advaita.org.uk - Quarterly Journal 05 - April 2010

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Journal of advaita.org.uk - no. 05 - April 2010

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consciousness and the Brain

The Book of One [second Edition] Extract | Essay on Consciousness & the Brain | Q & As

 

 

 

In this issue, please differentiate ‘Consciousness’, with a capital ‘C’ from ‘consciousness’; and ‘Self’, with a capital ‘S’, from ‘self’. The words with capital letters refer to brahman/Atman and with lower case to the individual person. Since the chArvAka does not believe in brahman, he will never talk about Consciousness with a capital ‘C’! (N.B. At the beginning of sentences, the reader will have to exercise viveka!) E.g. Humans exhibit consciousness only by virtue of Consciousness. Indeed, this could be the summary of the entire journal…

Extract from the newly published ‘The Book of One’

 

 

 

 

 

WHAT DO WE actually mean by the word ‘conscious’? It derives from the Latin ‘con scire’ meaning ‘to know with’ and it originally referred to the insights that were shared with other people, i.e. knowledge in the sense of truths, not information. Later, it came to be used when talking about knowledge that was, to some degree, secret, shared only amongst a few.

Even by the first century AD it was being used for private knowledge, known only to the individual. When the Latin was absorbed into the English language, it was used to create two words. ‘Conscious’ was used to refer to private thoughts and emotions, which no one else could share directly and ‘conscience’ was used for private knowledge deliberately withheld from others and therefore likely to make one feel guilty. Here again then, we have an example of a word whose current usage is now the opposite of its original meaning. Instead of sharing with others, we are keeping it to ourselves.

Nevertheless, we think we know what consciousness is. We are fully conscious when we are awake. We become unconscious if we are knocked out or given a general anesthetic and when we are in a deep sleep. And dreaming is somewhere in between, isn’t it? We might suggest that there are some other states, such as hypnosis, meditative trance or drug-induced hallucination and we would almost certainly claim that consciousness ceases altogether when we die.

If pressed, we might argue that it is something that has evolved in step with increasing complexity of the brain; that it is something that plants do not have, animals have a little and us a lot. When it comes to the crunch, we would probably concede that we really do not have any solid ideas about what it actually is, though we would be in no doubt at all that we have it.

On the face of it, you will be reassured that Advaita agrees with our experiential observation that we are usually aware of three basic states viz. waking, dreaming and deep sleep. As you will also have expected by now, however, the philosophy’s description of these states is not quite how we might have described them.

The Upanishad that deals in the greatest depth with the subject is the Mandukya, with its kArikA by Gaudapada. We know now, or to be strictly honest with ourselves, we know that this philosophy says that there is only One Self, Atman or brahman. Nevertheless, this appears to manifest in various ways and the sages and scriptures have to work backwards, through negation and inference in order to ‘explain’ or enable us to intuit the nature of reality. This Upanishad demonstrates how it is the same Consciousness that functions throughout and ‘witnesses’ all three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. It uses the states of consciousness in order to ‘talk about’ reality and begins by saying that the manifestation has four facets or aspects. (In fact the

Upanishad itself, as distinguished from the commentary, is very short and uses the mantra ‘OM’ as a very powerful metaphor to explain all of this. However, since it would necessitate a substantial diversion into Sanskrit to benefit from this, I will ignore it here. My book, OM: Key to the Universe, will cover all this if I ever find time to write it…) The first of these states is called jAgrat. This is the waking state and the waker-ego, called vishva, is conscious of the gross, physical, external world of sense objects. In the waking state, the ‘individual’ is complete (vishva = whole) with all its faculties of senses and mind. The second state is called svapna, meaning ‘sleep’, but only for the body – the mind remains active. This is the dreaming state and the dreamer is called taijasa. In this, the dreamer is conscious of the subtle or internal world of objects, i.e. thoughts, feelings, etc., but is unaware of the external world. In the dreaming state, Consciousness effectively projects the world of the dream from its own ‘light’ and the dream ‘consists’ of this ‘light’ of the mind (taijasa = ‘originating from or consisting of light’).

The third aspect is suShupti, meaning ‘excellent rest’ since both body and mind are now resting in the deep-sleep state. The sleeper-ego is called prAj~na, literally meaning ‘intelligent’, ‘wise’ or ‘intelligence’. In the deep-sleep state, the sleeper sees neither the external nor internal worlds of objects. The senses and mind are inactive and nothing is experienced, i.e. there is no perception or conception. The state is governed by ignorance (avidyA) but there must be some vestige of awareness since, for example, if someone calls our name, we will probably wake up. During this state there is no ‘knowing’ of anything nor appearances of any kind. prAj~na can also be translated as ‘the one who is nearly ignorant’. Because Consciousness is still present, the self is

not totally ignorant, but nearly ignorant. It is said to be a state of pure consciousness and bliss, precisely because there is no mental agitation but, since there is no knowledge, we are not directly aware of this. It is said that here the Self is identified with avidyA.

The fourth aspect is not actually a ‘state’ at all – it is called turIya – and it is characterized by neither ignorance nor error. But I will not say anything more about this for the moment; it is not something with which most of us are familiar.

