Fw: 115 Myths, Lies, Ommissions, and Obfuscations Your Government (and Its Media

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115 Myths, Lies, Ommissions, and Obfuscations

Your Government (and Its Media

 

 

 

>>115 Myths, Lies, Ommissions, and Obfuscations Your Government (and Its

>>Media) Have Told You -- and Sold You – About The Terror Event of

>>September 11, 2001 by Dr. David Ray Griffin

>>

>>(Numbers in parentheses refer to Griffin’s book, THE 9/11 COMMISSION

>>REPORT: Omissions and Distortions. Griffin's comments follow List.

>>Word Document attached should you wish to disseminate this.)

>>

>>1. The omission of evidence that at least six of the alleged

>>hijackers---including Waleed al-Shehri, said by the Commission probably

>>to have stabbed a flight attendant on Flight 11 before it crashed into

>>the North Tower of the WTC---are still alive (19-20).

>>

>>2. The omission of evidence about Mohamed Atta---such as his reported

>>fondness for alcohol, pork, and lap dances---that is in tension with

>>the Commission’s claim that he had become fanatically religious

>>(20-21).

>>

>>3. The obfuscation of the evidence that Hani Hanjour was too poor a

>>pilot to have flown an airliner into the Pentagon (21-22).

>>

>>4. The omission of the fact that the publicly released flight manifests

>>contain no Arab names (23).

>>

>>5. The omission of the fact that fire has never, before or after 9/11,

>>caused steel-frame buildings to collapse (25).

>>

>>6. The omission of the fact that the fires in the Twin Towers were not

>>very big, very hot, or very long-lasting compared with fires in several

>>steel-frame buildings that did not collapse (25-26).

>>

>>7. The omission of the fact that, given the hypothesis that the

>>collapses were caused by fire, the South Tower, which was struck later

>>than the North Tower and also had smaller fires, should not have

>>collapsed first (26).

>>

>>8. The omission of the fact that WTC 7 (which was not hit by an

>>airplane and which had only small, localized fires) also collapsed---an

>>occurrence that FEMA admitted it could not explain (26).

>>

>>9. The omission of the fact that the collapse of the Twin Towers (like

>>that of Building 7) exemplified at least 10 features suggestive of

>>controlled demolition (26-27).

>>

>>10. The claim that the core of each of the Twin Towers was “a hollow

>>steel shaft”---a claim that denied the existence of the 47 massive

>>steel columns that in reality constituted the core of each tower and

>>that, given the “pancake theory” of the collapses, should have still

>>been sticking up many hundreds of feet in the air (27-28).

>>

>>11. The omission of Larry Silverstein’s statement that he and the fire

>>department commander decided to “pull” Building 7 (28).

>>

>>12. The omission of the fact that the steel from the WTC buildings was

>>quickly removed from the crime scene and shipped overseas before it

>>could be analyzed for evidence of explosives (30).

>>

>>13. The omission of the fact that because Building 7 had been evacuated

>>before it collapsed, the official reason for the rapid removal of the

>>steel---that some people might still be alive in the rubble under the

>>steel---made no sense in this case (30).

>>

>>14. The omission of Mayor Giuliani’s statement that he had received

>>word that the World Trade Center was going to collapse (30-31).

>>

>>15. The omission of the fact that President Bush’s brother Marvin and

>>his cousin Wirt Walker III were both principals in the company in

>>charge of security for the WTC (31-32).

>>

>>16. The omission of the fact that the west wing of the Pentagon would

>>have been the least likely spot to be targeted by al-Qaeda terrorists,

>>for several reasons (33-34).

>>

>>17. The omission of any discussion of whether the damage done to the

>>Pentagon was consistent with the impact of a Boeing 757 going several

>>hundred miles per hour (34).

>>

>>18. The omission of the fact that there are photos showing that the

>>west wing’s façade did not collapse until 30 minutes after the strike

>>and also that the entrance hole appears too small for a Boeing 757 to

>>have entered (34).

>>

>>19. The omission of all testimony that has been used to cast doubt on

>>whether remains of a Boeing 757 were visible either inside or outside

>>the Pentagon (34-36).

