Chomsky Interview 8/1/04

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> Chomsky Interview 8/1/04

>

> Policy Spectrum

>

> by Noam Chomsky and Merlin Chowkwanyun; August 01,

> 2004

>

> MIT Professor Noam Chomsky is one of the world's

> most perceptive

> social critics. I had the opportunity recently to

> ask him some

> questions concerning a range of subject matter.

> Professor Chomsky's

> latest book is Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest

> for Global

> Dominance. Other works, many recently reissued,

> include American

> Power and the New Mandarins, Manufacturing Consent,

> and Deterring

> Democracy.

>

> Merlin Chowkwanyun: One scholar and activist whom

> you've cited (and

> whom I wish more people knew about and read) is

> Seymour Melman, who

> more than two decades ago articulated the concept of

> a " permanent

> war economy. " What was Melman describing, and how

> does it limit or

> shape a chief executive's foreign policy?

>

> Prof. Noam Chomsky: The term " permanent war economy "

> is attributed

> to Charles Wilson, CEO of GE, who warned at the end

> of World War II

> that the US must not return to a civilian economy,

> but must keep to

> a " permanent war economy " of the kind that was so

> successful during

> the war: a semi-command economy, run mostly by

> corporate executives,

> geared to military production. Among other very

> important

> contributions, Melman has written extensively on the

> harmful effects

> of gearing much of the economy to military

> production rather than to

> civilian needs. What he describes is correct and

> important, but

> there are other dimensions to be considered. After

> World War II,

> most economists and business leaders expected that

> the economy would

> sink back to depression without massive government

> intervention of

> the kind that, during the war years, finally

> overcame the Great

> Depression. The New Deal had softened the edges, but

> not much more.

> Business understood that social spending could

> overcome market

> catastrophes as well as military spending, but

> social spending has a

> downside: it has a democratizing and redistributive

> effect while

> military spending is a gift to the corporate

> manager, a steady

> cushion. And the public is not involved. People care

> about hospitals

> and schools, but if you can " scare the hell out of

> them, " as Senator

> Vandenberg recommended, they will huddle under the

> umbrella of power

> and trust their leaders when it comes to jet planes,

> missiles,

> tanks, etc. Furthermore, business was well aware

> that high-tech

> industry could not survive in a competitive free

> enterprise economy,

> and " government must be the savior, " as the business

> press

> explained. Such considerations converged on the

> decision to focus on

> military rather than social spending. And it should

> be borne in mind

> that " military spending " does not mean just military

> spending. A

> great deal of it is high-tech R & D. Virtually the

> entire " new

> economy " has relied heavily on the military cover to

> socialize risk

> and cost and privatize profit, often after many

> decades: computers

> and electronics generally, telecommunications and

> the Internet,

> satellites, the aeronautical industry (hence

> tourism, the

> largest " service industry " ), containerization (hence

> contemporary

> trade), computer-controlled machine tools, and a

> great deal more.

> Alan Greenspan and others like to orate about how

> all of this is a

> tribute to the grand entrepreneurial spirit and

> consumer choice in

> free markets. That's true of the late marketing

> stage, but far less

> so in the more significant R & D stage. Much the same

> is true in the

> biology-based sectors of industry, though different

> pretexts are

> used. The record goes far back, but these mechanisms

> to sustain the

> advanced industrial economy became far more

> significant after World

> War II.

>

> In brief, the permanent war economy has an economic

> as well as a

> purely military function. And both outcomes --

> incomparable military

> force and an advanced industrial economy --

> naturally provide

> crucial mechanisms for foreign policy planning, much

> of it geared to

> ensuring free access to markets and resources for

> the state-

> supported corporate sector, constraining rivals, and

> barring moves

> towards independent development.

>

> Chowkwanyun: The coup in Haiti occupied headlines

> for about a month

> this past spring, but a scan through the major news

> archives reveals

> a lack of follow-up stories since, save for the

> recent minor surge

> of articles on the U.S. new investigation of

> Aristide's alleged

> corruption. What preliminary interpretations can we

> make about the

> general U.S. press coverage of Aristide's fall from

> power? And how

> can we situate what happened in Haiti in historical

> context?

