Why It's Over For America

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http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0530-20.htm

 

Published on Tuesday, May 30, 2006 by the Independent / UK

Why It's Over For America

by Noam Chomsky

An inability to protect its citizens. The belief that it is above the

law. A lack of democracy. Three defining characteristics of the 'failed state'.

And that, says Noam Chomsky, is exactly what the US is becoming. In an exclusive

extract from his devastating new book, " Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the

Assault on Democracy, " America's leading thinker explains how his country lost

its way.

The selection of issues that should rank high on the agenda of concern for human

welfare and rights is, naturally, a subjective matter. But there are a few

choices that seem unavoidable, because they bear so directly on the prospects

for decent survival. Among them are at least these three: nuclear war,

environmental disaster, and the fact that the government of the world's leading

power is acting in ways that increase the likelihood of these catastrophes. It

is important to stress the government, because the population, not surprisingly,

does not agree. That brings up a fourth issue that should deeply concern

Americans, and the world: the sharp divide between public opinion and public

policy, one of the reasons for the fear, which cannot casually be put aside,

that, as Gar Alperowitz puts it in America Beyond Capitalism, " the American

'system' as a whole is in real trouble - that it is heading in a direction that

spells the end of its historic values [of] equality,

liberty, and meaningful democracy. "

The " system " is coming to have some of the features of failed states, to adopt a

currently fashionable notion that is conventionally applied to states regarded

as potential threats to our security (like Iraq) or as needing our intervention

to rescue the population from severe internal threats (like Haiti). Though the

concept is recognized to be, according to the journal Foreign Affairs,

" frustratingly imprecise, " some of the primary characteristics of failed states

can be identified. One is their inability or unwillingness to protect their

citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction. Another is their tendency

to regard themselves as beyond the reach of domestic or international law, and

hence free to carry out aggression and violence. And if they have democratic

forms, they suffer from a serious " democratic deficit " that deprives their

formal democratic institutions of real substance.

Among the hardest tasks that anyone can undertake, and one of the most

important, is to look honestly in the mirror. If we allow ourselves to do so, we

should have little difficulty in finding the characteristics of " failed states "

right at home.

No one familiar with history should be surprised that the growing democratic

deficit in the United States is accompanied by declaration of messianic missions

to bring democracy to a suffering world. Declarations of noble intent by systems

of power are rarely complete fabrication, and the same is true in this case.

Under some conditions, forms of democracy are indeed acceptable. Abroad, as the

leading scholar-advocate of " democracy promotion " concludes, we find a " strong

line of continuity " : democracy is acceptable if and only if it is consistent

with strategic and economic interests (Thomas Carothers). In modified form, the

doctrine holds at home as well.

The basic dilemma facing policymakers is sometimes candidly recognized at the

dovish liberal extreme of the spectrum, for example, by Robert Pastor, President

Carter's national security adviser for Latin America. He explained why the

administration had to support the murderous and corrupt Somoza regime in

Nicaragua, and, when that proved impossible, to try at least to maintain the

US-trained National Guard even as it was massacring the population " with a

brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy, " killing some 40,000 people.

The reason was the familiar one: " The United States did not want to control

Nicaragua or the other nations of the region, but it also did not want

developments to get out of control. It wanted Nicaraguans to act independently,

except when doing so would affect US interests adversely. "

Similar dilemmas faced Bush administration planners after their invasion of

Iraq. They want Iraqis " to act independently, except when doing so would affect

US interests adversely. " Iraq must therefore be sovereign and democratic, but

within limits. It must somehow be constructed as an obedient client state, much

in the manner of the traditional order in Central America. At a general level,

the pattern is familiar, reaching to the opposite extreme of institutional

structures. The Kremlin was able to maintain satellites that were run by

domestic political and military forces, with the iron fist poised. Germany was

able to do much the same in occupied Europe even while it was at war, as did

fascist Japan in Man-churia (its Manchukuo). Fascist Italy achieved similar

results in North Africa while carrying out virtual genocide that in no way

harmed its favorable image in the West and possibly inspired Hitler. Traditional

imperial and neocolonial systems illustrate many variations

on similar themes.