>>

>>20. The omission of any discussion of whether the Pentagon has a

>>anti-missile defense system that would have brought down a commercial

>>airliner---even though the Commission suggested that the al-Qaeda

>>terrorists did not attack a nuclear power plant because they assumed

>>that it would be thus defended (36).

>>

>>21. The omission of the fact that pictures from various security

>>cameras---including the camera at the gas station across from the

>>Pentagon, the film from which was reportedly confiscated by the FBI

>>immediately after the strike---could presumably answer the question of

>>what really hit the Pentagon (37-38).

>>

>>22. The omission of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s reference to “the

>>missile [used] to damage [the Pentagon]” (39).

>>

>>23. The apparent endorsement of a wholly unsatisfactory answer to the

>>question of why the Secret Service agents allowed President Bush to

>>remain at the Sarasota school at a time when, given the official story,

>>they should have assumed that a hijacked airliner might be about to

>>crash into the school (41-44).

>>

>>24. The failure to explore why the Secret Service did not summon

>>fighter jets to provide air cover for Air Force One (43-46).

>>

>>25. The claims that when the presidential party arrived at the school,

>>no one in the party knew that several planes had been hijacked (47-48).

>>

>>

>>26. The omission of the report that Attorney General Ashcroft was

>>warned to stop using commercial airlines prior to 9/11 (50).

>>

>>27. The omission of David Schippers’ claim that he had, on the basis of

>>information provided by FBI agents about upcoming attacks in lower

>>Manhattan, tried unsuccessfully to convey this information to Attorney

>>General Ashcroft during the six weeks prior to 9/11 (51).

>>

>>28. The omission of any mention of the FBI agents who reportedly

>>claimed to have known the targets and dates of the attacks well in

>>advance (51-52).

>>

>>29. The claim, by means of a circular, question-begging rebuttal, that

>>the unusual purchases of put options prior to 9/11 did not imply

>>advance knowledge of the attacks on the part of the buyers (52-57).

>>

>>30. The omission of reports that both Mayor Willie Brown and some

>>Pentagon officials received warnings about flying on 9/11 (57).

>>

>>31. The omission of the report that Osama bin Laden, who already was

>>America’s “most wanted” criminal, was treated in July 2001 by an

>>American doctor in the American Hospital in Dubai and visited by the

>>local CIA agent (59).

>>

>>32. The omission of news stories suggesting that after 9/11 the US

>>military in Afghanistan deliberately allowed Osama bin Laden to escape

>>(60).

>>

>>33. The omission of reports, including the report of a visit to Osama

>>bin Laden at the hospital in Dubai by the head of Saudi intelligence,

>>that were in tension with the official portrayal of Osama as disowned

>>by his family and his country (60-61).

>>

>>34. The omission of Gerald Posner’s account of Abu Zubaydah’s

>>testimony, according to which three members of the Saudi royal

>>family---all of whom later died mysteriously within an eight-day

>>period---were funding al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the 9/11

>>attacks (61-65).

>>

>>35. The Commission’s denial that it found any evidence of Saudi funding

>>of al-Qaeda (65-68).

>>

>>36. The Commission’s denial in particular that it found any evidence

>>that money from Prince Bandar’s wife, Princess Haifa, went to al-Qaeda

>>operatives (69-70).

>>

>>37. The denial, by means of simply ignoring the distinction between

>>private and commercial flights, that the private flight carrying Saudis

>>from Tampa to Lexington on September 13 violated the rules for US

>>airspace in effect at the time (71-76).

>>

>>38. The denial that any Saudis were allowed to leave the United States

>>shortly after 9/11 without being adequately investigated (76-82).

>>

>>39. The omission of evidence that Prince Bandar obtained special

>>permission from the White House for the Saudi flights (82-86).

>>

>>40. The omission of Coleen Rowley’s claim that some officials at FBI

>>headquarters did see the memo from Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams

>>(89-90).

>>

>>41. The omission of Chicago FBI agent Robert Wright’s charge that FBI

>>headquarters closed his case on a terrorist cell, then used

>>intimidation to prevent him from publishing a book reporting his

>>experiences (91).

