9/11, An Inside Job?

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Wed, 25 Jan 2006 23:27:46 -0600

9/11, An Inside Job?

 

 

 

http://desip.igc.org/GriffinReviewPt1_7-1-05.htm

 

Demographic, Environmental and Security Issues Project

DESIP

 

 

June 2005

 

9/11, An Inside Job?

 

A Review Essay based on David Ray Griffin's research

 

Part I

 

 

 

by Ronald Bleier

 

 

 

 

 

David Ray Griffin: The New Pearl Harbor Disturbing Questions About the

Bush Administration and 9/11 Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press

(2004)

 

 

 

David Ray Griffin: The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions And Distortions

 

Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press (2005)

 

A: The air defense stand-down

 

We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous

conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th,

malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the

terrorists themselves, away from the guilty.

 

President G.W. Bush

to the U.N. General Assembly, 11/10/01

 

 

 

 

 

Was 9/11 an inside job? David Ray Griffin addresses this question in

two books that critically examine the official account of the events

of 9/11. Griffin's books are masterpieces of concise compilations of

the available plausible evidence suggesting that the attacks must have

resulted from complicity at the highest levels of the United States

government. This review essay treats both books as a unit, summarizes

some of his most important findings, and includes relevant material

from other researchers.

 

 

 

Like most Americans, Griffin, a retired professor of Philosophy at the

Claremont School of Theology (California), at first viewed critics of

the Bush administration's account as crackpots. It seemed to him that

conspiracy theories on this subject were below the threshold of

possibility. In the 18 months following 9/11, he had not looked at any

of the evidence challenging the government's theory –- that the

attacks were the responsibility of 19 Arab hijackers led by Osama Bin

Laden. It seemed to him, as he writes in his introduction, " beyond

belief that the Bush administration – even the Bush administration --

would do such a heinous thing. " (The New Pearl Harbor, [NPH], xvii-xviii)

 

 

 

But in the spring of 2003 a colleague prodded him to look at

researcher Paul Thompson's 9/11 timeline that is strictly limited to

mainstream sources.[1] Griffin was " surprised, even amazed, to see how

much evidence he had found that points to the conclusion that the Bush

administration did indeed intentionally allow the attacks of 9/11 to

happen. " Griffin began to look at the work of Nafeez Ahmed, an

independent researcher in England, whose book " directly challenges the

accepted wisdom about 9/11 which is that it resulted from a breakdown

within and among our intelligence agencies. Ahmed, like Thompson,

suggests that the attacks must have resulted from complicity in high

places, not merely from incompetence in lower places. " Taken together,

Griffin concludes, Ahmed and Thompson " provided a strong prima facie

case for this contention. " Because the work of Ahmed and Thompson were

not likely to reach many American readers, and because of the U.S.

media's failure to provide an in depth investigation, Griffin decided

to write a magazine article which grew into his first book, The New

Pearl Harbor. (NPH, xviii-xix)[2]

Griffin's Title: The New Pearl Harbor

 

Griffin explains that the title of his first book, The New Pearl

Harbor (NPH), alludes, in part, simply to the pointed references to

Pearl Harbor that were made in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks.

For example, President Bush wrote in his diary that evening: " The

Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today. " Henry Kissinger in

an online post on 9/11 wrote that he hoped that the U.S. government's

response " will end the way that the attack on Pearl Harbor ended –

with the destruction of the system that is responsible for it. " (NPH, xi)

 

 

 

The title also has a deeper meaning. Griffin cites a commentary by

John Pilger suggesting that the events of 9/11 presented an

opportunity that was predicted in 2000 by soon-to-be top Bush

administration officials. The neoconservative Project for the New

American Century September 2000 document, " Rebuilding America's

Defenses, " written or d to by such figures as Dick Cheney,

Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, reasoned that the changes they

had in mind for the direction of U.S. policy would be difficult to

achieve " absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new

Pearl Harbor. " (NPH, xi) Griffin's title is a reference to the Bush

administration's opportunistic use of the 9/11 terror events to embark

on a plan of " aggressive imperialism " that has led to two wars, to

sharp increases in military spending, a dramatic shift towards a

national security state and a sustained attack on civil liberties.

(NPH, xii)

 

 

 

 

Why a second book on 9/11?

 

As his title indicates, Professor Griffin's second book on 9/11, The

9/11 Commission Report: Omissions And Distortions (O & D), is intended

as a response to the 9/11 Commission Report (July 2004), which gained

immediate mainstream popularity and credibility. The New Pearl Harbor

can be read as an investigation into an extraordinary crime

perpetrated by the U.S. government on its own people, and Omissions

and Distortions as an expose of the cover up of the crime (although

each book contains elements of both). Readers open to the message of

The New Pearl Harbor may divide as to the implications over the level

of the Bush administration's complicity in the terror events. Some may

take the view that the success of the attacks was due merely to

administration incompetence, combined with understandable mistakes,

some foreknowledge and a willingness to let it happen, roughly the

LIHOP school (Let It Happen On Purpose). Although Griffin presents

considerable evidence supporting the stronger conclusions of the MIHOP

school (Made It Happen On Purpose), many readers may assume that that

evidence could be explained away.

 

 

 

However, readers of Griffin's second book (especially after having

read the first) are more likely to find that it is difficult to escape

the conclusion that the White House must have been deeply involved in

planning and executing the 9/11 attacks. The difference is that

readers can see that although the 9/11 Commission had the opportunity

to rebut the allegations summarized in the first book, they simply

ignored most of them.

