Whence adhyAsa?

[Guest guest]

Apologies if this question has been covered before. I know we have discussed

the topic - at length during Sadananda's excellent posts on the

BrahmasUtra - and I summarised the notes relating to adhyAsa specifically

but I cannot immediately find any answer.

 

I am currently (re-)reading Douglas Fox's Dispelling Illusion, whose subject

is the alAtashAnti of gauDapAda (the 4th prakaraNa of the mANDUkya

upanishad). Referring to MU 2.12, he points out gauDapAda's claim that the

'self-luminous Atma, by means of its own mAyA, imagines within itself all

objects and experiences'. He goes on to say that shaMkara rejected this

because it meant that brahman either actively created everything or was

itself a victim, neither of which would be acceptable, knowing brahman to be

perfect and unchanging etc. ShaMkara therefore (says Fox) proposed his

adhyAsa theory but is this any more acceptable?

 

As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

a) brahman does the superimposing.

b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

c) we ourselves do it.

 

Since 'we' are ourselves a superimposition, if the third option is the case,

it would be a superimposition superimposing. Who would produce the first

superimposition? Since brahman is infinite, how could something exist

independently outside it? Thus the second option does not seem viable. If

the first were the case, it would mean that brahman were creating and

therefore active, which means change. So that cannot be the case either. Is

there another accepted answer?

 

Or is this one of those questions to which the answer is anirvachanIya (not

to be mentioned - i.e. inexplicable)?

 

sukhaM chara,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis,

 

I have no answer to your question but I am very interested in a part of the

formulation.

 

You say, Since brahman is infinite, how could something exist

independently outside it?

 

I wonder if you could enlarge on what you mean by infinite? I have understood

"infinite" to mean something like "having no boundaries". So silence could be

said to be without boundaries, and changeless, while sound exists within it.

 

In a similar way, "the now" could be said to be out of time, belonging to a

different dimension from time. So that who I am is conscious of the changing

events of time but is not subject to change, not subject to time.

 

But you seem to give "infinite" a meaning that is something like "inclusive of

everything". I can't quite grasp that - could you help me and enlarge on it a

bit?

 

Sincerely

Warwick

 

 

As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

a) brahman does the superimposing.

b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

c) we ourselves do it.

 

Since 'we' are ourselves a superimposition, if the third option is the case,

it would be a superimposition superimposing. Who would produce the first

superimposition? Since brahman is infinite, how could something exist

independently outside it? Thus the second option does not seem viable. If

the first were the case, it would mean that brahman were creating and

therefore active, which means change. So that cannot be the case either. Is

there another accepted answer?

 

Or is this one of those questions to which the answer is anirvachanIya (not

to be mentioned - i.e. inexplicable)?

 

sukhaM chara,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of Atman

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[Guest guest]

I am afraid this is a language problem. The misleading words

are "illusion" and "superimposition".

 

Let us take Sankara's classic example of rope and snake. Here, snake

is not a "superimposition" but a "misapprehension of the rope reality

as snake". No "superimposition" (placing one thing on another) has

actually taken place. The rope is simply "misunderstood" as another

thing. When knowledge of rope reality dawns, the

snake "misapprehensiion" simply vanishes.

 

Obviously, Sankara did not expect us to consider this example per se

and be content with it. He was trying to "describe" the Absolute

with an example from the physical world of duality. In his

circumstances, the rope-snake example was the best available. It

could not be the "perfect". That is all. But, he definitely wanted

us to go further. How?

 

When the misapprehension of rope as snake is resolved, there is still

duality left, in the sense that the rope exists as separate from its

seer. Here rope is representative of the entire creation -

everything that we experience, our body, thoughts, mind etc. etc.

Now the seer has to undo the misapprehension that the rope (perceived

world)is not other than him. Advaita has already given him the logic

to arrive at this conclusion. When the knowledge that creation is

not other than him dawns, then duality ends for the seer.

Then what remains is He Himself without a second. That is why a

Malayalee saint, a devout devotee of Lord Krishna, sang long ago:

 

"The woe that I underwent when I saw You, the only One, as two cannot

be described.".

 

If the above is understood, then have Mr. Douglas Fox's three

assumptions any validity?

 

I have not read Fox's "Dispelling Illusion". However, if he

meant "maaya" by the world "illusion", then it is a very unfortunate

error. "Maaya" is not "illusion". The universe considered as maaya

is not an "illusion". It is very real as long as we operate in

duality. "Maaya" only means all that are subject to change,

conditioned by space and time.

 

And before concluding, will it not help lessen confusion if we avoid

using terminology like "adhyaasa theory", "superimposition

theory", "theory of infinite regression" etc. etc. This is only a

suggestion.

 

Pranams.

 

M.R. NAIR

 

 

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> I am currently (re-)reading Douglas Fox's Dispelling Illusion,

whose subject

> As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

> a) brahman does the superimposing.

> b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

> c) we ourselves do it.

[Guest guest]

Hi Warwick,

 

You asked what I (Douglas Fox) meant by 'infinite'. I think that all that is

meant by this is that there is only brahman, nothing else. Therefore there

can be nothing outside of it, i.e. there cannot be a separate process of

adhyAsa. I'm not sure that silence is a viable analogy. Surely, if there was

a sound existing within it then it would not be silence? As for 'now' being

outside time, I would have said that time is only one of the several

concepts invented by us in order to try to make sense of the world. In

reality, 'all is always now' as T. S. Eliot said.

 

Hi M. R. Nair,

 

I don't think that there is a language problem here. Actually, I believe we

have to use the correct Sanskrit terminology here in order to avoid possible

misunderstanding. I disagree with your contention that the snake is not a

superimposition. If it were not, where else could it come from? adhyAsa is

another word for adhyAropa, meaning 'erroneous transferring of a statement

from one thing to another'. It is the basis of Advaita Vedanta and of

shaMkara's interpretation of the brahmasUtra. The fact that the perceived

object is a rope is hidden and the mind substitutes or projects something of

its own, namely the image of a rope. To say that the rope is simply

'misunderstood as another thing' is being too simplistic and missing the

clarity of shaMkara's analysis.

 

You go on to say that:

 

"When the misapprehension of rope as snake is resolved, there is still

duality left, in the sense that the rope exists as separate from its

seer. Here rope is representative of the entire creation -

everything that we experience, our body, thoughts, mind etc. etc.

Now the seer has to undo the misapprehension that the rope (perceived

world)is not other than him. Advaita has already given him the logic

to arrive at this conclusion. When the knowledge that creation is

not other than him dawns, then duality ends for the seer."

 

I think you are confusing the metaphor with the situation for which it is

being used as a metaphor. Our experience is that we are faced with the one

Reality but we fail to see it as it really is (the rope). Instead we

perceive separate objects and individuals (the snake). The metaphor is

telling us that, when we cease to superimpose the memory of separate objects

upon the reality in front of us, we will know the truth - that the separate

objects never existed, except in our minds.

 

Finally, you say:

 

"I have not read Fox's "Dispelling Illusion". However, if he

meant "maaya" by the world "illusion", then it is a very unfortunate

error. "Maaya" is not "illusion". The universe considered as maaya

is not an "illusion". It is very real as long as we operate in

duality. "Maaya" only means all that are subject to change,

conditioned by space and time."

 

As I said, the book is about gauDapAda's alAtashAnti. This is unambiguously

about paramArtha, not vyavahAra. There is no creation, no universe. mAyA is

the concealing power of AvaraNa (we fail to see the rope) combined with the

projecting power of vikShepa (we see a snake). He could have called the book

'Dispelling adhyAsa' - but probably far fewer people would have bought it

(than the few who actually did, I guess!).

 

sukhaM cara,

 

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Hari Om !!

 

 

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

>ShaMkara therefore (says Fox) proposed his

> adhyAsa theory but is this any more acceptable?

>

> As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

> a) brahman does the superimposing.

> b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

> c) we ourselves do it.

>

> Since 'we' are ourselves a superimposition, if the third option is

the case,

> it would be a superimposition superimposing. Who would produce the

first

> superimposition? Since brahman is infinite, how could something

exist

> independently outside it? Thus the second option does not seem

viable. If

> the first were the case, it would mean that brahman were creating

and

> therefore active, which means change. So that cannot be the case

either. Is

> there another accepted answer?

>

> Or is this one of those questions to which the answer is

anirvachanIya (not

> to be mentioned - i.e. inexplicable)?

>

 

Here are two examples:

 

1. The trees grow on the mountains and cover the mountain (the

onlooker does not see the mountain, and sees only the green trees).

 

2. The burning flames generate smoke and cover the flame.

 

I guess we should not say:

 

1. We can not say the onlooker covered the mountains with trees or

covered the fire with smoke.

 

2. There was independent smoke apart from fire.

 

3. The mountain actively covered itself or the fire actively covered

itself.

 

That is why the 'Maya' the inherent power of Brahman when projected

as the world outside, it deludes the beings as if REAL.

 

At the same time this Maya is the only real thing for an ignorant;

for a seeker it is Anirvachaniya, and for a realised soul it is non-

existant.

 

Just like a dreamer creates and hides things in the dream, so also

superimposition can be of a fictitious entity, which itself is a

superimposition.

 

If a small situation of a dream can create so much havoc

in 'Perception', what could be said of all powerful Maya, what is

impossible for Maya. All is one. -- I read some thing in these lines.

 

Probably, it could be called - 'Ati-Prasna', as I often read in Swami

Sivananda's answers. The only answer for an 'Ati-Prasna',

transcendental question is to Know your Self, and you will find the

answer in the sense that the question itself will vanish.

 

In Maharshi Ramana's style: "Findout who has this doubt about

Superimposition."

 

Does it answer ?

 

All is Maya, my friend.

 

Om Namo Narayanaya !!

 

Srikrishna

[Guest guest]

Hi Dennis

 

thanks for your reply.

 

You have obviously studied the texts very deeply, and I defer to your learning.

But The matter below is not one of scholarship but of direct experience. (And

let's leave aside for the moment the matter of whether the word experience

cannot be applied to the Absolute.)

 

I'm not sure that silence is a viable analogy. Surely, if there was

a sound existing within it then it would not be silence?

Well yes, it would, actually. Silence is not destroyed by sound, and if you

listen in the right way you can always hear the silence, no matter how great the

noise.

 

Cheers Warwick

-

Dennis Waite

advaitin

Wednesday, February 20, 2002 8:01 AM

RE: Whence adhyAsa?

 

 

Hi Warwick,

 

You asked what I (Douglas Fox) meant by 'infinite'. I think that all that is

meant by this is that there is only brahman, nothing else. Therefore there

can be nothing outside of it, i.e. there cannot be a separate process of

adhyAsa. I'm not sure that silence is a viable analogy. Surely, if there was

a sound existing within it then it would not be silence? As for 'now' being

outside time, I would have said that time is only one of the several

concepts invented by us in order to try to make sense of the world. In

reality, 'all is always now' as T. S. Eliot said.

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Hi Dennis Waite,

 

Thanks for your comments.

 

Let me make it very short.

 

Reading your answer, I cannot now figure out where we

have any disagreement as in the final analysis you and

I are converging at the same inevitable conclusion.

Do you have any disagreement abut that!?

 

My endeavour (points 1 and 2) was to adopt a very

"simple" and direct approach in order not to confound

issues. I didn't expect you to call it "simplistic"

as that word has unfortunate nuances!

 

Regarding point 3, I am still not sure what you are

trying to say. Anyway, let us postpone it until I

read "Dispelling Illusion".

 

M.R. Nair

 

Dennis Waite <dwaite wrote:

 

 

(1)

> I disagree with your contention

> that the snake is not a

> superimposition. To say that the

> rope is simply

> 'misunderstood as another thing' is being too

> simplistic and missing the

> clarity of shaMkara's analysis.

 

(2)

> > I think you are confusing the metaphor with the

> situation for which it is

> being used as a metaphor.

 

(3)

Finally, you say:

>

> "I have not read Fox's "Dispelling Illusion".

 

 

 

 

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http://sports.

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis,

 

Your question on Adhyasa is a very important one, and demands a

satisfactory answer. You are absolutely correct that neither of the

misguided attempts by Warwick or Madathil Nair, have adequately

answered your question. Nor can you possibly feel content with your

own proposed solution: that perhaps "this is one of those questions

to which the answer is anirvachiniya (not to be mentioned-i.e.

inexplicable). For if that were case our Advaitic position would be

reduced to merely an article of blind faith, and would be no better

than any other theological dogma.

