Our Worst Fears - Diebold WasEngineering Rigged Elections: Consumer Report Part 1

[Guest guest]

> Tue, 31 Aug 2004 14:56:50 -0700 (PDT)

> Fwd: Diebold found out! Details of how

they change the votes.

>

___________

 

 

> Mon, 30 Aug 2004 17:25:06 -0700 (US Mountain

> Standard Time)

> Fw: Diebold found out! Details of how they

change the votes.

> Monday, August 30, 2004 7:56 AM

>

> Highest priority! Spread the word. Coming elections

> compromised.

> Janis

>

8/30/2004 2:55:05 AM

>

> BULLETIN ITEM: Hackers Have Found It: Our Worst

> Fears - Diebold Was

> Engineering Rigged Elections

>

> This oughta put a shudder right up your spine.

>

> THE PEOPLE MUST DEMAND THAT EVERY ELECTION

> COMMISSION IN THE COUNTRY DEMAND

> THE DIEBOLD OWNER'S BE PERSONALLY PROSECUTED FOR

> FRAUD AND HIGH CRIMES AND TREASON AGAINST THE

CONSTITUTION.

>

>

> Vote Manipulation Program

> Sun, 29 Aug 2004 22:23:06 -0700

>

> VOTE MANIPULATION PROGRAM IN DIEBOLD SOFTWARE

>

> In the voting system that controls 50 million votes

> this fall, both

> paper ballot and touch screen systems, a 2-digit

> trigger invokes

> an election manipulation program in the Diebold GEMS

> central

> tabulator. Contains info on who put it there and why

> current

> security measures won't work, plus practical

> safeguards.

>

> For rest of article go to: 4-part investigative

> series at

>

http://www.blackboxvoting.org>http://www.blackboxvoting.org

>

>

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/114 & PHPSESSID=339ae8449404fefd390

> 502115352c9f9 Our worst fears:

> Submitted by

>

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=user/view/2 & PHPSESSID=339ae8449404fefd39050

> 2115352c9f9

> Bev Harris on Sat, 08/28/2004 - 18:52.

>

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=taxonomy/page/or/1 & PHPSESSID=339ae8449404fe

> fd390502115352c9f9 Investigations

> (Due to its importance, this story is pinned to the

> top. Scroll down

> for

> new daily reports). By entering a 2-digit code in a

> hidden location, a

> second set of votes is created in the Diebold

> central tabulator, a program installed in 1,000

locations, which controls both paper ballots and

> touch-screens, each system handling up to a million

> votes at a time.

 

> http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

> Full story

>

> After invoking the 2-digit trigger, this second set

> of votes can be changed so that it no longer matches

the correct set of votes. The voting system

> will then read the totals from the bogus vote set.

>

> It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to

> date not a single location in the U.S. has

implemented security measures to fully

> mitigate the risks. It is not too late to do so, and

the corrective measures are relatively simple.

>

> This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness. It

> was designed and tested over a series of a dozen

version adjustments, and has been in place for

> four years.

>

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/114 & PHPSESSID=339ae8449404fefd390

> 502115352c9f9

> read more

> ___

>

Consumer Report Part 1

 

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

 

Consumer Report Part 1: Look at this -- the Diebold

GEMS central tabulator contains a stunning security

hole

Submitted by Bev Harris on Thu, 08/26/2004 - 11:43.

Investigations

Issue: Manipulation technique found in the Diebold

central tabulator -- 1,000 of these systems are in

place, and they count up to two million votes at a

time.

 

By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a

second set of votes is created. This set of votes can

be changed, so that it no longer matches the correct

votes. The voting system will then read the totals

from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to

change the votes, and to date not a single location in

the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully

mitigate the risks.

 

This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness. It was

designed and tested over a series of a dozen version

adjustments.

 

Public officials: If you are in a county that uses

GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your

secretary or state may not have told you about this.

You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is

tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this

problem: Black Box Voting will be happy to walk you

through a diagnostic procedure over the phone. E-mail

Bev Harris or Andy Stephenson to set up a time to do

this.

