Mad Cow 'Firewalls' Just a Smokescreen

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http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF & b=127964

 

Mad Cow 'Firewalls' Just a Smokescreen

 

by Thomas O. McGarity

July 22, 2004

 

It's been seven months since the discovery of a mad

cow-infected Holstein in Washington state, time enough

for the administration to have developed a

comprehensive regulatory response to protect the U.S.

beef supply. Indeed, to listen to the rhetoric of

Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman, you'd think the

administration had done just that. In particular, the

administration is fond of referring to a series of

" firewalls " in place to prevent protein from infected

cattle from reaching the food supply. On closer

inspection, however, it turns out that the

administration's mad cow " firewalls " are more about

public relations than food safety, and that instead of

protecting the beef-eating public, the administration

seems more focused on protecting the beef industry's

profits.

 

Veneman announced the discovery of the first U.S. case

of mad cow on Dec. 23, 2003. Almost in the same

breath, she declared that any risk to public health in

the United States was " extremely low. " Officials

predicted that mad cow would not spread to other

animals because of regulatory " firewalls " USDA and the

Food and Drug Administration had previously erected.

In fact, Veneman boasted, she planned to eat beef for

Christmas. A few days later, USDA and FDA both

announced their intention to strengthen and supplement

existing protections.

 

An investigation by the Center for Progressive

Regulation (CPR) has concluded, however, that the

administration's actions don't match its rhetoric. The

much ballyhooed " firewalls " are so poorly conceived

and implemented that they provide far less protection

than the American consumer expects and deserves. In

particular, a critical loophole in the regulations

permits slaughterhouses to get away with doing no

testing whatsoever for mad cow contamination in edible

meat.

 

The government initially erected three " firewalls " :

controls barring U.S. companies from importing cattle

and feed from countries experiencing mad cow

outbreaks; a surveillance program to identify suspect

cattle and conduct tests on a small number of them;

and restrictions on the kinds of protein that can be

included in cattle feed.

 

After the discovery of the infected Holstein,

officials announced two additional " firewalls " aimed

specifically at protecting human health: a ban on the

use of " downer " (unable to walk) cattle in human food;

and a regulatory program to ensure that highly

infective " specified risk materials, " including

brains, spinal cords and small intestines, do not

contaminate edible meat. Unfortunately, none of these

" firewalls " provide the precautionary protections

implied in the " firewall " metaphor and demanded by the

meat safety laws.

 

USDA shredded its own restrictions on imports when it

covertly permitted U.S. meatpackers to import 33

million pounds of beef from Canada between September

2003 and May 2004 despite Veneman's August 2003

announcement that she was extending a ban on such

meat. And while USDA has expanded its surveillance

firewall, the number of cattle tested for mad cow

disease in the United States is still pitifully small.

Indeed, the program remains entirely voluntary. USDA

has adamantly rejected any sort of universal approach

for testing all cattle, and even refused to let one

company conduct universal testing on its own nickel!

 

FDA promised in January to enhance its feed

restriction firewall by eliminating some questionable

exemptions, but in the face of resistance from the

rendering and poultry industries, it has reneged on

that promise.

 

Most troublesome of all is an obscure, but gaping

loophole in the firewall governing the handling of

" specified risk materials " (SRMs) from slaughtered

cattle. The regulation permits industry to elect not

to implement rigorous standards for specific controls,

simply by asserting – as almost all establishments

apparently have – that mad cow disease is unlikely to

be a problem in their facility. After reaching that

conclusion on their own, companies are allowed to

follow far less rigorous, industry-drafted Standard

Operation Procedures to keep SRM out of edible meat.

They are required to have a written plan, but not to

follow it. Neither are they required to check for mad

cow, or to perform simple tests for brain and other

risky nervous system tissues in edible meat. Not

surprisingly, it appears that most of the beef

industry has taken this less burdensome path. As a

result, the administration's assurances about

safeguards and firewalls, at least with respect to

U.S. beef processing plants, amount to little more

than rhetoric.

 

The sad truth is that the firewalls are designed more

to protect the meat industry from economic loss than

to protect Americans from mad cow. The consequence:

American consumers are at an unnecessarily greater

risk of contracting a debilitating and always fatal

disease.

 

Thomas O. McGarity, an expert in food safety law, is a

professor of law at the University of Texas and

president of the Center for Progressive Regulation.