 

You go on to say that according to Douglas Fox, "Shankara rejected

Gaudapadas claim that "the Self -Luminous Self…. Imagines within

itself all objects and experiences."(MU2-12),and proposed his own

Adhyasa theory. But is that any more acceptable?" This leads us to

the further issue of having to decide if Shankara was a true follower

of Guadapada, or did he deviate from the 5th century sage, and head

out on a new path of his own having recognized the defects in

Gualdapadas teachings?

 

To restate the problem as formulated by Fox:

 

A) Brahman does the superimposing (Gaudapadas position) The

problem: Brahman becomes active and changeable.

B) Adhyasa is andindependent' process outside Brahman. The

problem: Brahman is no longer One without a second.

C) We ourselves do it. (Shankaras position) The problem: Who

would produce the first superimposition? (I.e. the defect of an

infinite regress and if Adhyasa is defined as MUTUAL SUPERIMPOSITION

it would lead to nihilism-see below).

 

In addition if we accept C) (Shankaras position) then we have an

another problem that must be addressed. concerning Adhyasa; A problem

similar to Fox's 3 alternatives, and that has be clearly articulated

by the great Japanese scholar Mayeda in his introduction to his book

'A Thousand Teachings by Shankara"

He writes

"3A; A Theoretical defect in Avidya (Adhyasa)

 

"Certainly the most crucial problem which Shankara left for his

followers is that of Avidya. If the concept of Avidya is logically

analyzed, it would lead the Vedanta philosophy toward dualism (Fox's

point B) or nihilism (Fox's point C) and uproot its fundamental

position..

As we have seen Avidya is the mutual superimposition of the Atman and

non-Atman. If so, Avidya would come to be logically untenable.

Shankara himself is aware of this fact and points it out in the

pupil's question to his teacher: 'Is it not experienced that the

thing which is superimposed upon something else, through Avidya does

not exist in the later-for example, silver does not exist in the

mother-of-pearl nor a snake in a rope, Likewise if the body and Atman

are always mutually superimposed..then they cannot exist in each

other at any time….this being the case it would follow as a result

that neither the body nor Atman exist. And this is not acceptable as

this is the theory of the nihilists. For this reason the body and

Atman are not mutually superimposed . (Upadeshasahasri 2-2-555)"

 

Mayeda continues "Thus the teacher does not give any definite

answer to the point raised by his pupil…As far as I know, Shankaras

own pupils did not take up this problem; It was Sarvajnamuni who

first tried to treat it. In his Samksepasariraka he has further

developed the concept of avidya on the basis of the ideas of his

teacher and Padmapada and tried to solve the problem left unsolved by

Shankara.

(The 'Whence (cause) of Adhyasa' According to Post

Shankara Vedantins)

In Sarvajnaatman's opinion Avidya is beginingless (anadi SS1-454)

it is not simply a negative entity like the absence of knowledge (or

wrong knowledge-Adhyasa) but a positive entity (bhavarupa,SS

1-320-322) He identifies it with Maya(SS 2-190) ..and it is the cause

of Adhyasa."

 

 

This, Dennis, has been the solution of every Vedantin from the time

of Padmapada to the present day. It is called 'Mula Avidya' (the

same as Maya, Shakti.Prikriti,Made up of three Gunas)and is said to be

the "Whence - the cause- of Adhyasa.. When I asked Swami Dayananda

Sarasvati why we wake up from deep sleep, because in that state there

is no Adhyasa, no misconceptions?, his reply was that because the Mula

Avidya exists in that state, and if it didn't, we would never wake up!

But that is no solution at all and it opens Advaitins to Fox's second

charge that, if Avidya is a beginingless positive entity, that exists

in all states including deep sleep, then Brahman can't be one without

a second.

 

The post Shankara Vedantins were well aware of this great challenge

to and seeming defect of Advaita Vedanta. Many books were written to

defend this untenable theory of Mula Avidya (i.e Vimuktatmas'. Ista

Siddhhi , Sri Harsha's Khandana Khandana etc.etc.). But it is in fact

undefendable. And all the Vaishnava Acharyas knew it, and used this

Mula Avidya doctrine to defeat the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta.

 

I submit for your review the Vaishnava critic of Mula Avidya as

used by Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallahaba, and other 'Qualified

Non-Dualists' and 'Dualists' after the time of Shankara. I do this

because it is important to see that the post Shankara Vedantins

attempted answers to your very pertinent question 'Whence Adhyasa'

utterly fails, and that if no answer is possible, then Advaita Vedanta

should be rejected as an indefensible, irrational and dogmatic

outlook on life.

 

 

The Vaisnava Vedanta Critique Of the

Advaita Vedantin's theory of

 

Avidya/Maya

 

 

The Problem: All schools of Vedanta agree that there is One Supreme

Reality. Universal experience testifies to the existence of a world.

The question then arises, how did this world come about? It is the

answer to this question that differentiates the Vaisnava Vedantins

from Advaita Vedantins in a very fundamental way.

 

The difficulty the Advaitin has is that he holds the Absolute Reality

to be ever free from all qualities (Nirguna) and Non Dual. How could

the world arise from such an entity? The AdvaitaVedantins answer to

this problem is as follows. He posits a principal which he

indiscriminately refers to as AVIDYA (IGNORANCE), MULA AVIDYA (ROOT

IGNORANCE), MAYA (ILLUSION), PRIKRITI (NATURE) SHAKTI (POWER)

AVYAKTA ( UNMANIFEST). This principle is a "Bava Rupa" it actually

exists in a very peculiar way. It is Tri Guna Atmaka (MADE UP OF

THREE GUNAS). This Avidya is ANADI ANNANTAM (BEGININGLESS AND ENLESS).

This Avidya has two powers: AVARANA SHAKTI (THE POWER TO COMPLETELY

COVER THE ABSOLUTE REALITY) and VIKSHEPA SHAKTI (THE POWER TO PROJECT

THE UNREAL WORLD) It is this Ignorance that is said to be the cause of

the dualistic world as well as transmigratory existence (Samsara) as

well as Adhyasa-the misconceptiontion of superimposing the Self and

the Non-Self. This Ignorance is neither describable as existent nor

non-existent (sat-asat anirvachiniya) nor can it said to be either the

same as the Absolute nor different from the Absolute. This Mula

Ignorance exists in all the common states of experience, including

deep sleep. If it did not exist in deep sleep, the Advaitin argues,

there would be no cause to account for waking up! It is only by

accepting this principal of Avidya that we can account for the

appearance of the world from the Non Dual Quality less Absolute.

This Ignorance can only be destroyed by the attainment of the

Knowledge of the Absolute, this destroys both Ignorance and its

effects--Adhyasa and the world and Samsara.

 

 

((( That the above depiction of the Advaita Vedantins

'theory'of Ignorance/Maya is not merely a straw dog set up by the

latter Vedantic Achhaaryas,(Baskara,Ramanuga,Mhadva,Nibarka, Chaitanya

and Vallahbha)so as to make it easy prey for criticism, can be seen

by an appeal the writings of the great Advaitic Acharyas.

Shakaracharya. describes this doctrine of Mula Avidya and its identity

with Maya and Prikriti in the most famous independent work ascribed to

him, Viveka Chudamani. His direct disciple Padmapada elaborates on the

doctrine of his teacher in his Pachapadika, ie his commentary on

Shankaras commentary on the first four Sutras of the Brahma Sutra

Bhashya . The two later branches of Advaita ,the Vivarana and the

Bhamati schools, (who by this time had to respond to the criticisms of

the Vedantic Acharyas against this Avidya Maya Vada (The Theory Of

Indeterminable Illusory Ignorance))had all accepted the truth of this

Mula Avidya. In fact Vimuktatmas' 'Ista Siddhi' is a sustained

refutation of the criticisms of the 'Maya Ignorance' theory. And one

can easily conclude that by the time Vicaspati Mishra composed the

'Bhamiti, Baskaras' Beda Abeda school had acquired wide currency at

the expense of the Advaita philosophy. For we see in the Bhamati

great efforts being made on the part of Vicaspati to answer the

objections of Baskara against this Root Ignorance Theory..

Sarvajamuni, Vidyaranya (pancadasi). Sri Harsha, and every famous

Vedantic writer has held this exact view. Not only is this true of

the past, but every modern day Advaita Vedantin (in the orthodox sense

- Swami Dayananda, Swami Chinmayananda, Swami Vivekananda, Swami

Shivananda) has accepted and propounded this doctrine of

'Indescribable Ignorance' in one form or another. In 1984 the Sringiri

Shankara Mutt, one of the highest authorities on the doctrinal issues

concerning Advaita Vedanta, issued a book dedicated solely to

upholding the truth that Ignorance in Vedanta does not mean merely

'not knowing, 'doubting', or 'misconceiving' as it is commonly

understood in the world but rather a unique type of Indeterminable

Ignorance ( which, it appears, only the Advaitins know about, in as

much as no other system of thought Eastern or Western have

acknowledged such a principal). It is this SAME Avidya , this

doctrine of Maya, that is the target of refutation by the Vaisnava

Acharyas, and not a doctrine which they themselves have imagined!)))

 

---

The response of the Vaisnava Vedantins to the above

theory of "Mula Avidya Maya" is that it is 1) opposed to reason (yukti

viruddha), 2) opposed to universal experience( sarva luakika anubava

viruddha) and 3) opposed to the scriptures (shastra viruddha ) and

therefore should not be accepted by those who are striving for the

highest goal attainable (parama purusharta).The following is an

elucidation of these three criticisms:

 

1) Opposed to reason:

 

A) We would like to ask the Advaitin exactly where does this positive

principal of Ignorance reside? It either exists outside of the

Absolute or within the Absolute, as there are no other alternatives.

If the Advitin takes the first option the he must abandon the idea

that the Absolute is Non Dual. If he takes the second option then he

must abandon the idea that the absolute is without qualities ( And if

this Mula Avidya were to reside in the Absolute, since this is the

greatest Ignorance of all- as compared with the ignorance of any

particular individual (Tula Avidya)-it would result in making the

Absolute the biggest ignoramus of all!).

 

 

B) To say that there is an entity whose nature is neither existent

nor non-existent is contradictory. As these are mutually opposed

qualities. the existence of one attribute necessarily implies the

absence of its opposite. Just as motion and being stationary are

not attributes which can be ascribed to a single object

simultaneously, so too it is not possible to conceive of a positive

entity called Avidya which is neither existent nor non-existent.

 

c) How exactly this positive entity, Avidya, can have the capacity to

cover the Absolute which is infinate is not something the mind can

conceive, and therefore, this Avidya/Maya is nothing more than an

article of faith, an unreasonable dogma that the Advaitin asks us to

accept, even in face of the fact that it can not be rationally

demonstrated.

 

d) This Avidya is claimed to be beginingless and endless. It is not

reasonable to suppose that a beginingless entity could ever come to an

end. That which has a beginning will certainly have an end, that which

has no beginning can never have an end!

 

E) Ignoring the above criticism, the Advaitin nevertheless claims

that this Beginingless Avidya/Maya and its effects can be destroyed by

Knowledge of the Absolute.(Brahmavid Brahma bhavati). Yet this too(

just like his imagination of Mula Avidya) is no more than a dogmatic

article of faith. How so? In the world it is NEVER seen that knowledge

ever creates or destroys any positive existing thing. In fact, all

that knowledge ever does and all that it can do is to reveal the

object of knowledge as it is. When we get the correct knowledge of a

pot, for example, that knowledge neither creates nor destroys the

pot. It merely reveals it as it is. (To quote a nyaya- Vidya

jnapakum na karakum- knowledge reveals the object it does not create

anything) To say that Knowledge has the capacity to destroy a positive

entity, Avidya, that is made up of the three qunas is not reasonable,.

At best, knowledge could possibly reveal this Ignorance as it is ,

but it could never destroy it. Therefore since the Advaitin stakes his

all on the necessity of Knowledge to the exclusion of every other

means for the removal of this Ignorance. And since it has be

demonstrated that Knowledge never destroys anything positive including

Avidya, ( Nor Maya, NorPrikriti,Nor Avyakta etc-for these are no more

than synonyms for Avidya according to the Advaitin.)!! It follows

from this that even if one were to hypothetically accept the truth of

the Advaitins' Mula Avidya , which is claimed to be the root cause of

samsara, there is no way that anyone could destroy it -including the

Advaitin -wheather by knowledge or by any other means,(bhakti, karma

yoga, meditation, etc) . And therefore the Advaitin has infact

disqualified himself for the attainment of the Highest Goal by

accepting this Maya doctrine.

