GMW: Zimbabwe, the U.S., the S.A.C.C. and food aid

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GMW: Zimbabwe, the U.S., the S.A.C.C. and food aid

" GM WATCH " <info

Mon, 15 Aug 2005 22:02:11 +0100

 

 

 

 

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http://www.gmwatch.org

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1. " GM is a high risk technology " - South African Council of Churches

2.An agricultural and trade expert challenges the United States' food

aid policies

 

COMMENT

 

There are varying accounts of whether a major food aid shipment held up

in Johannesburg, ostensibly over concerns that it might be

GM-contaminated, has finally gotten into Zimbabwe.

 

Even if it has been held up at the border, it looks probable that it

will get into the country within the next 24 hrs.

http://allafrica.com/stories/200508150461.html

 

And it's badly needed. Hundreds of thousands of people have been left

homeless there thanks to Robert Mugabe's razing of settlements around

Zimbabwe's urban centres.

 

As one commentator notes though, " As frustrating as Mugabe's behaviour

is [over the food aid], there are legitimate reasons for skepticism

behind the dictator's paranoia. "

http://www.gnn.tv/articles/1608/The_Good_News_Roundup

 

This is because historically, American food aid policies " were set up

to benefit American business interests, rather than constructed to

deliver aid effectively, " Mother Jones magazine reports in an

interview with

Sophia Murphy, co-author of the report " U.S. Food Aid: Time to Get it

Right " . (item 2)

 

The US is a signatory of the 1999 Food Aid Convention, which recognises

that food aid should be bought from the most cost effective source, be

culturally acceptable and if possible purchased locally so that

regional markets do not suffer. However, the US pretty much does the

opposite

on all of these, with USAID boasting that, " The principal beneficiary

of America's foreign assistance programs has always been the United

States. "

http://ngin.tripod.com/forcefeed.htm

 

The real irony in the present case, though, is that the food coming in

from Jo'burg is courtesy not of the US but of the South African Council

of Churches which, after listening to all sides of the debate, publicly

affirmed that " GM is a high risk technology " and called for " a

moratorium on any further permits granted for GMOs in South Africa. "

(item 1)

 

Mugabe should quit stalling the humanitarian aid of the SACC who are

the last people to knowingly force GM-contaminated grain onto those

already in need of succour.

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1.Statement of the South African Council of Churches (SACC) , May 2004

http://www.gmwatch.org/archive2.asp?arcid=3797

 

As participants in the first SACC consultation on GMOs held at the

ESCOM Convention Centre, Midrand, South Africa from 26-28 May 2004:

 

We welcome the initiative taken by the SACC in convening this

consultation on a topic which needs in-depth and more urgent and focussed

attention by Christians and the churches.

 

We thank the organisers for providing us the opportunity to enhance our

understanding of GMOs by means of a well-balanced program, thus

enabling us to broaden and deepen our contribution to the debate. We were

given the opportunity to listen to presentations from different sides of

the debate, and to reflect on and affirm our own Christian and indigenous

spiritual heritage and traditions.

 

We are concerned about:

 

1. The manner in which complex issues on GMOs are treated by proponents

of GMOs and South African legislation in a 'purely technical' manner,

delinking science from ethics, values, economic and political ideology,

and our African communal spirituality about life and food.

 

2. The link between the promotion of GMOs and neo-liberal economic

globalization with its inherent unequal power relations;

 

3. The scientific uncertainties related to the long term economic,

nutritional, health, ecological risks of gene transfer technologies in

view

of the irreversibility in the release and use of GE products;

 

4. The elevating of natural scientists and civil servants to be experts

and adjudicators in regard to issues of GMOs even as they pertain to

human life, the environment and the spirituality related to life;

 

5. The insufficient representation of relevant sciences (including

ethics) to advise government, and the apparent non-independence of

advisors

to government and government institutions in the development and

implementation of GMO policy;

 

6. The lack of public awareness and debate on GMOs, including our own

lack of participation in GMO policy developments;

 

7. The overriding profit motive and supremacy of the market over issues

such as human and environmental safety and health, and food supply;

 

8. The erosion of the sovereignty of national states, democracy and

transparency in policy processes of international agreements and

conventions related to food standards and agriculture which make

domestic issues

subject to trade concerns;

 

9. The commodification of life and monopolisation of knowledge through

the patenting of genes and living organisms as well as indigenous

science, products and practices.

