we don't cover krishna here - statement from Saskatchewan human rights commission

Bhakta Don Muntean · January 28, 2007

Well a long time fight [4.5 years] with the Saskatchewan human rights commission - is now taking another turn - into court - next month.

This 'human rights agency' has NO RESPECT for krishna [and thus hinduism] and they should be protested - by anyone thinking that saying "we don't cover krishna here" is appalling - for an human rights enforcement agency.

I shall post email contacts for the head of the saskathcewan human rights commission - in the next short while.

Thanks

BDM

January 28, 2007

This is the problem with those who think that god only is present in judeo-christian lines. The euro-centrists reject anything that is honored by darker skinned people.

its not canada, its all around. god is given no respect if he has no political punch. The right wing radio shows have this same mentality, actually stating that minor churches should not have the same rights as the established dominations (in relation to the bogus war or christmas). They say that trees should be allowed without having minerets, espousing their euro ideal, but in fact, the druid/wiccan tradition is the beginning of the yule tree tradition.

Human rights commissions have nothing to do with human rights, they are only concerned with employment practices, and you only have rights as determined by the jurisdictional boundries set by the lawmaker/commissioners. I actually won a case of a similar nature, the US Office of Special Counsel severely chastized the US Department of the Navy for their unfortunate decision to force me to remove a picture of Krsna I had affixed on my locker. This was a result of a landmark decision and Presidential Order signed by Bill Clinton affirming my rights to practice my religion on-the-job.

If you want to handle this politically, its a bit like pulling teeth, but you need a progressive ear (like the Clintons) to get things rolling in the right direction. I struggled for two years in my case, (Ill look it up, it must be on the internet somewhere, under MK Johnson v DON).

Dont blame canada for a worldwide prejudice. The mormon mafia and the freemasons who control the trident missile and submarine program were behing the willful offense of destroying the picture on my locker, dont think that they even care about world wide hindu protests. You are just glass to them.

Sincerely, mahaksadasa

mahak · January 28, 2007

Mr Clinton, as a result of a personal appeal I made to him via his wife, Hillary Clinton, issued the following executive order:

http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970819-3275.html

Hillary clinton and John McCain were also the only ones who responded to appeals for justice for eastern bloc hare krsnas experiancing persecution, out of 500 letters sent to all the usual poiliticians.

Hare Krsna, ys, mahaksadasa

Bhakta Don Muntean · January 28, 2007

Well the 'left wing' are the commie dinks in power here - so - i doubt there is any inclination for change and of course the Liberals don't give a frick about it either. Neither did/does ISKCON - so why do i care then?

mahak · January 28, 2007

Sometimes, nothing can be done. What, vidura was to kill bhisma, drona, karna, duryodhana, krpacarya because of the injustice their inaction allowed? He could have, you know, because he holds the diamond noose and rides the red buffalo, all those generals would have died by Viduras glance alone, but he just left the room.

Tis the nature of the world, which is why to be tolerant is recommended.

Hare Krsna, ys, mahaksadasa

Bhakta Don Muntean · January 29, 2007

Sometimes, nothing can be done. What, vidura was to kill bhisma, drona, karna, duryodhana, krpacarya because of the injustice their inaction allowed? He could have, you know, because he holds the diamond noose and rides the red buffalo, all those generals would have died by Viduras glance alone, but he just left the room.

Tis the nature of the world, which is why to be tolerant is recommended.

Hare Krsna, ys, mahaksadasa

Well in this case i say that the rights of the many are measured by an enforcement of the rights of the few or - the one.

I know that He shall help me - it is without a doubt going to be a problem when the human rights commission finds themselves in court on February 06, 2007 - to answer to some of these issues.

Here is a copy of the notice of mation i filed - i may post my advance brief:

In The Court of Queens Bench for Saskatchewan

In the matter of Section 58 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act

Between:

Donald Muntean – Appellant

Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission - Respondent

Notice of Motion

NO.47 (R.450)

Take notice that an application will be made to the presiding judge in chambers at the court house in Regina Saskatchewan, on Tuesday the 06 day of February 2007 at ten o’clock in the forenoon or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard on behalf of the plaintiff for an order that:

(a)

Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission [herein after to be referred to as SHRC] remit access to our human rights complaint’s file with proper regard to every applicable provision of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [herein after to be referred to as FOIPP]

(i)establishes bad-faith determinations on SHRC violations of s. 25, s. 26 and s. 27 FOIPP – standard of accuracy/manner of collection

(ii)establishes bad-faith determinations on SHRC violations of s. 53(3)(b)(i) FOIPP – attempted unauthorized access to representations to privacy commissioner

(iii)establishes clear juristic explication of s. 17(2)(b) and s. 24(2)© FOIPP - consultations/deliberations within adjudicative and discretionary files and ‘opinions and views given in course of employment’ recorded within consultations and deliberations within adjudicative and discretionary files