 

 

 

The strength and effectiveness of Griffin's work comes in part from

his mastery of the subject, the depth of his research, his brilliant

organizational ability and the clarity with which he presents

extremely detailed and complicated information. Those who agree with

the author's fundamental assumption, that there is a strong prima

facie case for critically examining the official story, are likely to

experience a sense of relief that an independent and competent

authority is finally pulling back the immense curtain of fog behind

which the terror attacks are still hidden. Griffin's work empowers and

helps to unify his readers who were confused and isolated by the shock

of the attacks and their aftermath.

 

 

 

A hallmark of Griffin's writing is his measured language. He is as

precise as possible, cautiously never going beyond known facts and

reasonable common sense deductions. In The New Pearl Harbor, while he

presents information that could plausibly suggest the highest possible

level of official complicity, Griffin pretty much limits himself to

calling for an independent investigation of the many troubling and

substantial issues raised by the 9/11 events.

 

 

 

In his second book, published after it became clear to Griffin and

many other skeptics that there was to be no credible independent

inquiry into the 9/11 events, the tone is often stronger and Griffin

goes as far as speaking of the 9/11 Report's " audacious lies, " in

addition to detailing its often breathtaking " omissions and distortions. "

 

 

 

Nevertheless, for the most part, even in his second book, he

conservatively limits himself to the conclusions that can fairly be

drawn from the available evidence. Again Griffin shrinks from coming

right out and accusing the Bush administration of planning and

executing the 9/11 attacks. Rather he concludes his inquiry with a

question: Why would the people in charge of writing the 9/11

Commission Report engage in such extraordinary deception if they were

not trying to cover up very high crimes? (O & D, 291)

 

***

 

 

 

Griffin begins The New Pearl Harbor by examining some of the commonly

accepted notions of the events of 9/11/2001. Critics claim that not

one of the planes that hit the Twin Towers and the Pentagon should

have reached its target, let alone all three of them. In the normal

course of events, military jets would have intercepted and if

necessary shot down the errant airliners before they reached their

targets. There are troubling aspects with Flight 93, the plane that

reportedly went down in Shankesville, Pennsylvania. Skeptics cite

testimony and other reasons to think that the U.S. Air Force shot it

down. Moreover, the official story about the collapse of the Twin

Towers and Building 7 of the World Trade Center is not credible. The

commonly accepted view is that the Twin Towers collapsed due to the

impact of the planes and the resulting fires and Building 7 from fire

alone, but skeptics believe that they collapsed because of preplanned

controlled demolitions. Finally, there are disturbing questions about

the behavior of President Bush and the Secret Service that day that

could point to guilty foreknowledge of a U.S. government conspiracy.

(NPH, 3)

The apparent air defense stand-down

 

Remarkably little attention has been paid in the mainstream press to

the simple question of why the most expensive and technologically

advanced air defense system in the world was unable to protect the

U.S. homeland for almost two hours after the first indications of

trouble in the skies. How did it happen that 19 Arab alleged hijackers

with minimal flying skills were able to take over four planes and

successfully pilot them through heavily trafficked air corridors on

illegal flight plans without routine military interception? Is it

conceivable that the U.S. did not have the timely information required

to prevent the attacks?

Flight 11 Strikes the North Tower at 8:46 AM

 

 

 

As early as 8:13 or 8:14 AM the FAA registered the loss of radio

contact with American Airlines Flight 11 and the loss of transponder

signal at 8:15. (O & D, 155) [3] Under normal conditions, the military

would have been notified within minutes and under standard operating

procedures the wayward passenger plane would have been intercepted by

8:24 or 8:30 at the latest. Such interceptions are routine. The FAA

reported that in a 10-month period before 9/11, between September 2000

and June 2001 there were 67 military interceptions of passenger

planes. (O & D, 140)

 

 

 

The issue is complicated by Bush administration attempts to confuse

the issue. On the Sunday following 9/11, Vice President Cheney, on

Meet the Press (9/16/01) implied that a presidential order was

required for interceptions as well as shoot-downs. (NPH, p.6)

Interceptions are routine procedures whereby military jets are

scrambled or diverted from training or patrol flights to communicate

visually if necessary with wayward planes and bring them to a correct

course or escort them to an appropriate airport. These interceptions

occur more than once a week on average. Shoot downs are more extreme

procedures generally requiring top-level authorization. General

Richard Meyers, then Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in

testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 13, also

helped to confuse the issue when he implied incorrectly that fighters

sent up to intercept aircraft could only do so if ordered by

commanders at the highest level. (NPH, p.6)

 

 

 

In addition, such interceptions normally occur quickly. General Ralph

Eberhart, the head of NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense

Command), explained in 2002, " it takes about a minute " for the FAA to

contact NORAD, " after which NORAD can scramble jets " within a matter

of minutes to anywhere in the United States. " According to the U.S.

Air Force website, " an F-15 routinely " goes from `scramble order to

29,000 ft in only 2.5 minutes, after which it can fly 1850 miles per

hour. " (O & D, 140)

Flight 175 Strikes the South Tower at 9:03 AM

 

United Airlines Flight 175 left Boston at 8:14. By 8:42, its radio and

transponder went off, and it veered off course. By then controllers

knew that the earlier flight had been hijacked and they would surely

have been ready to contact the military. In fact, in the second

version of the official story, they notified NORAD, a minute later, at

8:43. NORAD should have had fighters intercepting this plane by 8:53,

and by this time, seven minutes after the first plane hit the South

Tower, should have been ready to shoot down the second hijacked plane

if necessary. (NPH, 7)

 

 

 

Another disturbing feature connected with Flight 175 is that at 8:55

AM a public announcement broadcast inside the South Tower indicated

that the building was secure so that people could return to their

offices. These announcements continued until a few minutes before the

South Tower was struck, " and may have contributed to the deaths of

hundreds of people. " (NPH, 7) Researcher Paul Thompson asks: why

weren't people warned? Griffin suggests that the implication is that

someone other than the hijackers wanted to insure that there would be

a sufficient number of casualties to deliver the shock and awe the

conspirators required. (NPH, 7)

 

 

 

Since the second plane hit the WTC 17 minutes after the first, none of

the possible explanations for the failure to intercept the first plane

-- inattentive air traffic controllers, pilots at military bases not

at full alert, or the assumption that the plane's aberrant behavior

did not mean that it had been hijacked – could apply. (NPH, 7-8).