>

> Chomsky: As press coverage has declined, serious

> human rights

> violations increase, a matter of no interest since

> Washington

> attained its goals. Previous press coverage kept

> closely to the

> officially-determined parameters: Aristide's

> corruption and violence

> in a " failed state, " despite the noble US effort to

> " restore

> democracy " in 1994. It would have been hard to find

> even a bare

> reference to Washington's fierce opposition to the

> Aristide

> government when it took office in 1990 in Haiti's

> first democratic

> election, breaking the pattern of US support for

> brutal dictatorship

> ever since Wilson's murderous and destructive

> invasion in 1915; or

> of the instant support of the Bush-I and then

> Clinton

> administrations for the vicious coup leaders

> (extending even to

> authorization of oil shipments to them and their

> rich supporters in

> violation of presidential directives); or of the

> fact that Clinton's

> noble restoration of democracy was conditioned on

> the requirement

> that the government must adopt the harsh neoliberal

> program of the

> defeated US candidate in the 1990 election, who won

> 14% of the vote.

> It was obvious at once that this would have a

> devastating effect on

> the economy, as it did. Bush-II tightened the

> stranglehold by

> barring aid, and pressuring international

> institutions to do the

> same, on spurious pretexts, therefore contributing

> further to the

> implosion of the society. No less cynical was the

> contemptuous

> refusal of France, which preceded Washington as the

> primary

> destroyer of Haiti, even to consider Aristide's

> entirely legitimate

> request of repayment of the outrageous indemnity

> that Haiti was

> forced to pay for the crime of liberating itself

> from French tyranny

> and plunder, the source of much of France's wealth.

> All of this was

> missing, replaced by lamentations about how even our

> remarkable

> magnanimity and nobility were insufficient to bring

> democracy and

> development to the backward Haitians, though we

> would now try again,

> in our naive optimism.

>

> This illustration of abject servility to power is

> not, regrettably,

> unique. But the spectacle is particularly disgusting

> when the

> world's most powerful state crushes under its boot,

> once again, the

> poorest country in the hemisphere, as it has been

> doing in one or

> another way for 200 years, at first in

> understandable fear of a

> rebellion that established the first free country of

> free men right

> next door to a leading slave state, and on to the

> present. It is a

> depressing illustration of how a highly disciplined

> intellectual

> class can reframe even the most depraved actions as

> yet another

> opportunity for self-adulation.

>

> Chowkwanyun: Recent films and books from

> establishment liberal

> circles focus almost entirely on actions of the Bush

> Administration

> both abroad (the Iraq venture on false pretenses)

> and at home (the

> Patriot Act, for example). Should the analysis

> incorporate more

> events than that, and if so, how far back? How sharp

> a cleave does

> there really exist between the Clinton years and the

> current people

> in the executive branch? Is there

> more continuity than the recent works are

> suggesting?

>

> Chomsky: The Bush administration is at the extreme

> savage and brutal

> end of a narrow policy spectrum. Accordingly, its

> actions and

> policies came under unprecedented criticism in the

> mainstream, in

> conservative circles as well. A good illustration is

> the reaction to

> the National Security Strategy announced in

> September 2002, along

> with the virtual declaration of war against Iraq,

> and the onset of a

> highly successful government-media propaganda

> campaign that drove

> the frightened population far off the spectrum of

> world opinion. The

> NSS was condemned at once in the main establishment

> journal, Foreign

> Affairs, as a new " imperial grand strategy " that was

> likely to cause

> harm to US interests. Others joined in sharp

> criticism of the brazen

> arrogance and incompetence of the planners:

> Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz,

> Cheney, and the rest. But the criticism was quite

> narrow, more

> concerned with style and implementation than

> substance. Typical was

> the reaction of Madeleine Albright, also in Foreign

> Affairs. Like

> others, she criticized the Bush planners. She added,

> correctly, that

> every president has a similar strategy, but doesn't

> smash people in

> the face with it, antagonizing even allies. Rather,

> he keeps it in

> his back pocket to use when needed. She knew of

> course that

> the " Clinton doctrine " was even more extreme than

> the NSS, declaring

> that the US would resort to force unilaterally if

> necessary to

> ensure access to markets and resources, without even

> the pretexts

> of " self-defense " conjured up by Bush propagandists

> and their

> acolytes. But Clinton presented the doctrine

> quietly, and was

> careful to carry out his crimes, which were many, in

> ways that would

> be acceptable to allies and could be justified or

> concealed by elite

> opinion, including the media.

