Uranium weapons cover-ups--a crime against humainity

[Guest guest]

UnegaUnutsiGule

Fri, 12 May 2006 16:03:48 -0500

[Air_America_Radio] Re: [deadlyDUST] Uranium weapons

cover-ups--a crime against humainity

 

 

 

 

Cross posted from: deadlyDUST

 

deadlyDUST-

 

 

 

 

http://www.idust.net/Docs/Parker01.htm

 

Uranium Weapons Cover-ups- a Crime against Humankind

 

By Piotr Bein, Ph.D., M.A.Sc., P.Eng.,

Karen Parker, J.D., Diplome (Strasbourg)

 

Paper prepared in January 2003, for a monograph Politics and

Environmental Policy in the 21st Century, Faculty of Political

Sciences, University of Belgrade

 

 

Abstract:

Munitions that contain low-grade uranium 235 - insufficient to

trigger nuclear explosion - are chemical-radiological weapons. They

contain other toxic-radioactive elements and have indiscriminate

effects. They are illegal by virtue of international conventions, laws

and customs of war. When used in populated areas or in the presence of

numerous troops (enemy or friendly), they become weapons of delayed but

mass destruction (WMD). Fatal consequences of depleted uranium (DU)

armour-piercing ammunition emerged in veterans and civilians after wars

in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

While the victims remain neglected, hundreds of tons of uranium from

weapons developed in recent years against hard and buried targets have

polluted Afghanistan. Up-coming war scenarios involve larger

chemical-radiological contamination potential. The military,

governments, and nuclear and weapon industries fail to or inadequately

disclose the effects of uranium weapons, and manipulate inquiries of

international health organizations.

The media act as a propaganda outlet for these groups. The purpose of

Information Operations behind the propaganda is to influence perceptions

and actions of foreign and domestic public, governments, and

intelligence. A spiraling group self-deception perpetuates the

propaganda for fear of liability and criminal responsibility. Covering

up information on war crimes and crimes against humanity, and military

and foreign policy based on such information, are crimes themselves.

Independent researchers urge priority actions to reverse the cycle of

deception and human suffering because of deception on uranium weapons:

(i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii)

target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium

weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in

uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research

that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.

The weapons clearly violate humanitarian law, even in the absence of a

specific treaty barring their use. The violations related to the use of

the weapons are sufficiently grave to be classified war crimes or crimes

against humanity, which would impose legal liability and criminal

sanctions on the users as well as fair compensation and other remedies

for the victims of these weapons. A treaty banning uranium weaponry is

not necessary, but preparations for one could be exploited to duck

responsibility. Even beginning the process to draft a treaty could be

used by the US to argue that any ban on uranium weaponry in light of

existing customary law is null and void. The US uses public pressure for

an anti-DU treaty to bolster its position and to argue against the

existing ban. Unsuspecting activists play into the US position and

seriously undermine all anti-uranium initiatives

Conclusion: Pro-uranium weapons propaganda operates within the cover-up

system of the nuclear complex. At its core is a basically flawed model

of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, according to

which low-level internal radiation from fine uranium particles is not a

hazard. Proponents of uranium power and weapons use the model instead of

empirical evidence, which they suppress with a sophisticated

misinformation and fact-distortion web reaching as far as international

organizations responsible for public health. Recognizing the harm done,

Williams, for example, urges priority actions to reverse the cycle of

deception and human suffering because of uranium weaponry: (i) weapon

inspections to determine which ones contain uranium, (ii) target

inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium weapons,

(iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in

uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research

that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.

Observers believe that DU cover-ups serve to ease public acceptability

of present non-nuclear uranium weapons against hard targets, present

small nuclear warheads, and future pure fusion nuclear weapons. All of

these weapons contaminate with low level radiation. A future combat

scenario using fusion micro-weapons translates into a low-level

radioactive input comparable to that on DU battlefields [Gsponer et al.,

2002]. Elimination of uranium radiological and fission weapons in the

21st century would not terminate the health and environmental problems

of low-level radiation battles. Unless the legal thresholds of

acceptability of so-called low-level radiation are removed, the

perpetrators of non-nuclear but still radiological uranium weapons would

continue to contravene humanitarian law and place increasing parts of

the planet at risk. Ultimately, massive long-term human catastrophe

might result, far beyond the borders of radioactive wars. Thus, the

authors see the only solution is a complete and universal termination of

the development, testing, production and use of these weapons of

indiscriminate effect and delayed mass destruction. A beginning of that

termination is H. R. 3155, introduced at the US Congress.

Dr. Piotr Bein holds a master's degree from the Technical University of

Denmark and a doctorate in applied decision and risk analysis from the

University of British Columbia. A member of the Institute for Risk

Research, University of Waterloo, he served as a consultee on a recent

report from the European Committee on Radiation Risk. His 30-year career

of a licensed civil engineer, risk analyst, ecological economist, and

researcher of socio-economic impacts of atmospheric change switched to

an interest in information warfare after NATO attack on Yugoslavia.

Dr. Karen Parker received a Juris Doctor degree (honors) from the

University of San Francisco School of Law and a Diplome (cum laude) from

the International Institute of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France). Much

of her work in her twenty-year career specializing in human rights and

humanitarian law has been at the United Nations and Organization of

American States human rights forums. In 1996 she found out about the use

of DU weaponry in the Gulf War, and ever since has spoken up and written

on the illegality of these weapons at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Copyright Piotr Bein and Karen Parker, 2003. All rights reserved.

Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial community

internet sites, provided the source and the URL are indicated, the paper

remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To publish this text

in printed and/or other forms, including commercial internet sites and

excerpts, contact Piotr Bein at piotr.bein and Karen Parker at

ied

FULL PAPER

(They are no more All powerful. As their secrets Are unfolded. -- Afon

Claerwen, 28 November 2002)

Munitions that contain low-grade uranium 235 - insufficient to

trigger nuclear explosion - are chemical-radiological weapons. They

contain other toxic-radioactive elements and have indiscriminate

effects. They are illegal by virtue of international conventions, laws

and customs of war. When used in populated areas or in the presence of

numerous troops (enemy or friendly), they become weapons of delayed but

mass destruction (WMD). Fatal consequences of depleted uranium (DU)

armour-piercing ammunition emerged in veterans and civilians after wars

in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. While the victims remain neglected,

hundreds of tons of uranium from weapons developed in recent years

against hard and buried targets have polluted Afghanistan.

Up-coming war scenarios involve larger chemical-radiological

contamination potential. The military, governments, and nuclear and

weapon industries fail to or inadequately disclose the effects of

uranium weapons, and manipulate inquiries of international health

organizations. The media act as a propaganda outlet for these groups.

The purpose of Information Operations behind the propaganda is to

influence perceptions and actions of foreign and domestic public,

governments, and intelligence. A spiraling group self-deception

perpetuates the propaganda for fear of liability and criminal

responsibility.

Covering up information on war crimes and crimes against humanity,

and military and foreign policy based on such information, are crimes

themselves. Independent researchers urge priority actions to reverse the

cycle of deception and human suffering ecause of deception on uranium

weapons: (i) weapon inspections to determine which ones contain uranium,

(ii) target inspection to identify those hit and contaminated by uranium

weapons, (iii) health monitoring and support for target communities in

uranium-contaminated areas, and (v) fundamental review of all research

that was so far restricted to DU instead of uranium weaponry in general.

The weapons clearly violate humanitarian law, even in the absence of a

specific treaty barring their use. The violations related to the use of

the weapons are sufficiently grave to be classified war crimes or crimes

against humanity, which would impose legal liability and criminal

sanctions on the users as well as fair compensation and other remedies

for the victims of these weapons. A treaty banning uranium weaponry is

not necessary, but preparations for one could be exploited to duck

responsibility. Even beginning the process to draft a treaty could be

used by the US to argue that any ban on uranium weaponry in light of

existing customary law is null and void. The US uses public pressure for

an anti-DU treaty to bolster its position and to argue against the

existing ban.

Unsuspecting activists play into the US position and seriously

undermine all anti-uranium initiatives.

Introduction: The concept of toxic-radioactive warfare dates back to

World War II when air attacks with uranium oxide aerosols were

considered a realistic threat. Since then, the US has developed depleted

uranium (DU) ammunition (for example, the bibliography of Loewenstein

[1992]). Depleted uranium (DU) became a contentious

political-environmental issue after US, UK and other countries'

involvement in wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

Leading scientists in the area of radiation and its consequences have

joined with an increasing number of victims of DU weaponry (including

former combatants and civilians), and have squared off against the

governments that have developed and used, or sanctioned the use of,

these weapons. The " Kosovo " DU scandal in 2000/2001 saw tools of

information warfare employed to cover-up use of uranium non-atomic

weapons, including intimidation of vocal victims of DU, independent

researchers, and activists in the West and former Soviet block

countries. A consequential information warfare and the politics

regarding DU is tracked by the growing number of concerned groups,

including, for example, DU-Watch (www.du-watch.org). Contributed to by

many individuals, this material precipitated propaganda analyses

presented to international conferences in Manchester in November 2000

[bein] and in Prague a year later [bein and Zori*]. A recent article

describes information warfare in the context of war propaganda

constructed around the " Osama-WMD " theme [Chossudovsky, 2003].

UK researcher Dai Williams, who substantially expanded the understanding

of uranium weapons and their political cover-up, has posted a number of

essential materials at www.eoslifework.co.uk. For example, in 1997, a US

Air Force mission plan indicated a new generation of hard target guided

weapons with warheads from 120 kg to 10 t that would use " dense metal "

to double their penetration effect. Misinformation and cover-ups of

these weapons exhibit patterns similar to those employed for DU

armour-piercers. Williams writes: " The principle that uranium (depleted

or not) is used in some guided weapons, as well as anti-tank

penetrators, is now established by statements from Jane's, [uS secretary

of defense] Donald Rumsfeld and the UK Ministry of Defence. The question

now is not 'Has Uranium been used in guided weapons?' but 'Which ones,

how many, when and where?' "

The findings of research into the effects or DU and other weaponry

containing radiation but not causing nuclear explosions (which as a

whole can be referred to as radiological weaponry) are indisputable.

Even a cursory review of existing norms of the laws and customs of war

(humanitarian law) supports the conclusion that uranium weaponry of any

type is so patently illegal that the discussion should really focus on

bringing to justice those who have used it and redirecting action

towards the victims of these weapons.

