of 'transit trade' and other smuggling between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement of 1965, certain goods can be imported into Afghanistan through Pakistan, free of Pakistani customs duties. It is clear that a significant proportion of the goods thus imported are then smuggled into Pakistan, where they are sold in smugglers' markets. In recent years, this trade has been augmented by the transportation into Pakistan of goods imported into Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan from Dubai and other trading ports in the Persian Gulf. The value of this trade has been estimated in a World Bank study at $2.5 billion, and the profit to the Taliban may be as high as $75 million, although it is unlikely that it is pooled in such a way as to permit efficient budgeting.[51] The Pakistani state is a major loser from this trade, since it is thereby deprived of the revenues from indirect taxation which would otherwise accrue to it, and its general tolerance of the loss is a clear indicator of the extent to which powerful groups in Pakistan had come to value the goal of sustaining the Taliban regime above the goal of putting Pakistan's own economic house in order-something which should be borne in mind by international financial institutions from which Pakistan seeks lines of credit. The third relates to the raising of revenues from opium, of which Afghanistan under the Taliban became the world's largest producer.[52] Drug trafficking has received considerable attention in recent years as a 'non-traditional' security issue,[53] and weighs heavily in the thinking of the US Administration. Yet opium also represents a revenue source of some potential for power holders in a debilitated territory such as Afghanistan. The challenge for the Taliban therefore was to extract revenue from this source without so alienating foreign governments that the costs of the undertaking outweighed the benefits. Here again, the Taliban were not especially successful. The involvement of the Taliban in the drug trade was plain almost from the outset of their rule. In a 1996 interview, Mullah Omar admitted that the Taliban received revenue from a tax on opium.=, and[54] the Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 1998 published by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) found that the 'provinces under the control of the Taliban, at the time of the Survey, account for approximately 96% of Afghanistan's total opium cultivation'.[55] The position of the Taliban at that time was that it was 'difficult to encourage farmers to produce other cash crops'[56], and there was almost certainly some truth in this claim. However, eyewitness testimony pointed to Taliban involvement not only in compelling farmers to grow opium, but in distributing fertilizer for the crops.[57] Given the loose structure of the movement, this could well have reflected simply the greed of local Taliban, but it was not read in this way: the US State Department concluded that there was 'evidence that the Taliban, which control much of Afghanistan, have made a policy decision to take advantage of narcotics trafficking and production in order to put pressure on the west and other consuming nations'.[58] In 1999, according to a UN report, "the production of opium increased dramatically to 4,600 tonnes, almost twice the average production of the previous four years.[59]" However, on February 27, 2000, doubtless with an eye to their international standing, the Taliban ordered a total ban on cultivation of the poppy; the output for 2000 fell to 3,300 tonnes, and further dramatic falls were detected in early 2001. However, the ban was bitterly resented by farmers, for whom no alternative income sources were provided, and won the Taliban surprisingly little kudos, in part because of the suspicion that the ban was driven by the desire not to add to what was already a large stockpile, and that output falls owed much to the drought by which Afghanistan had been gripped. V Nonetheless, with the exception of the Taliban's hospitality to Usama Bin Laden, which catastrophically prejudiced any prospect of their developing amicable relations with the United States, the main consideration which thwarted the efforts of the Taliban to secure international recognition and legitimacy was their treatment of women. The issue is an extremely important one, not simply because women are a particularly vulnerable and long-suffering component of the Afghan population, but also because the mobilization of groups in the international community in defense of Afghan women points to ways in which the sovereignty claims of putative rulers of states may increasingly be subordinated to evolving international norms. At the same time, it points to the enormous tension which can arise between these norms, and the norms defended by groups for whom secular rules must be subordinate to those which they see as divinely-ordained. It is this tension which is at the heart of the Taliban's growing international isolation. The Taliban could charitably be described as the least feminist group in the world. This became clear once they reached Kabul, although the policies which they sought to impose in Kabul differed little from those which they had forcibly implemented in Kandahar from late 1994 and Herat from September 1995. In rural areas, in which the Taliban found themselves in potential competition with an existing tribal authority structure, they had far less scope to impose their puritanical visions, and as a result, there are areas nominally under Taliban control in which girls' schools continue to function.