>

> Continuities are real, and go back long before.

> After all, policies

> are largely rooted in institutions, and these are

> quite stable. But

> there are also differences, and even small

> differences can translate

> into substantial outcomes in a system of enormous

> power.

>

> Chowkwanyun: Even though day-to-day conditions and

> structural

> realities in Latin America are generally worse than

> those in the

> United States, political progress in Latin America

> of the past few

> years is inspiring, especially given the stacked

> odds in countries

> like Brazil. What accounts for these successes? Do

> you see an

> opportunity for more solidarity between American

> activists and

> counterparts in other countries, and in general,

> more global

> approaches to activism?

>

> Chomsky: Brazil is a remarkable and illuminating

> case. It is

> instructive to compare the two largest and most

> important countries

> of the hemisphere.

>

> In the forthcoming presidential elections in the US,

> there is a

> choice: between two candidates who were born to

> wealth and political

> power, attended the same elite university, joined

> the same secret

> society that instructs members in the style and

> manners of the

> rulers, and are able to run because they are funded

> by largely the

> same corporate powers. The Public Relations

> industry, which

> basically runs the campaigns, makes sure that they

> keep away

> from " issues " (except in vague and obscure terms)

> and focus

> on " qualities " -- " leadership, " " personality, " etc.

> The public is

> not unaware of its purposeful marginalization. On

> the eve of the

> 2000 election, about 75% of the public regarded it

> as largely

> meaningless -- prior to Florida shenanigans, the

> Supreme Court,

> etc., which were mostly an elite concern. In 2004,

> more appears to

> be at stake and interest is greater, but there is a

> continuation of

> the long process of disengagement mainly on the part

> of poor and

> working class Americans, who simply do not feel that

> they are

> represented. The Harvard University project that

> monitors these

> matters currently reports that " the turnout gap

> between the top and

> bottom fourth by income is by far the largest among

> western

> democracies and has been widening. "

>

> In Brazil, in dramatic contrast, there was an

> authentic democratic

> election. The organized public were able to elect

> their own

> candidate, a person from their own ranks, despite

> barriers far

> higher than in the US: a very repressive state,

> tremendous

> inequality and concentration of wealth and media

> power, extreme

> hostility of international capital and its

> institutions. They were

> able to do so because of decades of serious

> organizing and activism

> by very significant popular organizations: the

> Landless Workers

> Movement, the Workers Party, unions, and others.

> These are all

> lacking in " failed states " with democratic forms

> that have little in

> the way of substance, in which we have elections of

> the kind taking

> place in November 2004.

>

> It is also striking to compare the US reaction to

> the election in

> Brazil today and the election of a moderately

> populist candidate,

> with much less support and much less impressive

> credentials, 40

> years ago. That deviation from good form led to

> intervention by the

> Kennedy administration to organize a military coup,

> carried out

> shortly after the assassination, instituting a

> neo-Nazi National

> Security State of extreme brutality, hailed by

> Washington liberals

> as a great victory for democracy and freedom. Today

> nothing like

> that is considered. Part of the reason is that the

> activism of the

> intervening years has led to much more civilized

> societies in both

> countries. The US population is not likely to

> tolerate the

> unconcealed criminality of the Kennedy and Johnson

> years, nor would

> Brazilians easily capitulate. Another reason is that

> establishment

> of murderous dictatorships is no longer necessary.

> It should hardly

> be a secret that neoliberal mechanisms are well

> designed to restrict

> very narrowly the threat of democracy. As long as

> Brazil accepts

> them, the elected President must reject the program

> on which he was

> elected, and follow the orders of the international

> financial powers

> and investors even more rigorously than his

> predecessor, so as

> to " establish credibility " with the masters of the

> world. One of

> Clinton's impressive achievements was forging these

> bonds more

> firmly, so as to guard wealth and power from the

> threat that

> democracy might actually function.