 

F) The Advaitin might retort that the knowledge that he is talking

about is not any worldly knowledge, which he grants does not destroy

anything, but a special type of knowledge that is gained in

Nirvikalpa Samadhi , and it is this knowledge which has the capacity

to destroy the beginingless Mula Avidya. This reply has several

defects. Since this Nirvikalpa state is not a universal one, those

who have not yet attained that state will have to take it as an

article of faith that by attaining a particular state, at a particular

time, at a particular place, that has a beginning and an end this will

produce a knowledge which

 

has the capacity to destroy, forever, this infinite Power/Shakti

Ignorance that has covered the Absolute from beginingless time. So

there is no rational support for one who has not yet achieved it. The

next defect arises when the Advaitin claims that the truth of Mula

Avidya and its nature and its effects, as well as the fact that it is

destroyed by the knowedge obtained in the Nirvikalpa state is 'proved'

by those who have actually experienced that state. In other words, he

claims that we know all this on the basis of the testimony of those

who have experienced that state This reply can never be convincing for

the very reason that if in fact a person attained this 'special'

Knowledge in the Nirvikupa state and thereby destroyed this Mula

Avidya. There would then be no person left to give testimony to Mula

Avidya nor any world left to hear that testimony!! This follows

rigorously from the logic that the sole cause for the whole universe

as well as the individuals suffering in it, is nothing but the effect

of Mula Avidya and this is said to have been destroyed.

The defect of invoking some private mystical state as well

as the testimony of those who are supposed to have experienced those

states, so as to substantiate the truth of something that can not be

rationally defended, is that ANYTHING can be held to be proved by an

appeal to that state. It is a passing strange that the state appealed

to by the Advaitin, to defend the dogma that Mula Avidya can be

destroyed by the Knowledge attained in Nirvikalpa Samadhi, is the very

same state that Patanjali invokes to proclaim the truth of Duality.

And even though Patanjali may be supposed to have attained this

mystical private state (considering the fact that he wrote the

definitive book on the subject-the Yoga Sutras), he never conceived

of, nor even hinted at this dogma of Mula Avidya. For Patanjali the

only ignorance was subjective ignorance and when an individual removed

his subjective ignorance, then he alone would attain Kaivalyam. But

the world would not be destroyed nor become unreal thereby, nor would

the subjective ignorance of all the other real individuals be

destroyed. Thus by appealing to the same mystical state (and there can

be no distinctions, by definition, with regard to the actual state of

Nirvikalpa) we have two different reports about the nature of reality

as well as the nature of ignorance (either a Cosmic Principle which

accounts of the appearance of the world -Advaita Darshana-or a

subjective misconception which merely accounts for only one

individuals suffering and on the destruction of which there is an end

of suffering for that individual alone-Yoga Darshana)! This should

serve as a warning for those who would like to establish their views

on the basis of an individual mystical state!

 

G) There is no empirical means by which this Mula Avidya can be

demonstrated in as much as the senses cannot objectify this Mula

Avidya, nor can it be inferred in as much as there is no previous

cognition of it as associated with something else, so that it could

now be inferred.

 

H) Because Ignorance is opposed to Knowledge and since the Advaitin

claims that the nature of the absolute is Knowledge, how can Ignorance

reside in the Absolute?

 

I) When the Advaitin says that this Mula Avidya must necessarily

be inferred because without that inference we could never explain the

appearance of duality, what he is really saying is that in order to

uphold his cherished theory that Reality is Non-Dual and

Qualitiless,he is going to assume, to hypothesize this Mula Avidya,

even though it is not rationally sustainable and , in the face of the

above, an irrational doctrine.

 

 

2) Opposed to Universal Experience:

 

When the Advaitin claims that the world is the effect of this

hypothetical principal of Ignorance and is therefore unreal he

contradicts the experience of all individuals. That the world is real

is proved by every sense organ. We see the world, we hear the world,

we touch the world, this is the proof that the world exists. As

opposed to this evidence which is universal, if one were to assert

that that the world is unreal" because it is the effect of this

hypothetical Ignorance", it would be like someone claiming that fire

is cold, and that this is so is because…. and then he gives you the

reasoning to substantiate his claim. Would this reasoning be

acceptable or convincing? When the fact that fire is hot is a

universally accepted experiential fact, testified to by the senses

directly ,to say that it is cold and to give the reasons for it being

so, is no more than sophistry and can never lead to conviction.

Nor can the Advaita Vedantin fall back on the support of the Holy

Scriptures to support his view, for even if a hundred Srutis were to

proclaim that fire is cold, that statement can never be taken in its

literal sense and must be understood either metaphorically or as a

viddhi/command of the scripture to superimpose the idea of cold on the

fire and never that fire is in fact cold. This is so because all

Vedantins accept that the Scriptures are a 'means of knowledge' and

one 'means of knowledge' is never seen to contradict another 'means of

knowledge' The eyes never contradict the ears, and the scriptures

never contradict the sense organs. They each have there own sphere of

operation and the scriptures only reveal what is not accessible to the

sense organs .Only if both the sense organs and the scriptures were

thought to both reveal the same object could it then be said that

there is a possibility of contradiction, but this is not the case.

 

It is for this very same reason the Advaitin cannot offer as evidence

the mystical state of Nirvikalpa Samadhi to confirm his view that 'the

world is unreal, it being the outcome of Ignorance'. For what exactly

is this state of Nirvikalpa? It is a state in which one is no longer

aware of any distinctions, no objects and no subject aware of any

objects. When a person then comes out of this state and is once again

aware of the world and of himself as a subject cognizing that world,

how can he claim that the world that he is now perceiving is unreal

on the basis of that Nirvikalpa experience? In fact we all have the

experience of not being aware of the subject or object in deep sleep,

but no one coming out of that state believes that the world is unreal

or that an indescribable Avidya causes it. How can the absence of the

experience of the world prove its unreality when the senses, (even of

the one who had Nirvikalpa or sleep), prove the worlds existence now,

and allow us to correctly infer its existence even during the time

someone was in Nirvikalpa Samadhi or sleep?

 

 

3) Opposed to the Scriptures:

 

The Advaitin admits that in the Upanishads,(scriptures

which he himself considers to be of the highest authority), one does

find two types of texts-those that describe the Absolute

as free from qualities and Non Dual and those that describe the

Absolute with qualities. But the Advaitin argues that only the first

of the above mentioned texts describes the true nature of the

Absolute, and are therefore of primary and final import, whereas the

other set of texts are merely of secondary and interpretable import

It is based on this arbitrary distinction ,(in as much as this

distinction is not to be found in the Upanishads themselves), that the

Advaitin claims that the secondary description of Absolute(Brahman)

with qualities is the out come of Mula Avidya or Maya, The only

problem is he has not yet demonstrated the truth of this Mula Avidya,

the existence of which is necessary if his arguments about the

secondary import of those texts which describe the Absolute with

qualities are to be considered valid.. Actually this type of argument

against the AdvaitaVedantin, while correct , is not even

necessary,.for the truth of the matter is as follows;

 

If one were to go through all the Upanishads very

carefully and then proceed to meticulously analyze the 700 slokas of

the Bhagavad Gita and then to carefully analyse the 555 sutras of the

Brahma Sutras(ie: the Prastana Traya- the three conical works on which

all Advaitins must base their viewpoint) one would not find one

mention, one hint, one allusion to this purely scholastic doctrine of

an 'Indiscernible power which cannot be said to be existent or non

existent and which covers the Absolute and projects an unreal world'!

In fact it is much more likely that this doctrine of Avidya Maya,

rather than being a teaching that is faithful to the Upanishads, is a

teaching borrowed from the Buddhists who are well known for

proclaiming the illusory nature of the world. Furthermore we have not

only this negative evidence to disprove the scriptural validity of the

doctrine of Mula Avidya as the cause of the world, we also have the

positive evidence to demonstrate that Mula Avidya is not the cause of

any world real or unreal. The Sruti says "In the Beginning there was

the Absolute alone, it desired…;let me be many' and it created the

world." Here we are given in the clearest of terms that the cause of

the world is the desire of the Absolute and not any inferred

indiscernible cosmic force called Ignorance.

 

In summary, since all the Advaitic arguments for the existence of

Mula Avidya Maya have been demonstrated to be opposed to reason,

experience and scripture, unless these

criticisms can be shown to be false, all those who are true seekers of

truth, who desire liberation from all suffering and yearn to attain

the highest bliss, should reject the Advaita system completely for

like a stack of cards, without the acceptance of Mula Avidya the whole

edifice of Advaita falls to the ground.

 

 

So, Dennis, in summary, I conclude that if you are really a

jijnasu, you must get a satisfactory answer to this question. Perhaps

some of the other members of this list will make an attempt. I plan to

address your question ((and yes there is an answer) in the course of

my attempt to show, from a different angle, how SHASTRA IS THE ONLY

PRAMANA FOR ATMAVIDYA.

 

Hari Om

Atmachaitanya

 

 

 

advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> Apologies if this question has been covered before. I know we have

discussed

> the topic - at length during Sadananda's excellent posts on the

> BrahmasUtra - and I summarised the notes relating to adhyAsa

specifically

> but I cannot immediately find any answer.

>

> I am currently (re-)reading Douglas Fox's Dispelling Illusion, whose

subject

> is the alAtashAnti of gauDapAda (the 4th prakaraNa of the mANDUkya

> upanishad). Referring to MU 2.12, he points out gauDapAda's claim

that the

> 'self-luminous Atma, by means of its own mAyA, imagines within

itself all

> objects and experiences'. He goes on to say that shaMkara rejected

this

> because it meant that brahman either actively created everything or

was

> itself a victim, neither of which would be acceptable, knowing

brahman to be

> perfect and unchanging etc. ShaMkara therefore (says Fox) proposed

his

> adhyAsa theory but is this any more acceptable?

>

> As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

> a) brahman does the superimposing.

> b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

> c) we ourselves do it.

>

> Since 'we' are ourselves a superimposition, if the third option is

the case,

> it would be a superimposition superimposing. Who would produce the

first

> superimposition? Since brahman is infinite, how could something

exist

> independently outside it? Thus the second option does not seem

viable. If

> the first were the case, it would mean that brahman were creating

and

> therefore active, which means change. So that cannot be the case

either. Is

> there another accepted answer?

>

> Or is this one of those questions to which the answer is

anirvachanIya (not

> to be mentioned - i.e. inexplicable)?

>

> sukhaM chara,

>

> Dennis

[Guest guest]

Namaste Shri Atmachaitanya,

 

You maintain that it is possible to attain that state

where nothing but you exist, as just awareness, and

bliss and NOTHING else. You also insist, that liberation

is defined as attainment of such a non-dual state and

absolutely no return from there. You further claim that

you base this view on shastra (shruti).

 

In that case, you will have to clearly define, what exactly

is the source of shastra (shruti). To my understanding,

shruti is the testimony of a direct experience of the truth.

Who will testify for the existence of such a state of no return ?

(This is one of the objections that you list to the advaitin's

position, and indeed a very serious objection).

 

Looking forward to your reply.

 

Best regards

Shrinivas Gadkari

[Guest guest]

Namaste Atmachaitanyaji

 

I would also like to bring to your attention that the existent Advaita

Vedanta tradition doesn't accept the views of yours (and your teacher

Swamiji Satchitanandendra Saraswati's) with regards to avidya or mulaavidya.

This particular point and many other views of Swamiji Satchitanandendra

Saraswati are refuted in an unpublished work by Martha Doherty (a disciple

of Swamiji Dayananda Saraswati) using the works of Shankara, Gaudapada &

Sureswara (the same teachers whom Swamiji Satchitanandendra Saraswati

considers to be the only authentic teachers of Vedanta). I beg you to

purchase a copy of this brilliant 324 page Phd dissertation written by her

(read more about her at this site:

http://www.integralphilosophy.org/doherty.htm & the link is also available

there to purchase the dissertation). Her dissertation covers the views of

traditional scholars and modern alike.

 

Thank you.