[60] In cities, there were far fewer centers of countervailing power, and the Taliban religious police, known as the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice (Amr bil-Maroof wa Nahi An il-Munkir), had a free hand. That hand was directed against women, with a fierce paternalism of which Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor would have been proud. Decrees issued by this department forbade women to travel unaccompanied by a close male relative (mahram) or without being swathed in a stifling head-to-toe garment known as a burqa.[61] These rules were enforced in the days following the Taliban arrival in Kabul by teams of young Taliban who beat women with rubber hoses in front of foreign journalists. In addition, girls' schools in Kabul were closed, women were excluded from most areas of the workforce and from Kabul University, and-during a particularly grim period in late 1997-women were denied access to emergency hospital care, with fatal results: according to the US State Department, a non-governmental organization in October 1997 'reported that a female burn victim had died after Taliban authorities would not allow her to be treated by a male doctor'.[62] Furthermore, reports began to appear of young women being forced to marry young Taliban against their will.[63] The topic of gender relations in Afghanistan is complex and difficult, since social roles for some but not all Afghan women changed significantly as a result of wider processes of social development in urban areas, and particularly Kabul, over the last four decades.[64] From 1959 onwards, women in Kabul had opportunities to access higher education and employment on a scale which earlier would have been unthinkable.[65] Following the 1978 communist coup, and with the backing of coercive threats, the new regime sought to extend its ideology of gender roles into unreceptive rural areas. The results were catastrophic: the regime not only faced intense opposition to its policies from affronted rural dwellers, but the entire exercise set back the cause of laudable objectives such as female literacy by linking them, in the minds of conservative village clergy, with atheism and propaganda.[66] Furthermore, with the flight of millions of Afghan refugees to Pakistan, the resulting disempowerment of Afghan males in many cases prompted an obsessive preoccupation on their part with the protection of 'female honor', one of the few exercises on which they could still embark with much hope of success.[67] As a result of these experiences, the social roles of women became increasingly salient benchmarks for distinguishing different types of sociopolitical order. It was in this context that women's rights became a principal battleground between the Taliban and the international community. The Taliban viewed their treatment of women in a very different way from outside observers. They rightly pointed to the grim experience of Afghan women during the brutal division of Kabul between warring militias from mid-1992 to March 1995,[68] and credited themselves with eliminating such insecurity-although in late March 1998, a Voice of America correspondent laconically reported that while a Taliban spokesman had said in a statement that there was 'complete peace and security' in the provinces controlled by the Taliban, 'at the same time, he told reporters that a lack of adequate security is another serious problem in providing education to female students'.[69] Earlier, the Chair of the Taliban's 'Caretaker Council' in Kabul, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, had expressed himself 'perplexed at the silence of the western media regarding the tragedies and miseries that prevailed when previous governments were in power in Afghanistan', and went on to blame the bad publicity received by the Taliban on 'world Zionism fighting Islam'.[70] Raising an argument for cultural relativism, another Taliban spokesman complained that 'in the United States, they want to impose their American culture on us'.[71] This remark obliquely reflected the way in which the Taliban had become trapped in a series of increasingly acrimonious exchanges with prominent Western women. On 29 September 1997, the European Union Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Emma Bonino, was detained by the Taliban during a visit to what had been designated by the Taliban as a women's hospital. This represented more the confusion and incoherence of the Taliban than a deliberate and planned attempt to intimidate an international official, but it won the Taliban quite devastating media coverage (not least because Bonino was accompanied by the prominent correspondent Christiane Amanpour [72] ) and it prompted the German Foreign Minister to describe the Taliban justification for the detentions as 'unbelievable and shameful in every respect'.