(iv)establishes bad-faith determinations on s. 66(1)(a) FOIPP – SHRC withholding access to records and information

(v)invokes s. 58(4) FOIPP – reporting SHRC statutory violations to federal justice

(vi)SHRC cover the costs of bringing forward this application

(vii)any other remedy/penalty which the court sees fit under the circumstances

(b) on the following grounds:

 

(i)ss. 5, 7(2)(d), 8, 17(2)(b), 17(2)(f)(i), 25, 26(1), 26(3), 27, 31(1), 53(3)(b)(i), 58(4), 61, 66(1)(a),(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [s.S. 1990-91 c F-22.01]

(ii)Saskatchewan OIPC Report F-2006-004, Saskatchewan OIPC Report F-2006-003

And further take notice that in support of the said application will be read:

1.Cited FOIPP Statutes of Saskatchewan

2.Saskatchewan OIPC Report F-2006-004 (22 pages)

3.Saskatchewan OIPC Report F-2006-003 (Para. 69-70)

4.Pages 9-11, 13-18, 21, 23, 43-46, 61, 75, 82, 168-170, 221-225, 286, 328-332, 336-340, 350-354, 463-465, 470, 473, 477, 479-481, 484 of the severed human rights records submitted by SHRC

5.Appellant letters to OIPC dated - March 29, 2005, (9 pages) January 19, 2005 (9 pages) and March 08, 2004 (12 pages)

6.Appellant letters to SHRC dated March 13, 2004, (6 pages) and June 09, 2004 (5 pages)

7.SHRC letter to OIPC dated February 15, 2005 (6 pages)

8.SHRC October 2003 [human rights complaint] Dismissal Letter (8 pages)

9.SHRC [s. 56 FOIPP decision] letter dated December 20, 2006 (1 page)

10.Affidavit of Donald Muntean (3 pages)

 

Dated at Regina, Saskatchewan, this 22 day of January 2007.

_____________________

Appellant

To:

Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission

Saskatoon, SK S7K 2H6

Note: notice of motion and supporting documents to be personally served on Regina SHRC office with copies to be personally served on the office the deputy minister for Saskatchewan justice – additional copies to be provided to Saskatchewan OIPC

-----------------------------

Here is a letter which I wrote to the head of the human rights commission:

Donald JK Muntean

Ronald Rehaume

[edited]

Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission

Donna Scott, Chief Commissioner

[edited]

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

S7K 2H6

March 13, 2004

Receipt of your [registered] letter dated February 19, 2004 is acknowledged.

Please do not misinterpret this correspondence as – angry, rude or anything like that.

Your threat is certainly displaced - through this letter:

“…we have now consulted with the Regina Police Service and would like to inform you that we will be pursuing an investigation with the police if these types of harassing phone calls do not stop…”

With all due respect - the communications to which you refer - were not harassing calls.

To be ‘prosecuted’ as harassing calls - SHRC would have to prove that I had - “no lawful excuse to call” – and that is simply not provable by SHRC under the present circumstances – further – what you wrongly label as “rude and disrespectful” is a matter of motivated opinion.

There exists no evidence that any of these calls were prompted by anything other than a desire to get legitimate answers.

During my attempts to get answers - your staff was creating a pattern of inducing me into deep frustration in these interactions – to which I reacted by being ‘un-forbearing’ with SHCR staff – actually - I explained to these staff that I intended no disrespect – and if SHRC intends to prove otherwise – you better be in possession of actual audio recordings of these calls.

For example - we were calling you seeking a copy of the investigator’s ‘case report’ – as we were told by the investigator that we would be provided a copy of this.

Of course, ultimately - I was forced to ask your staff - to ask you - to place it into an envelope and send it to us – not at all a harassing call.

Additionally - when calling the Saskatoon office - I was seeking to speak with you – you indeed appear to encourage telephone communications - in providing your telephone number in the correspondences you’ve sent to us.

SHRC staff are quite well aware that I informed them [at the onset of the calling and each time I called thereafter] – that we have no telephone and it is an undue hardship for me to have to travel to the ‘pay phone’ - hour after hour and day after day - only to be told each time that you are on the telephone – this happens every time I call – and apparently your offices cannot place any callers on hold [i was told this by your staff].

So, in any case - you knew that I had questions and you clearly did not wish to answer them.

Some examples of these questions do include [but are not limited to]:

It must be noted that the investigator attempted to fabricate a scenario, in which she had us so-called ‘refusing’ to be personally interviewed in the investigation.

We learned of this absurd situation - when we received an email from her supervisor [Rrafoss] on March 11, 2003 - wherein he attempts endorse this ill-motivated effort:

"…I understand you do not wish to be interviewed personally, only in writing. This is highly unusual, but that is your wish...".

Then when we informed the supervisor [on that same day] that that was not the case [our letters to SHRC prove this] - he never replied - why?