 

>

> atmachaitanya108 [sMTP:stadri]

> Thursday, February 21, 2002 4:32 AM

> advaitin

> Re: Whence adhyAsa?

>

> Dear Dennis,

>

> Your question on Adhyasa is a very important one, and demands a

> satisfactory answer. You are absolutely correct that neither of the

> misguided attempts by Warwick or Madathil Nair, have adequately

> answered your question. Nor can you possibly feel content with your

> own proposed solution: that perhaps "this is one of those questions

> to which the answer is anirvachiniya (not to be mentioned-i.e.

> inexplicable). For if that were case our Advaitic position would be

> reduced to merely an article of blind faith, and would be no better

> than any other theological dogma.

>

> You go on to say that according to Douglas Fox, "Shankara rejected

> Gaudapadas claim that "the Self -Luminous Self.... Imagines within

> itself all objects and experiences."(MU2-12),and proposed his own

> Adhyasa theory. But is that any more acceptable?" This leads us to

> the further issue of having to decide if Shankara was a true follower

> of Guadapada, or did he deviate from the 5th century sage, and head

> out on a new path of his own having recognized the defects in

> Gualdapadas teachings?

>

> To restate the problem as formulated by Fox:

>

> A) Brahman does the superimposing (Gaudapadas position) The

> problem: Brahman becomes active and changeable.

> B) Adhyasa is andindependent' process outside Brahman. The

> problem: Brahman is no longer One without a second.

> C) We ourselves do it. (Shankaras position) The problem: Who

> would produce the first superimposition? (I.e. the defect of an

> infinite regress and if Adhyasa is defined as MUTUAL SUPERIMPOSITION

> it would lead to nihilism-see below).

>

> In addition if we accept C) (Shankaras position) then we have an

> another problem that must be addressed. concerning Adhyasa; A problem

> similar to Fox's 3 alternatives, and that has be clearly articulated

> by the great Japanese scholar Mayeda in his introduction to his book

> 'A Thousand Teachings by Shankara"

> He writes

> "3A; A Theoretical defect in Avidya (Adhyasa)

>

> "Certainly the most crucial problem which Shankara left for his

> followers is that of Avidya. If the concept of Avidya is logically

> analyzed, it would lead the Vedanta philosophy toward dualism (Fox's

> point B) or nihilism (Fox's point C) and uproot its fundamental

> position..

> As we have seen Avidya is the mutual superimposition of the Atman and

> non-Atman. If so, Avidya would come to be logically untenable.

> Shankara himself is aware of this fact and points it out in the

> pupil's question to his teacher: 'Is it not experienced that the

> thing which is superimposed upon something else, through Avidya does

> not exist in the later-for example, silver does not exist in the

> mother-of-pearl nor a snake in a rope, Likewise if the body and Atman

> are always mutually superimposed..then they cannot exist in each

> other at any time....this being the case it would follow as a result

> that neither the body nor Atman exist. And this is not acceptable as

> this is the theory of the nihilists. For this reason the body and

> Atman are not mutually superimposed . (Upadeshasahasri 2-2-555)"

>

> Mayeda continues "Thus the teacher does not give any definite

> answer to the point raised by his pupil...As far as I know, Shankaras

> own pupils did not take up this problem; It was Sarvajnamuni who

> first tried to treat it. In his Samksepasariraka he has further

> developed the concept of avidya on the basis of the ideas of his

> teacher and Padmapada and tried to solve the problem left unsolved by

> Shankara.

> (The 'Whence (cause) of Adhyasa' According to Post

> Shankara Vedantins)

> In Sarvajnaatman's opinion Avidya is beginingless (anadi SS1-454)

> it is not simply a negative entity like the absence of knowledge (or

> wrong knowledge-Adhyasa) but a positive entity (bhavarupa,SS

> 1-320-322) He identifies it with Maya(SS 2-190) ..and it is the cause

> of Adhyasa."

>

>

> This, Dennis, has been the solution of every Vedantin from the time

> of Padmapada to the present day. It is called 'Mula Avidya' (the

> same as Maya, Shakti.Prikriti,Made up of three Gunas)and is said to be

> the "Whence - the cause- of Adhyasa.. When I asked Swami Dayananda

> Sarasvati why we wake up from deep sleep, because in that state there

> is no Adhyasa, no misconceptions?, his reply was that because the Mula

> Avidya exists in that state, and if it didn't, we would never wake up!

> But that is no solution at all and it opens Advaitins to Fox's second

> charge that, if Avidya is a beginingless positive entity, that exists

> in all states including deep sleep, then Brahman can't be one without

> a second.

>

> The post Shankara Vedantins were well aware of this great challenge

> to and seeming defect of Advaita Vedanta. Many books were written to

> defend this untenable theory of Mula Avidya (i.e Vimuktatmas'. Ista

> Siddhhi , Sri Harsha's Khandana Khandana etc.etc.). But it is in fact

> undefendable. And all the Vaishnava Acharyas knew it, and used this

> Mula Avidya doctrine to defeat the doctrine of Advaita Vedanta.

>

> I submit for your review the Vaishnava critic of Mula Avidya as

> used by Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallahaba, and other 'Qualified

> Non-Dualists' and 'Dualists' after the time of Shankara. I do this

> because it is important to see that the post Shankara Vedantins

> attempted answers to your very pertinent question 'Whence Adhyasa'

> utterly fails, and that if no answer is possible, then Advaita Vedanta

> should be rejected as an indefensible, irrational and dogmatic

> outlook on life.

>

>

> The Vaisnava Vedanta Critique Of the

> Advaita Vedantin's theory of

>

> Avidya/Maya

>

>

> The Problem: All schools of Vedanta agree that there is One Supreme

> Reality. Universal experience testifies to the existence of a world.

> The question then arises, how did this world come about? It is the

> answer to this question that differentiates the Vaisnava Vedantins

> from Advaita Vedantins in a very fundamental way.

>

> The difficulty the Advaitin has is that he holds the Absolute Reality

> to be ever free from all qualities (Nirguna) and Non Dual. How could

> the world arise from such an entity? The AdvaitaVedantins answer to

> this problem is as follows. He posits a principal which he

> indiscriminately refers to as AVIDYA (IGNORANCE), MULA AVIDYA (ROOT

> IGNORANCE), MAYA (ILLUSION), PRIKRITI (NATURE) SHAKTI (POWER)

> AVYAKTA ( UNMANIFEST). This principle is a "Bava Rupa" it actually

> exists in a very peculiar way. It is Tri Guna Atmaka (MADE UP OF

> THREE GUNAS). This Avidya is ANADI ANNANTAM (BEGININGLESS AND ENLESS).

> This Avidya has two powers: AVARANA SHAKTI (THE POWER TO COMPLETELY

> COVER THE ABSOLUTE REALITY) and VIKSHEPA SHAKTI (THE POWER TO PROJECT

> THE UNREAL WORLD) It is this Ignorance that is said to be the cause of

> the dualistic world as well as transmigratory existence (Samsara) as

> well as Adhyasa-the misconceptiontion of superimposing the Self and

> the Non-Self. This Ignorance is neither describable as existent nor

> non-existent (sat-asat anirvachiniya) nor can it said to be either the

> same as the Absolute nor different from the Absolute. This Mula

> Ignorance exists in all the common states of experience, including

> deep sleep. If it did not exist in deep sleep, the Advaitin argues,

> there would be no cause to account for waking up! It is only by

> accepting this principal of Avidya that we can account for the

> appearance of the world from the Non Dual Quality less Absolute.

> This Ignorance can only be destroyed by the attainment of the

> Knowledge of the Absolute, this destroys both Ignorance and its

> effects--Adhyasa and the world and Samsara.

>

>

> ((( That the above depiction of the Advaita Vedantins

> 'theory'of Ignorance/Maya is not merely a straw dog set up by the

> latter Vedantic Achhaaryas,(Baskara,Ramanuga,Mhadva,Nibarka, Chaitanya

> and Vallahbha)so as to make it easy prey for criticism, can be seen

> by an appeal the writings of the great Advaitic Acharyas.

> Shakaracharya. describes this doctrine of Mula Avidya and its identity

> with Maya and Prikriti in the most famous independent work ascribed to

> him, Viveka Chudamani. His direct disciple Padmapada elaborates on the

> doctrine of his teacher in his Pachapadika, ie his commentary on

> Shankaras commentary on the first four Sutras of the Brahma Sutra

> Bhashya . The two later branches of Advaita ,the Vivarana and the

> Bhamati schools, (who by this time had to respond to the criticisms of

> the Vedantic Acharyas against this Avidya Maya Vada (The Theory Of

> Indeterminable Illusory Ignorance))had all accepted the truth of this

> Mula Avidya. In fact Vimuktatmas' 'Ista Siddhi' is a sustained

> refutation of the criticisms of the 'Maya Ignorance' theory. And one

> can easily conclude that by the time Vicaspati Mishra composed the

> 'Bhamiti, Baskaras' Beda Abeda school had acquired wide currency at

> the expense of the Advaita philosophy. For we see in the Bhamati

> great efforts being made on the part of Vicaspati to answer the

> objections of Baskara against this Root Ignorance Theory..

> Sarvajamuni, Vidyaranya (pancadasi). Sri Harsha, and every famous

> Vedantic writer has held this exact view. Not only is this true of

> the past, but every modern day Advaita Vedantin (in the orthodox sense

> - Swami Dayananda, Swami Chinmayananda, Swami Vivekananda, Swami

> Shivananda) has accepted and propounded this doctrine of

> 'Indescribable Ignorance' in one form or another. In 1984 the Sringiri

> Shankara Mutt, one of the highest authorities on the doctrinal issues

> concerning Advaita Vedanta, issued a book dedicated solely to

> upholding the truth that Ignorance in Vedanta does not mean merely

> 'not knowing, 'doubting', or 'misconceiving' as it is commonly

> understood in the world but rather a unique type of Indeterminable

> Ignorance ( which, it appears, only the Advaitins know about, in as

> much as no other system of thought Eastern or Western have

> acknowledged such a principal). It is this SAME Avidya , this

> doctrine of Maya, that is the target of refutation by the Vaisnava

> Acharyas, and not a doctrine which they themselves have imagined!)))

>

> ---

> The response of the Vaisnava Vedantins to the above

> theory of "Mula Avidya Maya" is that it is 1) opposed to reason (yukti

> viruddha), 2) opposed to universal experience( sarva luakika anubava

> viruddha) and 3) opposed to the scriptures (shastra viruddha ) and

> therefore should not be accepted by those who are striving for the

> highest goal attainable (parama purusharta).The following is an

> elucidation of these three criticisms:

>

> 1) Opposed to reason:

>

> A) We would like to ask the Advaitin exactly where does this positive

> principal of Ignorance reside? It either exists outside of the

> Absolute or within the Absolute, as there are no other alternatives.

> If the Advitin takes the first option the he must abandon the idea

> that the Absolute is Non Dual. If he takes the second option then he

> must abandon the idea that the absolute is without qualities ( And if

> this Mula Avidya were to reside in the Absolute, since this is the

> greatest Ignorance of all- as compared with the ignorance of any

> particular individual (Tula Avidya)-it would result in making the

> Absolute the biggest ignoramus of all!).

>

>

> B) To say that there is an entity whose nature is neither existent

> nor non-existent is contradictory. As these are mutually opposed

> qualities. the existence of one attribute necessarily implies the

> absence of its opposite. Just as motion and being stationary are

> not attributes which can be ascribed to a single object

> simultaneously, so too it is not possible to conceive of a positive

> entity called Avidya which is neither existent nor non-existent.

>

> c) How exactly this positive entity, Avidya, can have the capacity to

> cover the Absolute which is infinate is not something the mind can

> conceive, and therefore, this Avidya/Maya is nothing more than an

> article of faith, an unreasonable dogma that the Advaitin asks us to

> accept, even in face of the fact that it can not be rationally

> demonstrated.

>

> d) This Avidya is claimed to be beginingless and endless. It is not

> reasonable to suppose that a beginingless entity could ever come to an

> end. That which has a beginning will certainly have an end, that which

> has no beginning can never have an end!

