Downing Street reporter dissects pre-war Iraq intelligence

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Tue, 30 Aug 2005 13:59:58 -0700 (PDT)

Downing Street reporter dissects pre-war Iraq intelligence

 

 

 

Exclusive: Downing Street reporter dissects pre-war

Iraq intelligence

Michael Smith

 

Details 'chill factor' imposed around Iraq

intelligence; Putting Downing Street docs in

perspective

 

LONDON -- " The [u.S. WMD] Commission found no evidence

of political pressure to influence the Intelligence

Community's pre-war assessment of Iraq's weapons

programs. "

 

That is only one of a number of strange conclusions by

those charged with investigating the way flaky

intelligence was used to justify the 2003 Iraq War.

 

The most vociferous advocates of an attack on Iraq

were Dick Cheney, the vice-president, Defense

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld deputy Paul

Wolfowitz. They needed Congressional support and set

about obtaining it in an aggressive fashion, insisting

that not only did Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass

destruction threaten America and its allies but that

the dictator was closely linked to al-Qa'eda.

 

This was a bit of a problem for the CIA, and in

particular CIA director George Tenet. The CIA's 2001

annual assessment of 'worldwide threats' had played

down any immediate threat from Iraq while the Agency

had repeatedly dismissed the ludicrous idea that

Saddam was in league with Osama bin Laden, a claim

that was also strenuously denied in private by British

intelligence officials.

 

By early 2002, US media reported the CIA had come

under intense political pressure to back up the

neo-cons' claims on Iraq with Rumsfeld's Pentagon even

setting up an office of special plans which looked

back through all the previous intelligence, hyping up

any reports linking al-Qa'eda with Iraq in order to

prove the CIA wrong.

 

Meanwhile, Dick Cheney took to visiting CIA

headquarters in Langley and discussing the threat from

Iraq with analysts. According to former CIA officials,

the visits created a " chill factor " among those

working on Iraq. There was " a kind of radical

pressure " throughout 2002 and on into 2003, one said.

 

Tenet eventually agreed to put out a special National

Intelligence Estimate. Published in October 2002,

shortly after the first British dossier, it was this

document that was quite rightly pulled to pieces by

the presidential commission. There is no doubt that

Tenet buckled under political pressure. The classified

version of the National Intelligence Estimate did

contain caveats, although they were heavily buried.

The unclassified version had no caveats whatsoever. It

was far harder than anything produced in Britain.

 

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