Sâmkhya philosophy's view of soul

[Samkhya]

Even if neurobiology provided strong arguments supporting the view that mental events (perceptions, mental pictures, reasonings, feelings, awareness, volitions, and even the empirical self, etc.) are produced by the brain, can't we still say that Subjectivity itself, that Sâmkhya philosophy calls "Purusha", is to be distinguished from mental events, in the same way a spectator is not the same as the show he watches, and therefore, that it is not proven that Subjectivy depends upon the brain?

 

Thus, when we are unconscious, it does not imply that Subjectivity (Purusha) is non-existent, but simply that it is "void". Purusha has to receive an input from without in order to experience something, hence the need of a brain.

 

So, Subjectivity may be present in all organisms that have a nervous system, but the objective content of the diverse subjectivities depends upon the complexity and the state of the nervous system.

 

We can consider that subjectivity is bound to a body as long as the body can provide subjectivity with some objective content, and when the body is written off, the subjectivity (or soul) is no longer bound to it, but there is no reason to think that the soul ceases to exist.

 

Whether there is one or many soul is not settled.

 

With this view of the soul, I think we can face successfully some materialistic arguments.