>

> Of course, none of this is graven in stone. In the

> 1980s, for the

> first time in the history of Western imperialism,

> solidarity

> movements developed in reaction to Reaganite crimes

> in Central

> America, which went far beyond protest; thousands of

> people joined

> the victims, to help them, and to provide them with

> some limited

> protection from the US-run state and mercenary

> terrorist forces that

> were ravaging the region. Still more strikingly,

> they were rooted in

> mainstream circles, including significant

> participation from church-

> based organizations, among them evangelical

> Christians. These

> movements have since extended to many other regions,

> with actions of

> great courage and integrity, and heroic victims,

> like Rachel Corrie.

> Beyond that, for the first time ever, there are

> really significant

> international solidarity movements, based mainly in

> the South, but

> with increasing participation from the North,

> drawing from many

> walks of life and much of the world. Included are

> the global justice

> movements (ridiculously called " anti-globalization "

> movements) that

> have been meeting in the World Social Forum in

> Brazil and India, and

> have spawned regional and local social forums over

> much of the

> world. These are the first serious manifestations of

> the kind of

> international solidarity that has been the dream of

> the left and the

> labor movements since their modern origins. How far

> such

> developments can reach we can, of course, never

> predict. But they

> are impressive and highly promising.

>

> Bitter class warfare in the West is by and large

> restricted to the

> highly class-conscious business sector, which is

> often quite frank

> about its objectives and understands very well what

> its publications

> call " the hazard facing industrialists in the rising

> political power

> of the masses. " But while they have had great

> success in dominant

> sectors of power in the US, and other industrial

> countries, they are

> no more invulnerable than they have been in moments

> of comparable

> triumphalism in the past.

>

> Chowkwanyun: A common trope these days holds that

> academics are

> too " liberal, " " leftist, " or " radical, " etc. What

> are your thoughts

> on this interpretation and on the state of

> contemporary academia in

> general?

>

> Chomsky: I have to admit that I have an irrational

> dislike of the

> word " trope, " and other postmodern affectations. But

> overcoming

> that, this " trope " hardly merits comment. It can

> stand alongside of

> the charge that the media are " too liberal. " These

> charges are not

> entirely untrue. For quite good reasons, the

> doctrinal systems try

> to focus attention on " social and cultural issues, "

> and in these

> domains, it is largely true that professionals

> (academic, media)

> are " liberal " ; that is, they have a profile similar

> to CEOs. Much

> the same is true when we shift to the issues that

> are of major

> concern to the population, but are systematically

> excluded from the

> electoral agenda and largely swept to the side in

> commentary. Take,

> for example, the misleadingly named " free trade

> agreements. " They

> are supported by a substantial elite consensus, and

> generally

> opposed by the public, so much so that critical

> analysis of them or

> even information about them has to be largely

> suppressed, sometimes

> in remarkable ways, well documented. The business

> world is well

> aware of this. Opponents of these investor-rights

> versions of

> economic integration have an " ultimate weapon, " the

> Wall Street

> Journal lamented: the public is opposed. Therefore

> various means

> have to be devised to conceal their nature and

> implement them

> without public scrutiny. The same is true of many

> other issues. It

> is, for example, widely agreed that a leading

> domestic problem is

> escalating costs for health care in the most

> inefficient system of

> the industrial world, with far higher per capita

> expenditures than

> others and poor outcomes by comparative standards.

> The reasons are

> understood by health professionals: privatization,

> which imposes

> enormous inefficiencies and costs, and the immense

> power of the

> pharmaceutical industry. Polls regularly show strong

> public support

> for some form of national health care (80% in the

> most recent poll I

> have seen), but when that is even mentioned, the

> " too-liberal press "

> dismisses it as " politically impossible " (New York

> Times). That's

> correct: the insurance companies and pharmaceutical

> industry are

> opposed, and with the effective erosion of a

> democratic culture, it

> therefore doesn't matter what the population wants.

> The same is

> commonly true on international issues. One finds

> little difference,

> I think, between the academic world and other

> sectors of the

> professional and managerial classes, to the extent

> that broad

> generalization is possible.

>

> Merlin Chowkwanyun is a student at Columbia

> University.

>

>

> [Non-text portions of this message have been

> removed]