>

> E) Ignoring the above criticism, the Advaitin nevertheless claims

> that this Beginingless Avidya/Maya and its effects can be destroyed by

> Knowledge of the Absolute.(Brahmavid Brahma bhavati). Yet this too(

> just like his imagination of Mula Avidya) is no more than a dogmatic

> article of faith. How so? In the world it is NEVER seen that knowledge

> ever creates or destroys any positive existing thing. In fact, all

> that knowledge ever does and all that it can do is to reveal the

> object of knowledge as it is. When we get the correct knowledge of a

> pot, for example, that knowledge neither creates nor destroys the

> pot. It merely reveals it as it is. (To quote a nyaya- Vidya

> jnapakum na karakum- knowledge reveals the object it does not create

> anything) To say that Knowledge has the capacity to destroy a positive

> entity, Avidya, that is made up of the three qunas is not reasonable,.

> At best, knowledge could possibly reveal this Ignorance as it is ,

> but it could never destroy it. Therefore since the Advaitin stakes his

> all on the necessity of Knowledge to the exclusion of every other

> means for the removal of this Ignorance. And since it has be

> demonstrated that Knowledge never destroys anything positive including

> Avidya, ( Nor Maya, NorPrikriti,Nor Avyakta etc-for these are no more

> than synonyms for Avidya according to the Advaitin.)!! It follows

> from this that even if one were to hypothetically accept the truth of

> the Advaitins' Mula Avidya , which is claimed to be the root cause of

> samsara, there is no way that anyone could destroy it -including the

> Advaitin -wheather by knowledge or by any other means,(bhakti, karma

> yoga, meditation, etc) . And therefore the Advaitin has infact

> disqualified himself for the attainment of the Highest Goal by

> accepting this Maya doctrine.

>

> F) The Advaitin might retort that the knowledge that he is talking

> about is not any worldly knowledge, which he grants does not destroy

> anything, but a special type of knowledge that is gained in

> Nirvikalpa Samadhi , and it is this knowledge which has the capacity

> to destroy the beginingless Mula Avidya. This reply has several

> defects. Since this Nirvikalpa state is not a universal one, those

> who have not yet attained that state will have to take it as an

> article of faith that by attaining a particular state, at a particular

> time, at a particular place, that has a beginning and an end this will

> produce a knowledge which

>

> has the capacity to destroy, forever, this infinite Power/Shakti

> Ignorance that has covered the Absolute from beginingless time. So

> there is no rational support for one who has not yet achieved it. The

> next defect arises when the Advaitin claims that the truth of Mula

> Avidya and its nature and its effects, as well as the fact that it is

> destroyed by the knowedge obtained in the Nirvikalpa state is 'proved'

> by those who have actually experienced that state. In other words, he

> claims that we know all this on the basis of the testimony of those

> who have experienced that state This reply can never be convincing for

> the very reason that if in fact a person attained this 'special'

> Knowledge in the Nirvikupa state and thereby destroyed this Mula

> Avidya. There would then be no person left to give testimony to Mula

> Avidya nor any world left to hear that testimony!! This follows

> rigorously from the logic that the sole cause for the whole universe

> as well as the individuals suffering in it, is nothing but the effect

> of Mula Avidya and this is said to have been destroyed.

> The defect of invoking some private mystical state as well

> as the testimony of those who are supposed to have experienced those

> states, so as to substantiate the truth of something that can not be

> rationally defended, is that ANYTHING can be held to be proved by an

> appeal to that state. It is a passing strange that the state appealed

> to by the Advaitin, to defend the dogma that Mula Avidya can be

> destroyed by the Knowledge attained in Nirvikalpa Samadhi, is the very

> same state that Patanjali invokes to proclaim the truth of Duality.

> And even though Patanjali may be supposed to have attained this

> mystical private state (considering the fact that he wrote the

> definitive book on the subject-the Yoga Sutras), he never conceived

> of, nor even hinted at this dogma of Mula Avidya. For Patanjali the

> only ignorance was subjective ignorance and when an individual removed

> his subjective ignorance, then he alone would attain Kaivalyam. But

> the world would not be destroyed nor become unreal thereby, nor would

> the subjective ignorance of all the other real individuals be

> destroyed. Thus by appealing to the same mystical state (and there can

> be no distinctions, by definition, with regard to the actual state of

> Nirvikalpa) we have two different reports about the nature of reality

> as well as the nature of ignorance (either a Cosmic Principle which

> accounts of the appearance of the world -Advaita Darshana-or a

> subjective misconception which merely accounts for only one

> individuals suffering and on the destruction of which there is an end

> of suffering for that individual alone-Yoga Darshana)! This should

> serve as a warning for those who would like to establish their views

> on the basis of an individual mystical state!

>

> G) There is no empirical means by which this Mula Avidya can be

> demonstrated in as much as the senses cannot objectify this Mula

> Avidya, nor can it be inferred in as much as there is no previous

> cognition of it as associated with something else, so that it could

> now be inferred.

>

> H) Because Ignorance is opposed to Knowledge and since the Advaitin

> claims that the nature of the absolute is Knowledge, how can Ignorance

> reside in the Absolute?

>

> I) When the Advaitin says that this Mula Avidya must necessarily

> be inferred because without that inference we could never explain the

> appearance of duality, what he is really saying is that in order to

> uphold his cherished theory that Reality is Non-Dual and

> Qualitiless,he is going to assume, to hypothesize this Mula Avidya,

> even though it is not rationally sustainable and , in the face of the

> above, an irrational doctrine.

>

>

> 2) Opposed to Universal Experience:

>

> When the Advaitin claims that the world is the effect of this

> hypothetical principal of Ignorance and is therefore unreal he

> contradicts the experience of all individuals. That the world is real

> is proved by every sense organ. We see the world, we hear the world,

> we touch the world, this is the proof that the world exists. As

> opposed to this evidence which is universal, if one were to assert

> that that the world is unreal" because it is the effect of this

> hypothetical Ignorance", it would be like someone claiming that fire

> is cold, and that this is so is because.... and then he gives you the

> reasoning to substantiate his claim. Would this reasoning be

> acceptable or convincing? When the fact that fire is hot is a

> universally accepted experiential fact, testified to by the senses

> directly ,to say that it is cold and to give the reasons for it being

> so, is no more than sophistry and can never lead to conviction.

> Nor can the Advaita Vedantin fall back on the support of the Holy

> Scriptures to support his view, for even if a hundred Srutis were to

> proclaim that fire is cold, that statement can never be taken in its

> literal sense and must be understood either metaphorically or as a

> viddhi/command of the scripture to superimpose the idea of cold on the

> fire and never that fire is in fact cold. This is so because all

> Vedantins accept that the Scriptures are a 'means of knowledge' and

> one 'means of knowledge' is never seen to contradict another 'means of

> knowledge' The eyes never contradict the ears, and the scriptures

> never contradict the sense organs. They each have there own sphere of

> operation and the scriptures only reveal what is not accessible to the

> sense organs .Only if both the sense organs and the scriptures were

> thought to both reveal the same object could it then be said that

> there is a possibility of contradiction, but this is not the case.

>

> It is for this very same reason the Advaitin cannot offer as evidence

> the mystical state of Nirvikalpa Samadhi to confirm his view that 'the

> world is unreal, it being the outcome of Ignorance'. For what exactly

> is this state of Nirvikalpa? It is a state in which one is no longer

> aware of any distinctions, no objects and no subject aware of any

> objects. When a person then comes out of this state and is once again

> aware of the world and of himself as a subject cognizing that world,

> how can he claim that the world that he is now perceiving is unreal

> on the basis of that Nirvikalpa experience? In fact we all have the

> experience of not being aware of the subject or object in deep sleep,

> but no one coming out of that state believes that the world is unreal

> or that an indescribable Avidya causes it. How can the absence of the

> experience of the world prove its unreality when the senses, (even of

> the one who had Nirvikalpa or sleep), prove the worlds existence now,

> and allow us to correctly infer its existence even during the time

> someone was in Nirvikalpa Samadhi or sleep?

>

>

> 3) Opposed to the Scriptures:

>

> The Advaitin admits that in the Upanishads,(scriptures

> which he himself considers to be of the highest authority), one does

> find two types of texts-those that describe the Absolute

> as free from qualities and Non Dual and those that describe the

> Absolute with qualities. But the Advaitin argues that only the first

> of the above mentioned texts describes the true nature of the

> Absolute, and are therefore of primary and final import, whereas the

> other set of texts are merely of secondary and interpretable import

> It is based on this arbitrary distinction ,(in as much as this

> distinction is not to be found in the Upanishads themselves), that the

> Advaitin claims that the secondary description of Absolute(Brahman)

> with qualities is the out come of Mula Avidya or Maya, The only

> problem is he has not yet demonstrated the truth of this Mula Avidya,

> the existence of which is necessary if his arguments about the

> secondary import of those texts which describe the Absolute with

> qualities are to be considered valid.. Actually this type of argument

> against the AdvaitaVedantin, while correct , is not even

> necessary,.for the truth of the matter is as follows;

>

> If one were to go through all the Upanishads very

> carefully and then proceed to meticulously analyze the 700 slokas of

> the Bhagavad Gita and then to carefully analyse the 555 sutras of the

> Brahma Sutras(ie: the Prastana Traya- the three conical works on which

> all Advaitins must base their viewpoint) one would not find one

> mention, one hint, one allusion to this purely scholastic doctrine of

> an 'Indiscernible power which cannot be said to be existent or non

> existent and which covers the Absolute and projects an unreal world'!

> In fact it is much more likely that this doctrine of Avidya Maya,

> rather than being a teaching that is faithful to the Upanishads, is a

> teaching borrowed from the Buddhists who are well known for

> proclaiming the illusory nature of the world. Furthermore we have not

> only this negative evidence to disprove the scriptural validity of the

> doctrine of Mula Avidya as the cause of the world, we also have the

> positive evidence to demonstrate that Mula Avidya is not the cause of

> any world real or unreal. The Sruti says "In the Beginning there was

> the Absolute alone, it desired...;let me be many' and it created the

> world." Here we are given in the clearest of terms that the cause of

> the world is the desire of the Absolute and not any inferred

> indiscernible cosmic force called Ignorance.

>

> In summary, since all the Advaitic arguments for the existence of

> Mula Avidya Maya have been demonstrated to be opposed to reason,

> experience and scripture, unless these

> criticisms can be shown to be false, all those who are true seekers of

> truth, who desire liberation from all suffering and yearn to attain

> the highest bliss, should reject the Advaita system completely for

> like a stack of cards, without the acceptance of Mula Avidya the whole

> edifice of Advaita falls to the ground.

>

>

> So, Dennis, in summary, I conclude that if you are really a

> jijnasu, you must get a satisfactory answer to this question. Perhaps

> some of the other members of this list will make an attempt. I plan to

> address your question ((and yes there is an answer) in the course of

> my attempt to show, from a different angle, how SHASTRA IS THE ONLY

> PRAMANA FOR ATMAVIDYA.

>

> Hari Om

> Atmachaitanya

>

>

>

> advaitin, "Dennis Waite" <dwaite@d...> wrote:

> > Apologies if this question has been covered before. I know we have

> discussed

> > the topic - at length during Sadananda's excellent posts on the

> > BrahmasUtra - and I summarised the notes relating to adhyAsa

> specifically

> > but I cannot immediately find any answer.

> >

> > I am currently (re-)reading Douglas Fox's Dispelling Illusion, whose

> subject

> > is the alAtashAnti of gauDapAda (the 4th prakaraNa of the mANDUkya

> > upanishad). Referring to MU 2.12, he points out gauDapAda's claim

> that the

> > 'self-luminous Atma, by means of its own mAyA, imagines within

> itself all

> > objects and experiences'. He goes on to say that shaMkara rejected

> this

> > because it meant that brahman either actively created everything or

> was

> > itself a victim, neither of which would be acceptable, knowing

> brahman to be

> > perfect and unchanging etc. ShaMkara therefore (says Fox) proposed

> his

> > adhyAsa theory but is this any more acceptable?

> >

> > As Fox says, it seems then that one of the following must be true:

> > a) brahman does the superimposing.

> > b) adhyAsa is an 'independent' process outside of brahman.

> > c) we ourselves do it.

> >

> > Since 'we' are ourselves a superimposition, if the third option is

> the case,

> > it would be a superimposition superimposing. Who would produce the

> first

> > superimposition? Since brahman is infinite, how could something

> exist

> > independently outside it? Thus the second option does not seem

> viable. If

> > the first were the case, it would mean that brahman were creating

> and

> > therefore active, which means change. So that cannot be the case

> either. Is

> > there another accepted answer?

