moksa

Now that I have finished my degree (with First class honours) I thought it might be nice to share one or two papers that I have written. However there are one or two font problems such as Kçùõa = Krsna but I am sure the drift of the work can be understood. The concept of the Absolute in Hinduism and Buddhism To discuss fully every aspect of the Absolute in Hinduism alone is beyond the scope of this essay. Similarly to give an answer to the concept of the Absolute after possibly three thousand years of philosophical debate would border on arrogance and would be open to much dispute. In light of this it is my intention to first give a brief account of the development of thought through the Vedic tradition into the Upaniùads and the first five major philosophical schools before examining the concept of the Absolute as perceived by possibly the three most influential Vedanta scholars, Śaükara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva; finally proceeding to examine notions of the Absolute in Buddhism. The idea of an Absolute begins in the Vedic tradition and is developed further through the Upaniùads and into other schools of thought. It is not however, until the school of philosophy known as Vedānta that the concept of an Absolute fully develops. In Buddhism the idea is initially avoided by Siddhārtha Gautama (the Buddha) but is seen as not possible by some scholars while it is hinted at by others. The earliest Veda is accepted as being the èg Veda (Knott 1998:14); it is a collection of myths often with the same event being attributed to different Gods (Flood 1996:46). It is possibly the earliest hint that all the Gods are in fact one but in different manifestations (Hiriyanna 1996:14). The Absolute in the Vedas is more abstract and is more argumentative than this simple explanation. The Creation Hymn (Nāsadīya) (èg Veda 10.129 Doniger O’Flaherty [tr.] 1981:25-26) suggests the notion of an absolute as the beginning of the universe. The ‘one’ (Ekam) is unknown and neither exists nor not exists and is described as being indistinguishable. What is ascertained is that the ‘one’ came before the gods; however, despite being described as singular there is a small paradox in that it becomes the creation and another exists at the end of the hymn, “the one who looks down on it.” However, possibly the most important point of note are verses 3 and 4 which will become even more relevant when discussing the concept of the Absolute in Buddhism; and that is that the ‘one’ arose through heat (tapas) from emptiness. Having said that, Hiriyanna (1996:15-16) points out that it is verse 2 and more precisely ‘that one’ (Tat Ekam) that is the closest concept of the Absolute developed in the Upaniùads to be found in the Vedas. Virtually all literature on Indian philosophy and Indian monism begins with reference to the concept of brahman as the Absolute in the Upaniùads (Hiriyanna 1996:15-16, 1993:56, Hamilton 2001:14-15, Smart 1964:24, King 1999:44). However, the concept of brahman in the Upaniùads is one of ‘truth’ or ‘Real’ as opposed to the general conception of an absolute. Even the well known phrase “tat tvam asi”, ‘that you are’, may be interpreted as a meaning of reality rather than Absolute. It is not until we begin to explore Indian philosophy and especially Vedānta, the school of philosophy based on the end of the Vedas, that brahman comes to be considered more of an Absolute than merely truth. It is generally accepted by modern scholars (King 1999:45, Hiriyanna 1993:183) that there are six main schools of philosophical thought in Hinduism; however, not all of these schools believe in an Absolute, and in those that do, the nature of the Absolute is not always agreeable. The first two of these schools, often grouped together because of their similarities, Nyāya and Vai÷eùika tend not to discuss the concept of an Absolute but rather discuss plurality and the independence of categories. Although their emphasis is on plurality, the later scholars such as Udāyana do believe in the existence of a singular God as the creator of all worlds (Potter 1977:527). In this respect he could be seen as a dualist who believes in an Absolute that is independent of the self. The third and fourth schools, Sāükhya and Yoga, are also usually grouped together. The Sāükhya School has many different theories on the Absolute including monism and dualism (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987:6) and the scholar Aniruddha even goes as far to prove the non-existence of a God (Larson and Bhattacharya 1987:341). The Yoga School is also unclear in its belief of an Absolute. Hamilton (2001:111) discusses the concept of Īśvara as either a dualistic over ‘Lord’ or as a state of yogic practice but gives no clear argument as to which it is. The Mīmā§sā School of thought connects the concept of brahman to language based upon the Vedas and the Upaniùads. Their ideas keep with the Upaniùads’ concept of brahman being an absolute of truth via language (Coward and Raja 1990:35). While each school of philosophy so far mentioned can relate to a certain aspect of brahman in the Upaniùads, it