[73] The result was to turn Commissioner Bonino into a frontline critic of the Taliban: the European Parliament adopted 'Flowers for the Women of Kabul' as slogan for the following International Women's Day, 8 March 1998. The plight of Kabuli women then figured prominently in demonstrations and activities around the world, prompting the Taliban-controlled Radio Voice of Shariah to describe International Women's Day as a 'conspiracy' by 'the infidels of the world under the leadership of Emma Bonino' and to complain of 'the provocation which has been launched by Christendom against the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan'.[74] Even more worrying for the Taliban than the opposition of a prominent European such as Bonino was US Secretary of State Albright's November 1997 description of Taliban policies towards women as 'despicable',[75] an observation which interestingly provoked from the Taliban 'Foreign Ministry' a much less splenetic response than that encountered by Bonino, namely the claim that Dr. Albright's comments were based on 'her incorrect knowledge of reality'.[76] Whether the forthright statements by Bonino and Albright represented the best way to prompt Taliban concessions on the issue of women's rights was not the point. Rather, what these episodes demonstrated was the way in which Taliban 'foreign policy' had become the victim of the Taliban's pursuit of a domestic agenda out of step with much of the wider world. The Taliban came on the world scene at the wrong time for their own good. In the early 1980s, Afghan groups with similar attitudes to women-for example, the Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-were funded with few qualms by the US Administration.[77] But by the mid-1990s, the global strategic situation was radically different as a result of the collapse of the USSR, and new agendas of social awareness were being pressed with increasing vigor. The UN International Women's Conference in Beijing in September 1995 confirmed an agenda radically at odds with that of the Taliban, and a dense network of women's groups had formed to give effect to that agenda. Indeed, the failure of the Taliban to secure recognition or Afghanistan's General Assembly seat reflected in part the effective lobbying of those groups (which also put pressure on UNOCAL to distance itself from the Taliban). The Feminist Majority Foundation under Eleanor Smeal took a strong lead in such action, with support from American celebrities such as Mavis Leno and Lionel Richie,[78] and their position was bolstered by the release in August 1998 of a damning and widely-publicized report from the Boston-based Physicians for Human Rights entitled The Taliban's War on Women.[79] For these groups, the response of their own governments to the Taliban's demands for acceptance became an important symbol of those governments' seriousness about gender issues and (in contrast to what might have been the case had the rulers of a resource-rich state such as Saudi Arabia been under fire) there were no compelling reasons for the governments to ignore this domestic pressure. However, the tension between the Taliban and the wider world over the gender issue reflected a deeper tension-between a vision of the world as governed by rules of an evolving international society, and a vision of the world as ruled by the word of God. For the Taliban's Amir al-Momineen, this was the key distinction. In a statement in late December 1997, Mullah Omar claimed that the United Nations had 'fallen under the influence of imperialist powers and under the pretext of human rights has misled Moslems from the path of righteousness'. Increased rights for women would lead to adultery and herald 'the destruction of Islam'. 'We do not', Mullah Omar went on, 'accept something which somebody imposes on us under the name of human rights which is contrary to the holy Koranic law'. The holy Koran, he concluded 'cannot adjust itself to other people's requirements; people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the holy Koran'.[80] This neatly encapsulated the Taliban's philosophy of international relations: an uncompromising one, which repudiated international law, international opinion, and international organization if they appeared in any way to conflict with the Taliban's idiosyncratic interpretation of what holy Koranic law might require. As a result, the UN as an organization found the Taliban extraordinarily difficult to handle. Its Charter and its practices carried no particular weight with them, as the murder of Najibullah made clear. Yet given how few states retained a diplomatic presence in Kabul, the UN was the agency which carried the burden of giving voice to international law and international opinion, even as-in another guise-it sought to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Afghans living in Taliban-controlled areas. The 'United Nations' is really a family of loosely-connected and uncoordinated organizations, with their own interests, tactics, and strategies. The signals which the Taliban received from this labyrinth were confusing, and evoked a confused response. While agencies such as UNDCP sought to make the Kandahar leadership partners in their anti-narcotics programs, the General Assembly refused to seat the Taliban. While UN staffers in Pakistan made their way to the Taliban-controlled Afghan Embassy in order to obtain visas to enter the country, the Director-General of UNESCO called the Taliban 'madmen' and 'barbarians who interpret the Koran as they see fit'.