 

For the media: Harris and Stephenson will be in New

York City on Aug. 30, 31, Sep.1, to demonstrate this

built-in election tampering technique.

 

Members of congress and Washington correspondents:

Harris and Stephenson will be in Washington D.C. on

Sept. 22 to demonstrate this problem for you.

 

Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on

paper ballot (fill in the bubble) optical scan

machines, all votes are ultimately brought to the

" mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county

which adds them all up and creates the results report.

 

These systems are used in over 30 states and each

counts up to two million votes at once.

 

(Click " read more " for the rest of this section)

 

The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the

touch screen terminals. Think about it: If you were

going to tamper with an election, would you rather

tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with

just one machine, the central tabulator which receives

votes from all the machines? Of course, the central

tabulator is the most desirable target.

 

Findings: The GEMS central tabulator program is

incorrectly designed and highly vulnerable to fraud.

Election results can be changed in a matter of

seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be

designed with election tampering in mind. We have also

learned that election officials maintain inadequate

controls over access to the central tabulator. We need

to beef up procedures to mitigate risks.

 

Much of this information, originally published on July

8, 2003, has since been corroborated by formal studies

(RABA) and by Diebold's own internal memos written by

its programmers.

 

Not a single location has yet implemented the security

measures needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not

too late. We need to tackle this one, folks, roll up

our sleeves, and implement corrective measures.

 

In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris, and

director Jim March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in

California citing fraudulent claims by Diebold,

seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed

its voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly

vulnerable to and appears to be designed for fraud.

 

The California Attorney General was made aware of this

problem nearly a year ago. Harris and Black Box Voting

Associate Director Andy Stephenson visited the

Washington Attorney General's office in Feb. 2004 to

inform them of the problem. Yet, nothing has been done

to inform election officials who are using the system,

nor have appropriate security safeguards been

implemented. In fact, Gov. Arnold Swarzenegger

recently froze the funds, allocated by Secretary of

State Kevin Shelley, which would have paid for

increased scrutiny of the voting system in California.

 

On April 21, 2004, Harris appeared before the

California Voting Systems Panel, and presented the

smoking gun document showing that Diebold had not

corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated

and upgraded the GEMS program.

 

On Aug. 8, 2004, Harris demonstrated to Howard Dean

how easy it is to change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

 

On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that

the Calfornia Voting Systems Panel watch the

demonstration of the double set of books in GEMS. They

were already convened, and the time for Harris was

already allotted. Though the demonstration takes only

3 minutes, the panel refused to allow it and would not

look. They did, however, meet privately with Diebold

afterwards, without informing the public or issuing

any report of what transpired.

 

On Aug. 18, 2004, Harris and Stephenson, together with

computer security expert Dr. Hugh Thompson, and former

King County Elections Supervisor Julie Anne Kempf, met

with members of the California Voting Systems Panel

and the California Secretary of State's office to

demonstrate the double set of books. The officials

declined to allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to

film or attend.

 

The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting,

called in the general counsel for their office, and a

defense attorney from the California Attorney

General's office. They refused to allow Black Box

Voting to videotape its own demonstration. They

prohibited any audiotape and specified that no notes

of the meeting could be requested in public records

requests.

 

The undersecretary of state, Mark Kyle, left the

meeting early, and one voting panel member, John Mott

Smith, appeared to sleep through the presentation.

 

On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed

the demonstration.

 

On Aug 30 and 31, Harris and Stephenson will be in New

York City to demonstrate the double set of books for

any public official and any TV crews who wish to see

it.

 

On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City,

and on Sept. 21, Harris and Stephenson intend to

demonstrate the problem for members and congress and

the press in Washington D.C.

 

Diebold has known of the problem, or should have

known, because it did a cease and desist on the web

site when Harris originally reported the problem in

2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, Harris also offered to show

the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage

control expert, and to other Diebold execs. They

refused to look.

 

Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are

formally informed that the gas tank tends to explode

on the car you are telling people to use. If you KNOW

about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

 

LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS,

ACCOUNTABLE.

 

1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

 

2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS

that fails to implement all of the proper corrective

procedures, this fall, to mitigate risk.