The bioweapon is in the post / Did U.S. government lie about deadly virus?

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GMW: The bioweapon is in the post/Did U.S. government lie

about deadly virus?

" GM WATCH " <info

Fri, 11 Nov 2005 22:43:35 GMT

 

 

 

 

GM WATCH daily

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THE OTHER TERRORISTS

1.The bioweapon is in the post - New Scientist

2.Did U.S. government lie about deadly virus? - World Science

 

They're so prcautionary over bird flu, meanwhile...

 

" Terrorists could order genes that confer virulence to Ebola, say, and

engineer them into another virus or bacterium " (item 1)

 

" I don't understand the logic of creating a threat so we can learn to

defend against that threat, that would not have existed in the first

place if we hadn't created it. " (item 2)

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1.The bioweapon is in the post

09 November 2005

NewScientist.com news service

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18825252.900

 

YOU might think it would be difficult for a terrorist to obtain genes

from the smallpox virus, or a similarly vicious pathogen. Well, it's

not. Armed with a fake email address, a would-be bioterrorist could

probably order the building blocks of a deadly biological weapon

online, and

receive them by post within weeks.

 

That's the sobering reality uncovered by a New Scientist investigation

into the bioterror risks posed by the booming business of gene

synthesis. Dozens of biotech firms now offer to synthesise complete

genes from

the chemical components of DNA (See " A dollar a base pair " [below]).

Yet some are carrying out next to no checks on what they are being asked

to make, or by whom. It raises the frightening prospect of terrorists

mail-ordering genes for key bioweapon agents such as smallpox, and using

them to engineer new and deadly pathogens.

 

Customers typically submit sequences by email or via a form available

on a company's website. The companies then construct the specified genes

and mail them back a few weeks later, usually spliced into a bacterium

such as Escherichia coli. New Scientist approached 16 such firms,

identified by a Google search, to ask whether they screened orders for

DNA

sequences that might pose a bioterror threat. Of the 12 companies that

replied, just five said they screen every sequence received. Four said

they screen some sequences, and three admitted not screening sequences

at all (see Table).

 

The risks posed by gene synthesis first hit the headlines in 2002, when

a team from the State University of New York at Stony Brook made

infectious polioviruses from synthetic DNA. And just last month,

researchers

with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta,

Georgia, said that they had used similar means to recreate the virus that

caused the 1918 flu (New Scientist, 8 October, p 16).

 

In theory, a terrorist group could try to emulate the latter feat, or

create a virus such as Variola major, which causes smallpox. However,

the Variola genome comprises some 190,000 base pairs of DNA, and while

some companies will make sequences 20,000 or more base pairs long, an

attempt to order all the genes necessary to launch a smallpox attack

would

probably arouse suspicion. " That would stand out from a technological

point of view, " suggests Drew Endy, a bioengineer at the Massachusetts

Institute of Technology.

 

A more realistic risk is that terrorists could order genes that confer

virulence to dangerous pathogens such as the Ebola virus, and engineer

them into another virus or bacterium. They could also order genes for a

hazardous bacterial toxin - although many of these are also available

by isolating the microorganisms from the environment.

 

Virulence genes are typically no more than a few thousand base-pairs

long. Their sequences are publicly available, so screening gene-synthesis

orders for potential bioweapons shouldn't pose a huge challenge.

Indeed, a company called Craic Computing, based in Seattle, has written

open-source software called Blackwatch that does just that. It is used by

one of the leading gene-synthesis companies, Blue Heron Biotechnology of

Bothell, Washington.

 

Robert Jones, president of Craic Computing, says that Blackwatch " casts

a wide net " , comparing orders against sequences from organisms

identified by the US government as " select agents " that raise bioterror

concerns. But not all of these sequences are dangerous, and some

customers may

have the clearance to work with those that are. So even legitimate

orders may be flagged up as suspicious, and that means companies must

employ biologists to carefully examine any matches that crop up.

 

The need for expert human checks may be one factor deterring some

companies from screening orders. Others like to reassure customers who

may

be worried about commercial confidentiality that their sequence data

will remain secret. But whatever the reasons, some firms freely admit

that

they run no sequence screens. " That's not our business, " says Bob Xue,

a director of Genemed Synthesis in South San Francisco.