>>

>>42. The omission of evidence that FBI headquarters sabotaged the

>>attempt by Coleen Rowley and other Minneapolis agents to obtain a

>>warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s computer (91-94).

>>

>>43. The omission of the 3.5 hours of testimony to the Commission by

>>former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds—-testimony that, according to her

>>later public letter to Chairman Kean, revealed serious 9/11-related

>>cover-ups by officials at FBI headquarters (94-101).

>>

>>44. The omission of the fact that General Mahmoud Ahmad, the head of

>>Pakistan’s intelligence agency (the ISI), was in Washington the week

>>prior to 9/11, meeting with CIA chief George Tenet and other US

>>officials (103-04).

>>

>>45. The omission of evidence that ISI chief Ahmad had ordered $100,000

>>to be sent to Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11 (104-07).

>>

>>46. The Commission’s claim that it found no evidence that any foreign

>>government, including Pakistan, had provided funding for the al-Qaeda

>>operatives (106).

>>

>>47. The omission of the report that the Bush administration pressured

>>Pakistan to dismiss Ahmad as ISI chief after the appearance of the

>>story that he had ordered ISI money sent to Atta (107-09).

>>

>>48. The omission of evidence that the ISI (and not merely al-Qaeda) was

>>behind the assassination of Ahmad Shah Masood (the leader of

>>Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance), which occurred just after the

>>week-long meeting between the heads of the CIA and the ISI (110-112).

>>

>>49. The omission of evidence of ISI involvement in the kidnapping and

>>murder of Wall Street Reporter Daniel Pearl (113).

>>

>>50. The omission of Gerald Posner’s report that Abu Zubaydah claimed

>>that a Pakistani military officer, Mushaf Ali Mir, was closely

>>connected to both the ISI and al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the

>>9/11 attacks (114).

>>

>>51. The omission of the 1999 prediction by ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas

>>that the Twin Towers would be “coming down” (114).

>>

>>52. The omission of the fact that President Bush and other members of

>>his administration repeatedly spoke of the 9/11 attacks as

>>“opportunities” (116-17).

>>

>>53. The omission of the fact that The Project for the New American

>>Century, many members of which became key figures in the Bush

>>administration, published a document in 2000 saying that “a new Pearl

>>Harbor” would aid its goal of obtaining funding for a rapid

>>technological transformation of the US military (117-18).

>>

>>54. The omission of the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, who as head of the

>>commission on the US Space Command had recommended increased funding

>>for it, used the attacks of 9/11 on that very evening to secure such

>>funding (119-22).

>>

>>55. The failure to mention the fact that three of the men who presided

>>over the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks—-Secretary Rumsfeld,

>>General Richard Myers, and General Ralph Eberhart---were also three of

>>the strongest advocates for the US Space Command (122).

>>

>>56. The omission of the fact that Unocal had declared that the Taliban

>>could not provide adequate security for it to go ahead with its

>>oil-and-gas pipeline from the Caspian region through Afghanistan and

>>Pakistan (122-25).

>>

>>57. The omission of the report that at a meeting in July 2001, US

>>representatives said that because the Taliban refused to agree to a US

>>proposal that would allow the pipeline project to go forward, a war

>>against them would begin by October (125-26).

>>

>>58. The omission of the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997 book

>>had said that for the United States to maintain global primacy, it

>>needed to gain control of Central Asia, with its vast petroleum

>>reserves, and that a new Pearl Harbor would be helpful in getting the

>>US public to support this imperial effort (127-28).

>>

>>59. The omission of evidence that some key members of the Bush

>>administration, including Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul

>>Wolfowitz, had been agitating for a war with Iraq for many years

>>(129-33).

>>

>>60. The omission of notes of Rumsfeld’s conversations on 9/11 showing

>>that he was determined to use the attacks as a pretext for a war with

>>Iraq (131-32).

>>

>>61. The omission of the statement by the Project for the New American

>>Century that “the need for a substantial American force presence in the

>>Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein” (133-34).

>>

>>62. The claim that FAA protocol on 9/11 required the time-consuming

>>process of going through several steps in the chain of command--even

>>though the Report cites evidence to the contrary (158).