But the international community still confronts the " denial and deflect "

policies of the users. Why this quest to cover-up uranium weapons and

misrepresent their health and environmental effects? The paper seeks to

answer the question step-by-step. Part 1 briefly sets out the science of

radiological weapons, and summarizes their hazards. It then sets out a

digest of official documents proving that the authorities responsible

for uranium contamination knew about the risks involved - the principal

reason they suppressed the evidence. Part 2 overviews humanitarian law

relating to weaponry and the consequences of violations, including the

duty to condemn such weaponry, the duty to compensate victims (redress),

and the duty to clean up. Understanding of this clearly shows why those

responsible think they have to cover-up that they knowingly developed

and used " illegal " weapons. Rather than face those consequences, they

misstate, mislead, and misinform. Part 3 analyses the details of the

cover-ups with a view on exposing the methods and tactics and providing

a way to counter the damage caused by the cover-ups.

Part 1: Uranium weapons and their hazards

Uranium properties and military non-nuclear applications

Counting only uranium isotopes, uranium ore contains 99.3% U-238, 0.7%

U-235 and traces of U-234. DU metal is depleted of U-235 down to about

0.2%, hence the name. The rest is U-238 and traces of U-234. The

combined radioactivity of DU is about 40% less than in the natural mix

of uranium isotopes. References on DU weapons describe physical

properties of the metal as if other metallic forms of uranium differed.

This is true for uranium alloyed with other metals that can

significantly alter the original properties, but not for the uranium

isotopes. For example, a mix of 99.3% U-238, 0.7% U-235 and trace

quantity of U-234 would have the same physical properties as DU, but

would be difficult to detect, since the ratio of uranium isotopes, the

prime detection parameter for DU, would be similar to that in nature.

At 19.1 g/cm3, uranium has an advantage over slightly denser tungsten,

which is not as abundant and very expensive. The nuclear industry has

hundreds of thousands tons of waste DU to dispose of after U-235 has

been extracted. For the US arms makers, who obtain enrichment byproduct

uranium free of charge, DU opened an opportunity. The first non-atomic

weapon that employed DU was the " silver bullet " . At a high speed of

impact, bullet's density, hardness and flammability enable penetration

into heavily armoured targets. Tungsten does not ignite as easily and is

1.75 times harder, which together with a much higher melting point,

makes it more difficult to work with, compared to DU. Alloying with

0.75% titanium increases hardness of DU anti-tank penetrators.

Manufacturing processes e.g. heat treatment and forging, determine DU's

strength and fragmentation qualities.

The applications of armour-piercers range from 20 mm Phalanx gun in the

navy for piercing attacking missiles, through 30 mm gun in A-10

aircraft, to 105 mm and larger tank barrels. Tank armour and removable

armour of combat vehicles are hardened with DU plate. Many countries,

industrialized and poor, make and use the DU bullets and armour.

Significantly more uranium than in DU bullets would be used in weapons

developed under a Hard or Deeply Buried Target Defeat Capability

(HDBTDC) programme launched by the US military in the mid 1990s

[www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/hdbtdc.htm]. The weapons must be able

to penetrate targets in hardened buildings, or underground. This can be

accomplished with a high density penetrating warheads with smart fuses

that delay detonation until the weapon is in the desired space, for

example, on the lowest level of a multi-level concrete building. The

weapons also need to neutralize chemical and biological agents before

they escape into the environment, by using incendiary warheads.

Owing to its density, uranium - depleted or not - can double the

penetration power relative to older weapons. Currently, over 20 weapon

systems against hard and buried targets, stocked for imminent " wars on

terror " , are most likely made of uranium. New versions are under

development and testing. The biggest of them, Big BLU, contains several

tons of a " dense metal " in the penetrator alone. The mysterious metal

must be uranium, since as dense and harder tungsten would be

prohibitively expensive, less workable and not readily ignitable. Dr.

Asaf Durakovic measured very significantly higher levels of uranium in

Afghanis near targets hit by penetrating bombs and missiles. His team

noticed the weapons punched through several concrete floors and walls,

then buried 3 to 4 meters in the earth before exploding. [www.umrc.net].

Were they used in foreseeable war scenarios, the weapons would produce

contamination levels significantly higher than from DU bullets in the

Gulf War. For its pyrophoric properties, i.e. spontaneous burning in air

when in fine form (swarfs, metallic dust), uranium in an incendiary

warhead could be effective in neutralizing biological or chemical

weapons facilities hidden underground or in concrete structures.

Powdered uranium could be the incendiary agent in the last stage of a

warhead in a penetrating weapon cased or ballasted with uranium. The

incendiary warhead would add its mass to the weapon's penetrating

impact.

The shaped charge technology also employs uranium. By focusing

explosives in one direction e.g. by containing them with a conical or

concave hemisphere metal liner, detonation compresses and squeezes the

liner forward, forming a jet of molten metal traveling as fast as 10

km/s. Jane's website indicated some time ago that DU was used as " liners

in shaped charge warheads " . Guided weapons ranging from Maverick and

Hellfire missiles to torpedoes, sub-munitions in cluster bombs and the

first stage of BROACH MWS warheads use this technology. At his website

Williams provides an in-depth, up-to-date review of both the HDBTDC and

shaped charge weaponry.