 

Even if they don't routinely perform sequence checks, some companies

say that they do investigate their customers. But the scope of these

checks varies widely. While some firms say they conduct thorough probes

into customers' affiliations and scientific publications, others are less

exhaustive. For instance, Jennifer Wang, general manager of Bio Basic,

based in Markham, Canada, says that her company examines email

addresses to see if orders come from a legitimate research organisation.

 

Such a check would have spotted one suspicious order, sent from a

Hotmail address to BaseClear of Leiden, the Netherlands. This was for a

modified sequence from a hepatitis-like virus. BaseClear itself rejected

the order after the would-be customer failed to respond to requests for

more information, says Gerben Zondag, the firm's scientific director.

 

But email addresses are notoriously easy to fake. And even orders from

legitimate institutions may not be what they seem. Alfred Lasher, who

manages Picoscript in Houston, Texas, says that he turned down one order

placed by an individual at a US biotech firm, after Picoscript's

enquiries revealed the gene was being ordered on behalf of a friend in

another country.

 

Experts are concerned that the checks currently employed by some

companies aren't sufficient to exclude orders placed by terrorists.

" We're

taking this very seriously, " says Endy. Together with the J. Craig Venter

Institute in Rockville, Maryland, and the Center for Strategic and

International Studies in Washington DC, Endy's research group at MIT has

launched a study into the risks and benefits of synthetic genomics, and

aims to produce a set of policy recommendations by late 2006. The US

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, set up last year to

advise the US government on which advances in biology could be

exploited by

terrorists, is also considering the issue.

 

Some gene synthesis companies say they would welcome more detailed

rules. John Mulligan, president of Blue Heron, says it would be

helpful to

have a list of " select sequences " that are off-limits for gene

synthesis without explicit government permission, rather than having

to make

difficult judgments based on the list of select agents. " Tell us what we

can't make, " he implores.

 

But with gene synthesis firms springing up all over the world, and the

underlying technology becoming cheaper and more widely available, it is

unclear whether regulations enacted in any one country will be enough.

" It's going to be virtually impossible to control, " predicts David

Magnus, director of the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics in Palo

Alto,

California.

 

Endy argues that what's needed is better self-regulation: if

researchers only do business with companies that are diligent in sequence

screening and other security checks, then terrorists would soon find

themselves unable to place orders for dangerous genes. Otherwise, he

fears a

crackdown that could close valuable avenues of research. For instance,

gene synthesis can be used to make DNA vaccines, which may eventually

provide a means of responding rapidly to emerging diseases - or

bioterrorist attacks.

 

" As soon as people start dying from a bioengineered organism, there

will be a huge security response and research will be clamped down, "

warns

Endy.

 

From issue 2525 of New Scientist magazine, 09 November 2005, page 8

 

A dollar a base pair

 

Biochemists have long known how to build DNA from its component " bases "

- the chemical letters of the genetic code. By adding the bases in a

prescribed order and carefully performing a series of chemical reactions,

they can create precisely tailored stretches of DNA.

 

The process became significantly less laborious with the debut of the

automated DNA synthesiser in the 1980s. But a full gene - a DNA sequence

up to several thousand base pairs long - involves a formidable jigsaw

puzzle.

 

Commercial gene synthesis has only really taken off in the past few

years with advances in automating this assembly process. And as the main

players jostle for position, the costs of gene synthesis are plummeting.

Prices have dropped about tenfold in five years, and some firms now

supply genes for less than $1.50 per base pair.

 

Reconstruction of 1918 flu virus prompts warnings

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18825204.000

Virus synthesised in a fortnight

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4383

How the US crackdown on bioterror is backfiring

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=mg18024201.000

---

2.Did U.S. government lie about deadly virus?

World Science, Nov 9 2005

http://www.world-science.net/home/home34.htm

 

U.S. officials seem to have quietly reversed an assurance they gave

publicly last month - that a deadly virus, which scientists recently

recreated, would not leave a secure government facility.