[81] It is perhaps not surprising that the cynicism of UN officials about the Taliban was matched by the cynicism of the Taliban about the UN. But given the tunnel vision of the Taliban, it is doubtful whether anything but wholesale support for the Taliban's policies and aims would have satisfied the Kandahar leaders. The result was a growing contempt for the UN. On the one hand, this took the form of a willingness to exploit the goodwill of the UN for military purposes. Thus, in March 1998, the Head of the World Food Programme office in Herat claimed that the Taliban had been using displaced persons' camps in the Herat area 'as lures for fresh troops to join the front line', the basic message to male breadwinners being 'move your family down to the camp, and we'll make sure they get well fed, and you'll fight for us'.[82] On the other hand, it appeared in the form of a disdain for UN actions from which the Taliban could not benefit. This was clearly manifested in the Taliban blockade to prevent food supplies reaching the central Hazarajat region, a blockade which was implemented in the face of high-level pleas from the UN that it not go ahead, and which the Taliban enforced by bombing Bamian airport on 1 January 1998 when a clearly-identified UN plane was on the runway. Faced with a series of Taliban provocations, culminating in an assault on a UN staffer by the Taliban Governor of Kandahar Mullah Mohammad Hassan,[83] on 23 March 1998 the UN ordered the withdrawal of its expatriate staff in Kandahar and suspended its humanitarian activities in the south of the country.[84] Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Under Secretary-General for Special Assignments, was in Pakistan at the time of the withdrawal, and sent a very firm message: if the UN could not operate as it did in all other member states, 'we should pack up and go'. He added that the 'international community has a standard and if you want to be a member of the club you have to abide by the rules'.[85] In the same vein, the UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, demanded 'written assurances that international humanitarian law and principles will be respected'.[86] Some such written assurances were given in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Kabul on 13 May 1998 by the Taliban 'Planning Minister', Qari Deen Mohammad, and the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Martin Griffiths.[87] In other respects, however, the document proved a disaster for the UN, since Article 13, in a section entitled 'Access to Health and Education' stated that 'women's access to health and education will need to be gradual'. This prompted a scathing attack from the Executive Director of Physicians for Human Rights, Leonard S. Rubinstein, who stated that the UN 'endorsement of Taliban restrictions on women's basic rights to education and health care is a betrayal of international human rights standards and of the female population of Afghanistan'.[88] This specific issue took a back seat when the August 1998 US Tomahawk cruise missile strikes prompted a UN withdrawal from Afghanistan, in the midst of which a Military Adviser to the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), Lieutenant-Colonel Carmine Calo of Italy, was murdered in Kabul. And when the Taliban launched a further major offensive against their opponents in late July 1999, barely a week after a declaration issued at UN-sponsored talks in Tashkent, attended by Taliban representatives, had called for peaceful political negotiations in order to establish a broad-based, multiethnic and fully representative government, relations between the Taliban and the UN hit a new low. The Taliban's relations with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) proved equally tense, and the images of the Taliban conveyed to the wider world through NGO channels were on the whole extremely adverse. While some NGOs welcomed the security which the Taliban brought, and found them less corrupt than some other groups with which they had had to deal,[89] for others they were at best meddlesome and obstreperous. The issue of gender again proved extraordinarily sensitive, and those bodies which coped most effectively with the Taliban were those engaged in 'gender-neutral' work such as mine action,[90] or those such as the International Committee of the Red Cross that were not under donor pressure to take a strongly political stand in response to Taliban policy. Tensions finally came to a head on 14 July 1998, when the Taliban ordered international NGOs in Kabul to relocate to the ruined campus of the Kabul Polytechnic, which they were invited also to repair. This was understandably interpreted as a covert expulsion order, and many such NGOs opted instead to quit the capital. The Taliban responded by seizing NGO property, notably two vehicles donated to a medical charity by the Princess Diana Fund, vehicles which days later a correspondent reported 'now ferry around turbaned and gun-toting passengers in comfort through the bumpy and potholed streets of Kabul'.