> >

> > Or is this one of those questions to which the answer is

> anirvachanIya (not

> > to be mentioned - i.e. inexplicable)?

> >

> > sukhaM chara,

> >

> > Dennis

>

>

>

> Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of

> Atman and Brahman.

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>

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Atmachaitanya

 

 

But let's look at some of the arguments you put forth.

You claim that the Maya, or Mula Avidya, is an indefensible theory, and that all

the Vaishnava Acharyas knew it and used this doctrine to defeat the doctrine of

Advaita Vedanta. So let's go through it, point by point.

 

A) We would like to ask the Advaitin exactly where does this positive

principal of Ignorance reside? It either exists outside of the

Absolute or within the Absolute, as there are no other alternatives.

If the Advitin takes the first option the he must abandon the idea

that the Absolute is Non Dual. If he takes the second option then he

must abandon the idea that the absolute is without qualities ( And if

this Mula Avidya were to reside in the Absolute, since this is the

greatest Ignorance of all- as compared with the ignorance of any

particular individual (Tula Avidya)-it would result in making the

Absolute the biggest ignoramus of all!).

 

Where does Maya reside? It arises in Consciousness. It is analogous to the

arising of dreams in the night. Where do those dreams come from? They come from

the mind. While they are happening they have a form of reality. When awakening

happens they are seen to be only relatively real. Something that is, as Francis

Lucille puts it, subject to such a radical discontinuity, cannot be real. Not

absolutely real. And what we call everyday life is also seen to be a dream, or

Maya, when it is seen who "I" really is. Even if it is seen only as a glimpse,

it cannot be doubted that what "I" is, is that in which the appearances arise.

But it is known then that the absolute "I" has no attributes of its own - it is

the background against which everything that is in time and space happens, but

it is not itself in time and space. It is like the silence within which sounds

arise, sounds that do not destroy but only add depth to the silence. From the

viewpoint of the imagined "person" it might appear that the Absolute is, to use

your words, "the biggest ignoramus of them all" for wanting to entertain this

Maya. But if you can remember how it was when you were a child, when you

delighted in games of make-believe, you might be able to see that "playful" is a

much better word to use than "ignoramus".

 

B) To say that there is an entity whose nature is neither existent

nor non-existent is contradictory. As these are mutually opposed

qualities. the existence of one attribute necessarily implies the

absence of its opposite. Just as motion and being stationary are

not attributes which can be ascribed to a single object

simultaneously, so too it is not possible to conceive of a positive

entity called Avidya which is neither existent nor non-existent.

 

Oh dear! You really chose a bad metaphor this time! Being in motion and being

stationary are qualities that are attributed to the one object all the time. Sir

Isaac Newton believed, for a time, that there was such a thing as absolute

motion. But since the time of Einstein nobody does. Motion is always relative.

In relation to the earth in which it stands a post might be considered to be

stationary. But in relation to the centre of the earth it is considered to be

circling around it at tremendous speed. And in relation to the sun it is moving

at even greater speed.

And dreams also can be considered to be both existent and non-existent.

 

c) How exactly this positive entity, Avidya, can have the capacity to

cover the Absolute which is infinite is not something the mind can

conceive, and therefore, this Avidya/Maya is nothing more than an

article of faith, an unreasonable dogma that the Advaitin asks us to

accept, even in face of the fact that it can not be rationally

demonstrated.

 

Again, Sri Atmachaitanya, it is usually the case that the character who I think

I am in a night-dream has no idea that he is, in form and in every other

attribute, a figment of the imagination, as are also all the other characters in

the dream. Sometimes there are lucid dreams, where the dream continues but it is

understood that it is a dream. This is a good pointer, by way of metaphor, to

what is the case.

But you are right to state that it is something that the mind cannot conceive.

The conceptual function of the mind is to make images and representations of

things, and there is only so far that it can go. The mind exists within

consciousness, and while consciousness can perceive the mind, the mind cannot

conceive consciousness.

 

You make a mistake, dear Atmachaitanya, to imagine that the point of the

teachings is just to give an intellectual grasp of reality; the point of the

teachings is to take the mind, the diligent mind, to the limit of the mind's

capacity, after which, by Her grace, a jump can be taken, out of what you think

you are into what you have always been.

 

d) This Avidya is claimed to be beginingless and endless. It is not

reasonable to suppose that a beginingless entity could ever come to an

end. That which has a beginning will certainly have an end, that which

has no beginning can never have an end!

 

>From the point of view of the separate entity, it has a beginning, at birth, and

an end, at death or at awakening.

>From the point of view of the Absolute it could well be beginningless and

endless.

 

E) Ignoring the above criticism, the Advaitin nevertheless claims

that this Beginingless Avidya/Maya and its effects can be destroyed by

Knowledge of the Absolute.Yet this too is no more than a dogmatic

article of faith. How so? In the world it is NEVER seen that knowledge

ever creates or destroys any positive existing thing. In fact, all

that knowledge ever does and all that it can do is to reveal the

object of knowledge as it is.

 

Here again you are a bit out of date. In the world of quantum physics is has

been established for a very long time that reality is dependent on the observer.

Also, you seem to think that the world consists of material things that exist

independently of

consciousness. But no-one has ever known anything independently of

consciousness. Consciousness is the sine qua non of everything. When this is

truly understood it is readily experienced that knowledge certainly does destroy

the idea that there are "things" which exist independently of consciousness.

And there is another aspect, too. Thoughts, ideas, hopes and fears, pains even,

are nothing more than appearances in consciousness. And I can tell you from my

own authority that it often happens that when those thoughts, pains etc are

closely observed, or "surrendered to", they dissolve into formless being.

 

And now, to tell you the truth, I am tired of this conversation. The basic point

is that all the arguments that you put forward leave consciousness out of the

picture, or at least give it a peripheral role.

In the computer world they have a phrase for it; "garbage in - garbage out."

 

But in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of consciousness, by means of

logic, consciousness has to be at the centre of every proposition with which you

start.

 

And I have here in front of me the words of Sri Krishna Menon:

"Often we hear people discussing spiritual truth from the objective standpoint,

and resting content with theoretical knowledge. This is the result of pursuing

dry and fruitless lines of thinking. An aspirant has nothing to gain from mere

appreciatory or deprecatory discussion of the truths set forth in philosophical

works. The idea of the Acharya was only that each should follow some line of

spiritual thought which would help him to attain realization."

 

For me, Sri Atmachaitanya, Advaita, and especially the idea of Maya, or Avidya,

does the job very nicely. For you perhaps it doesn't. Maybe, for you, some other

line of thought does it.

In which case, go for it, and good luck.

 

Cheers

Warwick

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dear K Kathirasan,

 

You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

 

The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

be seduced into thinking that :

 

Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

 

You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

(adhyasa).

 

If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

I would love to hear about it,

 

If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

Principle)

 

If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

himself.

 

Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

 

In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

Bhashya is this:

 

Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

 

"It is on the presupposition of this mutual

superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

 

This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

 

Hari Om

Atmachaitanya

 

P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

arrive in a few days. Thank you.

Dear K Kathirasan,

 

You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

 

The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

be seduced into thinking that :

 

Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

 

You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

(adhyasa).

 

If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

I would love to hear about it,

 

If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

Principle)

 

If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

himself.

 

Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

 

In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

Bhashya is this:

 

Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

 

"It is on the presupposition of this mutual

superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

 

This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

 

Hari Om

Atmachaitanya

 

P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

arrive in a few days. Thank you.

Dear K Kathirasan,

 

You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

 

The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

be seduced into thinking that :

 

Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

 

You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

(adhyasa).

 

If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

I would love to hear about it.

 

If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

Principle)

 

If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

himself.

 

Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

 

In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

Bhashya is this:

 

Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

 

"It is on the presupposition of this mutual

superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

 

This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

 

Hari Om

Atmachaitanya

 

P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

arrive in a few days. Thank you.

 

 

 

This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

 

Hari Om

Atmachaitanya

 

P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

arrive in a few days. Thank you.

 

 

 

> > Messages Archived at:

advaitin/messages

> >

> >

> >

> > Your use of is subject to

> >

[Guest guest]

Namaste Atmachaitanyaji

 

Here is my reply with all due respects to you:

 

The traditional Advaita Vedanta tradition accepts that Vedantic teaching is

something that is passed down from a teacher to a student forming an

unbroken lineage. If that is so, then Swami Satchitanandendra's (henceforth

I will refer to him as SS) views are nothing but a break in tradition, hence

an asampradayavit. Of course, I am here specifically referring to his view

that avidya is not present in sleep. And may I know sir, who is Swami

Satchitanandendra's teacher? Is he a sampradayavit? As far as I know, SS

didn't even agree with his own teacher with regards to his views on avidya

and also with the other major views of the Vedanta tradition.

 

I don't find the need to discuss any further on this matter as it is my

'opinion' that the views of SS are entirely his and not belonging to the

Vedanta tradition. And this conviction arises after analaysing the defects

of his argument from the source I have stated previously (although I am yet

to finish studying the dissertation). It is good that you have ordered the

dissertation. Please study it to look at the various areas where SS may have

overlooked.

 

I would also highly recommend this dissertation to all mumukshus.

 

Thank you, sir.

 

Kathi

>

> atmachaitanya108 [sMTP:stadri]

> Friday, February 22, 2002 11:19 AM

> advaitin

> Re: Whence adhyAsa?

>

>

> Dear K Kathirasan,

>

> You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

> accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

> Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

> should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

> only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

>

> The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

> has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

> be seduced into thinking that :

>

> Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

> an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

>

> You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

> robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

> that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

> epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

> Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

> (adhyasa).

>

> If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

> illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

> removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

> I would love to hear about it,

>

> If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

> can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

> Principle)

>

> If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

> by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

> himself.

>

> Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

> Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

> and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

> has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

> allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

> begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

> and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

> world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

>

> In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

> Bhashya is this:

>

> Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

> Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

> it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

> body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

> ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

> innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

> and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

> functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

> which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

> the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

> Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

> suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

> to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

> that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

> discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

> nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

> these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

>

> "It is on the presupposition of this mutual

> superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

> conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

> secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

> injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

>

> This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

> contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

> of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

> distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

> process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

> instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

> once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

> Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

> easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

>

> Hari Om

> Atmachaitanya

>

> P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

> arrive in a few days. Thank you.

> Dear K Kathirasan,

>

> You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

> accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

> Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

> should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

> only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

>

> The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

> has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

> be seduced into thinking that :

>

> Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

> an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

>

> You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

> robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

> that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

> epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

> Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

> (adhyasa).

>

> If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

> illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

> removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

> I would love to hear about it,

>

> If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

> can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

> Principle)

>

> If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

> by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

> himself.

>

> Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

> Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

> and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

> has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

> allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

> begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

> and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

> world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

>

> In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

> Bhashya is this:

>

> Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

> Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

> it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

> body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

> ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

> innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

> and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

> functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

> which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

> the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

> Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

> suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

> to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

> that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

> discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

> nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

> these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

>

> "It is on the presupposition of this mutual

> superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

> conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

> secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

> injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

>

> This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

> contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

> of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

> distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

> process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

> instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

> once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

> Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

> easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

>

> Hari Om

> Atmachaitanya

>

> P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

> arrive in a few days. Thank you.

> Dear K Kathirasan,

>

> You say that the 'existent Advaita Vedanta tradition doesn't

> accept my views ' about 'Mula Avidya'. Absolutely correct. So what?

> Are we going to determine truth by consensus of opinion? Perhaps we

> should take a vote, and if 50 Swamis say there is Mula Avidya, and

> only 2 say there is no Mula Avidya, shall we go with the majority?

>

> The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

> has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

> be seduced into thinking that :

>

> Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

> an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

>

> You don't need to be a great scholar, you don't need to wear orange

> robes, nor have a PhD in Sanskrit to acknowledge the indisputable fact

> that the only 'things' that knowledge can destroy are the 3-fold

> epistemological categories of: A) not knowing a thing (Avidya). B)

> Doubts about a thing (Samshaya) c) misconceptions about a thing

> (adhyasa).

>

> If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

> illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

> removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

> I would love to hear about it.

>

> If you can't, then disregard any Swami who dogmatically claims that it

> can. (Especially a Swami unfamiliar with Heisenbergs' Uncertainty

> Principle)

>

> If your confidence will be increased about the veracity of my claims

> by an appeal to an authority, then I put before you the great Shankara

> himself.