is language that allows us to identify via names, from names categories and truth can be realized. However, the concept of absolute truth is not precisely the same as an Absolute and the Mīmā§sā scholars although important in initiating and influencing the Vedānta School of thought remain lacking in the concept of an Absolute judged by this paper’s concept of the term as a Universal power. Although the said mentioned schools have their discussions on the Absolute, these tend to be in retaliation to competing schools by later scholars; it is the school of Vedānta that discussion and quest for the Absolute really begins in Hinduism. It is argued by both Flood (1996:238) and Klostermaier (1998:200) that Vedānta is one of the most important and influential schools of Hindu thought in the realm of theological and ontological debate. It is the emphasis on the concept of brahman in the Upaniùads as an Absolute in the Western sense of the term, a Universal power, that distinguishes Vedānta from the other schools. Vedānta meaning ‘end of the Vedas’, also known as Uttara Mīmā§sā meaning ‘The Later Exegesis’ contains several scholars and different view points (Potter 1981:3); however, it is generally the case that each of these scholars although interested in various literature, are principally concerned with the interpretation of three main texts, the Upaniùads, the Vedanta Sutras also known as the Brahmasutras or the Sarirakamimamsasutras, and the Bhagavadgita from within the Mahabrahata (Potter 1981:4-5). Although ten main schools of thought each viewing the Absolute differently have developed in Vedanta, three scholars have stood out from the rest, Śaükara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva. Śaükara, although not the founder (Potter 1981:6) of the Vedānta view of Advaita Vedānta, meaning non-dualism or monism, is accepted as the most important philosopher in Indian thought (Halbfass 1991:132, Smart 1964:97). What he does is to focus on the passages from the Upaniùads, such as Chāïóogya Upaniùad 6.2.1-3 and 6.1.4 that identify ātman (self) with brahman, which he identifies as being the Absolute (Hamilton 2001:125-126). Śaükara then suggests that because all ātman is identical to brahman which is singular, therefore, all ātman must also be singular and the idea of plurality is hence an illusion or māyā. From this, Śaükara deduces that the Absolute is the entire cosmos and is not separate; what we perceive and name as plurality is an illusion. However, because brahman is the only thing that in reality exists, then the illusion is also the Absolute. Śaükara identifies two levels of reality; the higher reality, paramārthika, where the Absolute is perceived as one of pure consciousness and the lower level, vyavahārika, is the reality perceived as illusion (Potter 1991:166). The illusion itself is beyond comprehension and therefore belongs to the higher level; this means that the illusion and the Absolute are one and the same (King 1999:215). King quotes Ramana Maharishi’s summarization of this concept as: 1. Brahman is real. 2. The universe is unreal. 3. The universe is brahman. However, within the lower level the Absolute is able to take form which it does on occasion in order to pass on wisdom. Śaükara, uses this analogy to permit that pūjā or worship is permissible as a means towards mokùa, however, at some stage one must abandon the concept of the lower reality so that knowledge and hence release can be achieved through the higher level (Smart 1964:100-101). To summarise, Śaükara’s concept of the Absolute is essentially one of monism, everything is the Absolute; however, he makes allowances that occasionally the Absolute decides to manifest as an Īśvara or Godhead within the illusion of itself to depart wisdom. What must be kept in mind is that everything is in truth a manifestation of the Absolute, not merely the Īśvara. Rāmānuja’s concept of the Absolute challenged the non-dualism of Advaita; although not the first to teach qualified non-dualism, Viśiùñādvaita, he remains the most famous philosopher in this field. What Rāmānuja did was to point out that everything cannot be the Absolute because to say so would suggest that each person was an Absolute individually; thus causing a myriad of different Absolutes which in turn is a contradiction of terms. He furthered this point of view by quoting the Chāïóogya Upaniùad (6.2.3) passage, “Being thought to itself, let me become many” (Hamilton 2001:134). Instead, he argued that there is no illusion but only reality and this worked on two levels. Rāmānuja’s theory was that each person has a body and ātman, while the body changes through age and time, the ātman remains constant. By applying his theory to the cosmos, Rāmānuja was able to suggest that the changing cosmos was the body of the Absolute and not an illusion but that the ātman of the Absolute remains constant. The ‘body’ of the Absolute is the means in which the ātman experiences (Smart 1964:106-114). He maintains a sense of monism by allowing the Absolute to be the inner controller of us all, but each of us remains to a certain extent distinct and