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9 -11 -1948 Jinnah's death, Ahmadiyya role in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Pakistan

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PLEASE NOTE BELOW SPRING -SUMMER 1948 AHMADIYYAS (QADIANIS) LAUNCH JIHAD IN KASHMIR

 

9 - 11 1948 ALI JINNAH'S DEATH !

9 - 11 COINCIDENCE??

 

 Anti Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam 23rd February 14, 1999

Chapter 17

QADIANI INTRIGUES IN PAKISTANIn accordance with a pre-conceived plan, Mirza

Mahmud proposed to leave Qadian on 31 August 1947. In an address to his

community he explained that when he saw a revelation of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad

which he said to have received on 18 September 1894, he made a firm decision to

migrate. It says ‘Dagh e Hijrat’ (The Stigma of Migration) and said to have a

reference to migration of Ahmadis from Qadian. The events took a sharp turn in

August 1947 and a British Army Colonel told Mirza Mahmud that the Muslims would

be in great distress in Punjab after 31 August 1947. 1 Ahmad In PakistanLeaving

Qadian under fire and terror, Mirza Mahmud planned to go to Lahore in military

jeep to be provided by Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmad, the same fellow who was

subsequently involved in the Pindi Conspiracy case. Due to non-availability of

the said jeep, he took his son’s car and escorted by Cap. Attaullah arrived in

Lahore along with his wife and daughter-in-law. He narrated the whole incident

of his migration from Qadian to Lahore in a Friday sermon: "When a study of the

revelations vouchsafed to the Promised Messiah convinced me that our migration

from Qadian had been indicated with certainty and I decided to leave Qadian, a

message was sent to Lahore by telephone that some transport might be arranged

for, but no reply was received for eight or ten days and finally the reply that

came was that Government was not able to arrange for any transport…then Captain

Attaullah procured the car of Nawab Muhammad Din and the jeep of Mirza Mansoor

Ahmad and cars of some other friends.. We thus traveled from Qadian to Lahore,

in accordance with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s revelation, ‘After Eleven’." 2It is

alleged that during his journey from Qadian to Lahore, he wore a veil (burqa)

to conceal his identity. There is also a story that he attired himself as Hindu

Yogi and left for Lahore secretly in a plane leaving Qadiani community at the

mercy of unruly Hindu and Sikh attackers. 3 All these stories are wrong. He did

not conceal his identity during the journey. A Qadiani belonging to Lahori

Section draws the following conclusions on the basis of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s

revelations concerning the exodus of Ahmadis from Qadian: "Then again Hazrat

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received another ‘ilham’ about Qadian (the town where he

lived). ‘People having natures like Yazid would be born in this town’ (Tazkira,

P.181). Now Yazid (son of Muawiya) was the second Khalifa, of the Omayyed

Dynasty, with their capital at Damascus (Syria). He was instrumental in

introducing a secular and absolute monarchy amongst the Muslims and was guilty

of killing Hazrat Imam Hussain (grandson of the Holy Prophet p.b.o.h). So the

‘ilham’ refers to a time when a Khalifa like Yazid would appear amongst the

Ahmadiyya community, who would, of course, claim to be a holy one but would

actually be a worldly person. Then circumstances will arise which will cause

this Yazid like Khalifa and his followers to be driven out of Qadian. This is

corroborated by another ‘Ilham’ of Hazrat Mirza Sahib saying ‘The Evil Spirit

of Damascus’ So that just like Yazid was the Evil Spirit of Damascus, so would

be a similar evil spirit to born in Qadian.’ 4

Post-Partition QadianQadiani volunteers waged a desperate struggle for their

survival in Qadian.5 They equipped themselves with light arms, paraded in and

around that area and had frequent clashed with armed Sikh bands. On 28 August,

Sir Zafarullah met Lord Mountbatten and impressed upon him the need to save

Qadian.6 Molvi Saleem, the Qadiani missionary at Calcutta, visited Pandit

Nehru, Sardar Baldev Singh and Maulana Azad in connection with the security of

Qadian. The Indian authorities alleged that Qadianis had been attacking Sikh

villages and had terrorized their inhabitants. It also came to their notice

that big arms and ammunition dumps existed in Qadian. The Qadian volounteers

said to have been using arms in the name of self-defense.7 The Indian

Government arrested some notable Qadianis viz Fateh Muhammad Sayal, Nazir

Tabligh, under Section 3020, Syed Waliullah, Nazar Amoor Aama Qadian (Section

302) and Ch. Abdul Bari, Nazir Treasury, under the Safety Ordinance to ease the

Qadiani Sikh tension prevailing in and around Qadian. In a press conference in

Lahore, Mirza Mahmud announced his decision that Ahmadis would stick to Qadian

till Indian Government gave a written order that they could not allow them to

stay there. He added that time had come when the Governments of both the

Dominions should confer on the paramount necessity of protecting the sacred

religious centers such as Sarhind Sharif, Ajmer Sharif, Delhi, Qadian and

Nankana Sahib. Both the Dominions should agree to allow Muslims and non-Muslims

to stay at their respective sacred places with full guarantees for protection of

life and property. He said that he had invited Gandhi Ji and certain members of

the British Parliament to visit Qadian and see with their own eyes the state of

affairs prevailing there. He declared that inspite of open hostility of the

military and the police, it had been decided not to evacuate Qadian and keep

such number of persons there as could be adequately fed and live in reasonably

sanitary atmosphere. He emphasized that the question of Qadian could not be

treated as an individual case but had to be taken up on a national plan.8

Qadiani leadership continued to put all their pressure on Pandit Nehru,

Gandhiji, Maulana Azad and some British civil and military officers to arrive

at an agreement with the Indian Government regarding the fate of Ahmadis in

Qadian. At Lake Success, New York, in January and February 1948 the UN Security

Council debated the Indo Pak dispute on Kashmir. Sir Zafarullah, Pakistan

Representative to the UN, in his speech on 15 January 1948, referred to

massacres of "Ahmadi Muslims" in his hometown of Qadian. Sir Gopala Swami

Ayenagar, the Indian Representative refuted all of his charges. Sir Zafarullah,

in his speech dated 24 January 1948 again referred to the events of his home

town and remarked: "The representative of India has charged me with having

tried to create a wrong impression in the minds of the members of the Security

Council with regard to what occurred to my home town in Qadian. I wish to make

it clear that the reference to my own home was not by way of a specific

complaint or grievance as to what had occurred. (Where millions had lost their

homes and all that they possessed, and had gone through various stages and

degrees of suffering and misery, it would have been out of place to mention the

loss of one’s own home). I mentioned it as an instance where one knew what had

occurred, and yet the Government of India had chosen to deny altogether that

any thing had occurred.  What actually happened is that his house was looted by

the military and by Sikhs for five days between 27th September and 1st October.

By the sheerest coincidence, a Delhi newspaper came to my attention, in which I

noticed the second installment of incidents that took place at Qadian, where my

home was, and which incidentally, is the headquarter of religious movement

having missions all over the world.  I might mention that at my request and the

request of other prominent members of their particular movement, the Government

of India sent a detachment of troops stationed there to give us protection, and

it also sent an additional police."9The Hindustan Times disclosed that all

thanks go to Pandit Nehru who took personal interest in the matter and the

"Ahmadiyyas including their Khalifa were able to cross to Pakistan safely under

military escort. The border is only 20 miles away. However, 313 able-bodied men

stayed behind to look after the Anjuman’s work in India." 10 Those who stayed

in Qadian are called Ahmadi Dervishes (chosen hermits). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in

one of his revelations, claimed that an angel gave him a bread (Nan) and told

that was for him and his Dervishes. These men are also called Ashab-iSufa. The

period of Dervishship started on 16 November 1947 in Qadian 11 when an

agreement was concluded with the Indian Government. Their number changes but

does not decrease from 313. In 1966 their number was one thousand.12 It is

alleged that some Dervishes are the agents of foreign powers and had been

hiding themselves in a sacred enclave. Their role came under attack during 1965

and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. The Hindustan Times gives post-Partition picture of

Qadian in these words: ‘Among the prominent persons who visited Qadian in these

days (1947) to reassure the Ahmadiyya, were Bengal Chief Minister,

H.S.Suhrawardy (on instructions from Mahatma Gandhi), Mirdual Sarabai and Gen

Thimaya. Later Acharya Vinoba-Bhave also paid visit to the town.13 However

Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan occupied the houses, shops and lands

vacated by the Ahmadiyyas in Qadian. The Talim-ul-Islam Degree College became

the Sikh National College evacuated from Lahore, the Talim ul Islam High School

turned into the Kalaswala Khalsa High School (orginally located in the Gujrat

district) and the Nusrat Girls High School was renamed the Ved Kaur Arya Girls

High School. The Ahmadiyya College for training missionaries was not effected.

The Noor Hospital administered by the Anjuman was taken over by the State

Government to run as a Civil Hospital.’

RabwahMirza Mahmud temporarily encamped at Rattan Bagh Lahore. Then he acquired

1034 acres of land in district Jhang (Punjab) to set up a Zilli Qadian, 14

called Rabwah in last quarter of 1948. About two years before partition, Mirza

Mahmud claimed to have a vision in which Qadian was attacked with such force

that he had to evacuate the Ahmadiyya Community. It was ‘revealed’ to him that

the Ahmadis would find refuge in ‘nila gumbad’, which means blue dome. Since

there is a section of Lahore known as Nila Gumbad, the name being derived from

a mosque in the vicinity whose dome at one time was covered with blue tiles.

The Khalifa assumed that the vision referred to a future refuge in Lahore.

However, when the forced eviction actually did take place, emissaries of the

Khalifa discovered that the community would not be welcomed at Lahore, and they

were left with problem of finding a place to go, reports came in that Rabwah

site could be purchased, a location bounded on two sides by hills.

Bashir-ud-Din was reminded by his advisers that the published report of his

vision had contained a reference to hills also. Furthermore, he now realized

that Nila Gumbad was the blue dome of the open sky. With the certain feeling

that God had revealed to him the destination, the Khalifa, like a modern Moses,

brought his people out of India to the promised land of Pakistan. 15 Rabwah

remained more or less an independent Ahmadiyya state. The Rabwah Administration

ran a parallel Government in early decades. Officials of local bodies and other

agencies were appointed by the Punjab Government, with the consent of the

Rabwah Administration. Even a Deputy Commissioner in Jhang could not be

appointed without the prior clearance of Mirza Mahmud, not to speak of other

civil officials. Rabwah College had no non-Qadiani staff. Since property in

Rabwah was owned by the Ahmadiyya Anjuman, no one could sell/purchase a plot,

construct a house or run a business without their permission. No one dared to

defy Ahmadiyya authority. The dissidents had to face a tough time including

social boycott, maltreatment, assaults and humiliation. It was a closed city.