 

 

 

Helpful background information on the significance of transponder

signals is provided in journalist and 9/11 critic Michael Rupert's

Crossing the Rubicon. Ruppert explains that all commercial airliners

are equipped with transponders -–devices that identify the altitude

and position of planes by means of radio signals to air traffic

controllers (ATCs). When transponders go off, the plane can still be

tracked in two dimensions, but the ATC can no longer pinpoint its

altitude. At that point, the system is in emergency status and the

offending plane appears on the consoles of all the local ATCs. Ruppert

goes on to quote from the statement of a pilot, one Michael Guillaume,

who explains that such a plane

 

 

 

is now a hazard to air navigation, and the controller's primary

function of separating planes is now in jeopardy…If in addition to

losing communication and transponder the flight starts to deviate from

its last clearance, the whole system is in emergency condition. Alarms

all over the country would be going off. …

 

So we know that the traffic control system would be in panic mode

within two or three minutes of the initial events. … The odds are that

many flights would be on patrol just offshore. It would be most

improbable that even one commercial flight could go [astray] more than

ten minutes without being intercepted….

 

Interceptions are routine daily occurrences. The fact that they didn't

happen under extreme provocation raises some serious questions… [4]

 

Even more pointed information about the consequences of interruption

of transponder signal comes from French 9/11 researcher Thierry

Meyssan. He writes, " turning off the transponder, under the

conditions that prevailed that day, would have been the best way of

raising an alert. "

 

 

 

The procedures are very strict in the case of a problem with a

transponder, both on civilian and military aircraft. The FAA

regulations describe exactly how to proceed when a transponder is not

functioning properly: the control tower should enter into radio

contact at once with the pilot and, if it fails, immediately warn the

military who would then send fighters to establish visual contact with

the crew. [see FAA regulations: http://faa.gov/ATpubs]

 

The interruption of a transponder also directly sets off an alert with

the military body responsible for air defenses of the United States

and Canada, NORAD.

 

The transponder is the plane's identity card. An aircraft that

disposes of this identity card is IMMEDIATELY monitored,

AUTOMATICALLY. " If an object has not been identified in less than two

minutes or appears suspect, it is considered … an eventual threat.

Unidentified planes, planes in distress and planes we suspect are

being used for illegal activities can then be intercepted by a fighter

from NORAD. [NORAD spokesman:

http://www.airforce,dnd.ca/athomedocs/athome1e_f.htm])[5]

 

With this information in mind, we come back to the question of why the

planes that struck the Twin Towers weren't intercepted. In the

immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration apparently wasn't

prepared with a convincing answer to this fundamental question and in

the end, three versions of the official response were required. The

first version was enunciated two days later when General Richard

Myers, at his previously scheduled confirmation hearing, testified to

the Senate that the order to scramble aircraft " to the best of my

knowledge, was [given] after the Pentagon was struck. " (NPH, 8).

 

 

 

The problem with this first version, later confirmed by NORAD

spokesman, Major Mike Snyder, and indirectly by no less than Vice

President Cheney,[6] is that it seemed to imply that a government

ordered stand-down order had been arranged. Researchers Israel and

Bykov, correctly label Myers's testimony as " disastrous " for precisely

that reason and the official story was quickly modified.[7] The next

day CBS evening news floated the new cover story. " In the new script,

fighter jets from Otis and Langley Air Force Bases did try, but

failed, to intercept the hijacked planes. " [8] This became the second

version of the official story that took more formal shape when NORAD

published its timeline of 9/11 events on September 18th 2001.

 

 

 

Thus was born the second version of the official story. The clear

purpose of NORAD's September 18th document was to exculpate the

military from responsibility by suggesting that human error and

understandable mistakes prevented military jets from arriving on time.

But Griffin speaks for the critical consensus when he writes that

there is good reason to assume the truth that no fighters were

dispatched until after the Pentagon was hit at 9:38. Griffin argues

that Myers and Snyder were in a position to know what happened on 9/11

and " it is hard to suppose that they would have fabricated this

account, since it certainly did not make the U.S. military look good. "

(O & D, 143) [9]

 

 

The 9/11 Commission's Explanation

 

 

 

In his June 2004 testimony to the 9/11 Commission, General Richard

Myers testified that our air defenses failed in part, because we were

situated to defend against an external rather than an internal threat.

" We did not have the situational awareness inward because we did not

have the radar coverage. " (O & D, 260)

 

 

 

The issue of radar coverage plays a key role in the Commission's

explanation for the inability of the military to prevent the first

plane from striking the North Tower. The 9/11 Commission presents a

tortuous account whereby the military was not informed that there was

a problem with Flight 11 until 8:38. As noted above, had standard

operating procedures been followed, the military would have been

appraised at 8:15 or at the latest at 8:20, in plenty of time to

intercept Flight 11 before it struck the North Tower at 8:46. Yet,

according to the Commission account, even at 8:38, Battle Commander

Colonel Robert Marr at NEADS merely ordered fighter pilots at Otis AFB

to battle stations. [10] Then, according to the Commission, he placed

an 8-minute telephone call to Major General Larry Arnold, at NORAD's

U.S. Continental Region in Florida, to seek authorization to scramble

airplanes. By these means the Commission generated the scramble order

time of 8:46, just 40 seconds before Flight 11 struck the North Tower.

