'Denial' lays war blame at White House door (book review)

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" Denial' lays war blame at White House door

 

By Chuck Leddy, Globe Correspondent  |  October 3, 2006

 

Bob Woodward's behind-the-scenes study of the Bush White House and its

Iraq war policy dramatically critiques the administration for a lack of

strategic thinking, and for the substitution of optimism for planning.

The book meticulously lists how dearly strategic failures by the

administration have cost the United States in Iraq. Based on interviews

with President Bush's national security team, ``State of Denial " is

brimming with vivid details about White House meetings, critical phone

calls, intelligence reports, and military affairs.

 

For instance, Woodward describes a March 2004 trip to Iraq by senior

director for defense Frank Miller, who had been asked by his boss, then-

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, to find out what was really

happening there.

 

Miller rode around Baghdad with the 1st Armored Division and was

impressed by the sight of countless Iraqi children eagerly giving the

passing American troops the thumbs-up sign. What Miller didn't realize

at the time, writes Woodward, was that ``in Iraq the thumbs-up sign

traditionally was the equivalent of the American middle-finger salute. "

In April 2006, when Rice herself secretly arrived in Baghdad under heavy

guard, wearing body armor and a helmet, her senior assistant

sarcastically remarked, invoking Vice President Dick Cheney, ``Don´t

worry, we´re going to be greeted with flowers and sweets. "

 

According to Woodward, who earlier wrote two generally positive books

about the administration, what went wrong was that the planning for

postwar Iraq was based on faulty assumptions. Woodward describes a Feb.

28, 2003, White House meeting, three weeks before the invasion, where

the outline for postwar Iraq was discussed. General Jay Garner, in

charge of implementing the plans, admitted to Bush that he´d be unable

to complete four of his nine major assignments. In the face of this

shocking admission, writes Woodward, the president simply nodded and

moved on: ``No one asked the follow-up question of exactly who would be

responsible if Garner wasn´t, " writes Woodward. Days before the

invasion, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld apologized to Garner for not

being more involved with planning for the postwar era.

Garner had his team selected for rebuilding the Iraqi government, but

Rumsfeld had other ideas: ``I´m really uncomfortable with all these

people you have running the ministries. I think they all should be from

DOD, " the Department of Defense. Garner objected to Pentagon people

running, say, Iraq´s Ministry of Education, but Rumsfeld persisted.

 

Throughout Woodward´s account, Rumsfeld comes across as a

micromanaging, power-hungry bully who simply ``rode roughshod over

people, " especially Pentagon subordinates. One harried general

summarized working with Rumsfeld: ``If you can´t stand it . . . You

can retire. " Paul Bremer, who replaced Garner in May 2003, told a

colleague that ``Rumsfeld´s impossible to deal with. "

 

The Bush security team, as described by Woodward, was riddled with

interagency mistrust. At one point Rumsfeld stopped returning Rice's

telephone calls. Rice and former CIA director George Tenet blamed each

other for intelligence failures prior to 9/11. Tenet cited a July 10,

2001, meeting during which he warned Rice of a planned Al Qaeda attack

somewhere inside the United States. Rice did nothing about the warning,

according to Tenet.

 

At critical times, regarding postwar strategy for Iraq and possible

weapons of mass destruction, for example, the president simply failed to

ask basic questions that might have led to better policymaking, writes

Woodward. Bush's certainty remained unimpeded, despite the troublesome

facts. He told one group of congressional Republicans that ``We´re not

leaving [iraq] if Laura and Barney [bush´s Scottish terrier] are the

only ones who support me. "

 

Woodward's impressively detailed and eye-opening revelations about the

Bush administration 's handling of the Iraq war and its aftermath are

meeting with some of the same ``denials " referenced in the book´s

title. ``With all of Bush´s upbeat talk and optimism, " Woodward

writes, ``he had not told the American public the truth about what Iraq

had become. "

 

© Copyright 2006 Globe Newspaper Company.