DU is used in counterweights of military aircraft. Civilian aircraft

gradually abandon the use of DU weights in favour of safer tungsten,

after a number of crashes in which DU weights burned in the fire and

contaminated populated areas. Some helicopters have DU weights in the

rotor blades, for example, Apache A64 has 100 kg. DU weights would be

logical in guided missiles and in other weapons that employ, like

aircraft, flight control surfaces. Small quantities of uranium may be in

navigational equipment in aircraft, vessels and land vehicles.

During the " Kosovo DU " scandal, U-236, plutonium, americum and other

transuranic elements turned out to be in DU, contrary to industry

specifications. Although these extremely toxic and radioactive

substances were present only in trace quantities, their high power

significantly increases the toxicity and radioactivity of the 30 mm DU

bullets shot in Operation Allied Force. The substances are spent nuclear

fuels and nuclear waste recycled into DU stock. Uranium alloy in weapons

has a composition and toxic-radioactive properties depending on what

other materials in what quantities have been blended in.

It is, of course, convenient to dispose of very hazardous nuclear waste

far away from the producer's country. Much testing of DU weaponry took

place outside the national territory of the United States: Okinawa,

Puerto Rico (Vieques), Panama (whose government found out about it after

the fact) and on lands legally considered to be the lands of Indigenous

Peoples in the United States. According to Williams's compilation of

industry and military sources, other radiological weapons were most

likely tested in Iraq (Operation Desert Storm 1991, Desert Fox 1998), in

air raids in Iraq's no-fly zone since 1992) and the Balkans (Bosnia

1994-1995, Kosovo 1999). Most recently in Afghanistan, the use of these

weapons was confirmed by high contamination of residents near sites hit

by hard-target weapons.

Use outside a states' territory brings in a whole body of international

prohibitions related to " exporting " hazardous materials. As will be set

out in Part II, responsible authorities are liable under a wide range of

international law beyond humanitarian law.

Fate of uranium in radiological weapons:

Upon impact, the high kinetic energy of an armour-piercing DU

projectile ignites it and helps it penetrate the armour, self-sharpening

fashion. Part of DU metal vaporizes into a very fine dust (aerosol) of

uranium oxides. About two-thirds are dark brown and black insoluble

particles,. Those oxygen-rich are soluble in water, and yellow and

orange in colour. The dust covers the target area, is readily

re-suspended, and can travel with wind for at least tens of km. Fire

consuming DU ammunition and DU armour also turns the metal into oxide

particles. Depleted uranium rounds that miss the target may corrode in

soil or water, producing fine material that disperses with air movements

and washes away. Uranium oxide residue includes unnatural, sharp-edged

ceramic particles that pose a special hazard inside the body. About 50 -

70% of the particles in the dust are respirable, i.e. less than 10 mm in

size. Soldiers who survive an attack by DU ammunition may have DU metal

and dust in the wounds. They will likely have inhaled or ingested far

more DU dust than recommended limits on intake. Civilians may also

inhale or ingest DU dust or collect fragments of DU metal.

Several US Bradley fighting vehicles were buried in Saudi Arabia due to

" substantial non-removable depleted uranium contamination. " The

remaining vehicles and tanks were shipped to a decontamination facility

in the USA, where workers in protective suits cleaned up some vehicles,

but the more heavily contaminated equipment was buried in a radioactive

waste dump

The Kuwaiti government hired foreign contractors to gather destroyed

Iraqi equipment in its territory, including vehicles contaminated with

DU [uS Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1995]. A

1995 article in the US Army magazine Armor gave advice on minimizing

exposure to DU: " If you find radioactive DU contamination on a vehicle,

move the vehicle to a site away from water sources, food storage or

eating areas, and occupied bivouac sites [...] always keep personnel

away from contaminated equipment or terrain unless required to complete

the mission. "

DU particles still fly around DU battlefields and beyond. With a

half-life of 4.5 billion years, U-238 particles contaminate practically

forever. Elevated radioactivity levels (from U-235 and decay products of

U-238 in DU, from transuranics, and U-236 contained in " dirty " DU, or

from other uranium non-nuclear weapons used in the Gulf War) were

measured in Bulgaria, when the wind blew from the Persian Gulf. A decade

after the Gulf War, Dr. Chris Busby measured a-activity on the

battlefields in southern Iraq at 20 times higher level than in Baghdad,

and in the populated Basrah region adjacent to the battlefields - at 10

times higher level.

In November 2002, UN Environmental Program (UNEP) investigators of the

fate of DU ammunition used in 1994-1995 in Bosnia recommended evacuation

and cleanups of contaminated buildings and grounds in Had*i*i (Sarajevo)

and Han Pijesak (Republika Srpska). Had*i*i refugees in Bratunac and

elsewhere have died of radiation exposure, but a report from a local

health professional Dr. Slavica Jovanovi* has not been published yet. In

Kosovo, Montenegro and Southern Serbia, DU-sites were previously marked,

fenced off, and contaminated soil was removed to storage at the Yugoslav

nuclear institute in Vin*a.