To achieve the traditional goals in Iraq has proven to be surprisingly

difficult, despite unusually favorable circumstances. The dilemma of combining a

measure of independence with firm control arose in a stark form not long after

the invasion, as mass non-violent resistance compelled the invaders to accept

far more Iraqi initiative than they had anticipated. The outcome even evoked the

nightmarish prospect of a more or less democratic and sovereign Iraq taking its

place in a loose Shiite alliance comprising Iran, Shiite Iraq, and possibly the

nearby Shiite-dominated regions of Saudi Arabia, controlling most of the world's

oil and independent of Washington.

The situation could get worse. Iran might give up on hopes that Europe could

become independent of the United States, and turn eastward. Highly relevant

background is discussed by Selig Harrison, a leading specialist on these topics.

" The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the European Union were based on a

bargain that the EU, held back by the US, has failed to honor, " Harrison

observes.

" The bargain was that Iran would suspend uranium enrichment, and the EU would

undertake security guarantees. The language of the joint declaration was

" unambiguous. 'A mutually acceptable agreement,' it said, would not only provide

'objective guarantees' that Iran's nuclear program is 'exclusively for peaceful

purposes' but would 'equally provide firm commitments on security issues.' "

The phrase " security issues " is a thinly veiled reference to the threats by the

United States and Israel to bomb Iran, and preparations to do so. The model

regularly adduced is Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, which

appears to have initiated Saddam's nuclear weapons programs, another

demonstration that violence tends to elicit violence. Any attempt to execute

similar plans against Iran could lead to immediate violence, as is surely

understood in Washington. During a visit to Tehran, the influential Shiite

cleric Muqtada al-Sadr warned that his militia would defend Iran in the case of

any attack, " one of the strongest signs yet, " the Washington Post reported,

" that Iraq could become a battleground in any Western conflict with Iran,

raising the spectre of Iraqi Shiite militias - or perhaps even the US-trained

Shiite-dominated military - taking on American troops here in sympathy with

Iran. " The Sadrist bloc, which registered substantial gains in the December

2005 elections, may soon become the most powerful single political force in

Iraq. It is consciously pursuing the model of other successful Islamist groups,

such as Hamas in Palestine, combining strong resistance to military occupation

with grassroots social organizing and service to the poor.

Washington's unwillingness to allow regional security issues to be considered is

nothing new. It has also arisen repeatedly in the confrontation with Iraq. In

the background is the matter of Israeli nuclear weapons, a topic that Washington

bars from international consideration. Beyond that lurks what Harrison rightly

describes as " the central problem facing the global non-proliferation regime " :

the failure of the nuclear states to live up to their nuclear Non Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) obligation " to phase out their own nuclear weapons " - and, in

Washington's case, formal rejection of the obligation.

Unlike Europe, China refuses to be intimidated by Washington, a primary reason

for the growing fear of China on the part of US planners. Much of Iran's oil

already goes to China, and China is providing Iran with weapons, presumably

considered a deterrent to US threats. Still more uncomfortable for Washington is

the fact that, according to the Financial Times, " the Sino-Saudi relationship

has developed dramatically, " including Chinese military aid to Saudi Arabia and

gas exploration rights for China. By 2005, Saudi Arabia provided about 17 per

cent of China's oil imports. Chinese and Saudi oil companies have signed deals

for drilling and construction of a huge refinery (with Exxon Mobil as a

partner). A January 2006 visit by Saudi king Abdullah to Beijing was expected to

lead to a Sino-Saudi memorandum of understanding calling for " increased

cooperation and investment between the two countries in oil, natural gas, and

minerals. "

Indian analyst Aijaz Ahmad observes that Iran could " emerge as the virtual

linchpin in the making, over the next decade or so, of what China and Russia

have come to regard as an absolutely indispensable Asian Energy Security Grid,

for breaking Western control of the world's energy supplies and securing the

great industrial revolution of Asia. " South Korea and southeast Asian countries

are likely to join, possibly Japan as well. A crucial question is how India will

react. It rejected US pressures to withdraw from an oil pipeline deal with Iran.

On the other hand, India joined the United States and the EU in voting for an

anti-Iranian resolution at the IAEA, joining also in their hypocrisy, since

India rejects the NPT regime to which Iran, so far, appears to be largely

conforming. Ahmad reports that India may have secretly reversed its stand under

Iranian threats to terminate a $20bn gas deal. Washington later warned India

that its " nuclear deal with the US could be ditched "

if India did not go along with US demands, eliciting a sharp rejoinder from the

Indian foreign ministry and an evasive tempering of the warning by the US

embassy.

