Fw: Purposely Corrupted Diebold Voting Terminals

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Monday, November 01, 2004 5:41 PM

Purposely Corrupted Diebold Voting Terminals

 

 

 

Purposely Corrupted Diebold

Voting Terminals

By Bev Harris

10-31-4

 

 

 

Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --

 

 

 

1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million

votes at a time.

 

 

 

" By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is

created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches the

correct votes " !!!

 

 

 

The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set. It

takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single location in the

U.S. has implemented security measures to fully mitigate the risks.

 

 

 

This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness.

 

 

 

It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments.

 

 

 

Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS

1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told you about

this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is tampered with. Find

out for yourself if you have this problem: Black Box Voting will be happy to

walk you through a diagnostic procedure over the phone.

 

 

 

Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill in

the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately brought to the

" mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county which adds them all up and

creates the results report.

 

 

 

These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two million

votes at once.

 

 

 

The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen

terminals.

 

 

 

Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would you

rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just one machine,

the central tabulator which receives votes from all the machines? Of course, the

central tabulator is the most desirable target. Findings:

 

 

 

The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly

vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of seconds.

Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with election tampering

in mind.

 

 

 

We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate controls

over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up procedures to mitigate

risks.

 

 

 

Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has since

been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own internal memos

written by its programmers.

 

 

 

Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures needed to

mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to tackle this one, folks,

roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective measures.

 

 

 

In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris, and director Jim March,

filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims by Diebold,

seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its voting system was

secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and appears to be designed for

fraud.

 

 

 

The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly a

year ago. Harris and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy Stephenson visited

the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb. 2004 to inform them of the

problem.

 

 

 

Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using the

system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been implemented.

 

 

 

In fact, Gov. Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by

Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, which would have paid for increased scrutiny

of the voting system in California.

 

 

 

On April 21, 2004, Harris appeared before the California Voting Systems

Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that Diebold had not

corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated and upgraded the GEMS

program.

 

 

 

On Aug. 8, 2004, Harris demonstrated to Howard Dean how easy it is to

change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

 

 

 

On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia Voting

Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of books in GEMS. They

were already convened, and the time for Harris was already allotted. Though the

demonstration takes only 3 minutes, the panel refused to allow it and would not

look. They did, however, meet privately with Diebold afterwards, without

informing the public or issuing any report of what transpired.

 

 

 

On Aug. 18, 2004, Harris and Stephenson, together with computer security

expert Dr. Hugh Thompson, and former King County Elections Supervisor Julie Anne

Kempf, met with members of the California Voting Systems Panel and the

California Secretary of State's office to demonstrate the double set of books.

The officials declined to allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film or attend.

 

 

 

The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting, called in the general

counsel for their office, and a defense attorney from the California Attorney

General's office. They refused to allow Black Box Voting to videotape its own

demonstration. They prohibited any audiotape and specified that no notes of the

meeting could be requested in public records requests.

 

 

 

The undersecretary of state, Mark Kyle, left the meeting early, and one

voting panel member, John Mott Smith, appeared to sleep through the

presentation.

 

 

 

On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed the demonstration.

 

 

 

On Aug 30 and 31, Harris and Stephenson will be in New York City to

demonstrate the double set of books for any public official and any TV crews who

wish to see it.

 

 

 

On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City, and on Sept. 21,

Harris and Stephenson intend to demonstrate the problem for members and congress

and the press in Washington D.C.

 

 

 

Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because it did a

cease and desist on the web site when Harris originally reported the problem in

2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, Harris also offered to show the problem to Marvin

Singleton, Diebold's damage control expert, and to other Diebold execs. They

refused to look.

 

 

 

Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed that the

gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling people to use. If you KNOW

about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

 

 

 

LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.

 

 

 

1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

 

 

 

2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails to

implement all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to mitigate risk.

 

 

 

2004 Inc. All rights reserved.

 

 

 

 

 

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78