The pure consciousness of deep sleep can be considered to emerge, either to illuminate the subtle world of thoughts and emotions, as we become the dreamer, or to illuminate the external world, as we become the waker. In deep sleep, there is only ignorance – we do not also misperceive the world, mistaking a rope for a snake for example, because there is no perception at all. There is thus ignorance but no error or misperception. This non-apprehension is the same as the ‘veiling power’ of mAyA – AvaraNa. In dreaming and waking, the ignorance is still there but, with the mind and senses now active, we additionally fall into error – we misapprehend reality. This misapprehension ‘effect’ follows from the ignorance ‘cause’ of non-apprehension. Misapprehension is vikShepa, described

earlier as the projecting power of mAyA.

If we could see the rope, we would not mistake it for a snake. The misapprehension occurs under the conditions in which there is partial ignorance – we can see that there is something there but not sufficiently clearly to make out that it is a rope. Thus, the (partial) ignorance is the effective cause for the error. (Note that, if there is total ignorance – i.e. we cannot see anything at all – there is no error either. We cannot see the rope in order to mistake it for a snake. Hence the expression ‘ignorance is bliss’!) This explains why the deep-sleep state is known as the ‘causal’ state. In that ignorance is the potentiality for all manifestation in the dream and waking states.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Consciousness is that in which all else appears. It is there when there appears to be nothing. It can be thought of as the silence between thoughts or as the screen, upon which the movie of life is projected, unaffected by all, yet without which there would be nothing. Sri Poonja asked what we would see if he put up a blackboard the size of the wall and marked a small white spot in the middle of it. Ninety nine percent of people, he said, would say that they saw a white spot. Almost invisible, this is what draws our attention such that we do not even see the big blackboard. It is in our nature to look for objects against the background and ignore the background itself. In just the same way, we see a cloud in the sky and miss the sky. And we see the thought arising in Consciousness and know nothing about

Consciousness itself.

 

 

 

 

 

It is inevitable that our minds will search for an understanding of what Consciousness is, as though it were an object that we could observe, rather than that which enables observation to occur in the first place. All theories that we may come up with are going to fail and, worse, may delude us into thinking that we know something when we do not.

Ultimately, the scriptures summarize the matter very simply in one of the four great sayings or mahAvAkya-s from the Upanishads: praj~nAnam brahma – Consciousness is brahman. Consciousness equates to brahman, which is the one reality, all that there is. (The four ‘great sayings’ from the Vedas are: – ‘Consciousness is brahman’ from the Aitareya Upanishad, ‘That thou art’ from the Chandogya Upanishad, ‘This Self is brahman’ from the Mandukya Upanishad and ‘I am brahman’ from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.)

Before looking in more detail at the three states of consciousness, it is important to note that all of these explanations are made from the vantage point of the waking mind. Strictly speaking, it can only speak from experience about the waking state, since it is, by definition, not present in the other states. The true situation is summed up in the Katha Upanishad (IV.4): 'Having realized that it is the great, all-pervading Atman that sees the objects in the dream and the waking state, the wise man does not grieve.'

 

 

 

The Book of One: The Ancient Wisdom of Advaita

 

 

 

 

 

 

The above is an extract from the extensively revised Second Edition of The Book of One, now subtitled The Ancient Wisdom of Advaita. Here is a summary of the changes that have been made:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

New chapters on Ishvara and Neo-Advaita;

New topics: Sheaths, Behavioral Tendencies, dharma, dream metaphor, gold ring metaphor, mithyA, What is Enlightenment, jIvanmukti. Other topics have been rewritten or much expanded;

Any parts that I thought confusing, misleading or superfluous have been deleted or re-written;

New stories, metaphors and quotations have been added;

Many topics have been expanded where this enhances the overall presentation;

A number of new extracts have been added (from books read since the First Edition) to provide additional interest, clarity and reinforcing argument;

The Sanskrit Glossary has been considerably expanded and also now shows the actual Sanskrit script (Devanagari), which was not possible in the first edition;

The Appendix of Internet Links has been revised, updated and considerably expanded – there are now many more websites than existed when the first edition was written;

The Appendix of Recommended Reading has been revised, updated and expanded;

Italicized ITRANS spellings of Sanskrit words have been used throughout (i.e. the Anglicized versions that were used in the First Edition have been removed), apart from a few exceptions such as proper names and the word ‘Advaita’;

The spelling has been changed to US English (apologies to UK readers but this is to suit the majority of readers);

The text has been reworded throughout wherever there was potential confusion or poor sentence structure;

Corrections to grammar etc. have been made as appropriate;

Overall, the word count has increased from around 115,000 to over 150,000 and the Bibliography from 69 books to 144.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The page count has increased from 288 to 448 but the price has reduced from £9.99 / $17.95 to £7.99 / $13.95 and Amazon are offering pre-order prices of £7.19 / $9.41. (The price reduction is the result of costs being subsidized by the new Advaita Academy charity about which you will hear much more in the coming months.) Pre-order Amazon.US or Amazon.UK.