The prospect that Europe and Asia might move toward greater independence has

seriously troubled US planners since World War II, and concerns have

significantly increased as the tripolar order has continued to evolve, along

with new south-south interactions and rapidly growing EU engagement with China.

US intelligence has projected that the United States, while controlling Middle

East oil for the traditional reasons, will itself rely mainly on more stable

Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa, western hemisphere). Control of Middle

East oil is now far from a sure thing, and these expectations are also

threatened by developments in the western hemisphere, accelerated by Bush

administration policies that have left the United States remarkably isolated in

the global arena. The Bush administration has even succeeded in alienating

Canada, an impressive feat.

Canada's minister of natural resources said that within a few years one quarter

of the oil that Canada now sends to the United States may go to China instead.

In a further blow to Washington's energy policies, the leading oil exporter in

the hemisphere, Venezuela, has forged probably the closest relations with China

of any Latin American country, and is planning to sell increasing amounts of oil

to China as part of its effort to reduce dependence on the openly hostile US

government. Latin America as a whole is increasing trade and other relations

with China, with some setbacks, but likely expansion, in particular for raw

materials exporters like Brazil and Chile.

Meanwhile, Cuba-Venezuela relations are becoming very close, each relying on its

comparative advantage. Venezuela is providing low-cost oil while in return Cuba

organizes literacy and health programs, sending thousands of highly skilled

professionals, teachers, and doctors, who work in the poorest and most neglected

areas, as they do elsewhere in the Third World. Cuba-Venezuela projects are

extending to the Caribbean countries, where Cuban doctors are providing

healthcare to thousands of people with Venezuelan funding. Operation Miracle, as

it is called, is described by Jamaica's ambassador to Cuba as " an example of

integration and south-south cooperation " , and is generating great enthusiasm

among the poor majority. Cuban medical assistance is also being welcomed

elsewhere. One of the most horrendous tragedies of recent years was the October

2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In addition to the huge toll, unknown numbers of

survivors have to face brutal winter weather with little

shelter, food, or medical assistance. One has to turn to the South Asian press

to read that " Cuba has provided the largest contingent of doctors and paramedics

to Pakistan, " paying all the costs (perhaps with Venezuelan funding), and that

President Musharraf expressed his " deep gratitude " for the " spirit and

compassion " of the Cuban medical teams.

Some analysts have suggested that Cuba and Venezuela might even unite, a step

towards further integration of Latin America in a bloc that is more independent

from the United States. Venezuela has joined Mercosur, the South American

customs union, a move described by Argentine president Nestor Kirchner as " a

milestone " in the development of this trading bloc, and welcomed as opening " a

new chapter in our integration " by Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da

Silva. Independent experts say that " adding Venezuela to the bloc furthers its

geopolitical vision of eventually spreading Mercosur to the rest of the region. "

At a meeting to mark Venezuela's entry into Mercosur, Venezuelan president Hugo

Chavez said, " We cannot allow this to be purely an economic project, one for the

elites and for the transnational companies, " a not very oblique reference to the

US-sponsored " Free Trade Agreement for the Americas, " which has aroused strong

public opposition. Venezuela also supplied Argentina with fuel oil to help stave

off an energy crisis, and bought almost a third of Argentine debt issued in

2005, one element of a region-wide effort to free the countries from the control

of the US-dominated IMF after two decades of disastrous effects of conformity to

its rules. The IMF has " acted towards our country as a promoter and a vehicle of

policies that caused poverty and pain among the Argentine people, " President

Kirchner said in announcing his decision to pay almost $1 trillion to rid itself

of the IMF forever. Radically violating IMF rules, Argentina enjoyed a

substantial recovery from the disaster

left by IMF policies.

Steps toward independent regional integration advanced further with the election

of Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2005, the first president from the

indigenous majority. Morales moved quickly to reach energy accords with

Venezuela.

Though Central America was largely disciplined by Reaganite violence and terror,

the rest of the hemisphere is falling out of control, particularly from

Venezuela to Argentina, which was the poster child of the IMF and the Treasury

Department until its economy collapsed under the policies they imposed. Much of

the region has left-center governments. The indigenous populations have become

much more active and influential, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, both

major energy producers, where they either want oil and gas to be domestically

controlled or, in some cases, oppose production altogether. Many indigenous

people apparently do not see any reason why their lives, societies, and cultures

should be disrupted or destroyed so that New Yorkers can sit in SUVs in traffic

gridlock. Some are even calling for an " Indian nation " in South America.