(O & D, 165)[11]

 

 

 

But Griffin suspects that the Commission may have felt that the story

of an eight-minute phone call merely to seek authorization to scramble

planes might not seem plausible. Griffin teases out of the Commission

Report an " implicit " reason for the delay: namely that the military

didn't have at its disposal radar capable of spotting the wayward

Boeing 767 on its way to Manhattan. Griffin quotes the Commission

Report, which claims that after Flight 11's transponder was turned

off, " NEADS personnel spent the next ten minutes [from 8:38 to 8:48]

searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return… Shortly

after 8:50 while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the

flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the WTC. " (O & D, 166-167)

 

 

 

However, as Griffin points out, " This account suggests that a loss of

transponder makes it virtually impossible for the U.S. military to

track airplanes. " If that were true, " Soviet airplanes during the Cold

War could have avoided detection by simply turning off their

transponders. " Griffin found no sign in the 9/11 Commission Report

that this obvious objection was raised. Instead, he writes, " the

Commission apparently accepted and wrote down with a straight face,

the assertion that NEADS personnel spent several minutes trying to

find Flight 11 on their radar screens… But this statement grossly

misrepresents the capabilities of the U.S. military's radar systems.

For one thing the military radar system, unlike civilian radar, does

not need the transponder to tell the plane's altitude. " (O & D, 167)

 

 

 

Griffin cites French critic Thierry Meyssan, who points to the

Pentagon's own websites, which imply that it possesses " several very

sophisticated radar monitoring systems, incomparable with the civilian

systems. " The website for one of these systems, called PAVE PAWS,[12]

says that it is " capable of detecting and monitoring a great number of

targets that would be consistent with a massive SLBM [submarine

Launched Ballistic Missile] attack. " Griffin surmises that the " PAVE

PAWS system is surely not premised on the assumption that … SLBMs

would have transponders. " (O & D, 166-167)

 

 

 

Thierry Meyssan details some of the capabilities of PAVE PAWS. It is

used, he writes,

 

to detect and track objects difficult to pick up such as missiles

flying at very low altitudes. PAVE PAWS misses NOTHING occurring in

North American airspace. " The radar system is capable of detecting and

monitoring a great number of targets that would be consistent with a

massive SLBM attack. The system is capable of rapidly discriminating

between vehicle types, calculating their launch and impact points.,,, "

[http://www/pavepaws.org/ and

http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/pave paws.htm] [13]

 

By accepting General Richard Myers's testimony as fact, and by not

including an adequate description of U.S. radar monitoring

capabilities consistent with information on U.S. government websites,

Griffin concludes that the 9/11 Commission, which he calls the

Kean-Zelikow Commission,[14] is guilty of a major distortion. (O & D, 167)

 

 

B: Bush's Behavior on 9/11

 

 

 

" It was an interesting day. " —President Bush, recalling 9/11[15]

 

 

 

 

 

Skeptics of the official story of 9/11 have raised disturbing

questions about the president's behavior during the course of the

attacks. His actions and reactions were not what would be expected if

he and his aides were taken by surprise. The official version of his

movements and of what he knew and when is in some places

contradictory, contrary to known facts, and otherwise incomprehensible

unless one assumes foreknowledge on the part of his administration.

 

 

 

At 8:35 AM, on the morning of 9/11/01, President Bush's motorcade left

his hotel and headed for a for a photo opportunity at Booker

Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida.[16] According to spokesman Ari

Fleischer at a White House press conference that same evening, it

wasn't until President Bush arrived at the school just before 9 AM

that he was told that a plane had flown into the WTC. (NPH, p. 57)

It's difficult to believe that the president didn't know about the

first plane strike before he arrived at the school since millions

became aware of the first plane crashing into the WTC by 8:48. Most

people would assume that the president would be among the first to be

informed. (NPH, 57)

 

 

 

Paul Thompson cites a Washington Times account that Bush was told that

a plane had crashed in NYC while he was on his way to the school

[between 8:46-8:55 AM].[17] Photographer Eric Draper, riding in

another car in the motorcade with Press Secretary Ari Fleischer,

overheard Fleischer say on a cell phone, " Oh my God, I don't believe

it. A plane just hit the World Trade Center. " [between 8:46-8:55 AM].

 

 

 

In yet another account, the president didn't learn of the attack until

he arrived at the school at 8:55 when Karl Rove rushed up to him, took

him aside in a corridor and told him. According to photographer Eric

Draper, Bush replied, " What a horrible accident! " [between 8:55-9:00

a.m.][18]

 

 

 

A report about CIA Director George Tenet raises more questions

relevant to the president's knowledge and actions that morning. A few

minutes after 8:46 a.m., Tenet was told of the crash while at

breakfast with former Senator David Boren in Washington D.C. Boren

noted that Tenet was told that an airplane attacked the WTC. Tenet

said to Boren, " You know, this has bin Laden's fingerprints all over

it. " Thompson asks: " Why is Bush supposedly under the impression the

crash was an accident well after Tenet has been told it was an

attack? " Thompson wonders if Tenet has tried to communicate with Bush

at this time. [8:50 a.m.]