Sir Francis Mudie, the then Governor of the Punjab, was favourably inclined to

Qadianis. The Rabwah land was sold to them at throwaway prices. The lease

agreement was hurriedly concluded to afford an opportunity to Qadianis to

settle earlier. The place had a strategic importance for them. It is safe from

any attack from the side of Chiniot, as it has been separated by the river.

They kept this aspect in view while selecting a place for their headquarters.

Aspiration for QadianAlthough Mirza Mahmud set up a center at Rabwah, he always

yearned for Qadian. He made his followers believe that they would get back

Qadian and exhorted them to make attempts at reunion of Pakistan with India.

Munir Report states: "When the possibility of a separate homeland for Muslims

by the Partition of the country began faintly to appear on the horizon, Ahmadis

began to concern themselves with the shadow of coming events. Some of their

writings from 1945 to early 1947 disclose that they expected to succeed to the

British but when the faint vision of Pakistan began to assume the form of a

coming reality, they felt it to be somewhat difficult permanently to reconcile

themselves with the idea of new state. They must have found themselves on the

horns of dilemma because they could neither elect for India, a Hindu secular

state, nor for Pakistan where schism was not expected to be encouraged. Some of

their writings show that they were opposed to the Partition, and that if

Partition came, they could strive for reunion."16The loss of Qadian was greatly

felt in Ahmadiyya circles but they satisfied themselves with the interpretation

of Mirza’s prophecies regarding the return to Qadian. The plight of Qadian

migrants was compared with the exodus of Jews. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had already

claimed to be Moses for Ahmadiyya Jewry. Frequent references were cited from

the dreams and utterance of Mirza Qadiani to maintain that Ahmadis would soon

return to Qadian, the Holy Land of the Promised Messiah. 17 Mirza Mahmud

believed that milk in the breasts of Mecca and Madina had dried up, it was now

flowing in Qadian.18 Qadian is the "throne seat of the Messenger of God."19 It

is like the Haram 20 and the Madina of Ahmadis. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad called it

'an abode of safety’ and the ‘Jerusalem.’ Situated there is the Minaret of

Messiah, which the Mirza built himself to fulfill a prophecy. The mosque of the

Promised Messiah is the Masjid-Aqsa referred to in the Holy Quran.21 The other

important mosque of Qadian is Majid-i-Mubarak, the Blessed Mosque.22 Bahishti

Maqbra or the Cemetery of Paradise also lies there. 23 All this made it Sanctum

Sanctorum and a sign of God (Shaar-Allah). Every Ahmadis had to take firm oath

that he would never lose sight of his main objective of return to Qadian. He

had to prepare his family to offer all sort of sacrifices for the return to

Qadian.24 A dream of Mirza Mahmud (11 June 1951) makes it amply clear that he

aspired to get back Qadian by all means. 25 Just after his arrival in Lahore

till his death he kept on repeating the same theme. His prophecies signify that

Ahmadis would surely get back Qadian. That would either be by peaceful means or

by converting the whole population of the district of Gurdaspur to Ahmadiyyat,

a very ambitious target. It was also held that Ahmadis had to wage a war if the

need arose. To be perfect in faith every Ahmadi must keep in mind the ultimate

return to their original and real center. If Ahmadis had no power at this

timke, that made no difference at all. Even Jesus Christ had no power when he

declares his Ministry. Mirza Mahmud advised his followers to incorporate his

advice in their faiths that no small or big Government or a body of Governments

could ever keep them away from their goal. ‘If these Governments would dare to

interfere, the angles would come down from the Heaven to get Ahmadis take their

living center of Qadian’, 26 he claimed. A decade after independence, he

predicted: ‘Do not be disappointed. Rely on God, He will help create

circumstances favorable to (your return to Qadian). Do not you see that Jews

had to wait for 1300 years and at last they were able to settle themselves in

Palestine. But you have not to wait for 1300 years, it is possible that you

have not to wait for 13 years or even 10 years and God would bestow His

blessings upon you.’ 27Mirza Mahmud, on the one hand, gave the good news of

return to Qadian to his followers and on the other hand made secret contacts

with the Sikh leadership to impress upon them the need for the safety and

protection of Qadian. He desired to get their full cooperation in the event of

a political crisis. Qadian elders supported the Sikh demand of a special status

for Nankana Sahib situated at Sheikhupura, Pakistan, the birthplace of Guru

Nank. When Gyani Kartar Sing made a demand in October, 1947 that Vatican status

should be given to Nankana Sahib, AlFazl fully supported it. It was called a

‘just and reasonable demand’, although it had been put forth too late. 28 In

order to retain their legal claim on the properties of Qadian, instructions

were given to Pakistan Ahmadis not to submit claims for their properties in

Pakistan which they had left in Qadian and its surrounding villages of Nangal,

Bhani, Khara etc.29 It was made clear to them that since they had come to

Pakistan only temporarily compelled by the political circumstances of the time,

they would definitely get back Qadian in near future after making two or three

attempts.30 To retain their claim on properties in Qadian they should not

submit the claims in Pakistan. It was also declared that the dead bodies of the

Khalifa and other members of the Mirza family (Khandan-i-Nabuwat) should be

buried in Rabwah as an "Amanat" to be carried to Qadian at a proper time. The

inscriptions on the graves of the wife of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza Mahmud and

other members of the Mirza family still remind every Qadiani the Will of Mirza

Mahmud that they must have to take their dead bodies to Qadian for formal

burial in Bahishti Maqbra. The possibility of Akali-Qadiani compromise on holy

places of Nankana Sahib and Qadian lurks in the minds of Rabwah elders. They

always look to political developments in the Indian Punjab with keen interest.

Just after the Partition, Qadianis approached the Sikh leadership to forge

better relations between the two communities. In 1953, a fraternal delegation

of Ahmadis from Pakistan led by the brother of Sir Zafarullah Khan went to

Qadian taking with them vials of holy water from the Nankana Sahib shrine in

Pakistan and copies of the Granth Sahib for presentation to the Sikh Community

of Qadian. In return they were given copies of the Quran. Such courtesies

express the desire of the responsible leadership of both communities to build

better relations between themselves.31 Dr Shankar Das Mehra, a veteran Congress

leader who has been visualizing a great potential in Ahmadiyyat in forging good

relations with Hindus since mid 30s, sent an article on Ahmadiyyat to the

Statesman Calcutta which appeared in its issue of 22 February 1949. He

suggested to the Government of India to come to an alliance with the Ahmadiyya

Jama'at to revive the past glory of India. "The movement deserved attention, as

its founder was a Hindustani, their Mecca was Qadian and it had no real

sympathies for the political aspirations of the Muslim World". 32he argued. In

a letter to Nazir-I-Aala, Qadian, on 26 Decmeber 1949 he pinned hopes on the

Swadeshi (national) character of the movement and spoke high of it in bringing

two communities of India viz. Hindus and Muslims, closer to each other.33

Zafarullah as Foreign MinisterQadianis made a drastic change in the aims and

scope of their ambitions when Sir Zafarullah was invited to become the Foreign

Minister of Pakistan on 25 December 1947.34 The precise circumstances of Sir

Zafarullah being asked first to plead the Pakistan case before the Boundary

Commission, where his community had entered a plea as a separate community and

that resulted into loss of Gurdaspur to Pakistan, and later as Foreign

Minister, are subject of further research. At the time of Partition, Sir

Zafarullah was the Constitutional Adviser to the Nawab of Bhopal. 35

Quaid-e-Azam desired H.S. Suharwardy to join the Central Government at Foreign

Office. But he was sore at the way Kh. Nazimuddin had been made the first Chief

Minister of erstwhile East Pakistan. He declined the offer on the ground that he

was engaged in helping the Indian Muslims caught in unprecedented communal riots

that had erupted in the wake of independence.36 Sir Zafarullah’s appointment was

criticized by a section of Pakistan press on the ground that he was a die-hard

Qadiani and had never joined the Muslim League rather he made every attempt to

sabotage the sole representative organization of Muslims of India. 37 The Quaid

offered him an important post although he knew well his past career. Sir

Muhammad Ismail says: "During Willingdon’s Viceroyalty when Sir Zafarullah was

the Executive Counselor, Mr. M.A. Jinnah, in spite of his eminence in the

political field, was kept out of the Round Table Conference in its later

stages. Still the Quaid entrusted the Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to him. This

instance was sufficient to show how magnanimous he could be."38It has been said

that the Quaid had been prevailed upon to appoint Sir Zafarullah because

Zafarullah was very close to the British and the bureaucrats who had

recommended him felt there was a need to counterbalance Lord Mountbatten’s open

hostility towards the nascent state. Perhaps he had in mind the British attitude

towards Pakistan in making this decision. Not only were the British accountable

for many of the acute problems which faced Pakistan at its birth, they still

had a hand in its affairs. And Lord Mountbatten was frankly hostile. Someone

was, therefore, needed who could use his personal influence with White Hall in

smoothing out the unresolved matters. Hence the choice of Ch. Zafarullah Khan,

the acid test of the Jama'at Ahmadiyya’s attitude was, however, provided by the

Pakistan movement in which it did not participate.39 The group which had been

most dominant and powerful in Pakistan’s emerging foreign policy making

apparatus was bureaucratic elite, consisting of top civil servants and high

echelon of Pakistan military establishment. Initially, there was neither a

well-organized Foreign Office of Pakistan nor any well-equipped and trained

Pakistan Foreign Service. In the early years, some old hands of British India’s

Political Department used to man the higher posts of Pakistan’s Foreign Office.