Thus a false scenario of our so-called 'refusal to be interviewed' was left hanging.

Later, after additional letters to the investigator - informing her that there was no such 'refusal' - we received this problematic reply:

"…I understand that you and Ron now wish to come into the office to give a statement. I realize that there have been some miscommunications in the past regarding your preference of interview style, however…I'm sure that you can appreciate my busy schedule, and an in-office interview would have to have been penciled in my calendar a long time ago…" [Friday April 25, 2003]

The record evidences that we were REFUSED investigation interviews by the investigator - all the while - faulting us for it!

When we questioned the supervisor regarding this investigators objectivity – [especially considering the events documented at intake] - he then wrote to us [on May 13, 2003]:

"…communications of this nature are not helping your case..."

The supervisor’s questionable reply begs further inquiry – as do the matters initiating it.

The supervisor never once - neither in writing nor, during telephone discussions - attempted to answer to these concerns.

Why did you ignore solid information within our ‘Rebuttal Report to the Respondent’s September 20, 2002 Questionnaire’ – all of the respondent’s false claims are clearly and systematically refuted by us – such as the false confusion claims of the recruitment officer – [that he was confused by our approach to their services].

In referencing the respondent’s questionnaire - we see the respondent state a question that I asked her:

“…Has SGI contacted you about us?"…”

Then in your October 24, 2003 dismissal we read:

“…She says Donald asked her if she contacted SGI…”

Why the change?

Citing your dismissal letter:

"…Section 16(3) of the Code states:

 

(3) "No employment agency shall discriminate against any person or class of persons in receiving, classifying, disposing of or otherwise acting on applications for the agency's service or in referring an applicant or applicants to an employer or anyone acting on an employer's behalf on the basis of a prohibited ground."

Then in an incomprehensible reversal of continuity and logic you state:

"…question about their faith appeared to be a request for clarification. Since she was not doing the hiring herself, it does not offend Section 19 that she asked for this clarification, in my opinion…” [underline added]

When you state that; "…Since she was not doing the hiring herself it does not offend Section 19…" – Ms. Scott – isn’t that odd - since we are dealing with section 16(3) of the code: "employment agency"- not section 19: "employer"?

In the respondent's classification of our applications for services your assessment is that these questions had nothing to do with the respondent’s questionable disposing of our applications – well quite clearly that assessment has no basis within the facts - for you to state; "…question about their faith appeared to be a request for clarification…" - demonstrates the clear bias in this connection.

One is forced to ask - what manner of error is that – it is assuredly a clear misapplication – and just see the resultant inconsistency - the complaints had been filed under s. 16(3) – and with this error - a disposal of our rights to justice - is demonstrated.

To Cite again from your October 24, 2003 dismissal letter:

“…She [the respondent] says Donald asked her if she contacted SGI and this triggered the recollection of the e-mails he sent. She says she had previously done some quick research on the Internet after receiving those emails and discovered his website on Chakra. …” [underline added]

What is that supposed to indicate? I have no such “website” – yes there is a Chakra website – but I have no connection to it – further – just how did the respondent associate the SGI emails sent to her recruitment officer - to religion and Chakra?

Does this in any way abate the respondent’s culpability? Actually these comments demand further questions – questions not asked by SHRC!

Your dismissal letter claims:

"…Together, they engaged the services of Employment xxxxx Canada…"

Factually that is NOT the case - as SHRC well knows – this falsehood was advanced by the respondent - first in her questionnaire - that Devin was "confused" by the use of the word "we" - [used in ONE email].

You’ve used the words “we” and “us” in your correspondences – do you thus display a lack of individuality?

SHRC has endorsed an obvious feeble and untrue excuse.

Without doubt - the file shows that we submitted two resumes and two cover letters - in none of these are there any references to working 'as a team' etc., as alleged by the respondent.

This point was well covered in our 'Rebuttal Report to the Respondent's Questionnaire' - which "report" seems to have been fully ignored in this SHRC process and your subsequent dismissal.

The following quote evidences an important error within your dismissal suggesting concealment:

"…Donald would be referred for the Staples position in Customer Service and Ronald would be referred for the Staples position,…" [underline added]

“…Ronald would be referred for the Staples position,…” why do you omit the nature of the position as referenced by citing nothing after your comma!?

 

Why was the position Mr. Rehaume had been referred to at Staples NOT noted in your dismissal? Just what type of “position” was Mr. Rehaume referred to at Staples?

Clearly - it was a customer service position!

Within your dismissal letter - we note a biased endorsement of the respondent's motivated error concerning the “relevant customer service" experience of Mr. Rehaume:

"…She [the respondent] says the BMR client was looking for someone with a combination of technical and customer service skills, and EN did not feel Ronald had the customer service skills for the position..."

You undoubtedly reviewed the record of evidences - that Mr. Rehaume possesses a comprehensive customer service experience background - as is/was evident by information found within his resume and confirmed through his employment reference.