>>

>>63. The claim that in those days there were only two air force bases in

>>NORAD’s Northeast sector that kept fighters on alert and that, in

>>particular, there were no fighters on alert at either McGuire or

>>Andrews (159-162).

>>

>>64. The omission of evidence that Andrews Air Force Base did keep

>>several fighters on alert at all times (162-64).

>>

>>65. The acceptance of the twofold claim that Colonel Marr of NEADS had

>>to telephone a superior to get permission to have fighters scrambled

>>from Otis and that this call required eight minutes (165-66).

>>

>>66. The endorsement of the claim that the loss of an airplane’s

>>transponder signal makes it virtually impossible for the US military’s

>>radar to track that plane (166-67).

>>

>>67. The claim that the Payne Stewart interception did not show NORAD’s

>>response time to Flight 11 to be extraordinarily slow (167-69).

>>

>>68. The claim that the Otis fighters were not airborne until seven

>>minutes after they received the scramble order because they did not

>>know where to go (174-75).

>>

>>69. The claim that the US military did not know about the hijacking of

>>Flight 175 until 9:03, when it was crashing into the South Tower

>>(181-82).

>>

>>70. The omission of any explanation of (a) why NORAD’s earlier report,

>>according to which the FAA had notified the military about the

>>hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43, was now to be considered false and (b)

>>how this report, if it was false, could have been published and then

>>left uncorrected for almost three years (182).

>>

>>71. The claim that the FAA did not set up a teleconference until 9:20

>>that morning (183).

>>

>>72. The omission of the fact that a memo by Laura Brown of the FAA says

>>that its teleconference was established at about 8:50 and that it

>>included discussion of Flight 175’s hijacking (183-84, 186).

>>

>>73. The claim that the NMCC teleconference did not begin until 9:29

>>(186-88).

>>

>>74. The omission, in the Commission’s claim that Flight 77 did not

>>deviate from its course until 8:54, of the fact that earlier reports

>>had said 8:46 (189-90).

>>

>>75. The failure to mention that the report that a large jet had crashed

>>in Kentucky, at about the time Flight 77 disappeared from FAA radar,

>>was taken seriously enough by the heads of the FAA and the FBI’s

>>counterterrorism unit to be relayed to the White House (190).

>>

>>76. The claim that Flight 77 flew almost 40 minutes through American

>>airspace towards Washington without being detected by the military’s

>>radar (191-92).

>>

>>77. The failure to explain, if NORAD’s earlier report that it was

>>notified about Flight 77 at 9:24 was “incorrect,” how this erroneous

>>report could have arisen, i.e., whether NORAD officials had been lying

>>or simply confused for almost three years (192-93).

>>

>>78. The claim that the Langley fighter jets, which NORAD had previously

>>said were scrambled to intercept Flight 77, were actually scrambled in

>>response to an erroneous report from an (unidentified) FAA controller

>>at 9:21 that Flight 11 was still up and was headed towards Washington

>>(193-99).

>>

>>79. The claim that the military did not hear from the FAA about the

>>probable hijacking of Flight 77 before the Pentagon was struck

>>(204-12).

>>

>>80. The claim that Jane Garvey did not join Richard Clarke’s

>>videoconference until 9:40, after the Pentagon was struck (210).

>>

>>81. The claim that none of the teleconferences succeeded in

>>coordinating the FAA and military responses to the hijackings because

>>“none of [them] included the right officials from both the FAA and the

>>Defense Department”---although Richard Clarke says that his

>>videoconference included FAA head Jane Garvey as well as Secretary of

>>Defense Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the acting chair of the

>>joint chiefs of staff (211).

>>

>>82. The Commission’s claim that it did not know who from the Defense

>>Department participated in Clarke’s videoconference---although Clarke’s

>>book said that it was Donald Rumsfeld and General Myers (211-212).

>>

>>83. The endorsement of General Myers’ claim that he was on Capitol Hill

>>during the attacks, without mentioning Richard Clarke’s contradictory

>>account, according to which Myers was in the Pentagon participating in

>>Clarke’s videoconference (213-17).

>>

>>84. The failure to mention the contradiction between Clarke’s account

>>of Rumsfeld’s whereabouts that morning and Rumsfeld’s own accounts

>>(217-19).