Among them were some Britishers who mostly belonged to the old ICS Cadre. These

British officers viz. Creagh Coin, Fletcher, Dixon and Redpath had set the early

tone of the Pakistan’s foreign policy administration and moulded the political

outlook of its Foreign Office and its personnel. After the death of

Quaid-I-Azam and the departure of some British Officers, the whole foreign

policy establishment went under the grip of some top Pakistan civil servants as

the political elite at that time were fiercely engaged in domestic power

struggle.40 Iskandar Mirza, Ch.Muhammad Ali (both of them later became the top

office holders), Muhammad Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

during 1947-51, Aziz Ahmad and a few other civil servants like Akhtar Hussain,

who came from Supply and Agha Hilaly from Education, Health and Lands, became

the key figures in the Foreign Office. Some high ranking military officers,

like Ayub Khan entered into this group of foreign policy elite and began to

influence the foreign policy processes, particularly after the death of

Quaid-I-Azam. It is on record that as early as 1951 Ayub Khan started thinking

in terms of Pakistan’s joining the western military bloc. It is doubtful if the

Quaid, like other elites of newly founded state, was aware of the Qadiani

leadership’s theologian, in fact prophetic views about the future of the state

he had founded, yet he did direct that all matters of policy nature should be

referred either to him or to the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan. But in actual

practice, it was the Foreign Minister who was to decide which was routine and

which was a policy matter. 41 Contact CampaignAfter Zafarullah’s assumption of

the portfolio of Foreign Ministership of Pakistan, the head of Ahmadiyya

community got himself activity involved in Pakistan politics. He wrote a series

of articles in AlFazl, Lahore from September 1947 to January 1948 on the defense

potential and economic viability of newly established state of Pakistan. He

proposed that Pakistan should take every step to cooperate with India in the

political and economic fields as well as in the sphere of defense.42

Elaborating on economic, political and defense potentialities of Pakistan, he

proposed to establish a Territorial Force and Army Clubs for the country. In

his fourth lecture on the ‘Future of Pakistan’ held in Law College, Lahore, he

stressed the need of joint defense with India. He explained that Pakistan Army

was 80,000 in number and included infantry, artillery, parachuters etc of which

only 40,000 or its 50 percent was a fighting force. On the basis of data worked

out in relation to total border area with the fighting force, he concluded that

Pakistan could deploy only 43 men to defend one mile of its border of which 21

men could actually fight. He gave the example of Germany, which deployed one

thousand army men to defend one mile of its territory. He called Pakistan

defense very weak because it had a very small number of experienced officers,

no reserve force and poor artillery with little ammunition. Parachute Battalion

would likely to be disbanded. There was not a single ordnance factory in the

country. After pointing out these shortcomings, he strongly pleaded that

Pakistan and India must jointly devise their defense systems.43 He also argued

that Indian sub-continent was a geographical entity even if it would be divided

into million parts. Keeping this end in view, Pakistan and India should forge a

common cause in their defense policy,44 he concluded. After advocating a joint

defense scheme, he turned towards the Muslim League. In an interview with the

APP, Mirza Mahmud demanded that doors of the League should be kept open for all

non-Muslims of Pakistan in order to reorganize this party on democratic and

internationally recognized principles. It was argued that after the

establishment of Pakistan, the League had no basis for existence neither in

Pakistan nor in India. ‘Muslims of India should join the Indian National

Congress’, he maintained.45 To introduce himself in political circles of the

then West Pakistan, he embarked upon a tour of the area in March 1948. He

visited Sialkot, Jhelum, Karachi, Peshwar, Rawalpindi and Quetta, addressed

selected gatherings, met civil and military officers and political leaders of

repute.46 He discussed the key political problems of Pakistan including Kashmir

issue, defense policy and the future of the newly created Muslim state of

Pakistan. In his tour to the NWFP in early April 1948 he met Shinwari and

Afridi Chiefs in Landi Kotal, addressed two gatherings at Peshawar and called

on Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Utmanzai.47 Relations between

Afghanistan and Pakistan were tense since November 1947 when Sardar Najibullah

came to Karachi as a special envoy of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan to hold

talks with Pakistan officials. After his return to Kabul, Afghanistan kept on

raising the slogan of Pakhtunistan in high pitch. Qadianis had a pathological

hatred for Kabul as their missionaries were slain there at different occasions.

Zafarullah’s bias played a key role in formative phase of Pakistan Foreign

policy towards Kabul. On his return from Peshawar, Mirza Mahmud stayed in

Rawalpindi where he addressed a selected gathering in Cinema Hall and spoke on

Kashmir problem. He claimed to play a very crucial role if so desired by the

Government of Pakistan because Abdullah had a great respect for him. People

demonstrated outside the hall and the police had to resort to lathi charge to

disperse the agitating crowd. From Pindi he left for Quetta. Ahmadiyya

community Quetta arranged a reception in his honour on 14 June 1948. The

participants included M.Kazmi, the Iranian Counsel; Ministers of Kalat State,

top ranking civil and military officials, Sir Philips Edward, Political Agent

Quetta, Mirza Bashir Ahmad S.O.Quetta, Mr. Balang SP, Mr. Beck DSP, Khan

Bahadur Malik Bashir Ahmad, Under Secretary, Adj. Gen., Nawab Raisani, Agha

Sarwar Shah, Commissioner Colony Revenue Commission, Nawab Karam Khan Kansi,

Muhammad Khan Jogezai, Mir Doda Khan and some senior members of the Muslim

League. He discussed the issue of Islamic constitution and emphasized the need

to support the volunteers fighting in Kashmir.48 To his followers his message

was to attain power and get it even by force if it was not possible to have it

by peaceful means.49 He exhorted Ahmadis to launch a vigorous conversion

campaign. These utterances, afterwards, resulted in a counter offensive from

the ulema against Qadianism. HyderabadOn 11 September 1948 Quaid-I-Azam

Muhammad Ali Jinnah passed away. It was a tremendous loss to the Nation. People

were mourning the death of their great leader when the news came that the Indian

forces had marched into Hyderabad Deccan. Hyderabad enjoyed a peculiar position

during the British rule. The Nizam had the Imperialist favour only except in

mid 20s when he tried to assert his position by declaring the sovereignty of

the state in internal affairs. The Viceroy, Lord Reading, sharply reacted over

it and a Council was setup on 27 March 1926 to administer the State affairs.

Four British officers were included in the Council. The Nizam had lost almost

all power and became a titular head of the Hindu dominated State.50 The Nizam’s

sons, Prince of Berar and Muazzam Jah were at war with each other. Berar

borrowed a huge amount of money from the Hindu moneylenders for his personal

use and collaborated with the British Officers to come to power at an

appropriate time. Some Qadiani members of Sikanderabad family always planted

their agents in the King Palace who informed Qadian of all the palace

intrigues. Qadian promoted Prince Berar. In an address in late 1948, at the

time of Indian capture of Hyderabad, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad revealed that Prince

Berar had entered into a secret agreement with some Mahasabai Hindus 21-year

ago (1927). He received money and promised them certain concessions in the

event of his assumption of power at an appropriate time. The agreement came to

the notice of one of the Prince’s confidants (probably a Qadiani). He stole it

from his papers and handed it over to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad.51 A probe by the

Qadiani intelligence gave the background of the agreement. That since Prince

Berar did not receive pocket money from the state exchequer, he borrowed money

from Hindu moneylenders, who took advantage of the situation and concluded a

secret agreement with him. Mirza Mahmud says that he brought this agreement to

the notice of the Government. The British Government ordered the Nizam to pay

him about 10 to 20 thousand rupee per month. Mirza Mahmud further says that he

was in favour of bartering away Hyderabad for Kashmir. He argues that

Hyderabad, according to its conditions should have formed part of the Indian

Union as Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. He claims to have always been

inviting the attention of the Muslims to the fact that both these issues

(Kashmir and Hyderabad) are linked with each other and should be dealt with

jointly. He means to say ‘give Hyderabad to India and get Kashmir from it.’ He

deplored that sometimes the leaders of the nation get so subservient to

aspirations of the masses that they could not adopt a right course. He

expressed doubts in the ability of Prince Berar and Qasim Rizvi to deliver

goods.52 Political StrategyMuslim of Pakistan saw that Zafarullah did not

participate in the funeral prayers of the Quaid on the plea that he was a

non-Muslim. Qadianis openly called 900 million Muslims confirmed heretics

(Kafirs) and the Quaid was no exception. This sparked off heated controversy

through out Pakistan but Qadianis cared little for it. The Imperialist powers

fully backed them achieve their evil designs directed to undermine the

integrity of Pakistan. Qadianis had held the belief during the British rule in

India (and even still maintain) that they could prosper and propagate their

ideas only under the ‘shield’ of the British and that they could work properly

neither in Mecca, not in Syria, nor in Kabul except under this (British)

Government for whose progress and prosperity, the founder of the community used

ever to pray.’53 They now found the Pakistan situation too quite prospective.

During his political tours Mirza Mahmud exhorted the followers to concentrate

on and convert the large and thinly populated Baluchistan and ‘be in a position

to call at least one province as our own.’54 He asked them not to flock like

sheep in one or two departments but to spread out in all the key sectors. And

as for the military, if one assumed that there were 10,000 Ahmadis in Pakistan,

then 9,000 should go to the military. Military preparation is a very important

thing. How could you do your work until you have not learnt the military

science? He asked. ‘The subsequent devaluation and corruption of Pakistan

democracy, sabotage of the democratic process, hindrances created in the

enforcement of the Islamic laws and the emergence first of the bureaucracy and

later the military as the country’s ruling class should have been seen in the

background of such deep rooted Qadiani intrigues.’55 Broadly speaking, the

post-Partition Ahmadiyya policy toward Pakistan rested on the following points:

 

Setting up of a base in Pakistan. Mirza Mahmud had eyes on Kashmir and

Baluchistan. Penetration into Armed Forces. Return to Qadian by undoing the

Partition. Opening up of new missions especially in Afro-Arab countries with

the support of Sir Zafarullah.

KashmirQadiani intrigues in Kashmir had a long history. These have been briefly

discussed in the previous chapters while stating Qadiani role in All India

Kashmir Committee (1931). In 1933, Qadiani disruptionists formed an All India

Kashmir Association to further their nefarious ends with the support of British

Imperialism. The Qadiani periodical Al Islah, was brought out from Srinagar to

influence public opinion. From 1933 to 1946 Qadiani role in Kashmir politics

was manifestly pro-Maharaja.56 Sheikh Abdullah launched ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement

in 1946 which was directed against the Dogra ruler and was modeled on the

Congress ‘Quit India Movement’ of 1942. He used the platform of National

Conference, which was formed in 1939 in opposition to Muslim Conference. Mirza

Mahmud severely criticized the anti-Maharahja ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement and

supported the policy of Maharaja of Kashmir.57 He forgot all love for Kashmir

freedom fighters in the last phase of their struggle. He exhorted his followers

to fully concentrate on the conversion of Kashmiris to Ahmadiyyat and expressed

his firm conviction that Kashmiris would embrace Ahmadiyyat enmasse as happened

in case of the villages of Asnor, Chak Sunrij, Risshi Nagar etc. AlFazl gives a

report of Ahmadiyya mission’s activities in Kashmir: "Hazrat Muslih Maud in his

Advisory Committee Meeting last year (1945) had kindly given the approval for

setting up a Missionary Center in Kashmir keeping in view the importance of

this State in his mind. There was a need to establish a Darul Tabligh (Center

for Propagation of Beliefs) and ‘mosque’. The Government of Kashmir has been

pleased to give four Kanals of land for the ‘mosque’, Darul Tabligh and

guesthouse. Hazrat Mushil Maud sent a congratulatory telegram to Ahmadiyya

missionary when we got the land." 58Qadianis were also jubilant over the

success of Ghulam Babi Gilkar, President Jama'at Ahmadiyya, Srinagar from Fateh

Kadal Constituency as member of the Kashmir Assembly. Ahmadis from Jammu visited

Qadian and deplored the apathy of Mirza Mahmud towards Kashmir liberation

movement at that critical stage of struggle. Mirza Mahmud gave at length his

past role in Kashmir movement during (1930s) and criticized the present Kashmir

leadership for launching a movement having an anti Maharaja stance. ‘Blames are

being leveled against the Maharaja and his family, it is wrong and we strongly

oppose this movement. All our sympathies are with the Maharaja of Kashmir.