>

> Please read Shankaras' introduction to his Brahma Sutras (Adhyasa

> Bashya). This is his most complete examination of the cause, nature,

> and effect of Avidya. Nowhere else in whole of his extensive writings

> has he examined this subject more completely. You will not find one

> allusion, one hint, that points us to the idea that Ignorance is a"

> begingless and endless existent 'thing' that is made up of three gunas

> and has the twofold power of covering the Absolute and projecting the

> world and has to be 'destroyed' by Knowledge.

>

> In fact the sum and substance of his famous introduction the his Sutra

> Bhashya is this:

>

> Atman, the real 'I' of each one of us, is the Witnessing

> Consciousness. That alone is really real according to Vedanta, since

> it is absolutely undeniable. The non-Self which is made up of the

> body, the senses and the mind is an unreal appearance, set up by

> ignorance or privation of knowledge. Now the human intellect has an

> innate natural tendency to project the non-real not-Self (Un-Atman)

> and confound the identity of the real and unreal whenever it

> functions. This mixing up of the real and the unreal and the delusion,

> which prompts the mind to submit itself to a mistaken transference of

> the mutual properties of the Self and the Non-Self, is what is called

> Avidya. This tendency is so natural to all mankind that no one

> suspects that he is under the influence of this primary ignorance, due

> to want of discrimination, when he talks of me and mine. It follows

> that this Avidya or Ignorance is finally wiped off as soon as one

> discriminates the real and the unreal and determines their true

> nature. This discrimination and determination of the true nature of

> these, is what is termed Vidya or knowledge.

>

> "It is on the presupposition of this mutual

> superimposition of the Self and the non-self, called Avidya that all

> conventions of the means and objects of right knowledge-whether

> secular or sacred- proceed, as also all the shastras dealing with

> injunctions, prohibitions or final release" (Intro. SBh.)

>

> This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

> contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

> of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

> distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

> process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

> instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

> once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

> Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

> easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

>

> Hari Om

> Atmachaitanya

>

> P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

> arrive in a few days. Thank you.

>

>

>

> This clarification of the concept of Avidya then, is a special

> contribution of Shankara to Vedanta. Nowhere else, in the whole range

> of Vedantic literature do we find this precision of thought which

> distinguishes this basic Ignorance, which is responsible for the whole

> process of human knowledge and activity---from the individual

> instances of the ignorance of objects in ordinary life. And let me

> once again add that there is not the slightest mention of the Mula

> Avidya here, which was concocted by the post Shankara tarkikas, and so

> easily refuted by the Vaishnava Acharyas.

>

> Hari Om

> Atmachaitanya

>

> P.S. And yes, I have ordered Dr. M. Doherty's dissertation. It should

> arrive in a few days. Thank you.

>

>

>

>

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> > >

> > >

> > >

> > > Your use of is subject to

>

> > >

>

>

>

> Discussion of Shankara's Advaita Vedanta Philosophy of nonseparablity of

> Atman and Brahman.

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> Messages Archived at: advaitin/messages

>

>

>

> Your use of is subject to

>

[Guest guest]

Dear K Kathirasan,

 

If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

I would love to hear about it,

 

You have gone right to the crux of the matter. You seem to believe, in spite

of the evidence,

that behind the everchanging appearances that are all that is ever perceived,

there are "things" that exist independently of consciousness. That is only faith

on your part. But once it is understood that "things" are only appearances then

it is easy to understand how knowledge can have profound effects on "things".

 

Namaste

Warwick

PS You should get your computer fixed; it sends everything in triplicate -

once is quite enough.

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dear Friends,

 

Atmachaitanya wrote

 

"Now I would like to ask you: Is this " knowledge that has to be

recollected " indirect knowledge, or direct knowledge? It can't be

indirect knowledge, because no amount of recollecting indirect

knowledge will convert it into direct knowledge as Swami Dayananda

himself admits.. The only other alternative is that it is the 'direct

knowledge' (aparoksha Jnana) that has to be repeatedly recollected to

remove the remaining obstacles, AFTER the direct knowledge has been

attained from the shabda Pramana. But this is exactly the false

doctrine that Shankara has over and over again refuted throughout his

Prastana Traya Bhashyas, and in his Upadesha Sahasri. Shankaras

position is that after the attainment of Apararoksha Jnana, there is

absolutely nothing left to do, no obstacles left that have to be

destroyed, and no individual left to do any recollecting. Let me cite

a few examples: ....."

 

We dont claim that one has to do nidhiddhyasana (recollection) after one attains

aparokshajnAna. What is to be understood is that manana and nidhidhyAsana are

really angas (part) of sravana. Infact sureshvara in naishkarmyasiddhi even

states that repeated sravanam itself is nidhiddhyAsana. So both recollection of

what is heard already and repeated listening to the sastra are nidhiddhyAsana.

All three (sravana, manana and nidhiddhyAsana) are for gaining this

aparokshajnAna only. What is recollected is neither direct nor indirect

knowledge but it is the words of the sruti and guru which leads to the

destruction of ajnAna. Even in the case of objective knowledge an insight has to

be repeated for it to be truly effective. This does not contradict what shankara

says in all his bhasyas. What shankara actually rejects is the

jnAnakarmasamucchayavAdi who says that one has to do a mental karma like

meditation (upAsana) after gaining knowledge from the sastras (similar to modern

vedantins). nidhiddhyAsana is not a mental karma to produce an adrstaphala but

part of the pramanavyApAra to gain knowledge by destroying ignorance. You are

actually putting up a straw man (prasankhyAnavAdi) and beating it. Try to

understand what the other person says.

 

In brhadAranyaka bhAsya sankara says nischayena dhyAtavyam (should be meditated

upon) explaining the sentence AtmA vAre.. nidhidhyAsitavya: .How do you explain

this?

 

Further sankara while commenting on BG 7.2 'jnAnam teham savijnAnam idam

vaksyAmi...." explains savijnAnam as svAnubhavayuktham (along with one's own

anubhava). How do you explain jnAnam and vijnAnam here?

 

with love and prayers,

 

Jaishankar

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dear Atmachaitanya,

 

Before anyone can take up your invitation, you'd have to actually find one

thing, whether a teacup, a schoolbus, a thought, or adhyAsa, that actually

exists. Not even Knowledge exists. Rather, it is Existence itself. In

trying to establish any "actually existing thing," one must show how it stands

on its own. To do this, one must show how the thing is independent of awareness

of the thing. Since the demonstration itself would happen in awareness, the

demonstration cannot establish the existence of anything beyond awareness. So

why believe that stuff exists in such a way??

 

Regards,

 

--Greg

 

At 03:18 AM 2/22/02 -0000, atmachaitanya108 wrote:

 

 

If I am wrong, and you or anyone else, can cite just one example. one

illustration, one conceivable instance whereby knowledge destroys,

removes, alters, purifies or modifies, any 'actually existing thing',

I would love to hear about it,

 

 

 

Greg Goode (e-mail: goode)

Computer Support

Phone: 4-5723

[Guest guest]

Shree atmachaitanya wrote:

>

>The problem is so simple that it defies my imagination how anyone who

>has even the slightest capacity to think for themselves could possibly

>be seduced into thinking that :

>

>Mula Avidya is an existing thing (Bhava Rupa),( i.e. It actually has

>an ontological status) but it can be destroyed by knowledge!

 

Fantastic!

 

There is a conceptual problem in thinking ignorance as bhavaruupa

type as Shree atmachaitanyaji rightly pointed out. Personally I have

been struggling with this problem and unable to reconcile it. I am

not sure at what stage of the adviata doctrine development the

bhavaruupa aspect of the avidya has been introduced. In

Vivekachuudamani - there are two slokas that define maya -

 

avyaktanaamnii parameshha shaktii

anaadyavidyaa triguNaatmikaa para

kaaryaanumeya sudhiyaiva maaya

yayaa gatsarvamidam prasuuyate||

 

sannapya sanna ubhayaatmikaano

bhinnaapyabhinna ubhayaatmikaano

saangaapyasangaa ubhayaatmikaano

mahat bhuuta anirvachaniiya ruupa||

(typos could be there since typed from memory)

 

 

where anaadi avidya is qualified by three guNa-s and identified with maaya.

There is of course a consideration that VivekachuuDamaNi is not of Shankara.

I am not sure if there are equivalent slokas in Upadesha sahashri.

 

The triguNa aspect of maya comes from Sw. Up. statement -of

identification of maaya with prakR^iti which is triguNaatmikam -

maayantu prakRitim vidyaat -

 

atmachaitanyaji is right - Ramanuja takes this bhaavaruupa aspect of

avidya as puurvapaksha as in his maahaa puurvapaksha in his

shreebhaashya.

 

I would appreciate if Shree Atmachaitanyaji provides a

chronological analysis of how this concept of bhaavaruupa avidya came

about if it is from post Shankara scholars.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

--

K. Sadananda

Code 6323

Naval Research Laboratory

Washington D.C. 20375

Voice (202)767-2117

Fax:(202)767-2623

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Namaste!

 

There is me and the entire jagat that I experience. I know that the

objects of the jagat always change and are conditioned by space and

time. I cannot attach any permanence to them. But since I have this

notion of permanence, permanence cannot be nonexistent. So, the

quest for permanence begins.

 

Here comes advaita which tells me about the futility of looking for

permanence in the jagat. It asks me to find the "I" that experiences

the jagat and points out to me that that " I" is permanence

without which the jagat is not.

 

In essence, this means the entire jagat is in fact me. Through

a "misunderstanding" (a very simple term) I see it as separate from

myself. When the sense of separation ends, then only I, Permanence,

remain. This is what I have learnt from my guru parampara ending

with Poojya Dayananda Saraswathiji.

 

So, when I look at the Sun, I see only me as Sage Agasthya did. When

I think of Sri Atmachaitanyaji, I see only me. If I can accomplish

this, my guru parampara is vindicated. That is sufficient for me.

 

Sankara called avidya anaadi. It is there right at the beginning

of "Thathwabodha". I don't have to go to the more

complex "Brahmasutras". When my preceptor was teaching

us "Thathwabodha", I aksed him the doubt that if avidya is

beginningless, then, was Sankara not creating a parallel reality by

calling it anaadi. I remember I did not get a satisfactory answer.

Now, after more than fifteen years thence, I don't need one, because

I don't take the term "anaadi" literally.

 

The concepts of avidya and adhyasa are also me. They cannot exist

independently of me. I don't have to run helter skelter to find

their dates of birth. I don't have to read the works of erudite

Japanese philosophers to understand what these terms stand for. They

are as old as jagat and hence anaadi. What is important to me is

that I am permanence inspite of avidya, adhyaasa and the jagat. I

see and am concerned about only permanence and I look for and find

it in the everchanging jagat. The Sun is full, Shri Atmachaitanyaji

is full and the concepts of avidya and adhyaasa are also full. Thus,

for me, there is nothing in the jagat that is not "full" in itself.

If I have this realization, then the upanishdic

statement "Poornamatha, Poornamidam…" is vindicated as far as I am

concerned.

 

This was what I was trying to tell when I answered Dennis's

questions. I just wanted to be simple. I was not "misguided". If

anyone thought so, then that was an unpardonable insult on my guru

parampara.

 

I saw that Warwick finds silence amidst noises. I can see "silence"

amidst all the hallabaloo created by Shri Atmachaitanyaji's erudite

arguments and counter-arguments. I am, therefore, vindicated in my

stance and in my understanding of advaita. That is enough for me.

By trying to track down avidya and adhyaasa, I can only create more

ignorance. That cannot be my job as an advaitin.

 

To conclude, the universe is not independent of me. I don't look for

the place and date of birth of the universe as I know, like everyone

else, that that is a futile exercise. Similarly, avidya or adhyaasa

cannot exist independent of me. It is futile to attempt to cast

their horoscopes. I remain lighting up the universe, avidhya and

adhyaasa. And "I" is all that matters ultimately.

 

At the feet of Sankara always.

 

Pranams to everyone.

 

"Miguided" Madathil Nair

 

 

 

 

advaitin, "atmachaitanya108" <stadri@a...> wrote:

> You are absolutely correct that neither of the

> misguided attempts by Warwick or Madathil Nair, have adequately

> answered your question.

[Guest guest]

I would like to make the following points.