These facts were supplied to [and verified by] the respondent within their initial screening process.

In this regard - the dismissal letter - appears to demonstrate concealment.

The profiling, aspersion and disparagement advanced by the respondent [without any objective supports] as a defense is further embellished and endorsed within your dismissal letter:

"…He told us…that he was starting to be afraid of Mr. Muntean…he received some e-mails from Donald about SGI and the KGB, which scared him. He says Donald referred to the e-mails as his way of showing his transferable skills. He says he did not request examples of transferable skills. He says he then forwarded the e-mails to Linda, or thought he did, until Donald notified him that he actually sent them to him…"

Many questions beg to be asked here:

In what fashion, did these SGI emails “scare” the recruitment officer? Have you seen these emails?

Considering that the recruitment officer did in fact agree to receive/review these emails – as clearly evidenced by comments within the email sent to me [by the respondent] following this.

The respondent’s attempt at defamation as a defense - becomes egregious and is accepted [without question] as fact within your dismissal letter:

"…He says he felt so threatened by Donald and the harassment he was receiving that he almost considered looking for another job. He says there were times that he was fearful to leave work in case Donald was outside…"

Clearly the respondent has presented an atrocious and libelous material as a defense - without any objective supports!

Is it not surprising that being profiled without just cause would cause indignation?

What type of reaction would you expect from one who abhors violence – should SHRC not expect some resentment from me for SHRC’s having endorsed this flagitious fabrication?

Just what reasons underlie why has the respondent has NOT presented [nor SHRC requested] a police complaint [filed at that time!] - in this connection?

Why were these erroneous fabrications - NOT - recounted within the respondent's September 20, 2002 questionnaire?

The profiling and defamation – being employed as a defense by the respondent – has been arbitrarily endorsed by [a clearly biased] SHRC – just why does the respondent’s profiling take such a menacing tone - within your dismissal letter?

Additionally - within your letter of dismissal - Devin confuses his FYI email with my SGI emails:

"…He says he then forwarded the e-mails to Linda, or thought he did, until Donald notified him that he actually sent them to him …"

Ms. Scott – the preceding points are only a few concerning very obvious inequities that we have experienced at SHRC - there certainly are too many points to cover within this letter.

We assert that SHRC was willingly complotted - into the respondent’s [and others?] attempts to profile us – of course all starting at SHRC Intake – and even now - as evidenced by this noted February 19, 2004 letter.

Taken with the letter sent by Bill Rafoss [supervisor] on November 13, 2003 it clearly appears that there is an obvious effort at all levels of SHRC to evade answering legitimate questions regarding this matter – choosing instead to profile the legitimate victims.

At the end of the day - the respondent's culpability was ostensibly exonerated by means of a perfunctory investigation – which was poorly maneuvered through a biased presentation of the information - as fully evidenced through your dismissal and now the February 19, 2004 letter.

Just envision [if you can] the conundrum for a victim in being told - “We don’t cover Krishna here” - by a Human Rights Commission!

So when you write and tell me that you have contacted police - we regard it as yet another example of evasion and foundation setting for additional profiling.

You well know that we pose no [condemnable] threat to anyone – however – I am not so sure if we can afford our detractors the same ‘profile’…

All of which is respectfully submitted

Donald JK Muntean

---

Here is one of my submissions to a recent information and privacy commission hearing:

Donald J. K. Muntean

R. Gary Dickson, Q.C.

Saskatchewan Information and Privacy Commissioner

Regina, Saskatchewan

S4S 7G4

March 29, 2005

RE: SHRC Submission, dated February 15, 2005

Dear Mr. Dickson:

Thank you for providing a copy of Donna Scott’s submissions - with respect to their attempted justifications of their refusal to grant access to our human rights complaint file.

Indeed with this letter - the commissioner has presented an atypical defense.

Notwithstanding their attempt to make it sound authorized - it isn’t.

Our original supplement to your office dated March 08, 2004 and - our most recent January 19, 2005 submissions - contemplates and rebuts these arguments as submitted within the commissioner’s letter.

However, the commission has presented some egregious points within this letter and we certainly have no difficulty to demonstrate that these arguments are altogether out-of-context to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. [the Act]

A point-by-point redress best facilitates as a rejoinder method for the commissioner’s immaterial arguments.

“...I have refused to release the rest of the pages to the applicants because, in my opinion, they constitute documents to which an exemption...Section 15(1)© - refusal to give access to a record the release of which could interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation...The records that the applicants seek released have been compiled pursuant to an investigation into a complaint filed with the Commission by the applicants. The release of these documents would not interfere with this investigation because the investigation is complete...” [emphases added]

Here the commissioner has admitted that a release - would not interfere with the investigation into our human rights complaints - because the human rights process is completed.