Nevertheless he should also take care of his subjects,’59 he emphasized. Mirza

Mahmud, in reply to an address from a group of Qadianis of Kashmir stated that

there was no doubt that he had taken interest in Kashmir politics and had been

willing to offer his assistance to the interested parties if they promised to

work under his direction. ‘We were willing to cooperate with them and the

success could be achieved that way,’ he maintained. He narrated one of his

dreams, which he saw in 1942 about the Maharaja of Kashmir. "The dream was also

repeated the next day. The Promised Messiah had also seen a similar dream

regarding Maharaja of Patiala. This showed that there was some relationship of

Patiala and Kashmir with the Punjab politics. Anyhow, we had been continuously

making efforts to spread Ahmadiyyat and our Jama'ats had encircled Kashmir",60

he emphasized. With the transfer of power to the successor States of India and

Pakistan, the British paramountacy over the princely states lapsed. The Indian

leaders had planned to take over Kashmir long before the Partition. The

Radcliffe Award allotted Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur to India,

thereby providing India with lines of communications to the Kashmir Valley

which it otherwise could not have had. AK GovernmentPakistan leadership was

over-burdened with problems and could not take proper action to counter Indian

aggressive moves. The voluntary expedition of tribesmen to liberate the State

from Dogra ruler proved to be abortive owing to lack of planning and resources.

The people of Poonch waged a heroic struggle against the Dogra repressive

regime. Mirza Mahmud lost no time to form a Qadiani Battalion to fight on

Kashmir front. Qadianis had always opposed Jehad as the very coming of the

Promised Messiah was to abrogate the holy war for all times to come. It was an

article of their faith and they strictly adhered to it during the British rule

in India. But now the political expediency forced Mirza Mahmud to send Furqan

Battalion to Kashmir border to watch Ahmadi interests in Kashmir imbroglio and

to promote the strategic interests relating to Qadian. Many Qadiani agents were

already active in Poonch and the Valley. They undertook secret missions to

Kashmir under the instructions of Mirza Mahmud. Qadianis advance a claim that

during the liberation movement in Kashmir, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar formed the First

Azad Kashmir Government in exile at Rawalpindi. He said to have left for

Srinagar on 6 October to arrest Maharaja Hari Singh.61 A 13-member Cabinet was

secretly formed in Srinagar which included Minister-designate for education,

health, defense, law, etc. It was a Qadiani shadow Cabinet. Gilkar was arrested

in Srinagar and remained in jail for a few months. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz says:

‘The President of Provisional Government as announced by Radio Pakistan was

Anwar. Who is this Anwar? Three men have come forward since, each claiming that

it is he but it is believed by reliable people that Anwar was no other person

than Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, a member of the Working Committee of the Muslim

Conference, one of the old veterans of the Kashmir freedom movement who headed

the provisional revolutionary Government of Azad Kashmir. No soon was the

provisional Government formed than its President did a childish and fantastic

thing. He proceeded to Srinagar with the intention of arresting the Maharaja

and warning Abdullah of the dangerous consequences of his contemplated step in

forcing the state to accede to India. This self styled president was arrested

and detained. He met Abdullah before his detention and had a talk with him but

he did not reveal his indentity.’62The underground ‘Cabinet’ supposed to be

formed by Gilkar included either Qadiani or pro-Qadiani elements. Names of all

of them were not revealed except persons like Abdul Ghaffar Dar, Deputy

Publicity Officer (designate), Khawaja Abdul Mannan, Chief Engineer etc.63

There is absolutely no truth in Qadiani claim that Gilkar formed the first

Provisional Azad Kashmir Government. On 4 October, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, a

veteran leader from Jammu announced the formation of Azad Kashmir Government.

The announcement was made under the fictitious name of ‘Anwar.’64 He himself

told the scribe that since he loved the Turk General Anwar Pasha, he used that

name for the attainment of a sublime cause. Subsequently Ghulam Nabi Gilkar

appended his name with the epithet of Anwar. Gilker always opposed Pakistan

stand on Kashmir issue and advocated 'Independent Kashmir’ theory. The Azad

Kashmir government was formed on 24 October 1947 in the liberated area of

Kashmir and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim became its first President.65 On 26

October, India launched a full-fledged attack on Kashmir after the Maharaja’s

shady deal with the Congress leadership. When it was brought to the notice of

the Quaid he immediately responded by ordering General Gracey, the Acting

C-in-C Pakistan Army, to dispatch Pakistan troops to Kashmir, but the British

C-in-C refused to carry out these orders even though his British counterparts

on the Indian side were busy mounting an armed attack in Jammu and Kashmir

State. Philip Warner, the biographer of Field Marshal Auchinleck states:

"Auchinleck promptly flew to Lahore (after the landing of Indian troops in

Kashmir on the orders of General Lockart, the C-in-C of the Indian Armed

Forces). Here General Sir Douglas Gracey (deputising for Messervy, C-in-C

Pakistan Armed Forces, who was on leave) informed him that he had been told by

Jinnah to send troops to Kashmir for various missions, including that of

capturing Srinagar. Obviously Pakistan’s Governor General would not let Kashmir

so willingly. Auchinleck stated very clearly to Jinnah that what he was

proposing to do was quite irregular, for Kashmir had now legally became part of

India. He quietly pointed out that if Jinnah tried to proceed he himself would

order all British officers to withdraw from Pakistan’s Army, a threat which

infuriated but at the same time checked Jinnah. Auchinleck then suggested that

Jinnah should meet Nehru, Mountbatten, the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Prime

Minister in a conference, to which the Muslim leader had no choice but to

agree. In the event Nehru was ill and was unable to go, though it was agreed in

principle that a plebiscite would be called to determine the real feeling in

Kashmir." 66In the UN On Ist January 1948, India went to the Security Council

with complaint that Pakistan was aiding and abetting the frontier tribesmen and

its own national to join fighting in the State. While the Council was still

debating the issue, India intensified its operations in the State, which forced

Pakistan to send a limited number of troops into Kashmir to hold essential

defensive positions. Sir Gopal Swami Ayenger spoke on behalf of India and

Zafarullah presented Pakistan case in the Security Council. "The sum of his

(Zafarullah’s) arguments67 concerning Kashmir was that the accession together

with the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and the neighboring Sikh and Hindu

State were factors in one vast plot. He concluded with a suggestion that

India’s appeal to the Security Council was due to the failure of her Army to

enforce a decision. In this there was certainly an element of truth. In the

opening presentation, Sir Zafarullah Khan may well have overplayed his hand.

Dramatic and startling accusations exposing Indian leadership as a diabolical

tyranny seeking its satisfaction through blood were not likely to impress the

Security Council. His tendency to excessive length was also a handicap."

68Mirza Mahmud in his address in Rawalpindi on 12 April 1948 already made it

clear that the decision of the Security Council would be against Pakistan. That

decision would be guide by international factors and even ten Zafarullah Khans

could have no influence over it.69 He disclosed that Sir G.S.Ayenger had

assured America and Britain70 that India would provide required concessions in

the wake of war with the Russians. The Council appointed the UN Commission for

India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the facts and mediate between the

parties. ‘When the Commission arrived in Pakistan on 7 July, 1948 it at once

got a frank acknowledgement from Zafarullah Khan that Pakistan troops had been

fighting in Kashmir since 8 May. This fact was widely known but had not

previously been admitted by the Pakistan Government. In the eyes of the

Commission it constituted "a material change in the situation" and it stated so

in correspondence with the Pakistan Government. Pakistan also admitted in August

1948 that Azad Kashmir forces were under the operational control of Pakistan

army. 71 This changed the nature of the issue. India exploited the situation to

its advantage. The UN Commission, after prolonged negotiations secured agreement

of the parties to what are known as the UN Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5

January 1949. It provided for a cease-fire, which went into effect on 1st

January 1949. It proved fatal to the Kashmir problem. Sir Zafarullah’s

unusually lengthy speeches in the UN made the issue further complicated.

Pakistan got bogged down in textual battles with India over demilitarization

proposals losing sight of the primary objective, which was that of the

induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office. Main Iftikharuddin, a

veteran Muslim leaguer, in a speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on

5 October 1950 criticized Zafarullah’s role in a very lucid and impressive

manner: "Don’t we clearly see that their (American and British Imperialists)

sole interest is to maintain their hold over the peoples of the East whom they

cannot rule by old methods, whom they must rule now indirectly through their

agents and we have lent ourselves consciously or unconsciously, our Government

has lent itself consciously or unconsciously to be their agents. That is the

role we have played on this question. Sir, you just think of man I am just

saying that and I am not opposing any individual and so long as the policy of

the Government would remain what it has been obviously the best man will go and

prove himself to be a failure but this shows the symbolic appearance of the mind

and the intention and intensity of the feelings of the Pakistan Government. What

I mean is that Sir Zafarullah may be an able lawyer of thirty years or forty

years standing and a confirmed believer in British Raj-more loyal than the King

himself in whose thirty years not on one moment he did think it necessary to get

up and ask for freedom of this country. He helped the British Government

throughout his life. That person could go and speak, if he gets money, on

behalf of Bahawalpur or Bhopal or on behalf of the Indian Government, he would

go and represent as a diplomatic representative of the Indian Government, if he

is paid as he did in China and similarly he is representing Pakistan Government

as he is being paid to do so. He would even go and represent the United Indian

Government, if Heaven forbid that State comes into being tomorrow, if the

Government pays him to do so. That person we have sent to safeguard our

interests because that is the best lawyer that we could get. That very lawyer

represented us on the question of boundaries and we know what Radcliffe Award

was. That very lawyer was the intellectual leader of the hated Unionists, the

most reactionary element and the ugliest element in politics that this

sub-continent has produced. That person cannot feel the throb of freedom of the

people of Kashmir. He cannot fight for them. He can only do hair splitting. That

person cannot give a policy.  Sir, that is the proof that person must be

faithful to British interests. His object is to prolong the discussion, prolong

the whole affairs, so that both India and Pakistan may look up to Britain and

America for help. Our worthy Minister is more an agent of the British than of

the American. However, that is besides the point. The thing is this that this

policy has not given us Kashmir."73

Furqan BattalionIn June, 1948 Mirza Mahmud set up Furqan Battalion to axe his

grind in Kashmir affairs. In a special session of Majlis-i-Shoora, he announced

that he had been persuaded by some military officers to send at least a platoon

on Jammu front to take part in Kashmir war. Under the command of Mirza Mubarak

Ahmad, a platoon of 45 Ahmadis, after receiving instructions from M.M.Ahmad,

then Deputy Commissioner Sialkot, moved to MirajKay to fight on the Jammu

front. The Government of Pakistan, claims a Qadiani weekly paper Lahore, itself

requested Mirza Mahmud to send a Battalion on Kashmir front. An Organizing

Committee under Mirza Nasir Ahmad (Fatehuddin) was set up which recruited

Qadiani volunteers and by June 1948 the Furqan Battalion, under the command of

Col. (Retd.) Sardar Muhammad Hayat Qasarani was formed which stationed at Sarai

Alamgir near Jhelum. After Qaisarani, Mirza Mubarak Ahmad became its commander.