 

 

 

By the time the first pictures of the burning North Tower were

broadcast, the FAA, NORAD, the NMCC[19], the Pentagon, the White

House, the Secret Service and Canada's Strategic Command all knew that

three commercial planes had been hijacked. (NPH, 59) The overriding

question hanging over Bush's actions at the school is: why did he

decide to maintain his schedule in the face of a national emergency?

 

 

 

Skeptics suggest that the session at the Booker School may have been

staged in order to provide the president with an alibi to justify his

inaction during the attacks and to indirectly explain the lack of an

effective U.S. military air defense. If the president was unaware of a

national emergency, that would explain why he couldn't coordinate the

military response to the attacks. It would also explain why Vice

President Cheney had to take over many of his emergency duties.[20]

Evidence that the president downplayed knowledge that a terror attack

was underway is provided by the testimony of Gwen Tose Rigell,

Principal of the Booker School, who said:

 

 

" 'I actually heard the first plane had hit from the president, and he

said that a plane had hit the World Trade Center and that it was a

commercial plane,' says Rigell. 'He said but we're going to go on, and

in my mind I had created this picture of a plane knocking off some

bricks on the corner of the World Trade Center.' " [21]

 

 

Bush's town hall meetings

 

President Bush addressed the question of his actions that morning when

he responded to questions at two town hall meetings in December 2001

and January 2002. In his December 2001 Town Hall meeting in Orlando,

Florida, President Bush responded to a third grader named Jordan, who

had asked him: " How did you feel when you heard about the terrorist

attack? " President Bush responded:

 

Well, Jordan, you're not going to believe what state I was in when I

heard about the terrorist attack. I was in Florida. And my Chief of

Staff, Andy Card -- actually, I was in a classroom talking about a

reading program that works. I was sitting outside the classroom

waiting to go in, and I saw an airplane hit the tower -- the TV was

obviously on. And I used to fly myself, and I said, well, there's one

terrible pilot. I said, it must have been a horrible accident.

 

But I was whisked off there; I didn't have much time to think about

it. And I was sitting in the classroom, and Andy Card, my Chief of

Staff, who is sitting over here, walked in and said, " A second plane

has hit the tower, America is under attack. " [22]

 

Bush's version is problematical on at least two counts. For one thing,

he could not have seen the first plane hit the WTC on live TV because

the only known video of the first strike was not broadcast until the

next day. Secondly 9/11 skeptics believe that not only did he learn of

the strike before he arrived at the school but that he and his party,

in all likelihood, knew very well, unlike most Americans, that the

strike was not a " horrible accident, " but was rather a deliberate act

of terror. [23]

 

 

 

In addition, Griffin and others suggest that Bush's statement that he

saw the first plane hit the tower could suggest foreknowledge of the

attacks. (NPH, 62).

 

I was sitting outside the classroom waiting to go in, and I saw an

airplane hit the tower -- the TV was obviously on.

 

Before he entered the classroom for the reading lesson, Bush went into

a " hold, " a room at the school prepared especially for the president

and his staff complete with TV and communications equipment. Perhaps

it was then that Bush saw the first strike when he said he did if a

secret government video of the crash was available.[24] It's notable

that Bush felt he had to add the phrase, " the TV was obviously on, " as

if he realized that he was divulging privileged information.

Indirect evidence

 

There are a number of indirect indications that the president and key

aides must have been aware that America was under attack when the

first plane hit the WTC at 8:46 (if not twenty minutes earlier). We

have already noted that by the time the first pictures of the burning

North Tower were broadcast at 8:48, the FAA, NORAD, the NMCC, the

Pentagon, the White House, the Secret Service and Canada's Strategic

Command all knew that three commercial planes had been hijacked.

Presumably, that is how Bush knew that the plane that struck the first

Tower was a commercial aircraft when he spoke to Principal Rigell

before 9 a.m. and thus he must have been aware the U.S. was under attack.

 

 

 

Another indirect indication of real time knowledge of critical

information by the White House is Vice President Cheney's perhaps

inadvertent comment on Meet the Press on Sept 16, 2001, when he said,

" The Secret Service has an arrangement with the FAA. They had open

lines after the WTC was… " (at which point he stopped himself.) (NPH,

57) Cheney's apparent admission of the connection raises enormous

difficulties for the official story not only because it challenges the

White House version of the president's behavior. If the Secret Service

was in the loop as early as 8:46, it's necessarily the case that the

military was informed of developing threats to the South Tower (9:03

a.m.) and the Pentagon (9:38 a.m.) as well as issues with flight 93,

apparently downed in Pennsylvania shortly after 10 AM.

 

 

 

More information about the deployment of Secret Service personnel

comes from Mike Ruppert who points to a footnote in the 9/11

Commission Report which cites a Secret Service agent speaking to his

" counterpart " at the FAA HQ in Washington D.C. " shortly after the

second attack in New York. " With his background as a Los Angeles

police officer, Ruppert guesses that the " counterpart " in question

might have been a Secret Service agent stationed at FAA HQ.[25] In

that case, it would indicate that the Secret Service, and thus the

president's party, knew in real time everything that the FAA knew

about the developing national security emergency on the morning of

9/11 beginning perhaps as early as 8:13 a.m.

 

 

 

Indirect evidence that the president and his top aides were aware that

the military was called into action as early as 8:37 a.m. comes from

the 9/11 Commission itself. The Report gives 8:37 a.m. as the time

Boston flight controllers notified the military that AA Flight 11 was

hijacked, that the plane was seriously off course and headed toward

NYC. Shortly afterward, according to the Commission, jets were

scrambled. In that case, it would be imperative to contact the

president if only to inform him that it might be necessary to order a

shoot down.