 

1)In my understanding, I dont think that Avidya is

anaadi. It is Maya that is anaadi.

2)Avidya is the effect of Maya. The effect is

destroyed by Jnana.

3)The acquistion of Jnana is as real as the effect of

Avidya.If Avidya is considered as non existing, then

the aquistion of Jnana is also non-existent.

and finally

4)We seem to be playing a lot with words. I think it

was Sri Shirdi Sai Baba who said that from too much of

scriptural learning, one gets only "Bhrama

(confusion)" and not "Brahma (reality)".

 

Regards,

Anand

> where anaadi avidya is qualified by three guNa-s and

> identified with maaya.

> There is of course a consideration that

> VivekachuuDamaNi is not of Shankara.

> I am not sure if there are equivalent slokas in

> Upadesha sahashri.

>

> The triguNa aspect of maya comes from Sw. Up.

> statement -of

> identification of maaya with prakR^iti which is

> triguNaatmikam -

> maayantu prakRitim vidyaat -

>

> atmachaitanyaji is right - Ramanuja takes this

> bhaavaruupa aspect of

> avidya as puurvapaksha as in his maahaa puurvapaksha

> in his

> shreebhaashya.

>

 

 

 

 

Sports - Coverage of the 2002 Olympic Games

http://sports.

[Guest guest]

 

madathilnair [madathilnair]

Friday, February 22, 2002 3:00 PM

advaitin

Re: Whence adhyAsa?

 

Namaste!

 

There is me and the entire jagat that I experience. I know that the

objects of the jagat always change and are conditioned by space and

time. I cannot attach any permanence to them. But since I have this

notion of permanence, permanence cannot be nonexistent. So, the

quest for permanence begins.

 

Here comes advaita which tells me about the futility of looking for

permanence in the jagat. It asks me to find the "I" that experiences

the jagat and points out to me that that " I" is permanence

without which the jagat is not.

 

In essence, this means the entire jagat is in fact me. Through

a "misunderstanding" (a very simple term) I see it as separate from

myself. When the sense of separation ends, then only I, Permanence,

remain. This is what I have learnt from my guru parampara ending

with Poojya Dayananda Saraswathiji.

 

So, when I look at the Sun, I see only me as Sage Agasthya did. When

I think of Sri Atmachaitanyaji, I see only me. If I can accomplish

this, my guru parampara is vindicated. That is sufficient for me.

 

Sankara called avidya anaadi. It is there right at the beginning

of "Thathwabodha". I don't have to go to the more

complex "Brahmasutras". When my preceptor was teaching

us "Thathwabodha", I aksed him the doubt that if avidya is

beginningless, then, was Sankara not creating a parallel reality by

calling it anaadi. I remember I did not get a satisfactory answer.

Now, after more than fifteen years thence, I don't need one, because

I don't take the term "anaadi" literally.

 

The concepts of avidya and adhyasa are also me. They cannot exist

independently of me. I don't have to run helter skelter to find

their dates of birth. I don't have to read the works of erudite

Japanese philosophers to understand what these terms stand for. They

are as old as jagat and hence anaadi. What is important to me is

that I am permanence inspite of avidya, adhyaasa and the jagat. I

see and am concerned about only permanence and I look for and find

it in the everchanging jagat. The Sun is full, Shri Atmachaitanyaji

is full and the concepts of avidya and adhyaasa are also full. Thus,

for me, there is nothing in the jagat that is not "full" in itself.

If I have this realization, then the upanishdic

statement "Poornamatha, Poornamidam…" is vindicated as far as I am

concerned.

 

This was what I was trying to tell when I answered Dennis's

questions. I just wanted to be simple. I was not "misguided". If

anyone thought so, then that was an unpardonable insult on my guru

parampara.

 

I saw that Warwick finds silence amidst noises. I can see "silence"

amidst all the hallabaloo created by Shri Atmachaitanyaji's erudite

arguments and counter-arguments. I am, therefore, vindicated in my

stance and in my understanding of advaita. That is enough for me.

By trying to track down avidya and adhyaasa, I can only create more

ignorance. That cannot be my job as an advaitin.

 

To conclude, the universe is not independent of me. I don't look for

the place and date of birth of the universe as I know, like everyone

else, that that is a futile exercise. Similarly, avidya or adhyaasa

cannot exist independent of me. It is futile to attempt to cast

their horoscopes. I remain lighting up the universe, avidhya and

adhyaasa. And "I" is all that matters ultimately.

 

At the feet of Sankara always.

 

Pranams to everyone.

 

"Miguided" Madathil Nair

 

************************************************

 

Does having a sense of humor fit anywhere in the scheme of things here? :-).

 

Love to all

Harsha

 

 

 

/join

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

"Does having a sense of humor fit anywhere in the scheme of things here? :-).

 

Love to all

Harsha"

 

Harsha, that's WONDERFUL

Warwick

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

advaitin, "Warwick Wakefield" <nomistake@o...> wrote:

> "Does having a sense of humor fit anywhere in the scheme of

things here? :-).

>

> Love to all

> Harsha"

>

> Harsha, that's WONDERFUL

> Warwick

______________

 

Namaste Harsha and Warwick:

 

If you are laughing at the goings-on standing on the sidelines, you

can find me right behind you. Otherwise, you ought to elaborate on

your crispy comments.

 

Madathilnair

[Guest guest]

"Does having a sense of humor fit anywhere in the scheme of things

here? :-).

 

Dear Advaitins,

 

Ofcourse, it goes without saying that Advaita has a lot to do with

humour or Laughter. If Shankara himself was a list member, I would

have expected him to come in here and define Advaita in impeccable

Sanskrit as follows:

 

" He who thinks that Advaita is a laughing matter and he who thinks

that there is nothing to laugh about in Advaita, both do not know. It

is neither a laughing matter nor not a laughing matter; he among men

who knows this is wise and knows Advaita"

 

Now friends the situation is very grim. When Atmachaitanyaji ended

his post on 21st Feb, a bout was going on between Advaita and

Vishishadvaita and Advaita was on the ropes profusely bleeding from

the nose. Atmachaitanyaji somehow managed to make the bell go and

brought the round to an end. Being the best trainer available for

Advaita (other trainers are requested not to take offence here), he

promised to get 'Advaita' ready by the time of the next round to

deliver the knock out punch and to describe the entire proceedings to

us in his next post.

 

Now a lot of us are distracting him. How?

 

1. Some people (Kathirasanji - smile please) are bringing to his

attention a dissertation written by a student of Atmachitanyaji's

second teacher about the 'alleged' errors committed by his real

teacher. Despite the fact that the dissertation never got published

and is available only unbound shrink-packed, we see that

Atmachaitanyaji, has apparently left the importantant job on hand of

preparing Advaita for the next round and has now gone and ordered for

the dissertation which it appears will take 4 or 5 days to come. Has

anybody realised that the other pugilist is unlikely to wait that

long?

 

2. Some are getting into semantics on the relative superiority

of 'playful' over 'ignoramus'. When the situation is so grave, should

we disturb the trainer with such niceties.

 

3. Some are talking about teacups and school buses. Now the trainer

is confused. What is being suggested? Is it he or Advaita that should

have tea or neither or both? How can the time between two rounds be

appropriate for completing anybody's schooling.

 

4. Some are talking about what Advaita considers to be its greatest

contribution to boxing technique. Since in the previous round

described by Atmachaitanyaji, this technique came in for some heavy

punishment from Vishishadvaita, they think what advaita thinks is

it's strength is really it's weakness. Then they also speculate that

since this weakness is beginingless it is also endless and hence

there is no point in the bout proceeding further and that

Atmachaitanyaji can retire to his hideout in cyberspace and start

working on taking the good lady to task for having the 'misguided'

temerity to question his real teacher.

 

Now freinds let us keep off Atmachitanyaji and let him prepare his

ward for the next round and let us have him describe to us the

elegance,style and technique used by Advaita to deliver the knock out

punch. As we all know Atmachaityaji, it doesn't take much to disturb

him and he is himself a bit like Maya which came in for some heavy

bashing in the previous round. Nobody knows his whereabouts, he can

be known only from his effects (posts) which are always

unpredictable, surprising, superb, unsurpassed in lucidity and logic

and yet invariably provocative - in short, simply anirvachaniya.

 

Pujya Atmachaitanyaji, now that I have cleared the space for you,

tarry no more and come out with your description of the next round of

this epochal bout. We are waiting with bated breath.

 

Sukham Chara, Priyam Vada,

 

 

Venkat

 

Dennis - You started it all; so please have no complaints about me

lifting your 'Sukham Chara'. I have added my own bit to it because I

thought what else can be more 'Priyam' than humour.

[Guest guest]

Quoting Harsha :

>

> This was what I was trying to tell when I answered Dennis's

> questions. I just wanted to be simple. I was not "misguided". If

> anyone thought so, then that was an unpardonable insult on my guru

> parampara.

 

Dear Harshaji,

 

Hari Om!

 

I enjoy your clear-cut, straight answer to whatever-you-may-ask :-)

 

That answer of yours is what everyone should understand.

 

We have a saying in my mother tongue telugu. "kaMcu mOgunTlu kanakaMbu mOgunA

viSvadAbhirAma vinura vEma". When dropped on floor a plate made of steel

makes much more noice than a plate made of Gold. However, Gold has more value

than Steel. The moral is "Do not estimate the value of the object by the

sound of it..."

 

As this world is made by five elements and absolved in the overwehlming power

of maya, each human aspires things in his own way! Some people value the

intellectual answers while some others get satisfied by the answers provided

through the silence.. viSwaM darpaNa dRUSyamAnaM... All is nothing but a lila

and each seeker plays his own role... Luckey are those who can get an answer

to their quest in this lifetime.

 

I remain yours,

Madhava

 

>

> I saw that Warwick finds silence amidst noises. I can see "silence"

> amidst all the hallabaloo created by Shri Atmachaitanyaji's erudite

> arguments and counter-arguments. I am, therefore, vindicated in my

> stance and in my understanding of advaita. That is enough for me.

> By trying to track down avidya and adhyaasa, I can only create more

> ignorance. That cannot be my job as an advaitin.

 

 

 

Madhava K Turumella

IT Manager

forsa gmbH

Max-Beer-Str. 2-4

10119 Berlin

Germany

Telefon +49. 30. 62882-0

Telefax +49. 30. 62882-400

http://www.forsa.com

[Guest guest]

Quoting Madhava K Turumella <madhava:

 

A littleline (written by Sri Harsha) which has hidden below a big email

sparked me to reply. And I have also tried to point out something in Madhatil

Nair's message. Thank you.

 

Regards,

Madhava

 

************************************************

 

Does having a sense of humor fit anywhere in the scheme of things here? :-).

 

Love to all

Harsha

 

> Quoting Harsha :

>

> >

> > This was what I was trying to tell when I answered Dennis's

> > questions. I just wanted to be simple. I was not "misguided". If

> > anyone thought so, then that was an unpardonable insult on my guru

> > parampara.

>

> Dear Harshaji,

>

> Hari Om!

>

> I enjoy your clear-cut, straight answer to whatever-you-may-ask :-)

>

> That answer of yours is what everyone should understand.

>

> We have a saying in my mother tongue telugu. "kaMcu mOgunTlu kanakaMbu

> mOgunA

> viSvadAbhirAma vinura vEma". When dropped on floor a plate made of

> steel

> makes much more noice than a plate made of Gold. However, Gold has more

> value

> than Steel. The moral is "Do not estimate the value of the object by

> the

> sound of it..."

>

> As this world is made by five elements and absolved in the overwehlming

> power

> of maya, each human aspires things in his own way! Some people value

> the

> intellectual answers while some others get satisfied by the answers

> provided

> through the silence.. viSwaM darpaNa dRUSyamAnaM... All is nothing but a

> lila

> and each seeker plays his own role... Luckey are those who can get an

> answer

> to their quest in this lifetime.

>

> I remain yours,

> Madhava

>

>

> >

> > I saw that Warwick finds silence amidst noises. I can see "silence"

> > amidst all the hallabaloo created by Shri Atmachaitanyaji's erudite

> > arguments and counter-arguments. I am, therefore, vindicated in my

> > stance and in my understanding of advaita. That is enough for me.

> > By trying to track down avidya and adhyaasa, I can only create more

> > ignorance. That cannot be my job as an advaitin.

>

>