The book is easily recognizable by virtue of the brilliant ambigram design by Professor John Langdon (with Sanskrit conceptualization by Hari Kiran Vadlamani and overall cover realization by arthmediasolutions.com). Professor Langdon popularized the ‘ambigram’ – a word which reads the same in a different direction. This might be upside down (the most common), back to front, or as a mirror image. This is the advaita ambigram in the outside circle:

 

as seen the right way up and...

 

as seen upside down.

(Stand on your head if you don’t believe me, or turn the screen upside down if you have a laptop. Although I have to admit that I didn’t actually invert the second image!) The ‘One’ in the center is also an ambigram and ‘Not Two’ forms a third ambigram in the inner circle.

Professor Langdon is best known for designing the ambigrams used in the novel, Angels and Demons, by Dan Brown. (Dan also named his main character after John, in recognition of his help.) But John has written a fascinating book of his own; an investigation into the way in which many fundamental concepts in life and science are effectively reconciliations of opposites. And the book is profusely illustrated by wonderful ambigrams of various types. See my review of this book on the website.

Here is the brief tribute from The Book of One:

Angels and Demons: If you are wondering about the cover of the book, it utilizes the ‘ambigram’ – a word that reads the same from a different direction or orientation. The ambigram is a particularly potent symbol for this book for three reasons:

 

It presents the appearance of duality but, on investigation is found to be only one. In this sense, it is a metaphor for the non-dual reality in which are resolved all seeming opposites –both good and bad, angels and demons;

The recognition that the symbol is an ambigram does not usually occur immediately. It is only after a period of study and contemplation that the realization suddenly occurs. In this sense, it is a metaphor for the enlightenment that takes place in the mind on the dawning of Self-knowledge;

Appearances should not be taken at face value. If we look beyond the name and form, we may discover the unity behind the outward show.

May the reader find in this book the resolution of seeming opposites and the dawn of enlightenment. May the seeming duality resolve into the non-duality of Advaita.

(Special thanks go to John Langdon, the designer, who popularized the ambigram in the book Angels and Demons by Dan Brown, and to Hari Kiran Vadlamani, who commissioned the original ‘Advaita’ ambigram for his own company and subsequently the triple ambigram for the book cover.)

 

 

Consciousness and the Brain

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the last issue of the akhaNDAkAra journal, I attempted to demonstrate why it is that science, although it can provide valuable observations in the realm of the phenomenal, can never say anything useful about the noumenal. The article caused one reader to raise some interesting observations. In particular, this reader suggested that Shankara’s refutation of the chArvAka (materialist philosopher), which I presented briefly, were not very convincing. Accordingly, I wanted to expand upon this specific topic. [strictly speaking, chArvAka is the name of the philosopher and the materialist philosophy itself is called lokAyata shAstra or mata. So another name for the chArvAka is lokAyatika, and this is the term used in the brahmasUtra-s. It

is interesting to note that the term lokAyatika was effectively used by Shankara as an insult but nowadays would be regarded by most people as a compliment, since it literally means ‘someone experienced in the ways of the world’ – an indication, perhaps, of the spiritual depths to which Western society has sunk.]

 

 

 

 

 

 

The arguments to which I referred mostly appear in Shankara’s commentary (bhAShya) on the brahmasUtra-s. In the middle of a section which is arguing that the ‘fires’ referred to in a particular scriptural text have nothing to do with sacrificial rites but are actually talking about meditations, vyAsa suddenly introduces an incidental topic (‘aikAtmyAdhikAraNam’ - eka AtmanaH sharIra bhavat (III.iii.53-4)). This has not been specifically addressed before but has major significance for the entire body of scriptures. His comments on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (IV.iii.6) are also relevant, where yAj~navalkya asks what it is that ‘serves as the light’ for a man when there is no external light or sound ('when the sun and moon have both set, the fire has

gone out, and speech has stopped'). Janaka answers that it is the Self (i.e. Consciousness).

Shankara says that some people (i.e. the chArvAka-s) state that consciousness depends upon the body for its existence. Obviously, if this is the case, then there is no question of anything becoming ‘liberated’ from saMsAra – when the body dies, that is the end of ‘us’. And it would follow that there is no purpose in pursuing Advaita. Indeed, the only reasonable path to follow would be the hedonistic one – wine, women and song (or whatever your preferred source of pleasure). The materialist says that there is no ‘soul’ to go to heaven (or elsewhere) after death; the body itself is all there is, just happening to have ‘consciousness’ whilst alive. Consciousness is an ‘attribute’ of the body, they say, in the same way that heat and light are attributes of a fire – when the fire goes

out, the heat and light disappear. Similarly, we never see ‘consciousness’ independent of a body; the two always go together. The qualities which we associate with consciousness, such as independent motion, memories, ability to hold a meaningful discussion and so on, are all absent when there is no body. We don’t encounter them in connection with a brick, for example.