Meanwhile the economic integration that is under way is reversing patterns that

trace back to the Spanish conquests, with Latin

American elites and economies linked to the imperial powers but not to one

another. Along with growing south-south interaction on a broader scale, these

developments are strongly influenced by popular organizations that are coming

together in the unprecedented international global justice movements,

ludicrously called " anti-globalization " because they favor globalization that

privileges the interests of people, not investors and financial institutions.

For many reasons, the system of US global dominance is fragile, even apart from

the damage inflicted by Bush planners.

One consequence is that the Bush administration's pursuit of the traditional

policies of deterring democracy faces new obstacles. It is no longer as easy as

before to resort to military coups and international terrorism to overthrow

democratically elected governments, as Bush planners learnt ruefully in 2002 in

Venezuela. The " strong line of continuity " must be pursued in other ways, for

the most part. In Iraq, as we have seen, mass nonviolent resistance compelled

Washington and London to permit the elections they had sought to evade. The

subsequent effort to subvert the elections by providing substantial advantages

to the administration's favorite candidate, and expelling the independent media,

also failed. Washington faces further problems. The Iraqi labor movement is

making considerable progress despite the opposition of the occupation

authorities. The situation is rather like Europe and Japan after World War II,

when a primary goal of the United States and United

Kingdom was to undermine independent labor movements - as at home, for similar

reasons: organized labor contributes in essential ways to functioning democracy

with popular engagement. Many of the measures adopted at that time - withholding

food, supporting fascist police - are no longer available. Nor is it possible

today to rely on the labor bureaucracy of the American Institute for Free Labor

Development to help undermine unions. Today, some American unions are supporting

Iraqi workers, just as they do in Colombia, where more union activists are

murdered than anywhere in the world. At least the unions now receive support

from the United Steelworkers of America and others, while Washington continues

to provide enormous funding for the government, which bears a large part of the

responsibility.

The problem of elections arose in Palestine much in the way it did in Iraq. As

already discussed, the Bush administration refused to permit elections until the

death of Yasser Arafat, aware that the wrong man would win. After his death, the

administration agreed to permit elections, expecting the victory of its favored

Palestinian Authority candidates. To promote this outcome, Washington resorted

to much the same modes of subversion as in Iraq, and often before. Washington

used the US Agency for International Development as an " invisible conduit " in an

effort to " increase the popularity of the Palestinian Authority on the eve of

crucial elections in which the governing party faces a serious challenge from

the radical Islamic group Hamas " (Washington Post), spending almost $2m " on

dozens of quick projects before elections this week to bolster the governing

Fatah faction's image with voters " (New York Times). In the United States, or

any Western country, even a hint of such

foreign interference would destroy a candidate, but deeply rooted imperial

mentality legitimates such routine measures elsewhere. However, the attempt to

subvert the elections again resoundingly failed.

The US and Israeli governments now have to adjust to dealing somehow with a

radical Islamic party that approaches their traditional rejectionist stance,

though not entirely, at least if Hamas really does mean to agree to an

indefinite truce on the international border as its leaders state. The US and

Israel, in contrast, insist that Israel must take over substantial parts of the

West Bank (and the forgotten Golan Heights). Hamas's refusal to accept Israel's

" right to exist " mirrors the refusal of Washington and Jerusalem to accept

Palestine's " right to exist " - a concept unknown in international affairs;

Mexico accepts the existence of the United States but not its abstract " right to

exist " on almost half of Mexico, acquired by conquest. Hamas's formal commitment

to " destroy Israel " places it on a par with the United States and Israel, which

vowed formally that there could be no " additional Palestinian state " (in

addition to Jordan) until they relaxed their extreme

rejectionist stand partially in the past few years, in the manner already

reviewed. Although Hamas has not said so, it would come as no great surprise if

Hamas were to agree that Jews may remain in scattered areas in the present

Israel, while Palestine constructs huge settlement and infrastructure projects

to take over the valuable land and resources, effectively breaking Israel up

into unviable cantons, virtually separated from one another and from some small

part of Jerusalem where Jews would also be allowed to remain. And they might

agree to call the fragments " a state. " If such proposals were made, we would -

rightly - regard them as virtually a reversion to Nazism, a fact that might

elicit some thoughts. If such proposals were made, Hamas's position would be

essentially like that of the United States and Israel for the past five years,

after they came to tolerate some impoverished form of " statehood. " It is fair to

describe Hamas as radical, extremist, and violent,

and as a serious threat to peace and a just political settlement. But the

organization is hardly alone in this stance.

