Revealed: the lax laws that could allow assembly of deadly virus DNA

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" Zepp " <zepp

Tue, 13 Jun 2006 18:54:27 -0700

[Zepps_News] #Revealed: the lax laws that could allow

assembly of deadly virus DNA

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1797057,00.html

 

Revealed: the lax laws that could allow assembly of deadly virus DNA

 

Urgent calls for regulation after Guardian buys part of smallpox genome

through mail order

 

James Randerson, science correspondent

Wednesday June 14, 2006

The Guardian

 

A phial containing an incomplete sequence of smallpox DNA, obtained by

the Guardian over the internet

A phial containing an incomplete sequence of smallpox DNA, obtained by

the Guardian over the internet. Photo: Martin Argles

 

 

DNA sequences from some of the most deadly pathogens known to man can

be

bought over the internet, the Guardian has discovered.

 

In an investigation which shows the ease with which terrorist

organisations could obtain the basic ingredients of biological weapons,

this newspaper obtained a short sequence of smallpox DNA. The deadly

virus has existed only in laboratories since being eradicated from the

world's population 30 years ago.

 

The DNA sequence of smallpox, as well as other potentially dangerous

pathogens such as poliovirus and 1918 flu are freely available in

online

public databases. So to build a virus from scratch, a terrorist would

simply order consecutive lengths of DNA along the sequence and glue

them

together in the correct order. This is beyond the skills and equipment

of the kitchen chemist, but could be achieved by a well-funded

terrorist

with access to a basic lab and PhD-level personnel.

 

One study estimated that because most people on the planet have no

resistance to the extinct virus, an initial release which infected just

10 people would spread to 2.2 million people in 180 days.

 

The DNA sample we ordered had, at our request, three small

modifications

to render it harmless before it was sent by post to a residential

address in London. The company has since conceded that it was not aware

it was sending out a sequence of modified smallpox DNA.

 

There are legitimate reasons for researchers to buy lengths of DNA from

pathogens, for example in developing treatments or vaccines against

them. However, because this industry is so new and unregulated,

companies are selling custom-made DNA without making thorough checks on

the identities of the people who are placing the orders or what the

sequences are.

 

Of the four main companies operating in the UK, none currently screens

all their DNA orders. There are 39 companies operating in North America

and not all screen their orders.

 

" This is the most disturbing story I have heard for some time, " said

Phil Willis MP, chairman of the parliamentary science and technology

committee. " There is clearly a massive loophole which needs to be dealt

with by regulation or legislation. "

 

Alistair Hay, who is an expert on biological and chemical weapons at

the

University of Leeds and who advises the government and police, said he

was concerned that the company was prepared to supply the DNA to a

residential address. " I am surprised that it was so easy, " he said.

 

" I think for any company offering [DNA] sequences there is a need to

have some screens in place for sequences that may be suspect, " added

Prof Hay.

 

" This is a new field and the regulations haven't really caught up with

the technology yet, " said Robert Jones at Craic Computing in Seattle, a

company that makes software which some DNA synthesis companies use to

screen their orders for potentially dangerous sequences.

 

The potential to manufacture viruses from scratch first came to light

in

2002 when US researchers pieced together the genome of the polio virus

using short sequences of DNA around 70 letters long. And last year,

another team recreated the 1918 flu virus, a devastating and now

extinct

strain that killed an estimated 50 million people, more people than the

first world war.

 

Building smallpox using the same technique as scientists used to make

polio and 1918 influenza would be technically difficult because the

virus is larger - the smallpox genome is 185,000 letters long, the

influenza genome is 13,500 letters and polio is 7,741 letters. But as

techniques improve there is no theoretical reason why it could not be

done.

 

Craig Venter, the US entrepreneur famous for sequencing the human

genome, announced in 2003 that his team had constructed the virus phage

PhiX174 in two weeks. This has a genome 5,386 letters long. He is

currently working on making a bacterium Mycoplasma genitalium from

scratch which has a genome around twice as large as smallpox.

 

The Guardian placed an order online with VH Bio Ltd, a company in

Gateshead, Tyne and Wear, that supplies equipment and chemicals used in

standard molecular biology labs. We used an invented company name along

with just a mobile telephone number and free email address.

 

VH Bio Ltd rang to check whether the address provided was a residential

address. The journalist told VH Bio Ltd that our company was in the

process of moving offices and so wanted to make sure the order arrived.

 

The package, which contained a 78-letter sequence of DNA, which is part

of one of the smallpox virus's coat protein genes, was delivered by the

Royal Mail to a flat in north London. The A5-sized Jiffy bag contained

a

small plastic phial with a tiny blob of white gel at the bottom - the

DNA. The order cost £33.08, plus an additional £7 for postage.

 

Alan Volkers, chairman of VH Bio Ltd said the company had no idea that

the sequence they produced was a modified sequence of smallpox DNA.

 

He added that many of its regular customers carry out research which

requires supplies of DNA sequences from pathogenic organisms, and his

company does not normally screen DNA orders less than 100 letters long.

After discovering that it had supplied a small sequence of smallpox

DNA,

the company carried out checks on two European databases and a

30-minute

check using scanning software, but none of them raised any alert.

 

Dr Volkers added that the company processes several hundred

short-sequence orders per day and added: " It would be impossible to run

them all through [standard scanning software] and operate

successfully. "

 

" There are no regulations in place which require us to carry out

background checks on potential customers, " he said. " We will, of

course,

comply with any regulations which are introduced. "

 

Before beginning the investigation, the Guardian obtained advice from

four independent scientists, including an international expert on pox

viruses, the family to which smallpox belongs. They told us the order

would be safe to produce, transport and receive.

 

Without modifications to the sequence, it could potentially fall foul

of

the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. This lists so-called

Schedule 5 pathogens and toxins which are illegal to keep or use

without

first notifying the authorities. Also covered by the act is DNA

" associated with the pathogenicity " of the organisms on the same list.

 

In order to avoid our sequence coming under the act the DNA sequence we

ordered had three changes built into it to create so-called " stop

codons " .

 

These are effectively full stops in the genetic code which mean that if

the sequence were ever put together with others to make a smallpox gene

the protein production machinery would stop at that point. So the

sequence could never form part of a functional gene.

 

In making and receiving the order neither we, nor VH Bio Ltd, have

broken the law, but the most widely used software (called Blackwatch)

for screening DNA orders for potential bioterror agents picked out our

sequence as suspicious in a scan run by Craic Computing. This is

because

it looks for sequences of DNA letters close to sequences from dangerous

organisms.

 

 

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