OT: Interesting Connection

[Guest guest]

Hi y'all,

 

Not saying there is anything to this .. or whether I believe it or not.

But I was sorta surprised a couple of days ago when CNN asked .. on one

of their email polls .. if folks thought Chirac was following his own

agenda or that of the French people in his obstinate position of refusal

of any motions put forth by the US Government. Then someone sent me the

below .. and it made me wonder. Y'all keep smiling, Butch

--------------------------

The Chirac-Hussein Connection

 

French President Jacques Chirac is a pivotal figure on the international

scene, whose views on Iraq are of vital concern. Those views are not

driven simply by geopolitics, however. The factors that shape his

thinking include a long, complex and sometimes mysterious relationship

with Saddam Hussein. The relationship is not secret, but it is no longer

as well known as it once was -- nor is it well known outside of France.

It is not insignificant in understanding Chirac's view of Iraq.

 

Analysis

 

In attempting to understand France's behavior over the issue of war with

Iraq, there is little question but that strategic, economic and

geopolitical considerations are dominant drivers. However, in order to

understand the details of French behavior, it is also important to

understand a not really unknown but oddly neglected aspect of French

policy: the personal relationship between French President Jacques

Chirac and Saddam Hussein.

 

The relationship dates back to late 1974, when then-French Premier

Chirac traveled to Baghdad and met the No. 2 man in the Iraqi

government, Vice President Saddam Hussein. During that visit, Chirac

and Hussein conducted negotiations on a range of issues, the most

important of these being Iraq's purchase of nuclear reactors.

 

In September 1975, Hussein traveled to Paris, where Chirac personally

gave him a tour of a French nuclear plant. During that visit, Chirac

said, " Iraq is in the process of beginning a coherent nuclear program

and France wants to associate herself with that effort in the field of

reactors. " France sold two reactors to Iraq, with the agreement signed

during Hussein's visit. The Iraqis purchased a 70-megawatt reactor,

along with six charges of 26 points of uranium enriched to 93 percent --

in other words, enough weapons-grade uranium to produce three to four

nuclear devices. Baghdad also purchased a one-megawatt research reactor,

and France agreed to train 600 Iraqi nuclear technicians and scientists

-- the core of Iraq's nuclear capability today.

 

Other dimensions of the relationship were decided on during this visit

and implemented in the months afterward. France agreed to sell Iraq

$1.5 billion worth of weapons -- including the integrated air defense

system that was destroyed by the United States in 1991, about 60 Mirage

F1 fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles and advanced electronics. The

Iraqis, for their part, agreed to sell France $70 million worth of oil.

 

During this period, Chirac and Hussein formed what Chirac called a close

personal relationship. As the New York Times put it in a 1986 report

about Chirac's attempt to return to the premiership, the French official

" has said many times that he is a personal friend of Saddam Hussein of

Iraq. " In 1987, the Manchester Guardian Weekly quoted Chirac as saying

that he was " truly fascinated by Saddam Hussein since 1974. " Whatever

personal chemistry there might have been between the two leaders

obviously remained in place a decade later, and clearly was not simply

linked to the deals of 1974-75. Politicians and businessmen move on;

they don't linger the way Chirac did.

 

Partly because of the breadth of the relationship Chirac and Hussein had

created in a relatively short period of time and the obvious warmth of

their personal ties, there was intense speculation about the less

visible aspects of the relationship. For example, one unsubstantiated

rumor that still can be heard in places like Beirut was that Hussein

helped to finance Chirac's run for mayor of Paris in 1977, after he lost

the French premiership. Another, equally unsubstantiated rumor was that

Hussein had skimmed funds from the huge amounts of money that were being

moved around, and that he did so with Chirac's full knowledge. There

are endless rumors, all unproven and perhaps all scurrilous, about the

relationship. Some of these might have been moved by malice, but they

also are powered by the unfathomability of the relationship and by

Chirac's willingness to publicly affirm it. It reached the point that

Iranians referred to Chirac as " Shah-Iraq " and Israelis spoke of the

Osirak reactor as " O-Chirac. "

 

Indeed, as recently as last week, a Stratfor source in Lebanon

reasserted these claims as if they were incontestable. Innuendo has

become reality.

 

Former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who held office at the

time of the negotiations with Iraq, said in 1984 that the deal " came out

of an agreement that was not negotiated in Paris and therefore did not

originate with the president of the republic. " Under the odd French

constitution, it is conceivable that the president of the republic

wouldn't know what the premier of France had negotiated -- but on a deal

of this scale, this would be unlikely, unless the deal in fact had been

negotiated between Chirac and Hussein in the dark and presented as a

fait accompli.