Elsewhere traditional means of undermining democracy have succeeded. In Haiti,

the Bush administration's favorite " democracy-building group, the International

Republican Institute, " worked assiduously to promote the opposition to President

Aristide, helped by the withholding of desperately needed aid on grounds that

were dubious at best. When it seemed that Aristide would probably win any

genuine election, Washington and the opposition chose to withdraw, a standard

device to discredit elections that are going to come out the wrong way:

Nicaragua in 1984 and Venezuela in December 2005 are examples that should be

familiar. Then followed a military coup, expulsion of the president, and a reign

of terror and violence vastly exceeding anything under the elected government.

The persistence of the strong line of continuity to the present again reveals

that the United States is very much like other powerful states. It pursues the

strategic and economic interests of dominant sectors of the domestic population,

to the accompaniment of rhetorical flourishes about its dedication to the

highest values. That is practically a historical universal, and the reason why

sensible people pay scant attention to declarations of noble intent by leaders,

or accolades by their followers.

One commonly hears that carping critics complain about what is wrong, but do not

present solutions. There is an accurate translation for that charge: " They

present solutions, but I don't like them. " In addition to the proposals that

should be familiar about dealing with the crises that reach to the level of

survival, a few simple suggestions for the United States have already been

mentioned: 1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and

the World Court; 2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols; 3) let the UN

take the lead in international crises; 4) rely on diplomatic and economic

measures rather than military ones in confronting terror; 5) keep to the

traditional interpretation of the UN Charter; 6) give up the Security Council

veto and have " a decent respect for the opinion of mankind, " as the Declaration

of Independence advises, even if power centers disagree; 7) cut back sharply on

military spending and sharply increase social spending. For

people who believe in democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they

appear to be the opinions of the majority of the US population, in most cases

the overwhelming majority. They are in radical opposition to public policy. To

be sure, we cannot be very confident about the state of public opinion on such

matters because of another feature of the democratic deficit: the topics

scarcely enter into public discussion and the basic facts are little known. In a

highly atomized society, the public is therefore largely deprived of the

opportunity to form considered opinions.

Another conservative suggestion is that facts, logic, and elementary moral

principles should matter. Those who take the trouble to adhere to that

suggestion will soon be led to abandon a good part of familiar doctrine, though

it is surely much easier to repeat self-serving mantras. Such simple truths

carry us some distance toward developing more specific and detailed answers.

More important, they open the way to implement them, opportunities that are

readily within our grasp if we can free ourselves from the shackles of doctrine

and imposed illusion.

Though it is natural for doctrinal systems to seek to induce pessimism,

hopelessness, and despair, reality is different. There has been substantial

progress in the unending quest for justice and freedom in recent years, leaving

a legacy that can be carried forward from a higher plane than before.

Opportunities for education and organizing abound. As in the past, rights are

not likely to be granted by benevolent authorities, or won by intermittent

actions - attending a few demonstrations or pushing a lever in the personalized

quadrennial extravaganzas that are depicted as " democratic politics. " As always

in the past, the tasks require dedicated day-by-day engagement to create - in

part recreate - the basis for a functioning democratic culture in which the

public plays some role in determining policies, not only in the political arena,

from which it is largely excluded, but also in the crucial economic arena, from

which it is excluded in principle. There are many ways to

promote democracy at home, carrying it to new dimensions. Opportunities are

ample, and failure to grasp them is likely to have ominous repercussions: for

the country, for the world, and for future generations.

Noam Chomsky, the eminent intellectual and author, is a professor of

linguistics and philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in

Cambridge, Massachusetts.

© 2006 Independent News and Media Limited

 

 

 

" To be nobody-but-myself in a world which is doing its best, night and day, to

make me everybody else - means to fight the hardest battle which any human being

can fight, and never stop fighting. " -e.e. cummings-