 

We appreciate the role played by people and organisations outside the

church who have committed themselves and their organizations to fight

for socio-economic justice by resisting the unbridled introduction and

use of GMOs and products.

 

We affirm:

 

1. Our conviction that there is sufficient food for all our people, but

the problem remains inequitable access to and maldistribution of food.

 

2. Our commitment to the option for the poor, marginalized and

disempowered. And as far as GMOs are concerned we are further driven

by our

vision of the dignity of the human person; the common good; solidarity;

subsidiarity; integrity of creation; socio-economic and environmental

justice.

 

3. That food and life is a gift from God and we are co-workers and

custodians with God to sustain creation and life and the abundance

thereof.

 

4. The power and sustainability of indigenous knowledge, practices and

resources.

 

We commit ourselves to broaden and deepen:

 

1. our understanding of GMOs and the mechanisms dealing with these

matters on local, national, regional and international levels;

 

2. our theological reflection and action in addressing the

introduction, use and impact of GMOs and this biotechnology on food

security;

 

3. our networks of solidarity and cooperation in South Africa, in the

region, the continent and beyond;

 

4. our awareness of the organic link between food, HIV and AIDS,

poverty and GMOs.

 

We call on the SACC and its members to:

 

1. Take the issue of the right to food seriously and co-own the issue

of GMOs as an issue of justice in line with our longstanding commitment

to solidarity with the poor and marginalised.

 

2. Redouble its efforts and programmes aimed at the eradication of

poverty.

 

3. Learn from and be in solidarity with the struggles of the poor

related to food sovereignty and the impact of GMOs as promoted by the

dominant and fundamentally unjust economic ideology, systems and

mechanisms

of neo-liberal economic globalisation. We cannot but denounce and resist

with the poor this ungodly ideology, since it affects the core of our

common faith and vision for the world.

 

4.Undertake and facilitate the generation of prophetic/contextual

theologies and resource material for education, liturgies, bible

studies, as

well as theological reflection and research at academic institutions

which will empower the church to pursue its stand on GMOs.

 

5. Establish a pool of resources in terms of persons and institutions

inside and outside the church to assist the SACC in a variety of

engagements /interventions such as: dialogues with scientists; private

sector

companies; government; civil society; public awareness and education;

and, policy interventions in national, regional and international

forums.

 

6. Call on government, while it is still allowing GM technology to

operate and have an impact on our environment to:

 

-- affirm that GM is a high risk technology;

 

-- impose a moratorium on any further permits granted for GMOs in South

Africa;

 

-- take all measures necessary to make South Africa compliant with the

Cartegena protocol.

 

7. Develop regional and continental solidarity and cooperation related

to the churches' interventions on GMOs.

 

8 .Develop localised campaigns and advocacy initiatives.

 

9. Agree on a clear strategic planning process and eventual reporting

on progress made towards achieving its commitments.

 

10. Make this document public, and bring it to the attention of the

member churches and other stakeholders including small-holder farmers,

government, scientists, private sector, and civil society organisations.

 

28 May, 2004*

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2.Towards a Better Food Aid System: An Interview with Sophia Murphy:

 

An agricultural and trade expert challenges the United States'

overly-rigid and wasteful food aid policies.

 

Interviewed By Clint Hendler

 

August 9, 2005

http://www.motherjones.com/news/qa/2005/08/food_aid.html

 

As recent headlines from Niger show, the world has not yet figured out

how to stop famine and devastating hunger among the very poorest. More

than enough food is grown worldwide to feed everyone on the earth, but

according to the United Nations World Food Program, disasters such as

war, crop failure, or drought—combined with structural problems such as

poor governmental decisions, bad transportation, and brutal poverty—all

conspire to keep one in seven people in the world hungry, and one in

three children underweight.

 

The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), a

Minneapolis-based research and advocacy group, recently released a

report taking the

United State's food aid polices to task. Sophia Murphy, who co-authored

" U.S. Food Aid: Time to Get it Right " with Kathleen McAfee, argues that

the country's food aid system is need of major reform. The problems

stem from one crucial fact: aid policies were set up to benefit American

business interests, rather than constructed to deliver aid effectively.

The report finds U.S. expenditures highly inefficient, while failing to

give adequate attention to promoting long term food security in

recipient nations.

 

Mother Jones recently spoke with Murphy, who directs the IATP's Trade

Program, about the report and the reforms it recommends.

 

Mother Jones: Can you define the different types of food aid?

 

Sophia Murphy: Food aid includes any donation given to people who don't

have access to food in other ways—because they're poor, or their own

crops have been destroyed. In the case of aid from the United States,

it's either food that has been bought in the U.S. and shipped over, or

it's cash that the U.S. gives to a country or a relief agency so that

they

can go buy food from somewhere else. Usually it's charitable.

 

There are three broad kinds of food aid. " Program " food includes

government-to-government transfers of food, given as a form of economic

support. There's " emergency " aid—which is what we're seeing right now in

Niger, and saw in the wake of the tsunami—where about half of the U.S.

food aid budget goes. And then there's " project " food aid which is either

given to assist long-term food programs, or else it's allowed to be

monetized—meaning that the aid can be sold in order to raise funds for

operations or other development projects. By law, the U.S. government can

only give 25 percent of its food aid as cash—the rest must actually be

shipped as food. And the vast majority of that food must be grown,

processed and packaged in the United States.

 

As well, the United States—almost uniquely—also sells food as parts of

its " program food " aid. It offers other countries terms that are less

than the commercial rate, and the recipient government can pay the aid

back over 30 years, which is a very generous rate. The recipient

government can then turn around and sell that food in the market in their

country, and then they use the money they make off the sale to support

other budgetary expenditures.

 

MJ: That's interesting. So the United States can actually sell food and

call it aid?

 

SM: The U.S. is pretty much alone in selling food aid. South Korea

occasionally sells food aid to North Korea, but that's the only other

example. And this kind of aid used to make up the majority of American

food

aid, though it's dropped to comprising about 10 percent of all food

aid. But it's still there, and it still goes out. It's pretty

contentious.

So there is pressure to see the program food aid component ended. It's

an anachronism. Most donor governments are trying to rule it out,

saying that if you sell food aid, it's no longer food aid, and it should

count differently.

 

MJ: What do you mean count differently? Who is counting?

 

SM: Well, the major donor countries are members of something called the

Food Aid Convention, and at this convention they declare the minimum

amount that they plan on donating—although they set this level so low

that there is really no danger of missing it. The real issue is that

European nations like France—who have been criticized for their large

agricultural subsidies—are in turn pointing fingers at the United States'

program food aid, claiming that it's essentially an agricultural subsidy.

That issue has held up the most recent convention, and there's some

chance that the debate will be settled in the WTO. I think that would be

very bad, however, since the WTO's power is distributed based on the

basis of its member nation's economic power. That makes it a poor

forum to

make decisions about food aid.

 

MJ: How did the U.S. develop its current food aid policies?

 

SM: These programs were set up in the 1950s, with an eye towards Cold

War diplomacy in the Third World. The United States had post-war

agricultural surpluses, so American food sellers were interested in

developing

future markets for their goods, while still getting paid for extra

yields. So altruistic concerns were somewhat secondary.

 

MJ: Why do places like Sub-Saharan Africa have serious food security

issues?

 

SM: That's a very complicated question. In addition to contemporary

political factors, it goes back to colonialism, which essentially geared

these economies for extraction. Then in the immediate postwar area,

governments were eager to build up industrial sectors in these countries,

so the development of indigenous agricultural capabilities lagged

behind—especially so long as these African countries could rely on

Cold War

food aid.

 

Later on, many African countries had to liberalize their agricultural

commodity boards as a condition of getting loans or other forms of

economic assistance. Certainly these boards were often corrupt, or

mismanaged or had other serious problems. But as national entities,

the boards

did a fairly good job at allocating resources to remote parts of the

country. If you're a Malian cotton farmer and don't live near good

transport, an international cotton buyer isn't going to invest in your

crop,

he'll go elsewhere. But your nation's commodity board might have

invested. The boards provided other supports that the private sector just

hasn't found cash-worthy, like agricultural extension services. And now

that they're gone, in many cases it's hurting both domestic food

production, and production of export crops that could be used to buy food

abroad.

 

MJ:What are some of the biggest problems with the United States'

current food aid system?

 

SM: It's very inefficient. For about every two dollars spent, only one

dollar's worth of food actually reaches a recipient. The bulk of money

spent is actually used to buy crops and ship them abroad, even if

cheaper crops can be found closer to the recipient population. And

shipping

crops is very expensive, not to mention slow.

 

Cash aid, which is far more efficient, accounts for under 10 percent of

the food aid budget. The Bush Administration tried to double that

amount, but Congress didn't approve.

 

MJ: So what kind of reforms does your report call for?

 

SM: Well, the biggest step would be to move to a cash-based aid system,

without the usual requirements that the crops come from the U.S. Donors

should try wherever possible to buy foods regionally. This would be far

more efficient. The U.S. also needs to stop selling food aid and stop

allowing its food aid to be monetized.

 

The main reason reform is so difficult is that there aren't strong

domestic political constituencies that have an interest in moving to

an all

cash based system. The nongovernmental organizations would seem to be

the most likely to push for these changes. But they are happy to be

getting any aid at all, and worry about endangering the flow of food by

pushing too hard for reform. And because many of these organizations get

funds that they need from monetization of food aid, they actually have

an interest in perpetuating the system.

 

I certainly worry about endangering what little aid is coming now. I'm

not out in the field handing out food, so that makes it easier to call

for these sorts of risky changes; but for me, the excuses are no longer

good enough.

 

MJ: Who are the domestic interests benefiting from the current food aid

system?

 

SM: Large agricultural companies like Cargill get the bulk of the

benefits. Because of the ways the laws are written, and certain

purchasing

requirements, there are only a handful of agricultural companies that

can source these foods. And because of these requirements and specific

requests—like this food must be able to leave from this port on this

day—the government usually pays a bit more than market price to buy them.

 

There's also a requirement that 75 percent of the country's food aid

must be transported on a U.S.-flagged ship. Unfortunately, the American

shipping industry has been growing weaker over the years, and it's

become very expensive to use. The U.S. could send a lot more food if this

requirement weren't there, because it would save a lot of money. But this

is well off the food-aid-policy radar, because the provision requiring

it is tucked somewhere obscure in U.S. maritime law.

 

MJ: What about farmers? It's often said that they need this sort of

support.

 

SM: Farm groups often line up with the agricultural lobby when it comes

to votes on food aid. But the money is not going to farmers; it's going

to agricultural conglomerates. Food aid purchases are such a small

percentage of total U.S. agricultural output that they don't make any

appreciable difference in prices. Now, there are a small handful of crops

that are grown pretty much solely to send abroad as food aid—like some

kinds of lentils. And farmers who grew them might be in trouble if the

sourcing requirements were lifted. But it's a very small amount.

 

Now, of course, U.S. food aid purchases are very, very small when

compared with the total U.S. market. It would still be a small amount

if the

foods were sourced in countries nearer to needy areas, but it would be

relatively larger. It could be help to encourage agriculture, and

contribute to regional food security. Which, the way the money is being

spent now, isn't happening at all.

 

 

Clint Hendler is an editorial intern at Mother Jones

 

 

 

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