The U.S. removes the nuclear brakes

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Mon, 30 May 2005 01:54:33 -0400

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Last update - 11:32 26/05/2005

The U.S. removes the nuclear brakes

By Reuven Pedatzur

 

Under the cloak of secrecy imparted by use of military code names, the

American administration has been taking a big - and dangerous - step

that will lead to the transformation of the nuclear bomb into a

legitimate weapon for waging war.

 

Ever since the terror attack of September 11, 2001, the Bush

administration has gradually done away with all the nuclear brakes

that characterized American policy during the Cold War. No longer are

nuclear bombs considered " the weapon of last resort. " No longer is the

nuclear bomb the ultimate means of deterrence against nuclear powers,

which the United States would never be the first to employ.

 

In the era of a single, ruthless superpower, whose leadership intends

to shape the world according to its own forceful world view, nuclear

weapons have become a attractive instrument for waging wars, even

against enemies that do not possess nuclear arms.

 

 

Remember the code name " CONPLAN 8022. " Last week, the Washington Post

reported that this unintelligible nickname masks a military program

whose implementation could drag the world into nuclear war.

 

CONPLAN 8022 is a series of operational plans prepared by Startcom,

the U.S. Army's Strategic Command, which calls for preemptive nuclear

strikes against Iran and North Korea. One of the plan's major

components is the use of nuclear weapons to destroy the underground

facilities where North Korea and Iran are developing their nuclear

weapons. The standard ordnance deployed by the Americans is not

capable of destroying these facilities.

 

After the war in Afghanistan, it became clear that despite the

widespread use of huge conventional bombs, " bunker-busters, " some of

the bunkers dug by Al-Qaida remained untouched. This discovery soon

led to a decision to develop nuclear weapons that would be able to

penetrate and destroy the underground shelters in which the two member

states of the " axis of evil " are developing weapons of mass destruction.

 

The explanation given by administration experts calls these " small "

bombs, which would have a moderate effect on the environment. The

effect of the bomb would not be discernible above ground, the

radioactive fallout would be negligible, and the " collateral damage "

caused to civilians would be minimal.

 

Accordingly, America's deterrent credibility against the " rogue

states " would grow, because it is clear that the U.S. would allow

itself to make use of these " small bombs " - as they would destroy the

weapon sites but not cause the death of many civilians.

 

The war in Iraq, whose purpose was the destruction of Saddam Hussein's

development facilities and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction,

but which led to America's miring in the Iraqi swamp, has increased

the attraction of nuclear weapons. After all, it would have been much

simpler and more logical to destroy Saddam's facilities with a few

" small bombs, " which would not have caused any real damage to the

civilian population, than to become entangled in a ground war that has

resulted in 150,000 American soldiers treading water in the Iraqi swamp.

 

The problem with this argument is that it is hopeless. To understand

this, one may analyze the effect of a nuclear attack of the sort

posited by American military strategists in CONPLAN 8022. Obviously,

the U.S. would not use less than five to ten " small bombs " were it to

attack Iran or North Korea, since, considering the number of relevant

targets in the two countries, anything less would fail to achieve the

goal of deterrence and prevention. According to the plan, each bomb

would have a 10-kiloton yield - about two-thirds of that of the bombs

dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

 

Each detonation of a bomb a few meters underground would destroy most

of the buildings on the surface to a range of two kilometers. After

the explosion, there would be a need to quickly evacuate civilians

from an area of 100 square kilometers, to avoid the deadly effects of

the radioactive fallout; buildings, agricultural crops and livestock

would be affected in an area of thousands of square kilometers, and

depending on wind direction and velocity, there could be a need to

evacuate more people from thousands of additional square kilometers.

 

None of this takes into account the political and psychological

repercussions of using nuclear weapons for the first time in more than

60 years. The Bush administration regards all this as " limited

collateral damage. "

 

The nuclear policy that the Bush administration continues to

formulate, including plans for a preemptive nuclear strike against

states that do not possess such weapons and the development of new

nuclear weapons - is a recipe for disaster. It is a policy that blurs

the line between conventional and nuclear war. This blurring could

undermine the relative strategic stability that has set in since the

Cold War.

 

In addition, the Bush administration's approach contains a message

that is liable to encourage Iran and North Korea to reassess the

contribution such a weapon would make to their own nuclear policies,

possibly providing the incentive that would accelerate such development.

 

Herein lies an inherent contradiction in the American approach that on

the one hand acts with commendable determination to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear arms, but on the other hand, contributes

toward it by adopting an irresponsible nuclear policy.