Soldiers bring DU particles home on clothing and on " souvenirs "

collected from the battlefields. Many of non-combat military, civilians

at the ports receiving Gulf War soldiers and equipment, as well as

families of the combatants contracted Gulf War syndrome, without ever

being near DU battlefields, and without receiving vaccinations that were

administered to the combatants. In October 2002, vice chairman of the US

veterans coalition Denise Nichols stated in her critique of the

government's analysis of Gulf War casualties: " Civilians - meaning

service personnel wives and children - have reported in ill but no data

has been provided on that! These service personnel sent home items from

the Gulf and then returned, themselves and more equipment after the war.

Members of the same units, who did not go to the war but dealt with

returning equipment from the Gulf have reported ill. Civilians at the

port sites that work with the equipment returning from the Gulf have

reported in ill. Their families have also experienced health problems. "

The combat fate of uranium in the other munitions is similar to that in

DU bullets and armour. The energy of impact of uranium penetrators might

ignite the metal, or else uranium would burn in the explosion. If

uranium remained as fragments, it would eventually corrode. Uranium

lining of shaped charges likely turns partially into uranium oxide dust

with a high proportion of ceramic particles.

Production, testing, and disposal of uranium weapons create similar

hazards as combat use. To date, most of the states in the US have hosted

these activities. Data is scarce on similar problems in over 30 other

countries that produce and use uranium non-nuclear weapons. Many people

exposed in uranium mining, nuclear industry processes, DU weapons

manufacturing, testing ranges and disposal sites show significant

increases in slow onset cancers, compared to less exposed communities

and occupations See reports of the Military Toxics Project

[www.miltoxproj.org].

The cleanup bill for DU fine particles, shrapnel and unexploded

ammunition at just one of many such places around the world, the

Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana, would be $7.8 billion, so the area

was not cleaned up but closed. Disposal of expired uranium weapons can

release an order of magnitude more contamination than uranium battles.

The Sierra Army Depot in Northern California has burned tens of times

more DU munitions than all DU wars have used [The Chugoku Shimbun, May

19, 2000]. In a fire at a DU munitions plant near New York in the 1970s,

DU dust was carried downwind 41 km from the site of the fire. More

recent fires at the UK Royal Ordnance factory in Featherstone in 1996

and 1999 sent plumes tens of km away from the source. In 1999, a plume

of smoke reached 50 km out, exposing thousands of local residents to

uranium dust for at least several weeks. The fire released 200-500 kg of

DU, the mass of uranium in a medium-sized penetrating bomb. The fallout

fell down on unknown locations. A 1991 fire at the US Army base in Doha,

Kuwait, destroyed 300 high caliber DU tank rounds, an unknown number of

small caliber DU rounds, and four tanks with DU armour and 111 rounds of

120 mm ammunition. Thousands of soldiers were exposed to airborne

uranium oxide. The amount of uranium released would be a few tons - as

much as in the largest hard-target guided weapon. This information was

leaked to the media from the US Army's CHPPM report that has not been

released to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses.

US troops are still stationed at Doha.

Smaller-scale incidents are also hazardous. One involving pulverization

of metallic DU occurred at the Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. The

following note was sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 27,

1999: " A technician was found using a hammer and chisel to remove

installed depleted uranium counterweights from the aileron. This process

produced dust and debris that was scattered by a nearby fan. The

technician using a hammer and chisel on the depleted uranium was in

violation of several rules [...] The area has been secured and

decontamination procedures initiated. "

Hazards of uranium

The main hazards of uranium are fire, toxicity, and radioactivity.

Uranium in larger chunks ignites at 500 deg C, while in finer form it

self-ignites and burns spontaneously in the air. Heavy metal uranium

forms oxides that are as toxic as arsenic compounds, particularly

affecting the renal system. Inhaling and swallowing a high dose of

uranium oxides entering nose and throat could pose a serious risk, as

could happen in an acute exposure to explosion dust and debris from a

uranium weapon. Prolonged exposure in a contaminated environment would

lead to similar effects.

As in the toxic hazard, radioactive risks arise by inhaling uranium dust

in the air and ingesting it from dust in the mouth, water, or food.

Inhaled particles under 2.5 mm enter deep into the lungs. The body

removes insoluble uranium oxides very slowly, halving their amount in 10

to 20 years. Some particles may move from the lung to the lymph nodes

and bone. U-238 emits mainly a-particles - high energy but ranging only

a few millimeters in the air, and b-particles and g-rays from its

products of decay. Hence the radiological insult from a microscopic

speck of U-238 oxide inside the body is focused on the surrounding

tissue within a radius of about 30 microns.

" Impurities " added to DU in the recycling process add other " hot "

micro-particles to the hazards of pure DU. Uranium radiation hazards are

covered-up and misrepresented. The total radiological dose inside a

person over years severely exceeds safe limits. Limits set by the

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) derive from

empirically invalid assumptions due to secrecy and distortions around

the effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, then around Cold War

developments of nuclear power and weapons. The ICRP risk model was based

on studies of bomb survivors, which overlooked the effects from an

internal radiation source and ignored cancers that take decades to

appear.

Physicists instead of biologists developed the ICRP model before DNA was

known, yet it purports to represent cell damage processes. ICRP model

spreads a dose over a large mass of tissue instead of considering

biophysical and biochemical damage mechanisms at the cellular level. A

critique was just published by the European Committee on Radiation Risk

(ECRR). It shows ICRP models of risk from internal particles

underestimate empirical mortality and morbidity by a factor of 100 to

1000. Long before the ECRR critique, standard textbooks on radioactivity

have been stating that if a-particles enter the body with inhalation,

food or through open wounds, they become exceptionally dangerous, since

they emit much energy to each cell. The standard texts are also clear

that long-term effects of accumulated small exposures transfer to future

generations. Every dose is harmful and can cause cancer or genetic

changes after years, therefore one must always avoid unnecessary

exposure and maintain doses in smallest quantities possible.