 

 

 

Even 8:37 a.m. would have been remarkably late for the military to be

informed about problems that morning with a commercial airliner off

course. Paul Thompson emphasizes that 8:37 is 24 minutes after radio

contact was lost at 8:13 A.M, 17 minutes after the transponder signal

was lost and the flight went far off course, and approximately 13

minutes after the hijackers in the cockpit clearly stated that the

plane had been hijacked at 8:24 A. M. (8:37 a.m.)

 

 

 

More indirect evidence about Secret Service capabilities comes from

President Bush's Counterterrorism advisor, Richard Clarke who wrote

that the " Secret Service had a system that allowed them to see what

the FAA's radar was seeing. " [26] This means that the Secret Service

was in a position to know that the FAA was in crisis mode as early as

8:13 or 8:20 a.m. in which case many would assume that the president

in Florida would have been informed. (O & D, 48)

 

 

There is also information from Laura Brown, the Deputy in charge of

Public Affairs at FAA headquarters that the National Military Command

Center's (NMCC) threat teleconference [27] may have been set up as

early as 8:20 or 8:25. But this early time is in dispute. The 9/11

Commission Report informs us that this Pentagon initiated

teleconference did not begin until 9:29. But the sole support for this

belated start is some anonymous person at the Pentagon. Laura Brown at

first gave 8:20 or 8:25 as the starting time to journalist and 9/11

critic Tom Flocco. Such a time would be reasonable since it was

determined that AA Flight 11 was hijacked at 8:13, 8:20, or 8:24. But

after conferring with her superiors, Brown changed her story, revising

her initial time to around 8:45, about the time that the North Tower

was struck. Even this later time would indicate that the lead Secret

Service agent as well as other top White House officials traveling

with the president knew of an emergency situation while the motorcade

was still on its way to the elementary school. (O & D, 186-187)

Ignoring the threat to the President?

 

 

 

Most " astounding, " writes Griffin, about the presidential party's

movements that morning is that the secret service seemed to ignore a

possible threat to the president since it would have been logical to

assume that he would have been one of the intended targets. Indeed,

after viewing TV coverage of the second plane striking the WTC, one

Secret Service agent reportedly said, " We're out of here, " and yet the

president remained at the school for another half hour. By contrast,

Griffin notes, at the same time in Washington D.C., Rice and Cheney

were moved to secure bunkers. (NPH, 59) In the end, Bush didn't leave

the school until 9:34, shortly after he delivered a talk to the nation

exactly as previously scheduled at 9:29 am.[28] (Terror Timeline, 418).

 

 

 

Griffin goes on for almost two pages describing Bush's leisurely

behavior at the school, even after the president was notified at 9:05

a.m. of the second attack. Griffin quotes intelligence expert and

author James Bamford who writes that Bush " appeared uninterested in

further details. He never asked if there had been any additional

threats, where the attacks were coming from, how to best protect the

country from further attacks… " (NPH, 59). Viewers of the Michael Moore

film, Fahrenheit 911, saw the president remain seated in the classroom

for minutes after he was notified of the second strike on the WTC.

 

 

 

Instead, as Griffin (once again quoting Bamford) notes, while the

situation at the WTC was becoming increasingly desperate with people

jumping to their deaths, the president was listening to the children

reading a story called " The Pet Goat. "

 

" A-girl-got-a- pet-goat. But-the-goat-did

–some-things-that-made-the-girl's-dad-mad. " After the lesson,

according to Bill Sammon, an author generally sympathetic to the

president, Bush " openly stretched out the moment, " giving a pep talk

to the students, answering questions about education, chatting with

the children, posing for pictures with the classroom teacher and in

general appearing as the " dawdler in chief. " (NPH, 60-61)

 

 

 

Griffin finds it " amazing " that " perhaps stung by the criticisms of

the president's behavior, the White House put out a different account

a year later " which had the president leaving the classroom within

seconds of being told about the second attack at 9:05. Griffin notes

that skeptics believe that the " White House was so confident that none

of its lies about 9/11 would be challenged by the media that it felt

safe telling this one even though it is flatly contradicted by

Sammon's pro-Bush book[29] and by the video tape produced that day… "

(NPH, 61)

 

 

After Bush's televised address to the nation at 9:29, the presidential

party proceeded on their scheduled motorcade to the airport (NPH, 62),

where they were presumably informed that the Pentagon had been struck

at 9:38 and that Air Force One might come under terrorist attack.

 

 

 

Skeptics wonder why no military escort had been ordered by 9:55 a.m.

when Air Force One took off. At that time as many as eleven aircraft

were under suspicion of being hijacked. The implied question is once

again, did the president and his aides " know that he was not a

target? " (NPH, 62)

 

 

The Commission on the President's Behavior

 

 

 

In his book on the 9/11 Commission report, Griffin asserts that the

Commission's treatment of the issues raised by the president's

behavior is completely unsatisfactory. For example, he finds that the

Commission defends the president's dawdling at the school by arguing

that the president's instinct was to project calm. Griffin notes that

the Commission doesn't seem to have an opinion on whether such a

response is satisfactory, or whether an appearance of calm was more

important than getting himself and the students and school personnel

out of harm's way, or even if, under the circumstances, a lack of calm

would have been appropriate. (O & D, 41) The Commission at one point

suggests that the Secret Service didn't think it imperative for Mr.