>>

>>85. The omission of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta’s

>>testimony, given to the Commission itself, that Vice-President Cheney

>>and others in the underground shelter were aware by 9:26 that an

>>aircraft was approaching the Pentagon (220).

>>

>>86. The claim that Pentagon officials did not know about an aircraft

>>approaching Pentagon until 9:32, 9:34, or 9:36---in any case, only a

>>few minutes before the building was hit (223).

>>

>>87. The endorsement of two contradictory stories about the aircraft

>>that hit the Pentagon---one in which it executed a 330-degree downward

>>spiral (a “high-speed dive”) and another in which there is no mention

>>of this maneuver (222-23).

>>

>>88. The claim that the fighter jets from Langley, which were allegedly

>>scrambled to protect Washington from “Phantom Flight 11,” were nowhere

>>near Washington because they were mistakenly sent out to sea (223-24).

>>

>>89. The omission of all the evidence suggesting that the aircraft that

>>hit the Pentagon was not Flight 77 (224-25).

>>

>>90. The claim that the military was not notified by the FAA about

>>Flight 93’s hijacking until after it crashed (227-29, 232, 253).

>>

>>91. The twofold claim that the NMCC did not monitor the FAA-initiated

>>conference and then was unable to get the FAA connected to the

>>NMCC-initiated teleconference (230-31).

>>

>>92. The omission of the fact that the Secret Service is able to know

>>everything that the FAA knows (233).

>>

>>93. The omission of any inquiry into why the NMCC initiated its own

>>teleconference if, as Laura Brown of the FAA has said, this is not

>>standard protocol (234).

>>

>>94. The omission of any exploration of why General Montague Winfield

>>not only had a rookie (Captain Leidig) take over his role as the NMCC’s

>>Director of Operations but also left him in charge after it was clear

>>that the Pentagon was facing an unprecedented crisis (235-36).

>>

>>95. The claim that the FAA (falsely) notified the Secret Service

>>between 10:10 and 10:15 that Flight 93 was still up and headed towards

>>Washington (237).

>>

>>96. The claim that Vice President Cheney did not give the shoot-down

>>authorization until after 10:10 (several minutes after Flight 93 had

>>crashed) and that this authorization was not transmitted to the US

>>military until 10:31 (237-41).

>>

>>97. The omission of all the evidence indicating that Flight 93 was shot

>>down by a military plane (238-39, 252-53).

>>

>>98. The claim that Richard Clarke did not receive the requested

>>shoot-down authorization until 10:25 (240).

>>

>>99. The omission of Clarke’s own testimony, which suggests that he

>>received the shoot-down authorization by 9:50 (240).

>>

>>100. The claim that Cheney did not reach the underground shelter (the

>>PEOC [Presidential Emergency Operations Center]) until 9:58 (241-44).

>>

>>101. The omission of multiple testimony, including that of Norman

>>Mineta to the Commission itself, that Cheney was in the PEOC before

>>9:20 (241-44).

>>

>>102. The claim that shoot-down authorization must be given by the

>>president (245).

>>

>>103. The omission of reports that Colonel Marr ordered a shoot-down of

>>Flight 93 and that General Winfield indicated that he and others at the

>>NMCC had expected a fighter jet to reach Flight 93 (252).

>>

>>104. The omission of reports that there were two fighter jets in the

>>air a few miles from NYC and three of them only 200 miles from

>>Washington (251).

>>

>>105. The omission of evidence that there were at least six bases with

>>fighters on alert in the northeastern part of the United States

>>(257-58).

>>

>>106. The endorsement of General Myers’ claim that NORAD had defined its

>>mission in terms of defending only against threats from abroad

>>(258-62).

>>

>>107. The endorsement of General Myers’ claim that NORAD had not

>>recognized the possibility that terrorists might use hijacked airliners

>>as missiles (262-63).

>>

>>108. The failure to highlight the significance of evidence presented in

>>the Report itself, and to mention other evidence, showing that NORAD

>>had indeed recognized the threat that hijacked airliners might be used

>>as missiles (264-67).