The Furqan camp was named Zubir and the commanding officer was called ‘Alam

Kabab’, (a name revealed to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad for the future Muslih Maud,

Mirza Mahmud claimed that ‘office’ in 1944). Besides Col. Qaisarani, Maj.

Waqi-uz-Zaman (Second in Command), Major Hameed Ahmad Kaleem, Major Abdul

Hamid, Major Abdullah Mahar and Cap. Naimatullah Sharif occupied important

positions in the Battalion. The Battalion advanced from Baghsar front to the

Valley of Saadabad on 10 July 1948 and occupied a portion of it about miles

wide and 5 miles long when the cease-fire took place. Nine Qadianis were killed

during Kashmir war.74 As the war was going on, Mirza Mahmud summoned some

influential Qadianis to Lahore to start a movement inside the Valley. Khalifa

Abdul Manan, the son of Khalifa and an engineer by profession, was called to

Lahore and advised to contact some one in the Valley to help in the execution

of the Qadiani Plan. He states: He (Mirza) then said: ‘I want reliable person

from the Valley who should be available for operation on the fighting line to’…

‘I (Mannan) at once said: yes, Your Holiness! I have one in mind, but he is

presently in Srinagar "Can he come"? He inquired and I said ‘yes’, "but I have

no means to communicate with him." ‘You write him and give me the letter.’ I

wrote, the message reached him in Srinagar, he left in disguise immediately. He

was under orders of arrest from the Emergency Administration. He reached Lahore

within a few days, presented himself at Rattan Bagh and started the assigned

work and continued to work for years and year." 75 Furqan Force concentrated

its activities mostly in the Saadabad Valley Sector. It was a spy rather than a

fighting force. The leaders of the Muslim Conference expressed their

apprehensions on the Qadiani involvement in Kashmir affairs. Sardar Aftab

Ahmad, General Secretary, Muslim Conference, condemned the Qadiani role in

Kashmir war and held them responsible for spying and playing an Imperialist

inspired game.76 Mirza Mahmud, in his address dated 27 December 1950 states:

‘Sardar Aftab Ahmad, General Secretary Muslim Conference Kashmir, has alleged

that Ahmadis had sent the Furqan Force to fight in Kashmir as a part of a

conspiracy. They leaked secret reports to the Indian Army. On the basis of

their reports the enemy war planes bombarded Pakistan’s strategic positions.

All the leading newspapers of the Punjab carried his statement. We made a

complaint to the Government stating ‘Why did Government allow us to remain in

Kashmir for two years’? The Government asked Sardar Aftab to retract and the

Ministry of Kashmir prepared a draft statement and sent it to Karachi to

contradict his earlier statement. But Sardar Aftab’s statement appeared in

distorted form only in least circulated daily Tamir, Rawalpindi. After

sometimes in November 1950 Sardar Aftab repeated the same allegations on the

arrival of Sir Owen Dixon mission in Pakistan as mediator on Kashmir question

although the volunteer forces had been withdrawn from Kashmir by that

time.’77The Furqan Battalion was disbanded on 17 June 1950. Brig K.M.Sheikh of

Pak Army read out the message of Gen Gracey, C-in-C of the Battalion to the

Furqan Force in a ceremony held for that special purpose: Gracey paid a glowing

tribute to Furqan Battalion in his message dated 17 June 1950. The text of the

message to the Battalion from the notorious General Sir Douglas Gracey,

K.C.I.C.B.E., M.C., Commander in Chief (Furqan Battalion) is given below: "Your

offer to provide a volunteer force in the fight for liberation of Kashmir in

June, 1948 was gratefully accepted, and the Furqan Bn came into being. After a

short period of training during the summer of 1948, you were soon ready to take

your place in the field. In September 1948 you were placed under Commander MALF.

 Your Bn was composed entirely of volunteers who came from all walks of life,

young peasants, students, teachers, men in business, they were all imbued with

the spirit of service for Pakistan; you accepted no renumeration, and no

publicity for the self sacrifice for which you all volunteered. Yours was a

noble cause. You impressed us all with your keenness to learn, and the

enthusiasm you brought with you. You and your officers soon got over many

difficulties that face a young unit. In Kashmir you were allotted an important

sector, and very soon you justified the reliance placed on you and you nobly

acquitted yourself in battle against heavy enemy ground and air attacks, with

not losing a single inch of ground. Your conduct both individual and collective

and your discipline have been of a very high order. As your mission is over and

your Bn is under orders to disband. I wish to thank every one of you for the

services you have rendered to your country. Khuda Hafiz." 78

BaluchistanMirza Mahmud made no secret of his political motives after his

arrival in Pakistan. On 22 July 1948 he visited Baluchistan on a political

mission where a secret Independent Baluchistan movement was going on with the

British backings. He declared to turn Baluchistan into a Qadiani province so

that it could serve as a base for further infiltration into territories of

Pakistan. It may be of interest to know that the Greater Baluchistan Scheme was

prepared during the Second World War by pro-Axis elements. Hitler desired to

reach India to inflict heavy blow on British Imperialism. After formation of

the INA by Babu Subash Bose, Germany strongly felt the need to reach

Baluchistan through Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The plan was prepared in the

State of Kalat. A book on Greater Baluchistan Plan was also published. The

British confiscated all copies of the book in 1942.79 With the end of the

Second War, the British took keen interest in Baluchistan affairs for its

strategic importance as it could prove a bulwark against Russian expansionism.

They encouraged Indpendent Baluchistan elements. The political Agent of Quetta,

D.Y.Fell, and the Congress party were involved in a conspiracy in Baluchistan.80

Khan of Kalat was assured all British help including recognition of the

independent status of the state like that of Nepal. The British troops could

station for fifty years as they had been in Egypt. To carry out this plan Col.

Sir Jaffery Prior, the A.G.G. of Baluchistan visited Kalat to deliver Lord

Mountbatten’s message to the Khan. It was proposed that an All Baluchistan

Conference should be convened to get support for the Independent Baluchistan

Plan. The Khan conveyed the plan to the Quaid. He immediately took up the

matter with Mountbatten. Lord Mountbatten sent the following secret message to

Jaffery: ‘Stop Baluch Conference. Khan Kalat Most untrustworthy.’ 81At the time

of Partition, Khan Kalat again hobnobbed with the British to secure an

independent status for Baluchistan. The Shahi Jirga of Baluchistan had already

decided to join Pakistan in the end of June 1947 but the question of the merger

of Kalat State was still unresolved. On 19 December 1947 the Foreign Minister of

Kalat, D.Y.Fell, in reply to a question in Dewan-i-Aam stated that despite all

efforts no agreement had been reached with Pakistan regarding the annexation of

the State. The agreement related to the future relations between them. The Kalat

State proposed to surrender the control of means of communications and foreign

affairs to Pakistan but Pakistan insisted on unconditional annexation of the

State, and encouraged the rulers of Makran and Lasbella to challenge the

sovereignty of Kalat State.82 W.Wilcox gives the following version of the

annexation of Kalat State: Khan Kalat had employed Englishmen a few days before

Pakistan to command his army and serve him as Foreign Minister. On 12 August

1947 New York Times reported that ‘Pakistan recognized Kalat as an independent

sovereign state with the status different from that of the Indian States.’ The

next day The Times printed a map of Kalat and Makran as independent states. On

15 August, the Khan proclaimed Kalat independence. 83Douglas Fell, the Foreign

Minister looked for help from the British to maintain the independent status of

the State and the Khan’s brother and uncle sought aid from Kabul. In January

1948 Liaqat Ali Khan met Kalat Defense Minister in Peshawar. The Quaid saw the

Khan and other sardars when he traveled to Sibi to address Shahi jirga. On 25

February the Kalat National party sponsored a 'non accession bill' in

Awan-i-Aam (Lower House) and Fell left for London in search of support. Dawn,

Karachi carried the following banner line: 'The Khan of Kalat has direct treaty

relations with the British.'84 Consequently Pakistan decided to move its army

into Baluchistan and recognized the accession of Makran, Kharan and Lasbella

thereby isolating Kalat from the sea and the Iranian border. Khan of Kalat

announced his decision to join Pakistan unconditionally on 27 March 1948. After

the Kalat's accession, Prince Karim a relative of the Khan was dismissed from

the Governor-ship of Makran. He escaped to Afghanistan to recruit a tribal army

for fighting against Pakistan army. Fell and Anderson supported the rebel leader

and got financial support from Khan of Kalat. On 16 June, Karim and other rebels

were arrested by the Pakistan Army.85 Khan of Kalat in his autobiography calls

the Agent to the Governor General, Foreign Minister and Col.S.B.Shah, as black

sheep who opposed to the idea of Kalat's merger with Pakistan.86 Against this

political background one can fully assess the nature of Mirza Mahmud's visit to

Quetta in July 1948 and his utterance regarding establishment of an Ahmadiyya

state in Baluchistan: ‘The entire population of British Baluchistan - now

called Pak Baluchistan - is about five to six lakhs. Although the population of

this Province is less than that of others, it has an importance of its own as a

unit has the same value in a state as an individual has in a society. To

illustrate one may refer to the Constitution of America. In America every state

is represented by an equal number of members in the Senate irrespective of its

population which may be one crore or ten crores. In short, although the

population of Pak Baluchistan is only 5-6 lakhs or 11 lakhs including the

States, it has its importance as a unit. It is difficult to convert a big

population to Ahmadiyyat but it is easy to convert a small population. If,

therefore, the community pays full attention to this program this province can

be converted over to Ahmadiyyat in a very short time. Remember, our missionary

work can never succeed unless we have a strong base. A strong base is a

prerequisite for Tabligh (Propagation of ideas). Therefore, you should first of

all try to make your base strong. Have a base of your own somewhere. Let it be

any where. If we convert the whole of this province to Ahmadiyyat, we shall be

in a position to call at least one province as our own. And this can be done

very easily.’87

Mirza Mahmud’s TestimonyMunir Committee (1954) asked the following questions to

Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad (MBMA) regarding the establishment of a Qadiani

state in Baluchistan:   Question: Have you delivered the speech in your Friday

address in Quetta (Exhibit DE 324 ) which appeared in 13 August 1948 issue of

AlFazl? MBMA: Yes, please! Question: When you said the following words in your

speech what did you intend to convey by it: ‘Remember, our missionary work can

never succeed unless we have a strong base. A strong base is a prerequisite for

Tabligh (propagation of ideas).’ MBMA: These words are self-explanatory.