Bush " to run out the door. " Griffin wonders why the Commissioners

didn't think to suggest that there would have been an option somewhere

between " 'run[ing] out the door' and remaining at the school for

another half hour. " (O & D, 43)

 

 

 

On the issue of why air cover was not ordered, Griffin notes that not

seeing to the protection of the president under such circumstances

would seem to involve gross incompetence unless it was based on

foreknowledge that the president would not be a target. The Secret

Service never did arrange for protection of the presidential motorcade

and when Air Force One took off at 9:54, it did so without military

jet escort. Griffin notes that the Commission showed that it was aware

of the issue, but didn't see fit to ask the Secret Service why they

didn't call for air cover. (O & D, 44)

 

 

 

Griffin writes that the Commission tried to answer the most publicized

charge, namely that the president stayed away from Washington for so

long that day because he was afraid. The Commission argues that this

charge is unfair. However, Griffin emphasizes that this is the wrong

question to ask about the president's behavior. The real issue is that

neither the president nor any of his top aides seemed to have any fear

" when they should have been very afraid. " (O & D, 47)

 

The Denial of Presidential Knowledge

 

Griffin concludes his examination of the president's behavior with a

section discussing the Commission's strong claim that " No one in the

traveling party had any information during this time that other

aircraft were hijacked or missing. " Griffin argues that this " claim is

essential. Without it, the decision to remain and continue reading the

children's story could not have been rationalized. " (O & D, 47) Griffin

cites the Cheney and Clarke statements above to suggest that the

Commission's " claim that the presidential party had no knowledge about

other hijackings is, therefore almost certainly false. They couldn't

say, `We knew that the president was not in danger.' Griffin

concludes: " The failure of the Kean-Zelikow Commission to point out

this dilemma provides one of the many clues that it was dedicated to

something other than revealing the truth about 9/11. " (O & D, 48)

 

 

 

Here and in every single crucial aspect of the official story about

9/11, the case for Bush administration foreknowledge and the

likelihood that the Bush administration was deeply involved in

planning and execution the 9/11 attacks is immeasurably strengthened

by the wholly unsatisfactory defense provided by the 9/11 Commission

Report. The manifest unwillingness of the authors of the Report to

convincingly address the most pressing and obvious questions about the

official version is in itself a tacit and powerful admission of guilt.

It's reasonable to assume that had there been an innocent explanation

for the president and his party's extraordinary actions and responses

that morning, the Commission would have been eager to lay it out.

Instead, as Griffin and other researchers have concluded, no such

explanation has been forthcoming with the result that the public is

forced to makes its own deductions.

 

 

 

The End

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Future installments of this essay will focus on such issues as AA

Flight 77 and the attack on the Pentagon, the collapse of the Twin

Towers and WTC Building 7, 9/11 related criminal insider trading, AA

Flight 93, etc.)

 

 

 

 

 

[1] Paul Thompson, The Terror Timeline, New York: HarperCollins

Publishers Inc. 2004. Griffin began working with the Timeline when it

was available only on the Internet.

 

[2] The New Pearl Harbor is now available free on the Internet at

Houston Indymedia.

 

[3] Some of these times are in dispute. The 9/11 Commission often

gives later times apparently in order to paper over the lack of a

military response to the attacks. As Griffin indicates, despite news

reports at the time giving 8:15 for the loss of AA 11's transponder

signal, the 9/11 Commission, " entirely on the basis of interviews puts

the time at 8:21, " and Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) put the

time even later, at sometime after 8:30. (O & D, p. 321, note 1).

 

 

 

Some 9/11 skeptics present plausible arguments suggesting that no

commercial passenger jets struck the Twin Towers or the Pentagon. It's

not clear how this avenue of research would affect Griffin's and

others' investigations of the air defense stand-down. It would seem

that much of the information would remain relevant if only to show the

inadequacy of the official story. For more information, see Gerard

Holmgren, " Manufactured Terrorism: The Truth About Sept 11. "

http://911closeup.com/

 

[4] Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the

American Empire At the End of the Age of Oil , New Society Publishers:

Gabriola Island, BC, (2004), pp. 310-312.

 

Guillaume wonders what happened to the tape recordings of controller

and pilot conversations that many would assume to be a matter of

public record. (p. 313)

 

[5] Pentagate, U.K.: Carnot Publishing Ltd. (2002), p. 90. The

language has been slightly modified and colloquialzed by Laura

Knight-Jadczyk, " Comments on the Pentagon Strike, (undated, February

2005?), http://www.cassiopaea.org/cass/boeing.htm All emphasis is hers.

 

[6] On " Meet the Press " (9/16/01) " when Tim Russert…expressed surprise

that although we knew about the first hijacking by 8:20, " it seems we

were not able to scramble fighter jets in time to protect the

Pentagon. " Cheney did not dispute this statement " and made no

reference to jets being scrambled too late. (NPH, 8 & note 19, p.

208). In addition, Major Mike Snyder, NORAD spokesman, said that no

fighters were scrambled until after the Pentagon was hit. Boston Globe

9/15/01.

 

[7] General Meyers's testimony was publicly recognized as problematic

by Senators Carl Levin and Bill Nelson who wanted to know why no jets

were scrambled " until after the Pentagon was hit. " Senator Nelson

suggested that if necessary, the " exact timelines " should be reviewed

in executive session. http://emperors-clothes.com/9-11backups/mycon.htm

 

[8] 'Guilty for 9-11, Part 1: What Happened to the Air Force on

September 11th? " by Illarion Bykov and Jared Israel

http://emperors-clothes.com/indict/indict-1.htm

 

[9] The third version of the official explanation for the apparent air

defense stand-down is the 9/11 Commission's attempt to fix the

problems with NORAD's 9/18 timeline since military jets should have

intercepted the passenger planes even allowing for NORAD's new times.

As Griffin points out, this fix came almost two years after 9/11/01.