[91] While some international NGOs did shift to the Polytechnic, they were displaced by the Taliban in mid-1999 'after more than 800 troops occupied the compound for a month before moving to the front'.[92] After the Tomahawk cruise missile strikes, the activities of many NGOs were further limited by restrictions imposed by donor governments; one Western government even warned that it would suspend all funding to any Pakistan-based NGO whose expatriate staff set foot in Afghanistan. Despite a Taliban decree designed to guarantee the safety of NGO staff,[93] a fundamental tension between the Taliban and NGOs persisted, for while the Taliban welcomed them as assistants, they could not abide them as witnesses. Even before the expulsion of all expatriate aid workers from Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes, the position of international NGOs was approaching a crisis point following the August 2001 arrest of German, U.S., and Australian employees of Shelter Now International (SNI),[94] whom the Taliban accused of Christian proselytization. To experienced observers, this reflected less a concern with Christians per se than a desire to use an anti-Christian campaign as a way of energising Pakistani madrassa students, and as a pretext for asserting power over groups with some degree of autonomy. As so often in the past, the aid community found itself caught between a rock and a hard place. VI The tensions between the Taliban and the UN also reflected tensions between the Taliban and a number of powerful UN members. In the following paragraphs, I explore the dimensions of Taliban relations with three of the more important-Pakistan, Iran and the United States-since it is these three states which by virtue of their proximity or power are central to the prospects for any progress towards a settlement of the Afghan problem. I also make some brief comments about Taliban attitudes to Saudi Arabia, Russia, and India. Pakistan has always been the state closest to the Taliban, and there is much truth in the claim that without substantial Pakistani support, the Taliban would long ago have faced enormous problems in holding their positions in the parts of Afghanistan which they dominated. It is no exaggeration to say that despite Pakistani denials,[95] the expansion of Taliban power reflected a 'creeping invasion' of Afghanistan by its neighbor: for example, in mid-1999, Ahmed Rashid reported that in preparation for the Taliban's summer offensive, 'Transport planes from Pakistan fly military supplies at night to the ramshackle Kabul airport'.[96] To that extent, Pakistan has rightly been viewed as the state which it is vital to pressure if the Taliban are to be induced to take any interest in the concerns of the international community, and the military coup by General Pervez Musharraf on October 12, 1999, in no way altered this fundamental reality Yet the relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban is not one of direct control, for two reasons. First, the loose structure of the Taliban movement, based on personalistic ties rather than structured hierarchy, makes it virtually impossible to control in any carefully-calibrated way. This became very clear in May 1997 when the Taliban incursion into northern Afghanistan, manifestly orchestrated by Pakistan, failed dramatically through a lack of effective control over trigger-happy foot soldiers.[97] Second, the Taliban have proved adept at building ties to different lobbies in Pakistan as a way of protecting themselves from disaffection on the part of any single lobby.[98] In supporting a revivalist Sunni Pushtun movement such as the Taliban, Pakistani agencies pursued a very high-risk strategy, the consequences of which were reflected in the escalation more generally of militant religious activity in Pakistan.[99] And with the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, swiftly blamed on groups which had flourished under Taliban protection, President Musharraf found himself in the desperate position of having to choose whether to oppose the heated radicalism of Pakistan's religious extremists, or the immeasurable wrath of the United States.Having sown the wind, Pakistan was left to reap the whirlwind. Militant anti-Shiism lay at the core of the Taliban's deeply-troubled relations with Iran. This militancy derives in part from the nature of the education available in Deobandi madrassas, but in Afghanistan it is reinforced by patterns of hostility to the ethnic group of which a large number of Shia are members, namely the Hazaras. The Hazaras have a distinctly Central Asian phenotype, and have a long experience of social marginalization. These experiences have helped shape the character of Shiite political mobilization.