Her “opinion” - [which we are to learn later in her letter] - is warped by some ill-applied discretion concerning the protection of the [so-called] privacy interests - of the [so-called] witnesses in their investigation - in her “opinion” - we are entitled to ‘nothing’ under the Act - nothing but - a refusal.

In an attempt to gloss over this statutorily incorrect refusal - we see the commissioner cite from your previous Reports - while disregarding the basic points of the Act.

As we have noted in our discussions - the commission presumes that they are not bound by disclosure provisions within the Act.

In their opinion - it makes no difference that [most of] the refused information is defined as our “personal information” - under the meaning of sections 24(1)(h) and 24(2)© of the Act.

Please allow us to cite these sections:

24(1) Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), “personal information” means personal information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form, and includes:

(h) The views or opinions of another individual with respect to the individual;

Of course this exemption - ‘subject to subsection (2)’ - is very important in the assessment of what happens with personal information when it is ‘administratively recorded’ information and at the same time constitutes - personal information:

(2) “Personal information” does not include information that discloses:

© The personal opinions or views of an individual employed by a government institution given in the course of employment, other than personal opinions or views with respect to another individual; [emphases added]

Of course the commission has also misapplied section 17(1)(b) of the Act in the refusal of their consultations and deliberations by preclusion of subsection (2).

17(1) Subject to subsection (2), a head may refuse to give access to a record that could reasonably be expected to disclose:

(b) consultations or deliberations involving:

(i) officers or employees of a government institution

(2) This section does not apply to a record that:

(b) is an official record that contains a statement of the reasons for a decision that is made in the exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function; [emphases added]

As we have noted previously in our Supplement - sections 5 and 31 of the Act delineate a twofold access right - as pertaining to - ‘records’ and - ‘personal information’.

We maintain that the application of section 15(1)© of the Act cannot be applied [especially] to the exclusion of sections 17(2)(b) and 24(1)(h) and 24(2)© of the Act.

It follows that the Act cannot be applied - so as to be self-defeating.

Practically speaking - the commissioner’s reasoning cedes an applicant’s rights to access to personal information under sections 5 and 31(1) of the Act.

If the interpretations of the commission are accepted - then how are these noted provisions abrogated?

“We submit that to release any of these materials would be to disclose information that is integral to the lawful investigation of the applicants’ complaint.”

The commissioner is attempting to present through too simplistic an assumption - that their refusal to release the noted information - is to be supported by your previous Reports - of course while citing them - there is a failure to understand your words:

“...In your Report 2004-006, you also note that this is a discretionary exemption.

 

“To exercise its discretion properly, the government institution must show that it considered the objects and purposes of the Act… and did not exercise its discretion for an improper or irrelevant purpose.”

 

In any case, my purpose was to maintain the integrity of the investigative process in a manner that respects the purposes of the Act...”[emphases added]

We do not feel that her purpose was as noted - because we later read:

“...Some of the statements indicate that the witness giving the statement feels a sense of harassment by the applicants. It is not within the purview of our work to determine whether this fear is based on reality.

However...these witnesses, who did not choose to come into conflict with the applicants, would not now wish their statements and corporate documents released to the applicants for any purpose other that (sic) that for which they were originally gathered...it would be much harder to get the co-operation of witnesses if we had to make them aware that anything they might provide us with could be scrutinized outside the human rights process and even after the complaint process was completed...” [emphases added]

Just who were these so-called witnesses that - “...would not now wish their statements and corporate documents released to the applicants...” - is it Saskatchewan Government Insurance and/or other government agencies?

The commissioner’s understanding of the explications within your Reports appears as dissimulated - as her interpretation of the Act:

“...In considering objects and purposes of the Act, in your Report 2004-003, you recognize that the underlying objective of freedom of information legislation is full disclosure and openness of agencies to public scrutiny...” [emphases added]

The commissioner here admits knowing these ‘objects and purposes’ - yet the commissioner ignores the relevance and function of “freedom of information legislation”.

To this end - the commissioner maneuvers a misrepresented rationalization:

“...The procedure under the Code has a very similar objective and makes extensive provision for the release of information integral to the investigation. When I dismiss a complaint, a complainant has the right to have a tribunal member review my decision under section 29.4 of the code...” [emphases added]

So in that statement we noted the commissioner’s factual deflection.

The commissioner’s attempted transfer of our access rights to the “code”- clearly bears witness to the commissioner’s illusory ‘overriding jurisdiction’ claims.

This issue with them that you’ve revealed to us months ago - has of course beleaguered this process since the start.

It incidentally seems incredible that the commissioner well accepts the authority of the Act where in her ‘opinion’ - it extends them provisions for refusals.

Certainly the true objectives and purposes of the Act are lacking within her contrived disclosure process - as an example - within her scheme - there exist no provisions - as outlined in sections 15(1)(d), 17(2)(b), 24(1)(h) and 24(2)© of the Act.