Griffin reasons that if this 2nd version was a result of mistakes or

lying and it went uncorrected for that long, why should we have to

take the government's word that this third version by the 911

Commission is not a similar product.

 

[10] Otis AFB is in Massachusetts. It's not clear why jets weren't

scrambled from the closer Andrews AFB in New Jersey.

 

[11] 911 Timeline of some key events mentioned in the text. Times are

generally those given by David Ray Griffin.

 

8:12-8:15 radio and transponder contact with AA Flight 11 lost

 

8:14 UA Flight 175 leaves Boston

 

8:20 Bush says farewell to management at Colony Beach and Tennis resort

 

Fl 11 veers widely off course

 

8:24 FAA hears hijackers in cockpit of Fl 11 indicate that a hijacking

was in progress

 

8:35 Bush's motorcade leaves hotel

 

8:37 9/11 Commission reports that FAA notified the military regarding

problems with AA Flight 11. Jets scrambled from Otis AFB soon afterwards.

 

8:38 (Second version of official story) Military informed of problems

with AA Fl 11.

 

8:42 UA 175 radio and transponder went off and it veered off course.

 

NORAD notified at 8:43 (2nd version of the official story)

 

8:46 First terror strike hits WTC North Tower

 

8:55 All clear announcement at WTC South Tower

 

Bush arrives at Booker elementary right around this time

 

9:03 Terror strike on WTC South Tower

 

9:38 Pentagon strike

 

[12] PAVE is a program name for electronic systems. PAWS stands for

Phased Array Warning System. http://www.pavepaws.org.

 

[13] Pentagate, op. cit, p. 115. Once again I use Laura

Knight-Jadczyk's somewhat more colloquial version, " Comments on the

Pentagon Strike " op.cit. Her emphasis.

 

[14] Griffin explains that the 9/11 Commission, sometimes known as the

Kean Commission, should more properly be referred to as the

Kean-Zelikow Commission because of the influence of its executive

director, Philip Zelikow, and his efforts to shield the military and

the Bush administration from charges of complicity in the attacks.

(O & D, 6-14)

 

[15] Quoted in Allan Wood, Paul Thompson, " An Interesting Day:

President Bush's Movements and Actions on 9/11 "

http://cooperativeresearch.org/essay.jsp?article=essayaninterestingday

 

[16] Ibid. Bush said farewell to the management at the Colony Beach

and Tennis Resort at 8:20 a.m.

 

[17]

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline & t\

imeperiod=1:00am%20Sept%2011%202001

(All timeline references are to this url unless otherwise indicated.)

 

[18] Thompson and Allen record seven different accounts of how Bush

learned about the first crash: in his limousine, from Loewer, from

Card, from Rove, from Gottesman, from Rice, from television. " An

Interesting Day, " op. cit.

 

[19] FAA = the Federal Aviation Administration,

 

NORAD= North American Aerospace Defense Command; HQ: Colorado Springs;

divided into various sectors, only one of which was involved on 9/11;

NEADS, The Northeast Air Defense Sector

 

NMCC =National Military Command Center located in the Joint Staff area

of the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. According to French critic, Thierry

Meyssan, the NMCC " centralizes all information concerning plane

hijackings and directs military operations. " Pentagate, op.cit. p. 117.

 

[20] Jared Israel and Francisco Gil-White " Bush Gets Tangled in his

9-11 Lies, Part I: A Strange White House Press Conference, " Posted 25

September 2002, Updated 27 September 2002.

http://emperors-clothes.com/indict/calif1.htm

 

[21] Quoted in " The President as Incompetent Liar: Bush's Claim that

he Saw TV Footage of 1st Plane Hitting WTC. " Comments by Jared Israel.

[Posted 12 September 2002] http://emperors-clothes.com/indict/liar.htm

 

[22] " President Meets with Displaced Workers in Town Hall Meeting,

Remarks by the President in Town Hall Meeting Orange County Convention

Center, Orlando, Florida "

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011204-17.html

 

There is a slight discrepancy between Ari Fleischer's account and the

one Bush gave at his December and January 2002 Town Hall meetings.

Fleischer said Bush learned of the first strike when he first arrived

at the school and was informed by members of his staff whereas Bush

said that he saw what happened in real time on TV when he was already

in the school. Nevertheless, both versions have in common that no one

in the presidential party knew until Bush was already in the classroom

at 9:03 that the U.S. had suffered a terror attack. Both versions

present an alibi for going forward with the photo op.

 

In his January Town Hall meeting in California, Bush made similar

comments about when he learned of the first plane strike and that at

first he thought it was an accident. " President Holds Town Hall Forum

on Economy in California, Remarks by the President in Town Hall

Meeting with Citizens of Ontario, Ontario Convention Center, Ontario,

California, " California Town Meeting. January 5, 2002.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020105-3.html

 

[23] Critics note that school principal Rigell's testimony contradicts

Bush's account at these town hall meetings. Thompson calls Bush's

claim that he saw the first strike on live TV " preposterous. " Years

later, the Wall St Journal reported that a Bush spokesman later called

Bush's memory of the events, " just a mistaken recollection. " (3/22/04)

" An Interesting Day, " op. cit.

 

[24] See NPH, pp. 62-63.

 

[25] Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon: op.cit., p. 434.

 

[26] Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (March, 2004)

 

[27] In accordance with standard procedure, several teleconferences or

phone bridges were set up that day to link various agencies. One of

these was initiated by the NMCC.

 

[28] The 9:29 a.m. talk was previously intended to focus on education

issues.

 

[29] Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from Inside the Bush White

House (October 2002)