And we don’t see consciousness in individual elements and chemical compounds but, when these come together in the form of nucleotides in a DNA chain, cells begin to replicate and, at a certain level of complexity, consciousness is manifest as an epiphenomenon. (We have now moved from the 8th century chArvAka-s to the 21st century biochemist and neuroscientist but the principle is exactly the same.) The brahmasUtra uses the example of ‘intoxicating quality’. The separate ingredients of, say, beer – sugar, hops, malt, yeast, etc. – are not themselves intoxicating but, when they are brought together, something happens (i.e. fermentation) and an intoxicating quality is exhibited. But we wouldn’t expect to see this quality ‘apart from’ the beer that exhibits it. In just the same way, says the

chArvAka, there is no soul to go to heaven or become liberated because it is inexorably linked with the body.

It is strange that this question should be left until nearly the end of the brahmasUtra-s, since all of the scriptures pre-suppose the existence of a ‘soul’ separate from the body, but never mind!

The argument of the chArvAka uses the logical reasoning called ‘anvaya-vyatireka’. In this particular example, what they are saying is that consciousness occurs in the presence of the body but not in its absence. Therefore, the body is the same as consciousness. Or, to put this more formally:

 

When the body is present, consciousness is present (this is the anvaya, ‘association’ or ‘co-presence’ statement);

When the body is absent, consciousness is absent (this is the vyatireka, ‘exclusion’ or ‘co-absence’ statement);

Therefore the body is the same as consciousness.

 

 

 

 

 

 

vyAsa offers only one argument against the materialist. He says that there is a distinction between consciousness and the body because the former may be absent even while the latter continues to exist. When death occurs, we clearly see the body still lying there but all Consciousness-related signs have gone forever. Obviously, therefore, consciousness must be something other than the body. We can only see things in the presence of light but that does not mean that perception is an attribute of the light. Similarly it cannot be concluded that consciousness is an attribute of the body.

 

 

 

 

 

Shankara adds that, while such things as the form and shape of the body can be seen by another person, qualities such as consciousness, memory and life itself cannot be perceived, only inferred. Also, whilst we can appreciate that these exist in the body whilst it is alive, we cannot actually prove that they are no longer there after the body has died. For all we know, they might transfer to another new body, as is supposed by the theory of reincarnation. Since there is no way of disproving this possibility, the chArvAka’s argument cannot be substantiated. Basically, we cannot say that, because we do not experience something, it does not exist. In science, an example might be the neutrino. Millions of these pass through us and the Earth every second, yet most people have not even heard of them. Our not experiencing something may be because it doesn’t exist. But an equally plausible explanation (in the absence of any definite knowledge) is that our instruments are inadequate. The neutrino is a perfect example. Solar neutrinos were eventually detected in the 1980s by a detector using 50,000 tons of pure water surrounded by 11,000 photomultiplier tubes buried 1 km underground. An alternative explanation might be that the appropriate conditions for experiencing it are not present. E.g. if you have ever been into an underground cave system and switched out the lights, you will

know that you literally cannot see your hand if you hold it immediately in front of your eyes. If someone came into the cave with you, you do not claim that, since you can no longer experience them, they must have ceased to exist.

But, although we cannot conclude that something is absent because we do not experience it, we certainly cannot conclude that it is present. If we could, we would have to admit that we are surrounded by invisible unicorns and Martians, to mention two obvious examples. So it is conceded that we do not rely on experience for the conclusions about consciousness. For this we accept the pramANa (means of knowledge) of shAstra (the scriptures); we temporarily accept the assurance of those sages who have gone before and discovered the truth for themselves.

Shankara does not want to leave things there, however, and goes on to provide some further arguments. The materialist believes that there is only matter; i.e. no such thing as spirit (or ‘Consciousness’ separate from the body). So, asks Shankara, what exactly does he mean, when he talks about consciousness? If he means ‘the perception or awareness of things (i.e. matter)’, then he is saying that matter itself is both the subject and the object in the act of perception. How can X be perceived by something which is a quality of X? He likens this to claiming that the quality of fire, i.e. ‘heat’, could itself burn the fire. Or an acrobat could stand on his own shoulders. Form cannot sense form, nor can sound hear sound. If, on the other hand, we accept that consciousness is separate from matter, there is no problem

at all. It can perceive objects external to the body, and it can perceive thoughts, feeling, etc., which are internal.

 

 

 

 

 

 

There is another reductio ad absurdum argument which follows from such thinking. If we consider the sense of vision, we can say that the eye is the locus for the property of ‘seeing’. And we can say that this ‘seeing property’ is what perceives external objects. But there are two specific things that this ‘seeing property’ cannot perceive: namely itself and its substrate or locus. The reason for this is simply that the eye and its seeing attribute are the ‘subject’ of the act of seeing. Whilst it can perceive other objects, it cannot perceive itself – its objects must be different from and separate from itself. To generalize, a guNa or attribute cannot objectify either itself or its locus. Since the attribute is intrinsic to the locus, it cannot be different and separate from

it.

To extrapolate this to the topic of discussion, then, the chArvAka is proposing that consciousness is the attribute of the body as locus. This would mean that consciousness is able to objectify everything except two things – consciousness itself and its substrate, the body. Just as the eye cannot see itself, we would have to conclude that we could never experience our own body!