 

There is some evidence for this notion. Earlier, when Giscard d'Estaing

found out about the deal - and particularly about the sale of 93 percent

uranium - he had ordered the French nuclear research facility at Saclay

to develop an alternative that would take care of Iraq's legitimate

needs, but without supplying weapons-grade uranium. The product, called

" caramel, " was only 3 percent enriched but entirely suitable to

non-weapons needs. The French made the offer, which Iraq declined.

 

By 1986, Chirac clearly had decided to change his image. In preparation

for the 1988 presidential elections, Chirac let it be known that he

never had anything to do with the sale of the Osirak reactor. In an

interview with an Israeli newspaper, he said, " It wasn't me who

negotiated the construction of Osirak with Baghdad. The negotiation was

led by my minister of industry in very close collaboration with Giscard

d'Estaing. " He went on to say, " I never took part in these negotiations.

I never discussed the subject with Saddam Hussein. The fact is that I

did not find out about the affair until very late. "

 

Obviously, Chirac was contradicting what he had said publicly in 1975.

More to the point, he also was not making a great deal of sense in

claiming that his minister of industry -- who at that time was Michel

d'Ornano -- had negotiated a deal as large as this one. That is true

even if one assumes the absurd, which was that the nuclear deal was a

stand-alone and not linked to the arms and oil deals or to a broader

strategic relationship. In fact, d'Ornano claimed that he didn't even

make the trip to Iraq with Chirac in 1974, let alone act as the prime

negotiator. Everything he did was in conjunction with Chirac.

 

In 1981, the Israelis destroyed the Iraqi reactor in an air attack.

There were rumors - which were denied - that the French government was

offering to rebuild the reactor. In August 1987, French satirical and

muckraking magazine, " Le Canard Enchaine " published excerpts of a letter

from Chirac to Hussein - dated June 24, 1987, and hand-delivered by

Trade Minister Michel Noir - which the magazine claimed indicated that

he was negotiating to rebuild the Iraqi reactor. The letter says nothing

about nuclear reactors, but it does say that Chirac hopes for an

agreement " on the negotiation which you know about, " and it speaks of

the " cooperation launched more than 12 years ago under our personal

joint initiative, in this capital district for the sovereignty,

independence and security of your country. " In the letter, Chirac also,

once again, referred to Hussein as " my dear friend. "

 

Chirac and the government confirmed that the letter was genuine. They

denied that it referred to rebuilding a nuclear reactor. The letter

speaks merely of the agreements relating to " an essential chapter in

Franco-Iraqi relations, both in the present circumstances and in the

future. " Chirac claimed that any attempt to link the letter to the

reconstruction of the nuclear facility was a " ridiculous invention. "

Assuming Chirac's sincerity, this leaves open the question of what the

" essential chapter " refers to and why, instead of specifying the

subject, Chirac resorted to a circumlocution like " negotiation which you

know about. "

 

Only two possible conclusions can be drawn from this letter: Chirac

either was trying, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war and after his

denial of involvement in the first place, to rebuild Iraq's nuclear

capability, or he wasn't. And if he wasn't, what was he doing that

required such complex language, clearly intended for deniability if

revealed? No ordinary state-to-state relationship would require a

combination of affection, recollection of long history and promise for

the future without mentioning the subject. If we concede to Chirac that

it had nothing to do with nuclear reactors, then the mystery actually

deepens.

 

It is unfair to tag Chirac with the rumors that have trailed him in his

relations with Hussein. It is fair to say, however, that Chirac has

created a circumstance for breeding rumors. The issues raised here were

all well known at one time and place. When they are laid end-to-end, a

mystery arises. What affair was being discussed in the letter delivered

by Michel Noir? If not nuclear reactors, then what was referenced but

never mentioned specifically in Chirac's letter to his " dear friend "

Hussein?

 

Whatever the answer, it is clear that the relationship between Chirac

and Hussein is long and complex, and not altogether easy to understand.

That relationship does not, by itself, explain all of France's policies

toward Iraq or its stance toward a war between the United States and

Iraq. But at the same time, it is inconceivable that this relationship

has no effect on Chirac's personal decision-making process. There is an

intensity to Chirac's Iraq policy that may simply signify the remnants

of an old, warm friendship gone bad, or that may have a different

origin. In any case, it is a reality that cannot be ignored and that

must be taken into account in understanding the French leader's

behavior.