pluralistic in nature (Flood 1996:244), much like an arm differs to a leg but the inner controller of the body is said to be the mind. What Rāmānuja was saying is that the Absolute’s monistic nature is the subconscious but our conscious and atman remains, to a certain degree, autonomous as part of the changing ‘body’ in order for the Absolute to experience. Furthermore, Rāmānuja suggests that because the body of the Absolute is the cosmos, it is not only our inner controller but also our outer controller because it influences what we experience, much like a master to his servant; the servant remains to a certain amount autonomous but remains linked to the master’s commands that form an outside influence. Finally, Rāmānuja gives an almost ironic twist to the concept in that not only atman cannot exist without brahman, but brahman cannot exist without ātman (Hamilton 2001:132). Madhva the leading Dvaita or Dualism scholar, rejected monism altogether and declared that the Absolute was completely separate from its creation. His argument was to stress the differences between objects, including people’s ātman, rather than show their interdependence and similarity. By showing that, no matter how similar things appeared everything in the cosmos was unique and different from everything else, Madhva was able to conclude that the Lord or Absolute was also different from everything else. However, Madhva perceived the Absolute as that which controlled not only the Universe but also our inner selves as an “inner witness” (Flood 1996:246); without the Absolute, nothing would function or exist. Although the Absolute was timeless and resistant to change, its nature caused time and the cosmos to change. The concept of the Absolute that developed in Indian Buddhism, however, generally rejects the concept of Dvaita given by Madhva, although later schools of Buddhism outside of India that developed ideas such as the concept of the Amida Buddha remarkably mirror Madhva’s thought. It becomes difficult to disassociate the non-Indian ideas that entered such schools of Eastern Buddhist thought because many of them attempt to associate their school with India by the use of Sanskrit and talk of famous Indian teachers such as Nāgārjuna (Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai 1993:542). However, without doubt, the concept of the Absolute in Buddhism remains firmly in the Mahāyāna tradition or more precisely in Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamaka philosophy. Although pūjā is performed in the Theravādin tradition, even by monks, the concept of an Absolute is not truly accepted within the philosophical tradition. The Buddha in Theravādin philosophical tradition is not perceived as an Absolute, but is worshipped for guidance in much the same way as Confucius in Taiwan. Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamaka philosophy, rejects the concept of an Absolute as being contradictory to Buddha’s teachings and his own theories that it is not possible for an independent entity to occur and hence only emptiness truly exists (Gethin 1998:240, Hamilton 2001:105). However, his theories were developed by the likes of Bhāvaviveka, Candrakãrti, and Śāntideva to express the concept of emptiness as a kind of Absolute. The idea was based on the doctrine of origination where everything is caused through its relation to something else, for example, one’s past life causes your next life. However, this implies that everything has inner connection that is identical in its true relationship, yet, it also implies that there are two entities that are different from one another (Smart 1964:54). By showing that the inner connection is emptiness, it becomes a kind of Absolute that connects all things. If everything is emptiness then this also applies to nirvāõa and the state of Buddhahood. The Buddha being in nirvāõa becomes emptiness and because it is emptiness that connects the relationship of everything, the Buddha comes to be represented as a kind of Absolute. Having lost his difference in attaining nirvāõa the Buddha becomes one with that which is the same. The concept has many similarities with Śaükara’s concept of mokùa and brahman. However, the reality of an Absolute in Indian Buddhism remains hazy and is often denied because of its empty nature. It truly develops through Wang Yangming Confucian philosophy that blends Chinese Confucian thought with Chan Buddhism and becomes very influential in Japanese Buddhism but this line of thought was developed outside of India and is hence not relevant to this essay. I have shown a wide range of conflicting concepts of the Absolute in Indian Hinduism and Buddhism that allows me to conclude that there is no one correct concept of the Absolute in either Hinduism or Buddhism. The fact that an Absolute exists within the literature of these two religious traditions is not in doubt even though many would deny its relationship to Buddhism and Hinduism. What is in doubt, however, is the nature of the Absolute and its function in Indian religion; here lies the argument that is only touched upon in the limited scope of this essay.