[100] Since the Iranian population is overwhelmingly Shiite and the Iranian political system is dominated by Shiite ulema, it is hardly surprising that the Taliban's hostility to Shiism prompted a strong Iranian response, in the form of military and moral support for the Taliban's armed opponents, most importantly but by no means exclusively the Shiite Hezb-e Wahdat. Iran delighted in highlighting some of the more eccentric aspects of Taliban behavior, not least because on issues such as female access to education and employment, Iran appeared moderate, even progressive, in contrast to their Kandahari neighbors. One senior Iranian cleric described Taliban policies as 'fossilized'.[101] A Taliban spokesman, in turn, described Iran as 'an expansionist state which wants to establish "Greater Iran" from the Gulf in the south to the Amu [Oxus] river in the north and the Indus river to the east'.[102] In June 1997, relations took a nosedive when the Taliban ordered the closure of the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, and they reached their nadir in August 1998 when the Taliban seized the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, killed eight staff of the Iranian Consulate, and embarked on an orgy of killing in which perhaps 2,500 Shia perished in just three days.[103] This caused outrage in Iran, and brought Iran and the Taliban to the brink of war,[104] which only dexterous diplomacy by UN Envoy Brahimi managed to avert. Iran's hostility to the Taliban is muted only by the reluctance of at least some within the Iranian leadership to see an anti-Taliban campaign provide a stepping-stone for the revival of American influence in West Asia. When the Taliban took Kabul, they had high hopes of support from America.[105] In October 1995, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan reportedly accompanied General Naseerullah Babar in a convoy of trucks which entered Afghan territory from Quetta, a move which could only have been interpreted as a calculated insult to the Rabbani Government.[106] Staff of the US Embassy in Pakistan had made no secret of their animosity towards the Taliban's predecessors, and the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel, had just a month earlier demanded that Iran 'should stop supplying Kabul'.[107] In a fatal subordination of foreign policy to commercial interests, the US Administration was also sympathetic to UNOCAL's ambitions for the region.[108] The State Department's Acting Spokesman, Glyn Davies, remarked that 'the United States finds nothing objectionable in the policy statements of the new government, including its move to impose Islamic law'.[109] An Afghan-American commentator with the RAND Corporation who had served in the upper echelons of the State Department and the Department of Defense even went into print to argue that it was time for the United States to reengage in Afghanistan, maintaining that 'the departure of Osama Bin Laden, the Saudi financier of various anti-U.S. terrorist groups, from Afghanistan indicates some common interest between the United States and the Taliban'. [110] However, disappointment set in rapidly on both sides. As noted earlier, the Taliban's policies towards women made them political pariahs, and by 1998 even won them criticism from First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. Furthermore, if more explicit US interests in Afghanistan could be summed up in terms of 'drugs and thugs'[111]-in other words, the flourishing of opium crops and networks of terrorists from the Arab world[112]-it rapidly emerged that firm Taliban action could be expected on neither front. It soon became clear that Bin Laden had not left Afghanistan; on the contrary, he had been a major financier of the Taliban push to Kabul.[113] The bomb blasts on 7 August 1998 which devastated the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were blamed by US intelligence sources on Bin Laden, prompting the Tomahawk missile strikes on his training camps in Afghanistan two weeks later. This led to an upsurge of anti-American sentiment on the part of the Taliban and their Pakistani backers from the Jamiat-e Ulema-i Islam, and ultimately the promulgation by President Clinton on 6 July 1999 of an Executive Order freezing all Taliban assets in the USA and banning commercial and financial ties between the Taliban and the US.[114] As relations cooled with the Taliban, Washington began to flirt with the idea that the former Afghan monarch Zahir Shah could play a role in putting together an alternative, something which prompted the then Pakistani Foreign Minister-an ardent Taliban supporter-to remark in March 1998 during a Tokyo press conference that the Americans were 'thinking of putting puppets in Afghanistan', those puppets being 'people who hover around in Pakistan from one cocktail party to the other'.[115] It was

All Glories to Shrila Prabhupada Dear Tarun: >>>Elementary penguin singing Hari Krishna. So what does this line from John's song compare to My Sweet Lord? Give us a break--he may have said the words Hare Krishna in a Song--which had the FBI--more than anyone else seriously delving into the meaning in it. I guess at the End of the Day it comes down to this--the Walrus Song--is about nothing meaningfull and My Sweet Lord--is about the Supreme Personality of Godhead. Which Song brought the Holy Name into serious consideration? I like John's Music--but there IS no 'Equal' to the Profound Messages found in George's Music--not even John's. Your Servant, Bhakta don