The hazard of a-particles is large despite their short range in a

tissue, for example, 30 microns in the lungs. Although b-particles

penetrate tissue to the depth of several centimeters, the resulting

biological damage is significantly smaller compared to that of

a-particles. The tissue weakens g- and X-rays only to a small degree.

The biological effect of one absorbed quantum of g- and X-ray radiation

in the tissue is the same as from one quantum of b-radiation.

External exposure by contact with DU metal can be hazardous; over less

than a few hours one can get annual allowable dose. DU contaminated by

nuclear waste blended into it is more risky. Many military and civilians

got sick from wearing " DU jewellery " or keeping DU fragments in the

pockets. One mg of U-238 emits per year the equivalent of over one

billion high energy, ionizing particles and rays that can produce

extensive biological damage. The mass of inhalable particles is

typically a few nanograms (one billionth of a gram), so a typical one

may emit about a thousand particles per year, or one every few hours.

The energy of each a-particle exceeds the damage threshold of vital

cell-building molecules. Novel chemical reactions take place, which

alter or destroy the shape, organisation and function of these

molecules. A particle of uranium oxide lodged in the tissue damages a

cell beyond repair [www.llrc.org/health/healthpage.htm]. The

radiological insult triggers biological damage mechanisms, which extend

the initial damage. ECRR attributes a 1000 more damaging power to a

U-238 particle lodged in the tissue, compared to other forms of ingested

and inhaled U-238.

Health effects of uranium exposure

The health effects depend on the quantity of uranium oxide dust

inhaled or ingested, frequency, and duration of exposure. A high initial

dose can cause acute respiratory failure and poisoning, leading to death

within a few days. Smaller doses cause hair loss, reduced regeneration

of skin and nails, physical weakness, fatigue, flu-like symptoms,

diarrhea, and immune and peripheral nervous system damage manifested up

to a few months after the initial exposure. After a year and longer,

medium to high doses may cause birth defects in infants of pregnant

women, leukemia, and rapid-onset cancers, followed later by slower

cancers. Smaller initial doses longer-term may produce multiple physical

and mental symptoms, and nervous debilitation.

Damage of immune system in exposed population could be a major

mortality factor in Afghanistan, where several hundred tons of uranium

was released from hard-target weapons. Plagued by winter cold and

starvation, uranium casualties with reduced immunity would have greatly

reduced chances of surviving common diseases. Many could have died

without being diagnosed with uranium exposure. The same factor could

increase morbidity and mortality in Iraq and Yugoslavia - both countries

under international embargo, and consequent impoverishment of the

population coupled with reduced ability of local authorities to care for

the sick.

A team from the Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC) reported after a

visit to hard-target bomb sites in Afghanistan [www.umrc.net]: " The UMRC

field team was shocked by the breadth of public health impacts

coincident with the bombing. Without exception, at every bombsite

investigated, people are ill. A significant portion of the civilian

population presents symptoms consistent with internal contamination by

Uranium. "

The acute symptoms above have been reported by Gulf War veterans,

including post-conflict military personnel exposed to targets

contaminated by DU. The slower onset illness and disorders have been

reported by Gulf veterans, and doctors and health researchers who have

worked with civilians exposed to DU in Iraq. Leukemia, cancers and birth

deformities are on an increase among international soldiers and

policemen who served in Bosnia, and among local population exposed to DU

ammunition. The rates of all cancers in Sarajevo between 1995 and 2000

increased from 46 to 264 per 100,000 according to a Sarajevo registry

report of January 2001 [www.llrc.org].

As the contaminants spread over the years, so will the health

problems. Low but chronic exposure risks may arise from air, water or

food contamination in areas surrounding a population. The contaminants

could build up and bio-accumulate over years from the initial fallout.

Local terrain, ecosystem, meteorological conditions, agricultural

practice and food habits are some of the factors that would determine

the secondary exposures and doses.

Most DU research to date has assumed healthy, young male soldiers and

low-dose initial exposure from 30 to 120 mm armour-piercers (mass of DU

0.3 to 4.5 kg per bullet). If uranium is used in warheads having a mass

of up to several tons, then humans surviving the explosion will suffer

acute health effects from much higher doses. Being unprecedented, these

exposures require a new analysis of uranium fate-effect relationships.

The closest analogy would be fires of DU ammunition as at the Doha base,

UK Royal Ordnance factory fires, or the burning of DU counterweights in

jet crashes, but no medical reports are available. Wider area residents

are vulnerable to initial small doses from the fallout from large

uranium weapons, and to ongoing, indirect exposure to contamination of

air, water and food. Exposures in Iraq's Basrah region could be

analogous.

Government and industry documents on uranium hazards

The hazards of DU are similar to those from other uranium metals

suspected in new non-nuclear weapons. Official US and UK government

documents have been warning about toxic-radioactive risks of DU as

follows. A 1983 literature study by the Batelle Pacific Nothwest

Laboratory for the US Department of the Army, clearly discerns the two

types of DU hazards: " The chemical toxicity is the critical limit for

soluble uranium compounds, and the critical organ is the kidney.