Now that I have finished my degree (with First class honours) I thought it might be nice to share one or two papers that I have written. However there are one or two font problems such as Kçùõa = Krsna but I am sure the drift of the work can be understood. “Abandon all dharmas and instead seek shelter with me alone. Be unconcerned, I shall set you free from all evils.” (The Bhagavadgītā 18:66). Before any discussion can take place about the above quotation, it is important to look at what is meant by dharma. Unfortunately the concept of dharma is too complex to go into great detail in this paper and is worthy of study in itself. There are a myriad of definitions given for dharma, such as Klostermaier’s (1998:58) definition of ‘law’ or Sharpe’s (1985:8) definition that it is seen as “the sacredness of moral duty”. Bhattacharya (1992:25-38) on the other hand devotes a whole chapter on the discussion and concludes that it has many different meanings and levels depending on the situation at hand. He summarises dharma as being “righteous, truth, morality, performance of duty, observance of religious duties, to maintain universal canons of law, justice and equity” (Bhattacharya 1992:31) which all form part of a larger virtue. For the purpose of this paper I do not wish to continue the subject of what dharma is because it detracts from my main study; for this reason, I will simply use the word dharma and allow the reader to determine their own definition of the term. The most interesting aspect of the above passage is that it appears to be in complete contradiction to the message given in the rest of the Bhagavadgītā. The main theme of the Bhagavadgītā, which forms a part of the Mahābhārata, is that dharma has gone into decline and the God Kçùõa has appeared to restore the balance (Flood 1996:125). It is therefore, interesting that in the above passage, Kçùõa is saying to Arjuna that he should abandon dharma. What is meant by this passage is the discussion to be set forth in this paper. I have identified two major interpretations for the above passage and two minor possibilities not usually considered by scholars. I will, hence, begin by first looking at the two lesser possibilities that the dharma of going to battle is in contradiction to the rules of āpaddharma when a king is said to be in distress, set out in the Śāntiparvan section of the Mahābhārata and/or Kçùõa is playing Arjuna to his advantage. I will then view a more orthodox explanation given by Śaükara, that Kçùõa is the universe and hence dharma is not as important as first indicated. Finally, I will conclude with the most acceptable reason that only the dharma taught by Kçùõa is correct dharma because he is not only the guardian of, but is dharma. The Āpaddharma Parvans that form part of the Śāntiparvan (12) section of the Mahābhārata, discuss the dharma of the king when faced with distress and the possibility of losing the kingdom. It is stated in the Mahābhārata (12.128.18-19) that when a king is faced with ruin he “should not endeavour to save his Dharma or that of another at his own cost…” (Walimbe 1990:70). It is stressed that his life is superior to that of either artha or dharma (Walimbe 1990:84). However, it is mentioned that the king that chooses to fight to protect his dharma against overwhelming odds, is guaranteed Indra’s heaven upon death. Yet, this is not to achieve liberation at death but to attain heaven instead. It is better to follow the dharma of another caste until such a time that the kingdom can be reclaimed safely than it is to endanger one’s life needlessly (Walimbe 1990:71, 85). How is this relevant to the title’s quotation? Surely, it is not the realm of the Mahābhārata but the realm of the Bhagavadgītā that needs to be discussed? It is important to keep in mind that the Bhagavadgītā forms part of the Mahābhārata and was never truly supposed to be considered as a separate text (O’More in van Buitenen 1981:ix), with this in mind it is permissible to use other parts of the whole text to attempt the understanding of one passage. If it is also kept in mind that the above quotation was directed at Arjuna, a prince who is about to battle a greater army in the attempt to claim a kingdom for his brother, then the rules of āpaddharma become very relevant. The question then becomes a one of whether or not Kçùõa is attempting to tell Arjuna that he should leave the place of battle and abandon his dharma because he is outnumbered and risks losing the battle. Although it could be argued that, as I will discuss below, Kçùõa is brahman and to abandon the battle that cannot be won would increase the chance of attaining liberation through Kçùõa rather than dieing in battle to attain Indra’s heaven; it would be incorrect to argue such a case because Arjuna does not state the seeking of liberation as his reason for wishing to leave the battle. Rather Arjuna’s reason for not wishing to fight is because he sees killing his own kin as breaking with dharma (The Bhagavadgītā 1:31, 1:36-45; Sastry [tr.] 1977:14-17). For this reason, Kçùõa seeks to clarify that the dharma of class, varõāśrama dharma or sva-dharma, is greater than that of general dharma, sādhāraõa dharma, which includes family and the wider society; that is Arjuna’s class as a Kùatriya, has the dharma of a warrior that needs to be performed as his own duty (The Bhagavadgītā 2:31-33; Sastry [tr.] 1977:55). However, van Buitenen (1981:3) reports that “…on the level of dharma Arjuna will be proved to have been right [not to fight]…” If Kçùõa’s advice to Arjuna is to do battle when it is later stated that to fight against the odds and to fight against one’s kin is to be avoided, can Kçùõa be trusted? Sharpe (1985:76) points out that in popular folklore Kçùõa is depicted “as a youthful and mischievous ‘trickster’”. It is possible that the Kçùõa of the Bhagavadgītā has not lost any of his mischievous nature and may be seeking to trick Arjuna into abandoning his dharma at the very end of his discussion as a final means to convince him to commit and stand the chance of losing the battle. Certainly, despite his godly nature, Kçùõa appears not to know or care for the outcome of the battle (The Bhagavadgītā 2:37-38; Sastry [tr.] 1977:57). Although Sharpe (1985:76) suggests that the Kçùõa of the Bhagavadgītā is seen as a “mature leader of men” as opposed to his popular depiction, van Buitenen (1981:4) points out that earlier in the Mahābhārata, Kçùõa sends his men to fight on the opposing side, while he himself, takes a non-combative role as a charioteer in the battle. While Kçùõa, who also is a Kùatriya and as such has the same dharma duties as Arjuna, has cleverly avoided his sva-dharma and preaches to Arjuna the opposite of what he is doing. It would appear upon second glance that Kçùõa is on the opposing side to Arjuna and has taken his non-combative role as a charioteer in order to offer bad advice and possibly even spy. However, the depiction of Kçùõa is not one of a human nature in the Bhagavadgītā but one of a god in the form of an Avatar, a god in human form. It could be argued that the reason Kçùõa is in this position is because he is there to restore dharma and would therefore not offer false advice on the subject to Arjuna (The Bhagavadgītā 4:7-8; Sastry [tr.] 1977:121). Yet, as a god, Kçùõa falls into the trap that the Bçhadāraõyaka Upaniùad (1.4.10; Olivelle [tr.] 1996:15) sets, in that gods not wishing to lose men as ‘livestock’, are not to be trusted in the affairs of attaining liberation. This is especially potent when one considers that Kçùõa “persuaded Yudhisthir to speak a lie for the defeat and killing of Drona…” (Bhattacharya 1992:26) and claimed that such an act was not adharma, against dharma; considering that the whole basis of Indian religion is based upon the search for truth to escape the ‘big lie’ of illusion, māyā it becomes increasingly difficult to trust Kçùõa’s words concerning dharma. However, is Kçùõa really pertaining to be a god or is he simply realising a higher truth that forms the basis of Śaükara’s philosophy that everything is part of brahman? If this is the case then Arjuna is no different to Kçùõa; if Kçùõa is brahman, he is no different to anybody saying, ‘I am brahman.’ Although much is suggested that Kçùõa is the same as brahman, Kçùõa does not actually state it, rather it is left to Arjuna to make the statement and this is left unconfirmed (The Bhagavadgītā 10:12-13; Sastry [tr.] 1977:266). Kçùõa does say that he is the foundation or the abode of brahman (The Bhagavadgītā 14:27; Sastry [tr.] 1977:394) but this does not imply that he is one and the same as brahman. What Kçùõa does is to teach what brahman is and how to attain it and it is this teaching that could be deemed as being the ‘foundation of brahman’. Śaükara’s interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā (5:8; Sastry [tr.] 1977:419) includes “…this whole universe is unreal…neither are dharma and a-dharma its basis.” He looks at the fact that if what we experience in the now is unreal, then dharma is also unreal and should be abandoned. Furthermore, part of Kçùõa’s teaching includes that in order to reach brahman and liberation, one must abandon all desire and perform action without gaining karma (Flood 1996:125). Arjuna places great importance on dharma and this in itself can be viewed as attachment; by performing his dharma religiously, Arjuna is creating attachment to karma through his desire to do what is morally correct. Kçùõa by saying to Arjuna, ‘abandon all dharmas,’ and this is meant for Arjuna’s ears alone (Bhagavadgītā 17:63; Sastry [tr.] 1977:497), he is attempting to release Arjuna from the attachment to dharma. Alternatively, if it is to be assumed that everything is brahman, then dharma and adharma are also brahman and can hence be dismissed as both being the same, as per Śaükara’s interpretation above. This is suggested from the beginning of the Bhagavadgītā when Kçùõa appears to see no difference on which side is to win because both sides are in reality the same. Neither group is capable of death or birth because in brahman they cease to be individual/independent entities; only brahman exists. Arjuna fails to distinguish this reality and believes the illusion that the battle is to occur between two separate entities and thus attempts to cling to dharma (Bhagavadgītā 2:16-30; Sastry [tr.] 1977:34-54). Yet, Arjuna’s concept of the ‘oneness’ of family may also hint at the oneness of the situation at hand. Arjuna’s objection may simply be a metaphor against fighting within yourself, in which case it is Kçùõa that has initially failed to grasp the reality of the situation but only towards the end of the discussion comes to realise and asks Arjuna to abandon his dharma; after all it is Arjuna that identifies Kçùõa all encompassing nature with brahman. In such a situation there exists a paradox of ideas, on the one hand there is Arjuna with his dharma suggesting that it is wrong to fight your family possibly not only because they are family but also because they are in reality one with your self through brahman; on the other hand, there is Kçùõa’s argument that it is acceptable to fight because in reality there is only the oneness of brahman and hence you are not fighting anyone. Thus far, I have looked at the reasons why to abandon dharma without actually looking at the second part of the quotation, and that is to ‘seek shelter with me alone.’ If it was to be assumed that Kçùõa is one and the same as brahman then this would simply imply the above argument to abandon attachment to dharma in order to achieve liberation through brahman, but suppose Kçùõa is not the same, or does not imply this meaning. It is possible to interpret this part of the sentence along with the second sentence as someone removing ‘false’ dharma and replacing it with new ‘correct’ dharma. This is more likely when one recalls how Kçùõa refers to himself as the restorer of dharma (The Bhagavadgītā 4:7-8; Sastry [tr.] 1977:121). It is often puzzlement to commentators and readers alike, as to why the Mahābhārata appears to condone a variety of sins, such as gambling, fighting a war with one’s own family, lying, and so forth (Bhattacharya 1992:178). Walimbe (1990:123) writes that with in the Śāntiparvan (12) section of the Mahābhārata there exists a discussion between Bhīùma and Yudhiùñhira where it is advised to “discard” dharma that has been given falsely or by those who themselves do not practice it. It is also mentioned to be wary of those who teach against dharma and scripture. Here, there are two arguments, the first has already been mentioned that Kçùõa by being a charioteer is failing to practice his own dharma and is therefore suspect, and the second argument is that dharma before Kçùõa’s arrival was corrupt and hence the multitude of unexplainable sins. Therefore, it could be argued that Kçùõa in the said passage is telling Arjuna to abandon this ‘false’ dharma and instead follow the new correct dharma provided by him, the restorer of dharma, which keeps more in line with Vedic scripture and the Upaniùadic discussions of brahman. By ‘restoring’ the scriptural element to the ‘new’ dharma it also lays to rest many of the arguments against Kçùõa’s intentions and by being the charioteer, Kçùõa, the god is able to maintain an advisory position without compromising his own karmic actions. To conclude, I have looked at a myriad of arguments as to the meaning of the title’s quotation. Firstly, I looked at the possibility that the reason to abandon dharma is to avoid losing one’s life in battle and continued the argument to cast doubt on Kçùõa’s intentions. I then looked at the possibilities that lie behind the much talked about brahman within the Bhagavadgītā and its various implications to the abandonment of dharma. Finally, I conclude that the most plausible explanation for the quotation is that Kçùõa has appeared to restore dharma; this would suggest that dharma was in decline or being falsely taught and because dharma is the focus of Arjuna’s problem, it is more likely that it was being taught incorrectly. It is, therefore, my belief that the most plausible answer to the abandonment of dharma is in fact the ‘old’ wrongly taught dharma and the shelter being offered by Kçùõa is the teachings of his new dharma that is more in line with Vedic scripture and the concept of brahman.

Hello friend, Newcastle University is planning a deal with Durham University where the Religion department at Newcastle will close in return for the linguistics department at Durham closing. There will be a transfer between the universities of some staff but the department at Newcastle will cease and provisions made not to open religion at Newcastle in the future. This would mean that the only place in the North East of England offering Religion at degree level will be the limited Theology department of Durham (note that Durham has already closed its Middle East and Islamic department). If this closure goes ahead (and decisions have already been made) there will be no Hinduism being taught in Universities in the North East of England. I urge you, therefore, to make the Hindu communities in the UK aware of this. It is important that we promote inter-faith and inter-community understanding and give people the opportunity to learn about Hinduism at degree level, even if they choose not to follow it. You might think why Religion is important for the North East. We currently live in a multi-ethnic society where Newcastle is about to open an Islamic school. There are synagogues, sikh, Hindu, and ISKCON (Hare Krishna) temples, and mosques as well as a host of Christian denominations in Newcastle and Buddhist temples in the surrounding areas, much of the study for students of Religion at Newcastle involves visiting these places of worship and interacting with the local ethnic communities. Only Christianity exists in Durham. It is important that people have an opportunity in the North East to study about these cultures and promote harmonious relations within these diverse communities. The removal of Religion from Newcastle will have an affect that the poorer students who are unable to afford moving away from the area and those planning on doing Post Graduate courses will be unable to study the diverse course of Religious Studies in the North East of England. Furthermore, obligatory College fees at Durham as well as the standard tuition fees increases the cost for the poorer student wishing to study. Unlike Durham, Newcastle's course covers a wide range of different religions including New Religious Movements (cults) and Neo-Shamanism (New Age movement) as well as the mainstream topics such as Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Indian Philosophy, Christianity, Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The loss of such a department is the final slap in the face for Newcastle's bid to be a capital of culture, when it is unable to even offer a degree course in what is basically cultural understanding. There will be no difference in paying the current staff and paying the incoming linguistic staff as far as funding is concerned. However, this is purely a financial decision by the University that sees linguistic research as generating more money than religious research. The students at the university have not been properly consulted and plans have already been made in their absence. I hope that you will all be vocal in your support at preventing this loss to the North East of England and any letters being addressed to the University should be made to the Vice Chancellor. Thank you

Hsiang-kuo once said of Tao, "Some people say that the penumbra is produced by the shadow, the shadow by the bodily form, and the bodily form by the Creator. I would like to ask whether the Creator is or is not. If He is not, how can He create things? But if He is, He is simply one of these things, and how can one thing produce another?... Therefore there is no Creator, and everything produces itself..." Nagarjuna formulated a very similar argument. You are asking how nothing can create something. However, is nothing not also something? what Nagarjuna and Hsiang-kuo were saying is that if nothing is something then what created nothing? However, Nothing is that which is and is not simultaneously. By nature the void is free of something, but the void is there is it not? if the void is there, then is also must exist. If it also exists then it is no longer a void. The ultimate paradox. The problem with describing Brahman or Tao is giving names to a quality that very few people can grasp. Hence the reason why rsi in the past were reluctant to give it such names and qualities. What one must think is that if there is no nothing, then the alternative must be something, even if that something is undescribable because it is beyond the concept of our language or mind. This is what some of the later buddhists in zen were trying to say, if you have the one, that is the void, then the void too must exist, take away the one, and what do you have? that is nirvana. However, what I am saying is that even if you take away the void, then something must be there, and what then created that something? the void by its very nature can only be made by the absence of something. Before something is created then there must have been nothing. There are only two realities, nothing, or something. If there is nothing, then nothing also must be something, it is that which neither exists nor not-exist. It's very nature is the absence of something, but its very existence makes it something. If it is removed, then there is something that exists, and where did it come from? For example, only 1 and 0 exist in mathematics, everything else is merely an abstract term to describe the relationship of these two realities. If I had 1p and you gave me 1p we would say I had 2p, but what I had would not be a 2p coin, it would in reality be 1p and 1p, 2p therefore is just an abstract term to describe the relationship between 1p and 1p. The concept 1 can be viewed as matter or something, and the concept 0 that of nothing or void. If it is not 1 then it must be 0. Where Nagarjuna diverts from Hsiang-kuo is that he recognises that a thing cannot create itself, nor something create it. But Nothing in its very nature is capable of creating it. It does not exist, but at the same time it exists. The later Buddhist may say that the world is like an empty pot, but the pot is actually full, only they are unable to see. Without the space, there would be no pot. They might say that the world is like an empty room, but without the space, there would be no room. It is the emptiness that creates the pot and the room. Probably a poor example. An atom contains more space than matter, yet our eyes are unable to see the interconnecting web of vacuum, nor does it see the little islands of matter in this space. Instead we perceive the world as being solid matter. The void is everywhere, both within and without, only we don't see it. moksa

The main theme for the vedas is sacrifice and maintaining rta (the cosmic order). Krsna is not mentioned in the vedas. The general theme is that everything is interconnected like a spiders web. Sacrifice is a means to maintain this cosmic order, that which happens in the microcosm will be reflected in the macrocosm. By not performing ones duty of sacrifice one creates disharmony in the cosmic order and brings down catastrophe. It is therefore the duty of every hindu to maintain sacrifice and duty to maintain the cosmic order. What Krsna means when he refers to himself in this way, is that he too is rta. He is the web so to speak. However, this is not unique to Krsna. We are all the web, we are all rta. This is thought that is developed in the Upanisads. In the actual vedas this line of thought is still being developed but it is possible to argue that the vedic tradition was already beginning to realise this. By realising that we too are the web, we realise that we too are krsna and we achieve moksa through this line of thought. moksa

I am just going to leave this as an open question for discussion. How is the question of 'Do we see things as they are?' answered in the different traditions of Indian thought? moksa

That which is and is not? only 'nothing' can be the answer. The nature of 'nothing' is that which is and that which is not. If there is no Nothing, then there must be something. If something exists, where did it come from? Hence something can not create something because where did the first something come from? However, if there is nothing, then nothing must exist as nothing. If it did not exist then there would be something. Hence the nature of nothing is that which exists and does not exist simultaneously. Secondly, Shankara says we are all Brahman, Ramanuja says we are all part of Brahman but we are none of us are actually Brahman in the whole, Madhva says that Brahman is outside of ourselves and is separate. In another mailing I suggested that all three answers are correct. If Brahman is 'nothing' then nothing exists both within and without us. There is more void in an atom than there is matter, yet our eyes are unable to see this, just like the salt in a glass of water. However, nothing is also without everything. The largest matter in the universe, the universe itself must be surrounded by nothing. Nothing is simultaneously the largest/greatest thing in the universe and the smallest. It is that which cannot be surrounded except by itself, and it is that which has no form. Finally, If nothing exists then nothing gives rise to thought. I think therefore I am = I am therefore I think. If that which thinks exists, then that which exists thinks. If we look at Brahman in the beginning, it neither existed nor not existed. It realised itself and became atman. ie self realisation of existence. From thought and realisation came desire (Agni) to create and hence not be lonely. The subject area appears to be something that is trying to discover its meaning. From the above, my question is, 'Is Brahman nothing?' If Brahman is nothing, and Krsna identifies with Brahman, then is not the nature of Krsna also Nothing? moksa

When Krsna said that there are three ways to salvation what did he mean? Surely in order to practice karmayoga one must first have knowledge of jnanayoga or how can one realise karmayoga. Secondly, bhaktiyoga never really meant puja, when did it come to refer to puja? Bhaktiyoga was initially contemplation of Krsna, hence once again it is in reality jnanayoga. Through contemplation of the nature of krsna in the Gita, one realises that krsna and Brahman are in fact one and the same, that we are all part of Krsna and Krsna is part of us, that we are no different, just like Shankara's concept of Brahman. So is there three paths to moksa, or just one? moksa