GMW: Enabling global genetic pollution - the low down on Montreal

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GMW: Enabling global genetic pollution - the low down on Montreal

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Wed, 8 Jun 2005 10:49:19 +0100

 

 

 

 

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Here's a brilliantly clear article on what the recent biosafety

negotiations that Brazil and New Zealand wrecked were really about.

 

The NZ government has been using the opaqueness of the issues that were

being negotiated, and their consequent under-reporting, as a means of

sliding away from the enormity of what they did in Montreal.

 

This article by Lim Li Ching and Lim Li Lin, who were there in Montreal

last week to observe what occurred, explains the background and exposes

the full consequences of New Zealand's intransigence. As they explain,

the derailing of the talks will allow, in the words of one of the

delegates, " global genetic pollution to escape unnoticed and unscathed " .

 

It also details the stages of the negotiations and how from the start,

Brazil and New Zealand seemed intent " on merely blocking and delaying

the negotiations " , rejecting all the various versions of a draft

decision generated over three late night negotiating sessions during

which the

other delegates struggled to find compromises to get around Brazil and

New Zealand's intransigence.

 

The article notes that many delegates were perplexed by New Zealand's

stance as it does not commercially produce or export GMOs, leading them

them to question New Zealand's apparent extreme ideological commitment

to free and uncontrolled trade in this area, which lacked " due regard

for environmental or human health concerns. " It also raised in delegates

minds the question of whose interests New Zealand's position really

benefited.

 

The article also notes how the New Zealand government in the run up to

the talks prevented agreement on decisions being taken by a two-thirds

majority when attempts to achieve a consensus had been exhausted. It

was this which then laid the ground for NZ and Brazil being able to

derail the talks - something which otherwise would have been impossible.

 

Although the authors don't say as much, it now looks suspiciously like

the NZ government signed up to the Biosafety Protocol with the

undeclared intention of wrecking it.

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Brazil, New Zealand block decision on documentation of GMOs

The South North Development Monitor (SUNS), 7 June 2005, issue #5815

 

Montreal, 4 June 2005 (Lim Li Ching and Lim Li Lin) – Negotiations

under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety collapsed on the issue of

documentation requirements for bulk shipments of genetically engineered

commodities, after five days of intense and controversial talks. Two

countries – Brazil and New Zealand – held the talks hostage as they

repeatedly

blocked consensus.

 

The Second Meeting of the Parties (MOP2) to the Cartagena Protocol was

held in Montreal on 30 May-3 June. The meeting was supposed to take a

final decision on the detailed requirements for how to identify and

document shipments of genetically engineered commodities. This issue was

the main work of this meeting.

 

These commodities are known in the Biosafety Protocol as " living

modified organisms that are intended for direct use as food or feed,

or for

processing " (LMO-FFPs). Because of the intransigence of Brazil and New

Zealand, no decision on the issue was adopted at the meeting.

 

The Cartagena Protocol is an international law that regulates the

transboundary movement of genetically engineered organisms. It entered

into

force on 11 September 2003.

 

Article 18.2(a) of the Protocol deals with the detailed requirements in

the documentation that should accompany shipments of LMO-FFPs. This

same topic had been among the most contentious issues during negotiations

for establishing the Cartagena Protocol and was in fact the final issue

to be decided at the meeting that adopted the Protocol in Montreal in

2000.

 

The disagreements on it had then almost caused the negotiations to

break down when major exporter countries tried to exclude these

commodities

altogether. These countries and their allies – the US, Canada,

Australia, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile – called themselves the Miami

Group.

 

As a compromise, in order to obtain agreement on the whole Protocol

text, the other countries were forced to accept that documentation

accompanying LMO-FFPs must clearly identify that the shipment " may

contain "

LMOs and are not intended for intentional introduction into the

environment.

 

MOP 2 should have taken a decision on the detailed requirements for

this purpose, as Article 18.2(a) had a mandate to do so no later than two

years after the Protocol's entry into force (i. e. by September 2005)

and this was the last MOP that could have adopted such a decision.

Already, the meeting of the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group that had

met

in March had ended without agreement, and the draft decision that was

forwarded to MOP 2 was in fact a controversial revised Chair's text on

which there was no consensus.