“...I believe the disclosure under this process provides the openness and transparency of action that is at the root of freedom of information legislation...” [emphases added]

Well whatever it is the commissioner claims to believe - isn’t relevant - again why the indirect references - to rights under the Act - in statements like “...at the root of...”?

Unarguably - access to information rights - are governed by the Act - not their “code”.

As you’ve been cited by the commissioner:

“...To exercise its discretion properly, the government institution must show that it considered the objects and purposes of the Act… and did not exercise its discretion for an improper or irrelevant purpose...”[emphases added]

Considering the commissioner’s elaborate apologetics in support of her position - it is sure that even the commissioner has perceived the fact that the commission hasn’t exercised it discretion properly - at this point we feel that this indicates concealment.

In any sense the Act is clear about an individual’s rights to access to records and personal information - that the commissioner has even endeavored to transfer statutory access rights to the “code” - shows that there is apprehension to release the information/records - and for what reason?

This quote best evidences the commissioner’s motivated nonchalance:

“...I recognize that your Report 2004-006 also establishes that the investigative purpose does not create a presumption that the release of any particular document would necessarily disclose information with respect to the investigation. That is a more complex matter...”

It isn’t so ‘complex’ - inasmuch as section 7 of the Act - which outlines the procedure of segregating records/information which are responsive to a request - such as ‘personal information’ - and to sever the non-responsive information [like third party names, addresses etc.,] - section 7 pre-supposes a release of the ‘record’ or document and - the responsive information - while severing the non-responsive information from the record or ‘document’.

“...Had the applicants wished to know all of the information that lead (sic) to the determination against them they could have sought a review under section 29.4 but chose not to do so...”

Well considering everything that happened is it any wonder that we ‘chose not to do so’ - notwithstanding that - who is going to file any appeal without seeing any of the information first - and considering that we were informed by the investigator J. Powell - on March 11, 2003 [by Email]:

“...At the end of the investigation, I will disclose to you and Mr. Rehaume what evidence has been gathered...” [Email from Powell Wed, 12 Mar 2003 09:45:17 -0600]

We were also told they would be sending us the ‘case report’.

So what happened? The commissioner’s comments are sort of like a kick in the head - especially considering the noted comments from the investigator.

“...Freedom of information and protection of privacy are joint objectives in the same legislation...” [emphases added]

Which legislation - certainly - the Act oversees these “objectives” - not the “code”.

“...It (sic) my view, when the applicants fail to avail themselves of the procedure that allows for full disclosure and transparency within the purposes for which the records were created, the privacy interests of those through whom the records have been created must be taken into account...” [emphases added]

In this we see more prejudiced reasoning - again it reads like that kick in the head just mentioned - and to say ‘within the purposes for which the records were created’ - is to disregard too much.

What are the potential reasons that applicants may wish to access their administrative records/information held by government institutions?

Well in this instance we experienced serious aberrations in the human rights process - starting at Intake. We surely see evidences that we need to examine further - and the Act delineates extensive provisions to this end.

Within the “code” [and in the Act] there are provisions that may be invoked when bad faith actions and/or omissions and/or decisions etc., are observed from commission staff.

Of course you well know all this - and more importantly - their Q.C. commissioner knows!

Their process is not exempt from examination under other enactments. We certainly see the motives for the commission to advance this superfluous-judicial argument.

“...All of the witnesses in this case, other than the applicants themselves, provided us with information in cooperation with a human rights investigation.

It is fair to say that they cooperated with us because of the operation of the law and not because of a personal interest in the applicants’ human rights...” [emphases added]

Later in the letter the commissioner states:

“...it would be much harder to get the co-operation of witnesses ...”

Yes they cooperated ‘because of the operation of the law’ - however - it more and more appears like the commission does not implement any information gathering standards in their investigations?

It goes without saying - there is no question of ‘cooperation’ for people who are solicited to give evidence - when they are real witnesses to a complaint - and just who are these ‘witnesses’?

Why are there so-called witness statements from outside the respondent’s business - are perchance these “witnesses” [with their false tales of harassment] - from SGI?

In the next quote we see the apparent possibility:

“...Some of the statements indicate that the witness giving the statement feels a sense of harassment by the applicants. It is not within the purview of our work to determine whether this fear is based on reality.

However, suffice it to say that these witnesses, who did not choose to come into conflict with the applicants, would not now wish their statements and corporate documents released to the applicants for any purpose other that (sic) that for which they were originally gathered...” [emphases added]

Who are these so-called witnesses - as there weren’t any witnesses to the original complaints ‘outside’ the scope of Respondent’s business?

The commissioner states that - It is not within the purview of our work to determine whether this fear is based on reality - then we must ask - what so-called evidence or information did these so-called witnesses submit into this investigation?

Considering the Respondent has alleged that we harassed them - did the commission go looking for others - who might appear to have had the same problem with us?