>>

>>109. The failure to probe the issue of how the “war games” scheduled

>>for that day were related to the military’s failure to intercept the

>>hijacked airliners (268-69).

>>

>>110. The failure to discuss the possible relevance of Operation

>>Northwoods to the attacks of 9/11 (269-71).

>>

>>111. The claim---made in explaining why the military did not get

>>information about the hijackings in time to intercept them---that FAA

>>personnel inexplicably failed to follow standard procedures some 16

>>times (155-56, 157, 179, 180, 181, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202-03,

>>227, 237, 272-75).

>>

>>112. The failure to point out that the Commission’s claimed

>>“independence” was fatally compromised by the fact that its executive

>>director, Philip Zelikow, was virtually a member of the Bush

>>administration (7-9, 11-12, 282-84).

>>

>>113. The failure to point out that the White House first sought to

>>prevent the creation of a 9/11 Commission, then placed many obstacles

>>in its path, including giving it extremely meager funding (283-85).

>>

>>114. The failure to point out that the Commission’s chairman, most of

>>the other commissioners, and at least half of the staff had serious

>>conflicts of interest (285-90, 292-95).

>>

>>115. The failure of the Commission, while bragging that it presented

>>its final report “without dissent,” to point out that this was probably

>>possible only because Max Cleland, the commissioner who was most

>>critical of the White House and swore that he would not be part of

>>“looking at information only partially,” had to resign in order to

>>accept a position with the Export-Import Bank, and that the White House

>>forwarded his nomination for this position only after he was becoming

>>quite outspoken in his criticisms (290-291).

>>

>>

>>COMMENTS BY GRIFFIN:

>>

>>In discussing my second 9/11 book, The 9/11 Commission Report:

>>Omissions and Distortions, I have often said, only half in jest, that a

>>better title might have been “a 571-page lie.” (Actually, I was saying

>>“a 567-page lie,” because I was forgetting to count the four pages of

>>the Preface.) In making this statement, one of my points has been that

>>the entire Report is constructed in support of one big lie: that the

>>official story about 9/11 is true.

>>

>>Another point, however, is that in the process of telling this overall

>>lie, The 9/11 Commission Report tells many lies about particular

>>issues. This point is implied by my critique’s subtitle, “Omissions and

>>Distortions.” It might be thought, to be sure, that of the two types of

>>problems signaled by those two terms, only those designated

>>“distortions” can be considered lies.

>>

>>It is better, however, to understand the two terms as referring to two

>>types of lies: implicit and explicit. We have an explicit lie when the

>>Report claims that the core of each of the Twin Towers consisted of a

>>hollow steel shaft or when it claims that Vice President Cheney did not

>>give the shoot-down order until after 10:10 that morning. But we have

>>an implicit lie when the Commission, in its discussion of the 19

>>alleged suicide hijackers, omits the fact that at least six of them

>>have credibly been reported to be still alive, or when it fails to

>>mention the fact that Building 7 of the World Trade Center collapsed.

>>Such omissions are implicit lies partly because they show that the

>>Commission did not honor its stated intention “to provide the fullest

>>possible account of the events surrounding 9/11.” They are also lies

>>insofar as the Commission could avoid telling an explicit lie about the

>>issue in question only by not mentioning it, which, I believe, was the

>>case in at least most instances.

>>

>>Given these two types of lies, it might be wondered how many lies are

>>contained in The 9/11 Commission Report. I do not know. But, deciding

>>to see how many lies I had discussed in my book, I found that I had

>>identified over 100 of them. Once I had made the list, it occurred to

>>me that others might find this summary helpful. Hence this article.

>>

>>One caveat: Although in some of the cases it is obvious that the

>>Commission has lied, in other cases I would say, as I make clear in the

>>book, that it appears that the Commission has lied. However, in the

>>interests of simply giving a brief listing of claims that I consider to

>>be lies, I will ignore this distinction between obvious and probable

>>lies, leaving it to readers, if they wish, to look up the discussion in

>>The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. For ease in

>>doing this, I have parenthetically indicated the pages of the book on

>>which the various issues are discussed.

>>

>>(SOURCE:

>>http://www.septembereleventh.org/newsarchive/2005-05-22-571pglie.php)

>>

>>