Question: When you said: ‘If we convert the whole of this province to call at

least one province as our own. What did you mean by it ?’ MBMA: There were two

reasons for it:

The grandfather of the present Nawab of Kalat was an Ahmadi. 88 Baluchistan is a

small province Question: Did you say the following words in your Friday address,

which appeared in AlFazl dated 22 October 1948 (Ex D.E.210)?

"I know that now this province can not escape from our hands, it will fall prey

to us. Even if all the nations of world unite they cannot snatch this area away

from us."MBMA: Yes please! But this should not be taken in its literal sense. I

referred to the future. I only wanted to say that since an Ahmadi officer was

killed there, this province would sure to be an Ahmadiyya one.89

Munir Report records: ‘Reliance has also been placed in this connection on Mirza

Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad’s speech in Quetta, published in the AlFazl of 13

August 1948, in which he appealed to his Community to intensify their

propaganda in Baluchistan, so that province may become a base for future

operations and on his address at the Annual Meeting of Sadre Anjuman Ahmadiyya,

Rabwah during the Christmas of 1951 which was published in the AlFazl of 16

January 1952 in the course of which he made an impassioned appeal to his

followers to accelerate and intensify their proselytising activities so that

persons who had hitherto been unbelievers may fall into the fold of Ahmadiyyat

by the end of 1952.The address published in the AlFazl of 11 January, 1952 in

which Ahmadis were persuaded not to concentrate in one department, namely the

army, but to disperse in all other departments, has also been referred to as

well as several reports submitted by Ahmadi Government officers or officials to

the headquarters of the results of their tabligh.’90 Pindi Conspiracy CaseOn the

midnight of 9 March 1951, Major General Akbar Khan, Chief of the General Staff,

Pakistan Army, Brig. M.A.Latif and some civilians were arrested on the charge

of hatching a conspiracy to create commotion in the country by violent means

and to overthrow the then existing Government of which the late Liaqat Ali Khan

was Prime Minister. Major General Nazir Ahmad Qadiani, a close relative of Sir

Zafarullah, was at the Imperial Defense College in London on a training course

from where he was brought back and was arrested. From a Socialist’s point of

view, ‘The Rawalpindi ‘Conspiracy’ was bungled from the very start. The

mastermind was Maj Gen Akbar Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. Akbar

had fought in the war to liberate Kashmir and felt that he had been betrayed by

the political leadership. He was considered to be progressive, a pro-Nasserite

army radical, and the officers who supported him were a mixed bag ranging from

neo-Fascists to national chauvinists. The tiny Communist Party of Pakistan

(CPP) also got embroiled in this mess. Sajjad Zaheer told me that he had met

Akbar at cocktail party and the general had broached the subject and ‘requested

help’ to draft manifestoes and a possible plan of action. The CPP leadership

accepted the offer and participated in various meetings with army officers.

Eventually it was decided to shelve the plan for some time, but a conspirator,

fearing that the truth might be revealed at a later stage, turned informer and

the ‘conspiracy’ was unveiled. The army officers and Communist leaders were

arrested.’91 The interpretation that since the Pakistan army was cheated out of

victory by the cease-fire in Kashmir,92 they made a plan to over throw the

Government is not generally accepted. Zafarullah Poshni and Air Commodore

Janjua, who themselves were involved in the conspiracy case, call it a myth.

The real motive, says Zafarullah Poshni, was to change the Government which was

a ‘corrupt, nepotism-ridden, inefficient and weak-kneed bunch of characters

totally subservient to British Imperialist domination.’ 93 Brig Sadeeq Khan,

another accomplice in the Pindi Conspiracy case, reveals that Sir Zafarullah

gave a cease-fire signal in the Security Council precisely at the time

(January, 1949) when India had got some strategic gains in Kashmir. We accepted

the cease-fire without getting any political advantages out of our successes in

the war. He states that Sikander Mirza opposed Liaqat. He wanted to see Ayub

Khan in C-in-C uniform. They were good friends. Through Ayub Khan’s military

influence, he thought to attain power by removing his opponents from the way.

94 There is another plausible version of conspiracy, which proves it a British

inspired 95 rather than a pro-Soviet plot:

Qadianis, being the stooges of the British Imperialism and their stakes in the

affairs in the event of a successful coup that the military officers were not

Communists; they could not have been any thing but pro-British. Of the

Communist Party of British India, like other colonial British parties, had

generally been an extension of British political indifference and not ‘made in

Moscow.’ Moreover, the British intelligence had always had a certain presence

within the party itself. 96 A Soviet connected plot would appear to be highly

stupid at a time when Liaqat Ali was known to be trying to distance himself

from both Britain and the US. He had told the British that Pakistan should not

be taken for granted. He had declined all offers and pressure to enter the

so-called Middle East Defense Organization being then vigorously put forth by

the US. On the other hand, the removal of Liaqat Ali had the effect of drawing

in Pakistan closer and closer into a system of western alliances, from which it

has neither benefited nor been able to detach itself effectively. 97 All this

had us to believe that it was a British-inspired plot and Qadianis were

definitely involved in it. Subsequent events further confirm our belief.

Liaqat’s AssassinationWithin a span of four years, Liaqat Ali Khan came to know

of Qadiani prophecies and utterances regarding the creation of an Ahmadiyya

State in Kashmir and Baluchistan. In the wake of their policy and aspirations

for a united India he ordered the creation of a Special Intelligence Cell to

prepare a list of Qadianis in sensitive positions and to keep an eye on their

activities.98 The same year saw the discovery of military officers plot (Pindi

Conspiracy Case) to overthrow the Government. In the following year Liaqat was

assassinated in broad daylight. The assassin was killed on the spot and the

murder has since remained an unsolved mystery. Liaqat was said to have been

planning a heavy reshuffle of his Cabinet. A Jewish paper, the Jerusalem Post,

in its 23 October 1951 issue, wrote an interesting editorial on the

assassination of Liaqat Ali. It first noted the holding of the ‘Pan Islamic

Conference in Karachi last May (1951) and Liaqat Ali’s agreement ‘to the

appointment (as its Secretary General) of Aminul Hussaini’ (the late grand

Mufti of Palestine) and then went on to observe that, it may well be that in

doing so he signed the bill for his execution.’99 What the Post seemed to

suggest was that ‘even if he (the Mufti) has not been directly involved in

Liaqat Ali Khan’s death, nevertheless, the support of a man of his caliber has

encouraged local Muslim fire brands to put their threats into action.100

However, even if Liaqat Ali has been killed by the Mufti ‘fans’, the Post could

not restrain itself from commenting that the "smooth shuffling following the

murder was so rapid as to appear readily planned for any emergency." 101 Mian

Mumtaz Mahmud Khan Daultana made a startling disclosure of our history in

August 1983, when he hinted at involvement of Nawab Mushraq Ahmad Gurmani,

General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan

[Zafarullah was in New York at the time of Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination] and

Sardar Bahadur Khan in the assassination of Liaqat Ali. The reason he divulged

was that Liaqat wanted to nominate Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar as Deputy Prime

Minister, take Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy in the Federal Cabinet and bringing

I.I Chundrigar as the Governor of Punjab as he had decided to dismiss Ghulam

Muhammad from the Cabinet. As Liaqat decided to make the administrative changes

announced at a public meeting at Rawalpindi along with some other important

announcements on 16 October 1951 he was shot dead before he could utter a word.

Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, who rushed to Rawalpindi immediately after he heard

about the catastrophe, was not allowed to enter the room where the so-called

Cabinet was in session, although after the demise of the Prime Minister there

should have been no Cabinet. This was the so-called meeting of the Cabinet

where the decision to nominate Ghulam Muhammad as Governor General and Khawaja

Nazimuddin as Prime Minister was taken. He said that the entire Muslim League

and its Secretary General, Ch.Muhammad Ali were supporting Sardar Abdul Rab

Nishtar as the next Prime Minister but the League view was not honoured which

was the first setback to the concept of political parties in Pakistan. He said

that even Sardar Nishtar did not resist as he thought it not fit to create any

political controversy at that juncture of history. He further disclosed that

Liaqat Ali Khan had discussed the matter of the administrative changes with him

being the Chief Minister of Punjab on 14 October only two days before his

murder.102 Unrealistic Foreign PolicyPakistan could not adopt an independent

foreign policy and remained tied to the Imperialist interests owing to Sir

Zafarullah. Pakistan relations with the USSR remained tense and cool in early

years after our independence. The first move to establish diplomatic relations

with Russia was made in mid April 1948 not out of sincerity but to win the

sympathies of western powers on Kashmir issue. Zafarullah, in a meeting with

the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko in New York proposed to

exchange ambassadors. But it had no effect on the attitude of Western country

because Pakistan nominee to Russia presented his credentials in Moscow on 31

December, 1949 and his counterpart from Russia come to Pakistan even late in

march 1950. Another opportunity to establish relation with Russia came when

Liaqat Ali was invited by Moscow. He instead professed to visit Washington

because his influential Foreign Minister was an agent of Imperialism and had

long been paving way to push Pakistan into western bloc. He was eager to set up

Ahmadiyya Missions in Europe and America in accordance with the prophecies of

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his successor Mirza Mahmud.103 The secret documents made

public in London after expiry of 30 year statutory period reveal that the year

(1949) Liaqat Ali Khan was invited to visit the Soviet Union, China had gone

Red. The Russian invitation caused considerable concern in Whitehall and the

Commonwealth Relations Office Pakistan Desk was inundated with dispatches from

British envoys, foreign and Pakistan press reports. The documents give the year

another significance. It was the time when the Commonwealth Office had prepared

(September 1949) an appraisal of India’s foreign policy which stated its

"deep-seated unwillingness to accept the division of the Indian subcontinent

and a consequent basic hostility to Pakistan."104 The Indian leaders felt

attracted to Moscow. Nehru had sent first his sister Vijay Laxmi Pandit and,

after her, Dr Radhakrishnan as India’s envoy to Kremlin. New Delhi seemed

unduly upset by the Soviet invitation of June 1949 to Pakistan Prime Minister.