It’s all too coincidental - that it appears as though they used this point - that the witness giving the statement feels a sense of harassment by the applicants - but then the commissioner also says - It is not within the purview of our work to determine whether this fear is based on reality - what right did they have to collect and use these so-called statements?

What is the real reason - these witnesses...would not now wish their statements and corporate documents released to the applicants - is it motivated by some sense of ‘loss’ for these witnesses - as indirectly expressed in section 19(1)©(i) of the Act?

Notwithstanding - applicants are entitled to records and information - defined as ‘personal information’ - in section 24 of the act - in the form of opinions and views.

In our way of seeing - section 19(1)©(i) of the Act - doesn’t read like section 15(1)(d) of the Act - thus we posit that the commission shall not ultimately plead application of section 19(1)©(i) of the Act to conceal third-party legal liabilities.

“...In my view, taking the privacy interests of others into account is a legitimate purpose that is not improper or arbitrary...”

The privacy interests of their witnesses’ - isn’t at the center of this refusal - as noted by the commissioner herself - these witnesses...would not now wish their statements and corporate documents released to the applicants.

“...the first part of section 15(1)©, which allows me to exempt records, the release of which would interfere with an investigation. I note that this section does not refer only to the investigation to which the records relate, but an investigation...” [emphases added]

This is a clear example of the commissioner entering a totally irrelevant interpretation - I note that this section does not refer only to the investigation to which the records relate, but an investigation.

So let us look at the phraseology of section 15(1)© of the Act: interfere with a lawful investigation or disclose information with respect to a lawful investigation - the phrasing is in the present tense - double singular - “...a lawful investigation...” - for both parts.

Regardless the amount of circuitous argumentation the commissioner may apply - there simply isn’t foundation for the interpretation that the commissioner is alleging here.

“...When we ask witnesses to co-operate with us we make them aware of the fact that their assertions and their private corporate and other documents may be subject to public scrutiny within the adjudicative process...would be much harder to get the co-operation of witnesses if we had to make them aware that anything they might provide us with could be scrutinized outside the human rights process and even after the complaint process was completed...” [emphases added]

Why is the commissioner advancing this interpretation? Without question their file materials are subject to scrutiny outside the ‘human right process’.

The commissioner is augmenting this argument within her immaterial interpretations of section 15(1)© of the Act - as evidenced by the commissioner’s next comment:

“...I believe this would leave potential witnesses feeling very vulnerable and uncooperative. For this reason, disclosure of evidence would interfere with other investigations...” [emphases added]

Section 15(1)© is discretionary - reason indicates that it applies in the singular and in the present tense.

Logically - if one requested the information during the investigation - and such disclosure could interfere with the investigation - then it could be refused - the only legitimate reason that the head could refuse to disclose information - is if it would interfere with that investigation - that is what the wording of section 15(1)© conveys.

To say that the vulnerability of potential future witnesses - who may not thus cooperate with them in future investigations [knowing that they and their representations may be called to question outside the human rights process] is the reason that disclosure of evidence would interfere with other investigations is simply unacceptable - nor has this position foundation within the Act.

We assert that this elaborately manufactured interpretation is directed by a very real sense of a necessity for concealment.

The commissioner is well aware of these facts - and aware that they have taken too great an amount of time - in taking such a sidestep.

The next part of the commissioner’s letter deals with section 17 and three citations not noted in the commissioner’s February 03, 2003-refusal letter.

We have already discussed the section 17 material at length - however - there are a couple additional points to be broached.

First - the commissioner cites your Report [2004-001] with a view to justify a refusal based on a what appears as a - general interpretation - of consultations/deliberations.

Of course we maintain that a reading of section 17(1)(b) is to be contrasted to section 17(2)(b) of the Act.

We also submit that with application of the 17(2)(b) exemption - there must be a consideration of section 17(2)(f)(i) of the Act.

There also has to be consideration of section 24(2)© of the Act when disclosing consultations and deliberations.

According to the commissioner there were [only?] seven individuals generating records which are claimed as severable - under section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

“...There are also notes to the file which record general observations and opinions...”

As confirmed through section 24(2)© of the Act - applicants are entitled to ‘opinions and views given in the course of employment’ by officers and employees of government institutions - where they are about the applicant.

Logically - in what part of an ‘official record’ are ‘opinions and views’ recorded?

They would be [primarily] found within consultations and deliberations.

“...They expressed their opinions vigorously to our staff in our Regina office, and in the minds of the staff, created the potential for harm and breaches of security...” [emphases added]

The commissioner notes that it was our right to complain [but not that the complaints were justified] - our letters to them easily demonstrate what we were saying - thus anyone may comprehend the motives behind the commissioner’s interesting choice of words.

Particularly - potential for harm and breaches of security - this too was used in the so-called determination against us. Never was there any possibility of potential for harm and breaches of security.

Why is the commissioner ill-profiling us in this letter? If even indirectly.