 

The fact that no decision was adopted leaves open the question as to

whether the mandate of Article 18.2(a) to take a final decision will

expire. No meeting will be held before September 2005, when the mandate

lapses. However, Brazil, which would be the next host of the third

meeting

of the parties (MOP3) in March 2006, clearly indicated that it was

willing to continue discussions on this issue at the MOP3. Other

countries

also made similar references to continuing negotiations on this issue

at MOP 3.

 

The lack of adoption of a decision also leaves open the question as to

which version of the draft text would be the basis of the negotiations

at MOP 3. In total, eleven versions of the draft decision were

discussed. Usually, in such situations, the basis for negotiations

reverts back

to the last agreed text by all Parties.

 

The delegate from Ethiopia, in his closing statement, invited all

delegates from developing countries in the meantime to design through

their

national legislation strict requirements for the documentation

accompanying shipments of LMO-FFPs, instead of waiting till MOP 3 for

a further

decision to be taken on the issue.

 

The majority of Parties had wanted the MOP to require that

documentation accompanying shipments of LMO-FFPs clearly state that

they contain

LMOs and to also provide further details of their identity. In addition,

they were keen to ensure that only LMOs approved in the importing

countries are shipped to them.

 

Brazil and New Zealand, on the other hand, merely wanted the " may

contain " language to remain, and were unwilling to compromise on this

issue.

This position means that shipments of commodity grains need not be

segregated nor tested before leaving the country of export. Shipments of

commodity grains can consist of mixtures of non-LMOs, approved LMOs and

even unapproved LMOs, because of contamination by experimental LMOs.

This allows " global genetic pollution to escape unnoticed and unscathed " ,

as Ethiopia, which was the Chair of the Africa Group, explained.

 

The recent discovery of an unapproved and experimental genetically

engineered maize, Bt 10, which had been inadvertently grown and exported

commercially from the US, is a case in point. In response to this, the

European Union took emergency measures to prevent its entry, by requiring

a certificate accompanying shipments of corn gluten and brewers' yeast

that expressly states that those shipments do not contain Bt 10. This

in effect requires the testing of shipments before export.

 

Because Parties were keen to secure agreement on this very important

issue, most were willing to compromise and accepted that in some specific

cases, the " may contain " language could remain, provided that some

detailed information, such as the identity of the LMOs that are or

might be

in the shipment, were also given. Negotiations had already begun to

proceed in a Contact Group on this basis in late night and early morning

sessions over the week.

 

However, from the start, Brazil and New Zealand seemed intent on merely

blocking and delaying the negotiations. Over three late night

negotiating sessions, various versions of a draft decision were

discussed and at

each turn, rejected by the two countries. At times, Peru and Mexico

also actively supported and advanced the Brazilian and New Zealand

positions.

 

By the last Contact Group session which went on till three in the

morning of 3 June 2005, even intense negotiations within the " Friends of

the Chair " (Malaysia, Ethiopia, Brazil, New Zealand and the EU) failed to

yield any results, despite the majority of countries being prepared to

compromise beyond their respective bottom lines.

 

Many delegates were perplexed by New Zealand's stance as it does not

commercially produce or export GMOs. This led them to question New

Zealand's ideological free trade stance, apparently without due regard

for

environmental or human health concerns, and to ask whose interest this

position benefited. The two main negotiators from New Zealand were

officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

 

Brazil was " once upon a time… a member of the Like-Minded Group of

Developing Countries " during the Protocol negotiations, the Ethiopian

delegate nostalgically recalled. However, domestic developments including

the approval of commercialized plantings of genetically engineered soya,

have clearly led it to break ranks with the Group, which had fought so

hard to protect the environment, health and socio-economic interests of

developing countries in the face of intense pressure from industry and

the main exporters and producers of genetically engineered organisms.

 

The Ethiopian delegate asked if this was " a rift that we have to take

into future consideration when we deal with Brazil " and whether better

protection for developing countries will continue to be " undermined by

Brazil " .

 

Because the Contact Group was unable to come to any consensus on the

draft decision, the last text was sent to the larger Working Group on the

last day of the meeting, with many square brackets.

 

NGOs attending the meeting, outraged by the behaviour of Brazil and New

Zealand in stalling the negotiations, carried out a silent protest

outside the Working Group meeting room, holding up placards with the

words

" Shame New Zealand, Shame Brazil " , reflecting the mood of most of the

delegates. A Brazilian NGO representative, in a closing statement,

stressed that " the Brazilian delegation here does not represent the

position

of most Brazilians " .

 

During the Working Group discussion, the Swiss delegation introduced a

non-paper which was a text that sought to balance the competing

interests. The Swiss proposed that the non-paper should be adopted in its

entirety without any amendments. Despite reservations from Brazil and New

Zealand, this was eventually taken up by the Chair of the Working Group

and forwarded to the Plenary as a Chair's text.

 

During the final Plenary, Brazil and New Zealand again rejected the

Chai''s text outright. Many other Parties and regional groupings,

including the Africa Group and the EU, were willing to accept the

compromise as

a decision to be adopted by MOP 2 even though it was well below what

they had hoped to achieve in this meeting.

 

To break this deadlock, the Asia and Pacific Group suggested that the

MOP revert back to an earlier draft of the decision which better

reflected their interests. That particular text would have required

exporters

to provide a clear statement that the LMOs have been approved in the

Party of import, and to specify what LMOs have been used to constitute

the mixture.

 

Because decisions at the MOP are usually taken by consensus, Brazil and

New Zealand were successful in derailing the talks, and thus, no

decision was adopted on Article 18.2(a). The issue of decision-making

also

came up during discussions on the rules and procedures for the meetings

of the Compliance Committee set up under the Protocol. The Committee, in

its earlier meeting in March, had proposed that decisions could be

taken by a two-thirds majority, provided that all efforts to reach

consensus have been exhausted.

 

However, New Zealand objected to this proposal, and the decision on the

rules of procedure for the meetings of the Compliance Committee was

adopted by MOP 2 with the paragraph on voting remaining in square

brackets. This unresolved issue is also reflected in the rules of

procedure for

the adoption of decisions by the Conference of the Parties to the

Convention on Biological Diversity, the parent convention of the

Cartagena

Biosafety Protocol, which remains in square brackets.

 

But, in actual fact, decisions by a simple majority vote can be taken

by subsidiary bodies to the Convention, and the Compliance Committee can

be considered to be such a subsidiary body.

 

Other decisions were adopted by MOP 2, including on notification; other

scientific and technical issues; documentation requirements for LMOs

for contained use, intentional introduction into the environment, and for

any other LMOs within the Protocol's scope; capacity-building; risk

assessment and risk management; and socio-economic considerations.

 

MOP 2 also noted the report of the first meeting of the Open-ended Ad

Hoc Working Group on Liability and Redress and its conclusions. The

Working Group had met for three days prior to MOP 2, from 25-27 May 2005.

 

At the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP 1) in Kuala Lumpur in 2004, a

clear process to develop an international liability and redress regime

for GMOs was adopted. The decision from MOP 1 stipulates that five

working group meetings will be held over three years, in order to enable

the MOP to fulfill the requirements of Article 27 of the Biosafety

Protocol, including completing its mandate by 2008.

 

At the Working Group meeting in Montreal, the options for the elements

of a liability regime were further elaborated. Importantly,

inter-sessional work will be carried out between now and the Working

Group's next

meeting in February 2006. Countries and other stakeholders were invited

to submit draft text to the Secretariat three months before the next

meeting. The co-chairs of the Working Group, from the Netherlands and

Colombia, will meet before then to develop a draft text on liability and

redress, based on the submissions received.

 

The biosafety talks were also overshadowed by the Canadian Government's

refusal or delay in issuing visas to a number of delegates from

developing countries who had intended to participate in the meetings,

including some government representatives from Ethiopia (the chair of the

Africa Group) and Iran, and civil society representatives from India and

Togo. The Canadian delegation and officials from capital met with some

delegates from Africa to discuss the issue, and gave their promise that

such incidences would not happen again.

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Additional Resources

Documents of MOP-2:

http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meeting.aspx?mtg=MOP-02

(including the draft Decision on LMO-FFPs, UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/2/2)

Daily coverage by IISD Linkages:

http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/bs-copmop2/

 

 

 

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