If we accept that the one who perceives is different from what is perceived, we are obliged to conclude that, since we can perceive the body, we cannot be the body – Consciousness cannot be the body. Our memory shows us that the ‘I’ who experienced being a child is the same as the ‘I’ that now experiences being an adult – but the body has changed radically. Consciousness remains the same whilst the body is born, grows old and dies. This also leads us to the conclusion that Consciousness is permanent while everything else changes. We only think that this is not the case when we identify with things that do change, such as the body and mind. In fact, if we did not remain essentially the same, we could not say that an event recalled from the past happened to ‘us’. So the view of the materialist does not explain

the phenomenon of memory. [in fact, as I explained in How to Meet Yourself, and copied the relevant section into the new edition of The Book of One, modern science does have a plausible explanation as to how this works. Since it is relevant to the discussion (and since I do not want to be accused of ignoring the other side of the argument!), here it is:

“We know that long-term memories seem to reside in the cortex of the brain. Short term ones exist for only a few seconds before beginning the process of consolidation into longer term ones, involving one of the organs within the brain (the hippocampus). A complex protein has been identified as being responsible for the translation process. What has been discovered recently, however, is that our long-term memory is not necessarily very reliable. Whenever we revisit it for whatever reason, whether mentally to relive an enjoyable experience or in order to recall a specific item of data, the information is reprocessed and stored anew in our long term memory and thus will not be quite the same as the earlier version. It is hardly surprising that witnesses of crimes or accidents have been shown not to be totally reliable. We

may actually rewrite the story, with modifications, each time we remember it.

 

 

 

 

 

 

“The experimental data for this was, admittedly, derived from rats rather than humans but the mechanism is believed to be the same. Rats were taught to associate being placed in a dark room with receiving an electric shock. Needless to say, after a while it could be observed that they became anxious whenever they were shown the room, irrespective of whether they received a shock. Once this pattern was observed repeatedly, even after a significant lapse of time, it could be concluded that this association was fixed in their long-term memory.

 

 

 

 

 

“Some of the rats now either had their hippocampus removed or they were treated with a drug that suppressed the action of the protein responsible for laying down long-term memories. When these rats were shown the room, they reacted as before with anxiety, showing that their long-term memory in the cortex of the brain was still registering the association with electric shock.

“Some of the other rats were shown the room (but not put into it) and then had either the hippocampus removed or were treated with the drug. In all cases, when they were subsequently put into the room, they showed no anxiety whatsoever. They wandered about quite happily, indicating that the long-term memory association had completely disappeared.

“In fact, revisiting old data from electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) back in the 60s showed that this effect had already been seen with humans. If someone was asked to relive their traumatic episodes or fears and then given ECT whilst still conscious, the related memories were found to have disappeared subsequently. Of course, such experiments would no longer be allowed today!â€

Of course, this in no way nullifies the arguments that Consciousness = the Self = who we really are, but it does show that the mechanism by which we are able to associate with past events may involve data stored in a mechanistic way in the brain.]

Another way of looking at this is that, if consciousness were an attribute of the body, we ought to be able to experience it in just the same way that we experience the body’s form and color, etc. Properties of the body are objects of the sense organs. Yet we are not aware of consciousness as an attribute or object at all. Rather it is we, as Consciousness (the subject), who are aware of everything else. Nor do we experience it in others. We can infer consciousness in others, because they move, speak, etc. But we cannot see it or otherwise experience it. Indeed, it is conceivable that we might be mistaken in our inference – it seems almost certain that, one day, we will be taken in by a robot. The dream experience is also quoted by Shankara as showing that the physical body is not a sine qua non for consciousness. In our dreams, the gross body is absent and we assume a ‘dream body’ and experience a dream world, which exist entirely within our own mind. The gross body does not contribute to our experiences in the dream but lies motionless on the bed. Although we ‘see’ a perfectly realistic (to the dreamer) world in full color and three dimensions, the gross, physical eyes remain closed and the room may be dark. This world is seen by ‘dream eyes’.

In fact, it is not the eyes that ‘see’ but the consciousness behind the eyes. Thus, we can recall things that we have seen in the past even though they are no longer present and our eyes are closed. Someone with an eidetic memory can describe every detail, even though not remarked upon at the time. Even a blind man, whose eyes have been physically removed, can still see in his dream the images of events and objects from his past. Consciousness is separate from the body and senses and illumines them as do the sun, moon and fire but it is not itself illumined by anything else.

Further, Shankara points out in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad that the agent must be separate from and ‘superior’ to the organs because otherwise it would not be possible to know that the thing that we touch, for example, is the same thing that we earlier saw. Nor can the agent be the mind because the mind itself is an object to the experiencing consciousness. Presumably, here, Shankara refers to thoughts and feelings which, as it were, make up the mind. If we claim that these are in the mind rather than being the mind, it seems it would still be possible to claim that it is the mind which ‘sees’ the thoughts and feelings. So this last objection has not clearly been refuted. However, this would seem to offer no real help to the Western scientist, who does not acknowledge the existence of a ‘mind’ to begin

with.

Overall, notwithstanding the flimsiness of some of the points, the above arguments show that the materialist view (that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the body or brain) is not proven.

Bibliography

 

 

 

 

 

 

Brahma Sutra Bhasya of Shankaracharya, Swami Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashrama, 1996. ISBN 81-7505-105-1.

Vedanta Explained: Shankara’s Commentary on the Brahma-sutras, V. H. Date, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1954. No ISBN.

Brahma Sutras, Swami Sivananda, The Divine Life Society. Electronic download.

Talks on Brahma Sutras, Swami Paramarthananda, Sastraprakasika Trust. MP3 files on CD.

Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Swami Madhavananda, Advaita Ashram, 1934. ISBN 81-7505-102-7.

Shankara on Rival Views (A Shankara Source Book Vol. 4), A. J. Alston, Shanti Sadan, 1989. ISBN 0-85424-058-6.

The Book of One [second Edition], Dennis Waite, O Books, 2010. ISBN 978-1846943478.

 

Questions & Answers

 

 

 

 

 

The Question and Answer dialog that triggered the writing of the above essay now follows:

Question: I enjoyed the most recent issue of akhaNDAkAra, and I have a few questions/comments about the section 'Consciousness' is the subject and cannot be investigated objectively’. I've taken the position of Devil's Advocate here. Any counter arguments or pointers you can offer would be greatly appreciated!

You Say: 'The idea that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter is not, it may surprise the reader, an invention of modern science. This same view was held by the chArvAka-s (a materialist philosophy) in the time of Shankara (around 8th century AD) and Shankara rejects their position in his commentary on the Brahmasutra (III.iii.54). He says that consciousness must be distinct from the body since it does not exist in a dead body, whereas all of the other attributes persist (for a time, at least!). Furthermore, we can perceive other attributes, such as form and color of the body but we cannot see consciousness. Nor can we see its non-existence (e.g. it might transfer to another body at death). So, if it does not consist of material elements, what else is there (since materialists deny that there is

anything else)?'

I think these are all bad arguments, because they assume that consciousness is a low-level feature of matter. If you assume that consciousness is analogous to digestion, for example, then these arguments do not go through. Digestion is uncontroversially an epiphenomenon of certain biological organisms. However, digestion does not exist in a dead body, and it cannot be directly perceived. We can observe the intake of food, the initial breakdown of the food by bile, the removal of essential nutrients in the small intestine, and the excretion of waste. However, digestion itself cannot be directly observed, and it could be argued that consciousness is perfectly parallel. We can observe the behavioral manifestations of being conscious, of gaining consciousness, and of losing consciousness. We can also observe correlations

between states and structures of the brain and the content, presence, and absence of consciousness. Of course, the Advaitin will object that only relative consciousness is gained or lost in these cases, that there is a principle of consciousness that underlies the relative states of being awake, dreaming, and deep sleep. However, this assumes the very point at issue, viz. whether consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain or it is something outside of space/time. I'm not sure I see anywhere in the Advaita tradition an independent argument for the claim that consciousness is a basic, metaphysical feature.

You go on to say: 'Finally, Shankara points out that matter is an object of perception. If consciousness is only matter, then we have the contradictory state of affairs that consciousness is 'acting on itself'. This, he says, cannot happen. For fire, though possessing heat, does not burn itself, nor does an actor (or acrobat), trained though he be, ride on his own shoulder. And it cannot be that consciousness which is an attribute of the elements and their derivatives, (and hence is one with them), will perceive those elements, etc. Hence just as the existence of this perception of the elements and their derivatives is admitted, so also must its separateness from them be admitted.'

I don't follow this argument. The claim that consciousness is 'only matter' is stronger than the claim that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, I think. The first claim implies that consciousness can be identified with physical structures of the brain, for example, whereas the latter claim only entails causal relations between consciousness and the brain. If consciousness is the product of matter, why can't it act on matter? Digestion, again, is clearly the product of matter, and it acts on matter. And you say: 'Moreover, though perception takes place when light and other accessories are present, but not when they are absent, it does not follow that from this that perception is an attribute of the light, etc. That being the case, it does not follow that consciousness should be an attribute of the body just because it occurs where the body is present and does not occur where the body is absent.'

The example of perception and light shows, I think, that light is a necessary condition for perception. Perception is not an 'attribute' of light, because light is not a sufficient condition for perception - a suitable perceptual apparatus like that of the human visual system is required. Again, I think the analogy with digestion is instructive. Digestion requires a complex (though relatively easily satisfied on Earth) set of conditions, but it is still, for all that, an epiphenomenon of the body. Finally, you say: 'One other point in respect of science's idea that consciousness arises in the brain is that this would explain nothing. Conversely, Advaita's explanation that everything arises in Consciousness explains everything.'