The respondent claims [as their defense] that we harassed them - the before-mentioned [implausible outside] witnesses claimed that they felt a sense of harassment - and at last - so did the commission - pretty systematic profiling - if you ask us.

“...The records covered...a. Summaries, advice and opinions recorded in the course of employment to assist either me in deciding on the merits and course of action concerning the applicants’ complaint, or to assist those advising me for the same purpose,

 

c. To report conduct of the applicants for the purpose of determining whether there was a potential risk of harm or security concern...it was within the job duties of those making these records to record their opinions and observations for possible future action...” [emphases added]

In consideration of the first point - we would note that sections 17(2)(b) and 17(2)(f)(i) of the Act extends that an applicant should receive the records detailing - ‘advice and opinions recorded in the course of employment’ - as found in an adjudicative file.

We assert that the Act conducts an clear interpretation - that within adjudicative records which are classified as consultations or deliberations - wherein officers or employees of a government institution give and/or receive “advice or direction” on the file - it does not follow that these consultations or deliberations are severable.

With respect to the second point - they are in the words of the commissioner - ‘opinions and observations’ - and as noted under section 24(2)© of the Act - we are entitled to those - further - since the commissioner called and complained to the Regina City Police - it begs asking - what other profiling actions did they take - and - on whose behalf?

The commission entered significant problems into this process by saying - “we don’t cover Krishna here” - all the rest was a consequence of that.

For the commission there are now too many questions with no answers . . .

At last - the three citations not noted in the commissioner’s February 03, 2003 - response cover letter.

“...Section 22(a) . . . While the advice seems more practical than legal it is nonetheless based on our lawyer’s assessment of the legal rights and responsibilities involved, and is therefore covered by solicitor client privilege. In any event, this record is also exempted by section 17(1)(b) . . . ”

The commission cannot apply section 22(a) of the Act to these records - as Mr. Woodward isn’t an outside legal counsel - he being situated in their ‘legal department’ compels contradiction.

Practically speaking - Mr. Woodward is an officer-employee of the human rights commission.

As such - this information isn’t severable as per sections 17(2)(b) and [to a lesser extent] 24(2)© of the Act. What ‘practical advice’ is it to counsel one to make a mistake?

The points about section 29 - ‘personal information of other individuals in the respondents data base’ - allegedly used to contrast the services we received.

We are not interested in that information - it is irrelevant.

We understand what materials are severable under section 29 of the Act - and these exemptions do not impact the personal information and administrative records/information which are responsive to our request.

“...Section 31(2) These documents refer to personal information compiled solely for the purpose of determining qualifications for employment. These documents were acquired for comparative purposes in determining whether the applicants were discriminated against in relation to others. You will note that wherever section 31(2) is referred to there is also a reference to section 15(1) . . . ”

Section 31(2) of the Act is an exemption that is to be applied only if it were a government institution to which we had applied for employment.

Certainly section 31(2) of the Act cannot be applied by the commission to negate a proper interpretation/application of section 24 of the Act.

It appears odd that Mr. xxxxx generated this record on May 09, 2003 - before the human rights complaint process - yet the commissioner attaches section 15(1)© of the Act to it.

Thus - we come to the end of the too many aberrations within their defense of their process.

Whatever the numerous malfeasances they’ve been engaging in - it hasn’t at all stopped!

It is very soon to be three years since we heard them say - “we don’t cover Krishna here” - time seems to be of little consequence to the commissioner - as it isn’t her waiting for justice.

The human rights commission has dehumanized and dispossessed us with their process.

We will spare you our chronicle of suffering - you have endured its narration in the past - and the ‘official record’ likely speaks for itself.

The minister responsible was informed and was fully apathetic.

At the end-of-the-day - this obvious deficiency of a fair and impartial administration of the civil and legal rights of the people of Saskatchewan justifies reporting the entire matter to the federal justice minister - clearly unapologetic apathies - may even likewise be besmirching other judgments?

We respectfully ask that all our points be considered - within this letter and within the January 19, 2005 letter and of course in our original March 08, 2004 Supplement - as we are hopeful that nothing shall be overlooked - we do not wish to waste neither yours nor our time in repeating too much.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

 

Donald J. K. Muntean

Bhakta Don Muntean · January 29, 2007

Sometimes, nothing can be done. What, vidura was to kill bhisma, drona, karna, duryodhana, krpacarya because of the injustice their inaction allowed? He could have, you know, because he holds the diamond noose and rides the red buffalo, all those generals would have died by Viduras glance alone, but he just left the room.

Tis the nature of the world, which is why to be tolerant is recommended.

Hare Krsna, ys, mahaksadasa

Well in this case i say that - the rights of the many are measured by an enforcement of the rights of the few or - the one.

I know that He shall help us in this - it is without a doubt going to be a problem when the human rights commission finds themselves in court on February 06, 2007 - to answer to some of these issues.

Here is a copy of the notice of motion we filed - i may post my advance brief: