Disease by Design: 1918 Spanish Flu Resurrection

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biodefense

Wed, 5 Oct 2005 18:30:45 -0700

Disease by Design: 1918 " Spanish " Flu Resurrection

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Sunshine Project

News Release - 5 October 2005

http://www.sunshine-project.org

 

 

Disease by Design: 1918 " Spanish " Flu Resurrection

Creates Major Safety and Security Risks

 

 

 

The resurrection of 1918 influenza has plunged the world closer to a

flu pandemic and to a biodefense race scarcely separable from an

offensive one, according to the Sunshine Project, a biological

weapons watchdog.

 

" There was no compelling reason to recreate 1918 flu and plenty of

good reasons not to. Instead of a dead bug, now there are live 1918

flu types in several places, with more such strains sure to come in

more places, " says Sunshine Project Director Edward Hammond, " The US

government has done a great misdeed by endorsing and encouraging the

deliberate creation of extremely dangerous new viruses. The 1918

experiments will be replicated and adapted, and the ability to

perform them will proliferate, meaning that the possibility of

man-made disaster, either accidental or deliberate, has risen for the

entire world. "

 

The 1918 experiments are part of the US biodefense program and are of

no practical value in responding to outbreaks of " bird flu " (H5N1).

The 1918 virus is a different type (H1N1) of influenza than " bird

flu " . 1918 flu is more than eighty five years old and no longer

exists in nature, posing no natural threat. While it is reasonable to

determine the genetic sequence of 1918 and other extinct influenza

strains, there is no valid reason to recreate the virulent virus, as

the risks far outweigh the benefits.

 

But the most significant story isn't Tumpey, Tauberberger, and

colleagues. It is the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) attitude

about the experiments and its implications. " The biggest news about

resurrecting 1918 flu is the US government's enthusiastic embrace of

designer disease and the impact that it will have on our future. "

says Hammond, " By encouraging genetic riffs on influenza and other

viruses with the explicit intent of building more dangerous

pathogens, CDC is fueling the gathering dangers of competition to

discover the worst possibilities of biotechnology applied to

bioweapons agents. Some might do it just to keep up with the

Americans, resulting in a further blurring of defense and offense and

heightening the biological mistrust evident in US foreign policy. "

 

In addition to the potentially broad damage to international security

and cooperation in the biological sciences if novel diseases continue

to be created, the 1918 experiments heighten the chance that a flu

lab will be the source of the next pandemic.

 

CDC says that it plans to keep its vials of 1918 flu under close

guard in one place. But that's a red herring according to the

Sunshine Project. Influenza with as many as five 1918 flu genes, and

which are potentially pandemic, have already been handled at labs in

at least four places other than CDC, including labs in Athens, GA,

Winnipeg, MB (Canada), Seattle, WA, and Madison, WI. With the

exception of the Canadian lab, none of these facilities has maximum

(BSL-4) biological containment, and it is a virtually certainty that

more labs will begin 1918 flu work now.

 

In fact, the only possible source of a new 1918 influenza outbreak is

a laboratory. The situation of the 1918 flu is not dissimilar to

SARS, whose natural transmission is believed to have been halted. The

experience with SARS accidents is chilling: It has escaped three

different labs to date. A 1918 influenza escape would be very likely

to take a higher human toll. The US biodefense program has also had a

number of lab accidents since 2002, including mishandling of anthrax

and plague and laboratory-acquired infections of tularemia. In

Russia, a researcher contracted ebola and died last year.

 

Importantly, human error and equipment failures aren't the only ways

for a disease agent to escape a lab - something vividly illustrated

by the anthrax letters in the US four years ago. Unlike anthrax,

however, 1918 influenza would transmit from human to human.

 

" We are no safer from a pandemic today than yesterday. In fact, we're

in greater danger, not only from influenza; but from the failure of

the US to come to grips with and address the threats posed by the

research it sponsors, in terms of legislation, ethics, and

self-restraint. " concludes Hammond.

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