I don't see this at all. The claim that all there is is Consciousness has to confront two enormous explanatory challenges: the coherence/persistence of our perceptions and the cosmology of science. As for the first challenge, nobody will deny that there is an extraordinary coordination between various perceptions, between those of different agents, between those of the same agent at different times, and between different perceptions of the same agent at the same time. Mary can tell me about a new statue in the park, and I can go there and appreciate it for myself. I can return to my bedroom each night, and see that that the bed, the nightstand, the floor lamp, and the dresser have the same appearance and configuration as they did on previous nights. I see, hear, and pet the barking dog, and these various perceptions are

resolved into a single, coherent experience of the dog. How are these familiar occurrences possible if there is not a world of independent, existing things, a world that has some sort of intersubjective reality that is more substantial than fleeting forms of awareness? As I see it, Advaitins try to defuse this sort of objection by permitting only an appeal to 'direct experience'. It's true that external objects are not part of my 'direct experience'. As far as my own experience goes, there are only perceptions, feelings, and thoughts. But can't one reasonably infer the existence of external objects from one's own direct experience and the reports of others? Doesn't the behavior of even Self-realized Advaitins indicate that this inference has been made? It seems to me that someone who really took seriously the notion that her sensations do not correspond to a substratum of independent, existing things would regard the world as a series of disconnected flashes of images, feelings, and smells. Another problem with the restriction of evidence to 'direct experience' is that it seems to be tantamount to solipsism. I have no 'direct experience' of the awareness of others, and, thus, shouldn't I also discount my own belief and the claims of others that they are aware? As for the second challenge, it seems to me that the Advaita position is not easily reconciled with a naturalistic cosmology. If all there is is Consciousness, then how are we to make sense of the claims of science that there was a big bang, that stars and planets coalesced out of the remnants of the big bang, that life on Earth evolved from single-celled creatures, etc. If these events happened, they happened when no one was around to observe them. Hence, if they occurred, they occurred outside of awareness. Of course, they are now, in some sense, part of Consciousness, because we and many others are discussing them. However, if the Advaita position is right, these events did not become existent until theories about them were created. Again, this is extremely counterintuitive, and I think both of the challenges I've

outlined explain why, at least as it stands, the Advaita position is explanatorily inadequate.

Answer: I don’t think your attempt to draw a parallel between digestion and consciousness succeeds. I would argue that digestion is a ‘process’. You acknowledge that you can observe the various stages of this process. Surely digestion is nothing more than the stages of which it consists? Consciousness on the other hand is something absolute, without which nothing else is. You are confusing consciousness and awareness when you say that we ‘gain’ and ‘lose’ consciousness. It is the brain activity and sense organs that cease to function in the normal way under anesthesia for example. To say that we are not conscious is not at all the same thing as saying that consciousness is absent.

I’m not sure what you mean when you say that you can’t find 'in the Advaita tradition an independent argument for the claim that consciousness is a basic, metaphysical feature'. The entire scriptural purport is to show that ‘all there is is brahman’; ‘brahman is real, the world is mithyA and the jIva is not other than brahman; ‘thou art That’; ‘Consciousness is brahman’, etc.

And the continuation of your parallel with digestion does not stack up (for me) either. Digestion is a series of cause effect relationships at the material level. When you mix starch with saliva, the enzymes chemically convert the starch to sugar – the first stage of the digestion process. Simply cause and effect. To claim that consciousness was like this would mean that the effect became the cause which would be counter to the second law of thermodynamics.

I don’t see that digestion is an epiphenomenon of the body either. It is simply the chemical process whereby some sort of solvent acts upon a substrate to extract something more subtle that was previously in combination with the substrate. (Clumsily put but I think you should get the point!) Consciousness doesn’t do anything but it is nevertheless that without which nothing gets done. It is certainly not a process or the result of anything.

Regarding the existence of separate objects, no one denies that this is our empirical experience but that does not mean it is really the case. The example of dreams amply illustrates this. The dream world is perfectly real for the dreamer and only realized to be illusory upon waking. And knowing the truth about brahman does not affect the experience of the world – we still experience the sun rise despite knowing that it does no such thing.

Where does your understanding that we have to rely only on ‘direct experience’ come from? Advaita relies primarily on shAstrIya pramANa – testimonial evidence from the scriptures. Ideally this is backed up and explained by the guru – shabda pramANa. This is then subjected to reason. Only then may we realize for ourselves that what they say is true. There is no solipsism. There is ‘only the Self’, not ‘only me’ – a big difference!

Your point about cosmology does not hold water. Irrespective of the arguments that the idea of creation makes no sense, there is no problem with the idea of evolution. Since there is only Consciousness, this could all happen without there needing to be any ‘intelligent’ life form present to observe it.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Question: I agree with you that the analogy between digestion and consciousness is misguided. Incidentally, this is the philosopher John Searle's analogy. Digestion clearly does have coordinates in the space-time continuum, and, on the other hand, it is difficult on reflection to assign temporal and spatial boundaries to consciousness. However, I'm not convinced that to say that someone is 'unconscious' is not to say that consciousness is absent. In fact, one way of framing the Advaita position, I think, is to say that it regards 'unconsciousness' as the consciousness of absence rather than the absence of consciousness. I think the crux of that matter is whether consciousness can be assigned temporal/spatial boundaries. If it cannot, then it is limitless, it makes no sense to speak of its

appearance and disappearance, and it must be the absolute reality.