 

Now, authorities acknowledge they perhaps will mail copies of the germ,

which killed an estimated 50 million people in 1918, to qualified

laboratories that apply for it.

 

The apparent flip-flop suggests the initial assurance might have been a

lie, or deception, meant to calm a nervous public about the risky

project, says the head of an anti-biological weapons organization.

 

But U.S. officials say they didn't mislead anyone.

 

Scientists and government officials announced last month that they had

designed a virus identical in most key respects to the infamous 1918

" Spanish Flu " virus.

 

The project's stated purpose was to let scientists study the virus and

thereby design vaccines against related pathogens, including a bird flu

that is alarming governments worldwide.

 

But some experts expressed doubts from the start about the venture's

safety. They said the virus could accidentally escape or land in

terrorist hands.

 

In response to such concerns, officials with the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Ga., a U.S. agency, said the

virus would be held securely at the agency's headquarters, and

wouldn't be

sent elsewhere for research, according to newsreports.

 

The San Francisco Chronicle reported on Oct. 6 that Jennifer Morcone, a

spokeswoman for the agency, had given such an assurance. If researchers

from outside the agency want to work with the virus, the paper quoted

her as saying, " We will consider hosting researchers at the CDC if they

go through the same training and clearances required of our

researchers. "

 

The research journal Nature reported similar assurances by the

officials. The Chicago Tribune cited CDC Director Julie Gerberding

saying the

agency had no plans to share the virus with other labs.

 

The apparent reversal, when it came, was quiet.

 

It appeared in the form of a cryptic notice - which the agency was

legally required to publish - in the Oct. 20 Federal Register, the

official

publication of federal government notices.

 

It said the agency would add the virus to a " list of select agents and

toxins " maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services.

 

Basically, this means the virus can be mailed out, agency spokesman Von

Roebuck acknowledged, according to a news article in the Nov. 10

Nature.

 

" Labs that are registered to work with select agents—in particular,

dangerous pathogens that are subject to specific handlingrules—will be

able to request the virus, " Nature reported, citing Roebuck. The parcels

could travel via commercial carriers, the journal added.

 

A staff member who answered the phone at the CDC's media relations

office on Tuesday told World Science that the agency hasn't announced the

new policy publicly, as far as he knows.

 

The staffer, who identified himself as Chris Cox, referred further

questions to Roebuck. Roebuck said in an emailed statement to World

Science

that

the agency didn't mislead anyone, because officials said only that they

were not planning on sending out the virus.

 

He didn't deny it would ever happen, though. " Requests to obtain the

virus for investigations at non-CDC laboratories that advance the science

and understanding of influenza pandemics will be considered on a

case-by-case basis , " he wrote, adding that such mailings will follow

strict

safety procedures.

 

The policy dismayed the project's critics.

 

Edward Hammond, director of the U.S. office of the Sunshine Project, a

non-profit group that works against chemical and biological

weaponsusage, said he wasn't sure whether the agency's original

statement was a

lie.

 

" Did they lie, as in did they know that they were going to flip this

policy within a week? I don't know - it's difficult to tell, but they

certainly in my judgement deceived, " he said.

 

On the other hand, he said, any expert on the subject would have known

that the policy as originally stated was " a fiction to begin with. "

That's because even without the mailing, anyone with the right equipment

could have reconstructed the virus using the information released as

part of the project.

 

The no-mailing claim " was a red herring from the get-go, " he said. " It

was intended to reassure, when they knew that the assurance that

most people would draw from it was based on a misunderstanding. "

 

But the policy change raises the dangers still further, said Jens Kuhn,

a research scholar at the acknowledged Harvard Medical School.

 

" There's a big risk associated with it, " he said. He added that

officials didn't announce the mailing policy to begin with " probably

because

they would have gotten the same kind of heat they're getting now. "

 

On the other hand, it might have been a good idea not to announce it,

as this could further encourage bioterrorists, said Kuhn, who, like

Hammond, opposed the project from the start.

 

" I don't understand the logic, " he said, " of creating a threat so we

can learn to defend against that threat, that would not have existed in

the first place if we hadn't created it. "

 

Source: world-science.net

 

 

 

 

 

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