Insoluble compounds present a [radiological] hazard primarily to the

lungs [.] The exposure limits for toxicity are more conservative than

most of the radiological limits and thus protect from either type of

insult. " [Mishima et al., 1983]

A 1984 US Federal Aviation Agency document cautions the investigators of

aircraft crashes against the hazard from DU in counterweights of

civilian airplanes: particles inhaled or ingested are toxic and can

cause long-term irradiation of the internal tissue. Six months before

the Gulf War, a Science Applications International Corporation report

wrote, " Short-term effects of high doses can result in death, while

long-term effects of low doses have been implicated in cancer. " Shortly

after the Gulf War in March 1991, a memo from the US Defence Nuclear

Agency stated that alpha particles emitted from DU dust created from

exploded DU ammunition pose a health risk, but beta particles from DU

shrapnel and from intact DU bullets are a serious hazard to health.

In the early nineties, the UK Atomic Energy Authority warned that if all

of the DU fired by tanks in the Gulf War was inhaled, " there could be

half a million deaths as a result by 2000. " Tanks fired only about 8% of

all DU used in that war. A 1993 US General Accounting Office report

GAO/NSIAD-93-90 stated, " Inhaled insoluble [DU] oxides stay in the lungs

longer and pose a potential cancer risk due to radiation. Ingested DU

dust can also pose both a radioactive and toxicity risk. "

A 1995 US Army Environmental Policy Institute report warned,

" Toxicologically, DU poses a health risk when internalized.

Radiologically, the radiation emitted by DU results in health risks from

both external and internal exposures [...] If DU enters the body, it has

the potential to generate significant medical consequences. "

A January 2001 leak revealed that the UK Ministry of Defense was

secretly testing for radiation poisoning among British soldiers just

months before it sent troops to Kosovo. At the time the ministry was

refusing screening for Gulf War veterans. The disclosure went much

further than an earlier leak that showed only that officers knew 4 years

earlier about the risk of developing lung, lymph and brain cancers from

DU shells.

The industry is also well aware of the risks from airborne contamination

by DU. Paul Loewenstein, vice president of Nuclear Metals Inc. (now

Starmet Corporation, the prime US supplier of DU metal and related

products) wrote: " The main hazard to health occurs in those fabrication

steps where finely divided particles (dust or oxides) can become

airborne. In operations such as melting and casting, machining,

grinding, pickling and heating without using a protective atmosphere or

vacuum, it is essential to provide extensive ventilation and to monitor

worker's breathing zones. Vents and fume hoods that protect workers are

exhausted through carefully monitored filter systems. Workers must

change footwear and clothing when leaving areas where finely divided

uranium is present. " [Loewenstein, 1992]

The Boeing Corporation safety guide for DU counterweights in aircraft

and missiles advises: " Most heavy metals, such as uranium, are toxic to

humans depending on the amount introduced into the body. For short-term

(acute) exposures, the toxicological effects are the primary concern,

and acute exposures to significant amounts of uranium may result in

kidney damage. " [section 4.1.2]. Section 4.1.3 spells out the

radiological hazard: " The principal radiological hazard associated with

uranium is due to high linear energy transfer of the alpha particles its

radionuclides and daughters emit. A chronic exposure to these

radionuclides result in an increased risk of cancer, typically in the

bones, kidney, and lungs, since these are the organs where uranium is

deposited. " Section 6.2.5 concerns airborne contamination with uranium

fine particles: " Failure to control airborne contamination could result

in inhalation of the contamination and spread of contamination to other

areas. " To this end, Section 12.2.3 commands: " Wear a respirator [.]

whenever entering areas with airborne DU dust particles. " [boeing, 2001]

Part 2: Humanitarian law relating to weaponry

and the consequences of violations of this law

A weapon may be determined to be illegal two ways:

by adoption of a specific treaty banning it; and

because its use would necessarily violate existing law and customs of

war (humanitarian law).

A weapon made illegal only because there is a specific treaty banning it

is only illegal for countries that ratify such a treaty. A weapon that

is illegal by operation of existing law is illegal for all countries.

This is true even if there is also a treaty on this weapon and a country

has not ratified that treaty. Evaluating whether DU weaponry (or any

other type of weaponry) is legal or illegal, requires analysis under

this law.

Humanitarian law: the basics

The laws and customs of war (humanitarian law) includes all treaties

governing military operations, weapons and protection of victims of war

as well as all customary international law on these subjects. The main

treaties relating to military operations are The Hague Convention of

1899 (186 Parry' s T.S. 429) and The Hague Convention (IV) and

Regulations of 1907 (1 Bevans 631), providing a legal framework

governing war. Yet some of the most basic rules of war are not found in

existing treaties, in part because they were considered widely known and

part of the universally understood customary rules of war.

One of these basic rules is the obligation to carry out military

operations only in the field of battle - understood to be operations

against enemy combatants who are not hors de combat and against

territory and objects of the enemy that are deemed legal targets.