 

 

 

 

 

Answer: Sounds like a good summary of the position to me! And is this not our experience? When we ‘come to’ after being under anesthesia, do we not ‘know’ that we have been ‘unconscious’? It is not an inference, made only after we look at the clock and see that time has passed. As T. S. Eliot says in the Four Quartets: 'Or when, under ether, the mind is conscious but conscious of nothing…'

Question: You said: 'I'm not sure what you mean when you say that you can't find "in the Advaita tradition an independent argument for the claim that consciousness is a basic, metaphysical feature". The entire scriptural purport is to show that "all there is is brahma"; "brahman is real, the world is mithyA and the jIva is not other than brahman"; "thou art That"; "Consciousness is brahman", etc.'

Well, the Advaita literature is, of course, full of these ‘assertions’. As I see it, there are two pillars of argumentation in the Advaita tradition: dRRigdRRishya viveka and avasthA traya. I don't see that either of these lines of reasoning establishes that Consciousness is the ultimate reality. The first shows that consciousness is not a 'thing', but then gravity, solidity, etc., are not things either (though they are features of the world and not the ultimate reality). The second line of reasoning shows that our self is not the body or the mind, but it does, I think, leave open the question of what the self is. In particular, it does not immediately follow that the self is Consciousness. Couldn't the self be some sort of potential of the body, i.e. I am an expression of the body (or a

part/subsystem of the body) functioning in a certain way just as, for example, a song is an expression of a track on the CD and the stereo functioning a certain way?

Answer: You will not find any ‘proof’ that Consciousness is the ultimate reality in the scriptures because none is possible. You will only find assertions and pointers. ‘Proofs’ relate only to the phenomenal world. Enlightenment is the realization in the mind that Consciousness is the non-dual reality. It comes as the final recognition when the ignorance that causes us to see duality everywhere finally falls away.

Question: You said: 'And the continuation of your parallel with digestion does not stack up (for me) either. Digestion is a series of cause effect relationships at the material level. When you mix starch with saliva, the enzymes chemically convert the starch to sugar - the first stage of the digestion process. Simply cause and effect. To claim that consciousness was like this would mean that the effect became the cause which would be counter to the second law of thermodynamics.'

I don't follow you here. This would put the effect before the cause only if Consciousness is the ultimate reality, but that is of course exactly the question at issue.

Answer: This discussion arose in relation to Shankara’s example of ‘heat’ burning the ‘fire’, etc. Not sure what I meant by that statement now (!) but hopefully the essay above will have clarified this point.

Question: You said: 'I don't see that digestion is an epiphenomenon of the body either. It is simply the chemical process whereby some sort of solvent acts upon a substrate to extract something more subtle that was previously in combination with the substrate. (Clumsily put but I think you should get the point!) Consciousness doesn't do anything but it is nevertheless that without which nothing gets done. It is certainly not a process or the result of anything.'

I agree that it is difficult to regard consciousness as a process, both because it seems irreducible and because it is difficult to situate it within space/time. I don't agree, however, that it doesn't do anything. In fact, it seems absolutely essential to cognitive relations like knowing, understanding, intention, etc., in a way that it is not essential to running, speaking, dancing, etc. On the face of it, at least, consciousness seems to be part of the causal nexus for cognitive relations (I can't understand something without being conscious of what's understood), but we can imagine unconscious zombies running, speaking, dancing, etc.

Answer: You are using ‘consciousness’ here in the sense of ‘intelligence’. But this is not the sense in Advaita. Rather, intelligence is Consciousness reflected in the mind. All ‘action’ relates to prakRRiti – the mithyA world of people and objects, not to Consciousness itself.

Question: I understand your point that ultimately there is no creation, according to Advaita. However, I'm still unclear about how we can make sense of evolution or any other part of scientific cosmology at the relative level of existence if all there is is Consciousness. As I understand it, to exist at the relative level on the Advaita view is to be an object of relative consciousness. However, there were no animals for the first 3.2 billion years of evolution, and, thus, there was, for all we know, no relative consciousness during this time frame. What can it possibly mean to say that this phase of evolution occurred if there was no awareness of it and Consciousness is all there is?

Answer: Again, you are confusing the non-dual brahman (which is synonymous with ‘Consciousness’ as I have been using it, with a capital ‘C’) with the consciousness (small ‘c’) ‘exhibited’ by a person. In fact, as I have been checking through the journal, I have had to change some of your ‘c’s to ‘C’s so as not to cause any more confusion. And readers should note that the last issue of akhaNDAkAra contains a number of instances where the wrong case has been used – my apologies!

The consciousness of a person is better called chidAbhAsa, which literally means ‘false appearance or reflection (AbhAsa) of consciousness (chit)’. Evolution is simply our attempt to rationalize what we now see, or infer, in respect of the changing form of Consciousness (capital ‘C’) at the level of appearance. There are, no doubt, theories and mathematical descriptions of the changing form of waves in the ocean but, in the final analysis, it is all only water. Also, ‘existence’ relates to Consciousness itself, not to the object. When we say that the chair exists, what is actually the case is that brahman exists in the form of the chair. The chair itself is mithyA.

Hope all of this answers your questions… although I have a sneaking suspicion that it won’t!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Enlightenment: The Path through the Jungle

by Dennis Waite

On the teaching of Advaita

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How to Meet Yourself by Dennis Waite

Introductory book on Advaita

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Back to the Truth by Denis Waite

Advanced book on Advaita