They feared that Russians, by treating Pakistan as a leading Muslim nation

might strive for anew pro-Soviet alignment of Muslim and Arabs through out the

Middle East. Britain’s assessment was that neither Pakistan was going over to

Communist Camp nor the acceptance would materialize. They persuaded Americans

to invite Liaqat Ali to Washington to take the sting out of any visit he paid

to Moscow. The documents revealed that help for Britain’s efforts came from an

unexpected quarter. Before the Foreign Office could formally approach State

Department, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Pakistan’s Finance Minister, while in

Washington, seems to have taken the matter out of British hands (by) expressing

support for the idea of an invitation to Pakistan Prime Minister to visit

Washington. The invitation would be extended by Assistant Secretary of State,

George McGhee, when he visited Karachi in December 1949. The British Embassy in

Washington informed the Foreign Office late in November on the basis of

confidential information from the State Department. Documents reveal that

Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, told Attlee (14

June) to bring a reversion of feeling in Britain’s favour by making an over

indication regarding ‘current Indian policy towards delay, if not obstruction

of plebiscite in Kashmir.’ Baker also advised that the Foreign Office should

approach the State Department to take steps for a majority vote in the UNCIP

for securing an acceptance of arbitral procedure in the Kashmir dispute. This

was subsequently done, the documents say. "The Moscow visit did not take place.

Why? The then Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan, had made clear at

an American Embassy reception in Karachi that Pakistan was quite ready to leave

the next move to the Russians, Sir Graffety Smith (the British High Commissioner

in Pakistan) reported on July 21 to London. He quoted Sir Zafarullah as saying

they have asked us, we have accepted. The next move is up to them. Which move

the Russians obviously did not make.’105

Korean WarPakistan, being an ally of America, fully supported the US policy on

the Korean crisis and was even willing to offer a brigade of Pakistani troops

which the United States had offered to equip with modern weapons. Further

Pakistan not only signed the Japanese Peace Treaty, but also provided full

support to it from the floor of the Conference. Pakistan’s unequivocal support

at a critical juncture left a deep impression on the minds of Americans.106 Two

years later Dulles, as Secretay of State, supporting Pakistan’s request for the

supply of wheat, recalled that at the time of Japanese Peace Treaty, the Soviet

Union tried to portray the treaty as being imposed upon Japan by a few Western

powers headed by the US, and that "at that juncture Pakistan furnished a

leadership which brought to that Conference a substantial number of Asian

countries."107 ChinaPakistan voted in favour of the representation to the

People’s Republic of China in the UN in 1950, but there after up to 1960 voted

for the US sponsored resolutions for the postponement of the question of

China’s seat in the UN.108 Mirza Mahmud, in his covert language of revelation

and dream, states that he saw the Government of Pakistan had paid a glowing

tribute to Zafarullah Khan in a statement which had established the

international position of Pakistan. It was becoming evident that in the UN to

British or American circles India was likely to gain importance as a result of

its likely service to check the Russian influence in China but at that time

Zafarullah Khan offered his services and explained that Pakistan could also

render this service.109 Muslim StatesPakistan served actively in the cause of

independence of Indonesia, Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland, but none of these

nations had any ties with Pakistan other than the cultural.110 The relations

with other Muslim State were also deplorable due to our pro-British stance.

‘When Iran, then Egypt and then Iraq exploded against Britain in the summer and

autumn of 1951, Pakistan found itself in an embarrassing situation. It had a

policy of close friendship with these countries; at the same times their

immediate actions were prejudicial to its interests. Iran’s abrogation of

Britain’s oil rights threatened Pakistan’s essential oil supply. Egypt’s

efforts at that time to break the treaty concerning the Suez Canal could have

interfered with the flow of trade to Pakistan from the West. Further Pakistan

wanted British support in the UN in its quarrel with India. Hence it tried to

soothe both sides.’111 On 16 October 1951 the Egyptian Parliament approved the

unilateral abrogation of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and proclaimed Farooq as

King. There was an exultant mood in Egypt. Newspapers proclaimed ‘King and

people break the fetters of British Imperialism.’ Anti-British demonstration

flared up in Ismailiya and Port Said and armed clashes occurred between

Egyptian guerrilla squads and British army between November 1951 - January

1952. The Wafd Government was not prepared to risk armed combat with British

troops. On 27 January 1952 Martial Law was proclaimed and King Farooq dismissed

Nahas Government. Four Prime Ministers held office in the next six months. On 22

July 1952 the Free Officers seized power.112 In February 1952 when an

anti-British movement was going on in Egypt, Zafarullah on his return from

London paid a friendly visit to Cairo. It was resented by the Egyptian

nationalists. They felt that an ‘emissary of British Prime Minister had come to

persuade King Farooq to maintain hated colonialist status quo over the British

evacuation of the Suez Canal base.’ Zafarullah held meetings with Ali Mehr

Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt and King Farooq. Soon after his arrival, the

Mufti of Egypt As-Sheikh Hasnain Muhammad Makhlov issued a fatwa in which he

exposed Qadiani heresy, condemned Zafarullah as Kafir and criticized the past

political role played by the Ahmadiyya movement against Islam and the integrity

of the Arabs states. The Arab press gave it a wider publicity which resulted in

deterioration of our relations with the Islamic world. Some Arab countries

dplored Pakistan’s pro-West policy and criticized its unwholesome attitude

towards Arab nationalism. Zafarullah, in the capacity of the Foreign Minister

of Pakistan asked the Pakistan Ambassador at Cairo to officially protest to

Egypt against the fatwa. Prime Minister of Egypt, Najib Hilali took the matter

to King Farooq and requested him to sign a contradictory statement which he

refused. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat says that Hilali tendered his resignation over

this issue (28 June 1952).113 Mirza Mahmud wrote a letter to the daily Alyum,

Cairo to explain the Ahmadiyya beliefs. He clarified Ahmadiyya prophecy

concerning their return to Qadian, which the paper maintained, would take place

after launching an attack on India. He requested the Egyptian and Arab press to

help in promotion of friendly relations with Pakistan. 114 Zafarullah claims

that he met Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

and discussed the issue of withdrawal of British forces from the Suez. He

visited Cairo and London several times to remove intervening difficulties. In

Cairo, Ambassador Kaffery of the United States was eager to help him and his

assistance proved very valuable. Eden managed to get an appointment for

Zafarullah with British Prime Minister Churchill. Before Zafarullah could call

on him, General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander of the British forces in Suez,

held a secret meeting with him. General Robertson explained him that the

British military presence in Suez was an anachronism and they should withdraw.

Moreover, the Revolution in Egypt was backed by the people and would come to

stay. Zafarullah called on British Prime Minster and discussed the issue with

him. His response was positive. At last an agreement on the withdrawal of

British forces from Egypt was concluded in conformity with the terms of the

agreement made with the Egyptian revolutionary authorities. Zafarullah claims

that Gamal Abdul Nasir remembered and appreciated his service rendered in this

matter.115 Britain concluded different agreements with Egypt at different

occasions. A first agreement laying down general principles was initialed on 27

July 1954 and a final one on 19 October 1954. It was a boon to the Egyptian

forces which were then battling for the supremacy against a combined civilian

military opposition led by the Muslim Brethren (Akhwans). Although it still

tied Egypt to a British military alliance of sorts, to general egyptian public

it meant the ultimate triumph over Imperialism after nearby 75 years of the

physical presence of British troops in the country. The last British troops

left Port Said on 13 June, and on 18th Jamal Nasir ceremoniously raised the

Egyptian flag over Navy House there.116 An Ally of ZionistsZafarullah believed

that the Zionist State of Israel is a ‘reality’ and has come into existence

whether we recognize it or not. An interesting letter appeared in the Pakistan

Times: "In reply to a question in Karachi recently, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah

Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, said that as a realist he had to accept the

position that whatever one’s own stand in the matter, in actual fact the State

of Israel had come into existence. This indicates that even Sir Muhammad

Zafarullah is prepared to accept the logic of fait accompli. The Minister’s

provision, whatever one’s own stand in the matter, could only thinly disguise

this preparedness to wash off hands from any territory which may be forcibly

snatched away from Muslims."117In the UN forums, Sir Zafarullah had a chance to

discuss varied political issues with Israeli envoys. Zionists of India published

a monthly journal Indian and Israel from Bombay. Its editor was F.W.Pollack and

H.Eschablim worked as its Assistant Editor. Pollack was a good friend of

Mahatma Gandhi. He was also the Trade Commissioner of Israel for India and

South East Asia. The aim of the paper was to promote friendly relations between

India and Israel. It published a photograph of Sir Zafarullah, Pakistan Foreign

Minister with A.Aban, Isreal’s Permanent Representative at the UN. Zafarullah

was seen chatting with him in friendly manner. The paper wrote the following

lines under their photograph: "Though diplomatic relations have not yet been

established between Israel and Pakistan, the United Nations provide a welcome

platform for diplomats of both countries to exchange views on Asian problems

effecting both nations." 118 

References:

Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol X P.747 AlFazl Lahore, 31 July, 1949 Mirza Muhammad

Hussain, Fitna Inkar-I-Khatam-I-Nabuwat, Lahore, 1978 P.192 Mumtaz Ahmad

Farooqi, Fateh Haq, Lahore P.48 Mirza Bashir Ahmad, Muzalam-I-Qadian Ka

Khooneen Roznamcha, Lahore, 1949 Tarikh Vol X P. 74 Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol

XInPp. 195-219 Pakistan Times, Lahore, 17 October, 1947 Security Council Record

Speeches of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Representative of Pakistan, 24

January, 1948 The Hindustan Times, 31 October, 1974 quoted ‘From the World

Press’, compiled by B.A.Rafiq of London Mission AlFurqan Rabwah,

Dervishan-I-Qadian Number, July-September, 1963 AlFurqan Rabwah, November, 1966

The Hindustan Times, 31 October, 1974, Dr Dinsha Mehta was Mahatma Gandhi’s

representative who visited Qadian alongwith Suhrawardy on 23 October, 1974.

