Legalizing Preemptive Nuclear Attack Against Iran

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Sat, 12 Nov 2005 17:20:54 EST

Legalizing Preemptive Nuclear Attack Against Iran

 

 

 

People are not connecting the dots on this one. Some people probably

don't even realize the US powers that be wanted the ability to use a

pre-emptive nuclear attack.

 

A Legal US Nuclear Attack Against Iran

 

The real reason for the IAEA Iran resolution

 

By Jorge Hirsch

 

11/12/05 " AntiWar " -- -- On September 24 of this year, the United

States finally achieved a goal it had persistently pursued over

several years. Iran was declared by the IAEA (International Atomic

Energy Agency) to be in " non compliance " with its obligations under

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

 

The resolution passed by the IAEA is remarkably weak. It does not set

a date for Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council, and it does

not even mention the possibility of sanctions. It even notes that Iran

has made " good progress " in correcting its " breaches, " all of which

date back to before October 2003. The LA Times characterized it as a

" gentle slap. " It is instead an enormous thud.

 

We pointed out before that the probable reason for the U.S. to insist

on the passage of such a weak resolution (on the face of opposition by

Russia and China to stronger resolutions) was to reach a stalemate in

the Security Council that would provide an excuse for U.S. military

action, which would necessarily include the use of nuclear weapons

against Iran [1], [2], [3]. There is, however, an even stronger reason

for the U.S. to have pushed for this resolution so adamantly, a reason

which is valid even if Iran is not referred to the Security Council at

the forthcoming November 24 meeting or thereafter, and that supports

the predicted scenario.

 

The IAEA resolution of September 24 2005 allows the United States to

carry out a nuclear attack against Iran " legally. "

 

Non-nuclear states have sought for many years that nuclear states

issue clear " negative security assurances, " meaning a committment from

nuclear states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

No matter how logical such a desire appears to you and me, nuclear

states have been notoriously reluctant to make such pledges,

especially the United States.

 

The latest such assurances from the five nuclear states date back to

1995, and are the subject of UN Security Council Resolution 984, which

was passed with unanimity. The legal status of these assurances is not

totally clear, and non-nuclear states have continued to request

" legally binding " assurances, implying that the existing assurances

are not. In fact, in 2002 John Bolton, then Undersecretary of State

for Arms Control and International Security, in an interview with

" Arms Control Today " explicitly disavowed any U.S. committment to the

1995 resolution.

 

Nevertheless, a case can be made that these assurances are at the very

least " politically binding " and may even be " legally binding. " The

reason is that they were made for the explicit purpose of having the

non-nuclear states extend the NPT in 1995. The fact that the

non-nuclear states indeed did extend the NPT based on these assurances

confers them legally binding character even if it was not so intended

originally, according to G. Bunn (1997).

 

The text of the 1995 U.S. negative security assurance (S/1995/263) reads:

 

" The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons

against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion

or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed

forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has

a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a

non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a

nuclear-weapon State. "

 

Good news, the U.S. cannot nuke Iran, a party to the NPT? Think again.

The paragraph immediately before in the U.S. declaration reads:

 

" It is important that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons fulfil their obligations under the

Treaty. In that regard, consistent with generally recognised

principles of international law, parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be in compliance with these

undertakings in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence to

the Treaty. "

 

Iran was " in compliance " until September 24th, 2005. Thereafter, the

" benefit " of not being subject to nuking no longer applies. An

analysis of this qualification of the U.S. negative security assurance

declaration and its implications for non-nuclear states has been made

by Jean du Preez in 2003 and is consistent with our conclusion.

 

Bolton's statements were made at a time when the US had already been

denouncing for several years that Iran was pursuing a secret nuclear

weapons program in violation of the NPT. The detailed analysis of

Gordon Prather, however, shows that Iran's 'violations' did not then

nor do now amount to " non-compliance. " Nevertheless it will be

politically very important for the US that the 1995 security assurance

is no longer applicable to Iran, and Bolton (now US Ambassador to the

UN) will surely emphasize it at the United Nations when the time comes

to justify the US action.

 

Iran's protective shield against US nukes, however feeble it was, is

no longer. Any " negotiating proposal " of the EU and the US towards

Iran will be carefully tailored so that Iran cannot possibly accept

it. Irrespective of what happens at the November 24th IAEA meeting,

the US plan to nuke Iran will continue moving forward, focused and

unrelenting.

 

Jorge Hirsch is a professor of physics at the University of California

San Diego