Article 25 of The Hague 1907 (Regulations) partially addresses this by

prohibiting operations by any means against " undefended towns, villages,

dwellings or buildings. "

Another basic rule requires that all military operations must cease upon

cessation of hostilities. Still other customary international rules

includes the duty to warn of dangerous materials or weapons and its

corollary rule the duty to clean up such material. The duty to warn rule

was set out clearly by the International Court of Justice in its famous

Corfu Channel case (1949 International court of Justice Reports, 4). The

Court in Corfu Channel emphasized the concept of " elementary

considerations of humanity " -- echoing the language of the Martens

Clause, set out below. As will be seen below, certain provisions of

humanitarian law relating to victims of armed conflict also contain

limitations on military operations.

The 1899 The Hague Convention banned all weapons and material that cause

superfluous injury. Article 23 of the 1907 The Hague Convention,

Regulations....continued.at.....

http://www.idust.net/Docs/Parker01.htm

 

rest of article cut off-

 

 

References

Piotr Bein and PeÝa Zori*, Propaganda for Depleted Uranium - a Crime

against Humankind, International Conference Facts on Depleted Uranium,

Praha, November 24-25, 2001,

du-watchDUPraha.doc

Michel Chossudovsky, War Propaganda, Centre for Research on

Globalisation, 16 January 2003,

http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO301A.html

Boeing Corporation, Safety, Health and Environmental Affairs (SHEA)

Guide RJ-028G: Depleted Uranium Counterweights, September 18, 2001

Asaf Durakovic, New Concepts in CBRN Warfare in the Light of the Gulf

War Experience and Current Reality of Global Terrorism, Uranium Medical

Research Centre, Proc.

The Third GCC Conference of Military Medicine and Protection Against

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Doha, Qatar, October 20th-23rd, 2002

www.umrc.net

European Committee on Radiation Risk, Recommendations of the ECRR:

Health Effects of Ionising Radiation Exposure at Low Doses for Radiation

Protection Purposes, Green Audit, Brussels, 2003

A. Gsponer, J. Hurni and B. Vitale, A comparison of delayed

radiobiological effects of depleted-uranium munitions versus

fourth-generation nuclear weapons, Proceedings 4th International

Conference of the Yugoslav Nuclear Society, 2002,

http://arXiv.org/abs/physics/0210071

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-6: Information

Operations, USGPO, Washington DC, 27 August 1996

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, JCS Publication 1,

Glossary Department of Defense Military and Associated Terms, 1987

Paul Loewenstein, Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium, American Society

for Metals, 1992

J. Mishima, M.A. Parkhurst, R.I. Sherpelz and D.E. Hadlock, Potential

Behaviour of Depleted Uranium Penetrators under Shipping and Bulk

Storage Accident Conditions, Batelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory for

the US Department of the Army, Richland, Washington 99352, March 1983

The National Alliance, Who Rules America? The Alien Grip on Our News and

Entertainment Media Must Be Broken, National Vanguard Books, P.O. Box

330, Hillsboro, West Virginia 24946, USA,

www.natall.com/who-rules-america/ [posted to the Internet in November

2002]

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication

3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, USGPO, Washington DC,

10 July 1996

Karen Parker, Depleted Uranium at the United Nations, proceedings CADU

international conference in Manchester, November 2000

Karen Parker, Written statements at UN Human Rights forums on behalf of

IED/HLP: UN Docs. E/CN.4/1997/NGO/49; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/NGO/19;

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/NGO/25; E/CN.4/1999/NGO/119

Karen Parker, Memorandum on Weapons and the Laws and Customs of War,

International Educational Development/Humanitarian Law Project

(IED/HLP), 1997, excerpted in Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.

E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27

Robert J. Parsons, UN-backed Cover Up: Deafening silence on depleted

uranium, Le Monde Diplomatique, February 2001

US Army Environmental Policy Institute, Health and Environmental

Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use by the US Army, Atlanta, 1995

US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick,

MD, 8 May 1995

Venik's Aviation, Health Risks of Using Depleted Uranium, Philadelphia,

November 03, 2001, www.aeronautics.ru/venik.way.to

Dai Williams, Depleted Uranium weapons in 2001-2002: Mystery Metal

Nightmare in Afghanistan? www.eoslifework.co.uk/du2012.htm

Dai Williams, US Patents confirm Uranium warheads,

www.eoslifework.co.uk/u23.htm#USpatreport

Authors

Dr. Piotr Bein holds a master's degree from the Technical University of

Denmark and a doctorate in applied decision and risk analysis from the

University of British Columbia. A member of the Institute for Risk

Research, University of Waterloo, he served as a consultee on a recent

report from the European Committee on Radiation Risk. His 30-year career

of a licensed civil engineer, risk analyst, ecological economist, and

researcher of socio-economic impacts of atmospheric change switched to

an interest in information warfare after NATO attack on Yugoslavia.

Dr. Karen Parker received a Juris Doctor degree (honors) from the

University of San Francisco School of Law and a Diplome (cum laude) from

the International Institute of Human Rights (Strasbourg, France). Much

of her work in her twenty-year career specializing in human rights and

humanitarian law has been at the United Nations and Organization of

American States human rights forums. In 1996 she found out about the use

of DU weaponry in the Gulf War, and ever since has spoken up and written

on the illegality of these weapons at the United Nations and

elsewhere.

from International Depleted Uranium Study Team

http://www.idust.net/Docs/Parker01.htm