They met Mirza Bashir Ahmad, Amir Jama'at Qadian, Mirza Nasir Ahmad, Malik

Ghulam Farid, Molvi Jalaluddin Shams, and Mirza Munwar Ahmad. Earlier Krishna

Muriti and Dr Sophist came to see Qadian with Sarabai on 19 October 1947 and

assured all help to Ahmadis.(Malik Salahud Din MA, Tabieen Ashab-I-Ahmad, Vol

VII, Lahore Art Press, Lahore, 1971 PP 65-66) "For nearly 40 year (1908-1947)

Qadian was as it were a miniature Vatican, not sovereign, but some thing of a

state with in a state. Crime in Qadian, for instance, was invariably reported

first to the Ahmadi office and then to Police’, says O.H.Kspate (Prof. London

School of Economics) whose service were acquired by Mirza Mahmud for

presentation of Ahmadiyya case to the Punjab Boundary Commission), India and

Pakistan, London P.190 The Moslim World April, 1855-S.E.Brush, Ahmadiyyat in

Pakistan -P.148 Munir Report P.196 AlFazl Lahore 26 November, 1947 Mirza Mahmud

Ahmad, Haqiqat-I-Roya, P.35 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Dafa-ul-Bala, Qadian P.11 Mirza

Ghulam Ahmad, Dur-I-Samin, Qadian Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ashtihar Chanda

Minara-tul-Masih, Qadian 28 May, 1900 Tazkira P.127 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad,

Alwasyat, Qadian P.25 Tarikh Vol Xii P.376 Supplement Tehrik-I-Jadid Rabwah

December 1971 AlFazl Lahore, 25 October, 1947 AlFazl Rabwah, 15 March, 1957

AlFazl Lahore, 25 October, 1947 AlFazl Lahore, 4 December, 1947 AlFazl Lahore,7

December, 1947 Barkat Ahmad Rajiki, Tehrik-I-Ahmadiyyat, Qadia, P.6 Ibid Ibid

Qadiani were pressing for his Chief Ministership of the Punjab-AlFazl Lahore,

29 November, 1947 Nawab of Bhopal was the Chancellor of Chamber of Princes at

that time. He wanted to abdicate in favour of his daughter. He approached Lord

Mountbatten first with the request of a Stand Still Agreement without acceding

to India. When refused, he sent his constitutional Adviser, Sir Zafarullah to

discuss Terms of Accession. He was told that no alteration in the Instrument

would be possible. Nawab Bhopal was an ally of Sir Conard Cornfield, head of

Political Department of British India and Political Adviser to the Viceroy. He

is the same fellow who destroyed 4 tons of most valuable papers concerning

Princes which included top secret letters and instructions on the British

Imperialist policy in India. Zafarullah worked to secure a unique place for the

Princes in the wake of new constitutional set up of India and Pakistan. Nawab

Bhopal, however, subsequently announced the State’s accession to India with the

Quaid’s consent. Outlook, Karachi 6 July 1974 Suharwardy was also engaged in

Sovereign Bengal movement with Sarat Chandra Bose at that time, see Amllendu

De, Islam in Modern India, Maya Prakashan, Calcutta, 1982, PP 230-242 Quoted in

AlFazl Lahore, 31 December, 1947 Sir Mirza Ismail, My Public Life, P.100

Pakistan Times Lahore 24 November, 1980 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Indian

Perspectives) Edited by K. Arif, Vanguard Book Ltd. 1984 P.41 Impact

International UK, 27 September, 1974 AlFazl lahore, 4 December, 1947 AlFazl

Lahore, 21 December, 1947 AlFazl lahore, Ist December, 1947 Jang Karachi, 24

December, 1947 AlFazl Lahore, 19 December, 1947 Tarikh-I- Ahmadiyya Vol XII

PP.280-310 Ibid P.321 Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol XII P. 343 Ibid P.354 Rais Ahmad

Jaffery, Hyderabad Jo Kabhi Tha, Lahore 1960 P.73 Mirza Mahmud Ahamd’s address

AlFazl Lahore, 21 September, 1948 Ibid Tabligh-e-Risalat, Edit by Mir Qasim

Ali, Vol VI, P.69 AlFazl Lahore, 13 August, 1948 Impact London, 27 September,

1974 Al-Islah Srinagar, 4 July, 1946 AlFazl Qadian, Ist February, 1946 AlFazl

Qadian, 10 January, 1946 AlFazl Qadian, 20 June, 1946 AlFazl Qadian, 11, April,

1947 Tarikh Vol VI, p.656 It is interesting to note that AlFazl, Lahore did not

mention in any of its issues of October-November, 1947, the formation of Azad

Government by Gilkar, Sardar Gul Ahmad Kausar, Editor Hamara Kashmir,

Muzaffarabad wrote an article in his paper on 4 October 1953 which is quoted

extensively by Qadiani writers in support of their claim-See also Tarikh

Ahmadiyyat Vol XI P.322 Bazaz op.cit. P.621 Also Lord Birdwood Two Nations

Kashmir, London 1956 P.81 See Assad Ullah Kashmiri Qadianis,

Maamar-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Rawalpindi P.25 Lt. Syed Anwar

Shah of Hill Surang, Tehsil Bagh Azad Kashmir and Major Khurshid Anwar under

whose command Afgan tribesman attacked Muzaffarabad on 21 October 1947 are

other claimants See also Maulana Taj Mahmud, Azad Kashmir Kee Qaradad Per

Mirzaeon Kay Gumrah Kun Propoganday K Maskar Jawab, MTKN, Pakistan, 1973 Philip

Warner, Auchinleck, The Lonely Soldier, London 1981, P.225 See Zafarullah,

Servant of God, PP 149-152 Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, London, P.88

Tarikh-I-Ahmadiyya Vol XII P. 324 Sir Zafarullah says that the Security Council

was considering the resolution on Plebiscite. Philip Noel Baker, Minister for

Common Wealth Affairs talked to Sir Ayenger and Sir Shankar Baj Pai and asked

them to try to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to agree to go alongwith the

resolution. He was given some hope that the Prime Minister might be brought

round, when Mr.Noel Baker received a telegram from Prime Minister Attlee to

desist. The resolution was announced that his delegation has been recalled to

Delhi for consultation(Servant of God, P.153) W.Norman Brown, The United States

And India And Pakistan, USA P. 189 For Indian Version of Kashmir problem, see

Bhagwan Singh, Political Conspiracies of Kashmir, Light and Life Publication,

Lukhnow, India, 1973 Speeches and Statements of Mian Iftikharuddin, Edit. By

Abdullah Malik, Lahore, 1971, P. 266 Weekly Lahore, Lahore 31 March, 1975 Also

Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat, Vol VI, P.267] Khalifa Abdul Mannan, Kashmir Story, Lahore

1970 P. 120 Shamsul-ulema Mufti Atique Ullah Shah Mufti-I-Azam Poonch, Azad

Kashmir Mein Kay Hath Kanday, Supplement the Sadiq Azad Kashmir, 5 January,

1951 P.16 Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s Address dated 27 December, 1950 Publicity

Department, Rabwah Tarikh, Vol. VI, P.675 Urdu Digest, Lahore, October, 1969

Dr. Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement in Baluchistan, Islamabad, PP 36-40

Urdu Digest Lahore October, 1969 AlFazl Lahore, 20 December, 1947 W.W.Wilcox,

Pakistan, the Consolidation of State, USA, 1963, P.76 Dawn, Karachi, 28

February, 1948 W.Wilcox, Pakistan, USA 1963 PP.75-81 Mir Ahmad Yar, Inside

Baluchistan, Royal Book Co. Karachi, 1975, P.156 AlFazl Lahore, 13 August, 1948

Mirza Mahmud furnished the "proof" for it. He published the photo copy of the

letter which the grandfather of Khan of Kalat, Mir Khuda Dad Khan wrote to

Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani on 11 June, 1903 and requested him to pray for him.

He came to know about Mirza Sahib from Hussain Buz of Loralai(Mirza Mahmud,

Islami Nazarya, Rabwah 1953) It does not establish, in any way, that Mir Khuda

Dad was an Ahmadi. Tehqiqati Adalat Mein Imaam Hamat Ahmadiyya Ka Bayan,

Publicity Department Rabwah, P.30 Munir Report, P.200 Tariq Ali, Pakistan:

Military Rule or People’s Power, Jonathan Cape, London 1970 P.45 Maj.Gen.Akbar

Khan’s article in Hikayat, Lahore, September, 1972 Quoted by Hasan Askari

Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Karachi,

1976 P.85 The Outlook Karachi, 3 February, 1973 . Also see Col(Retd) Hasan

Khan’s article on Pindi Conspiracy case in Urdu Digest, Lahore Oct. 1982 Weekly

Hurmar, Rawalpindi 1-7 April, 1984 Special Research Report on the Pindi

Conspiracy Case. See also Maj-Gen (Retd) Akbar Khan’s interview in Defense

Journal, June-July, 1985 Qadianis were very eager to take control of General

Head quarters of Pakistan Army in early 50s. Fazal Mahmud Khan Qadiani, Deputy

Financial Adviser, Central Ordnance Department Rawalpindi wrote a letter to

Mirza Mahmud on 24 February 1949 and gave a few proposals for this sinister

plan. (See Mir Ghulam Nabi Nasik, Mirzaeyat Kay Napak Iraday, Rawalpindi 1951)

The Communist Party of India secretly collaborated with the British during the

Second World War to sabotage national movements. Arun Shourie, a well known

Indian writer has given many startling facts supported by documentation in the

four issues of the Illustrated Weekly of India, 18 March-8 April 1984 on the

Imperialist-Communist collaboration during early 40s. Impact London 8-21

October, 1982 Impact International , UK, 27 September, 1974 The Impact London,

8-21 October, 1982 James Solomon Vincent, a Pakistani Secret Service Agent in

an exclusive interview with the weekly Takbir, Karachi has revealed that a

German Convert Kenzy was responsible to kill Liaqat Ali Khan. Said Akbar, the

"alleged assassin" was just a camouflage (Jang Lahore, 9 March 1986) Kenzy

embraced Qadianism, became Abdul Shakoor, lived in Quetta and married in

Rabwah. He had close relations with Zafarullah family. The Impact London 8-21

October, 1982 Daily Muslim Islamabad, 25 August, 1983 Nawai-e-Waqat Lahore, 1st

February, 1972 Dawn Karachi, 1st February 1985 Dawn Karachi, 1st February, 1985

Sir Zafarullah says that Dean Acheson, who as Secretary of State presided over

the Conference and John Foster Dulles, who had conducted the negitiations for

the treaty and as incharge of it on behalf of the United States, expressed

their gratification to him, (Servant of God,P.175) Wheat to Pakistan: Hearings

on H.R. 5659-5661 before the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 15

June, 1953 PP 8 and 9 Pakistan Foreign Policy, Indian Perspectives, Edited by

K. Arif, Vangard Books Limited. Lahore, P.81 AlFazl Rabwah 25 January, 1950

Almubashrat, P.294 N.Brown, op.cit. P.352 N.Brown, op.cit. P.352 Derek Hopwood,

Egypt, Allen and Unwin, USA, 1985, P. 33. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol XVII P.307

Mirza Mahmud letter to Alyum, Egypt Published by Anjuman Taraq-I-Islam, Rabwah,

July, 1952 Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.186 P.J.Vatikiotis, The Modern History

of Egypt, London, 1976 PP.389-390 Pakistan Times 30 June 1949, (Letter of Syed

Ghulam Sarwar, Gujrat) Indian and Israel, Bombay, June 1952

  

 

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