Open to Attack

[Guest guest]

http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=16968

 

Open to AttackAnne-Marie Cusac, The Progressive

October 15, 2003

Since September 11, 2001, the nation has been on alert about the vulnerability

of chemical facilities. And while the Bush Administration claims that homeland

security is a priority, time after time it has opted to do nothing dramatic to

improve the security of U.S. chemical facilities. All along, it has followed the

wishes of the U.S. chemical industry -- at our peril.

 

The risk to the American people is great. According to the General Accounting

Office, " 123 chemical facilities located throughout the nation have toxic

'worst-case' scenarios where more than a million people in the surrounding area

could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas if a release occurred. "

 

Approximately 700 other plants, says the GAO, " could each potentially threaten

at least 100,000 people in the surrounding area, and about 3,000 facilities

could each potentially threaten at least 10,000 people. "

 

The Bush Administration knows there is a huge security risk. On February 6,

2002, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified

that Al Qaeda could be planning to target chemical facilities. In February 2003,

the Bush Administration announced that terrorists " may attempt to launch

conventional attacks against the U.S. nuclear/chemical industrial infrastructure

to cause contamination, disruption, and terror. Based on information, nuclear

power plants and industrial chemical plants remain viable targets. "

 

The Administration refuses to do what is necessary to protect the American

public from terrorist attacks on chemical plants. Instead, it is listening to

what industry wants.

 

" We haven't even done the minimal things, " says Gary Hart, the former Democratic

Senator from Colorado and one-time Presidential candidate. " There has been zero

leadership from either the White House or the new department " of Homeland

Security.

 

Hart has a lot of credibility on this issue. As co-chair of the United States

Commission on National Security in the Twenty-First Century, he helped author

the commission's prescient report, " New World Coming: American Security in the

21st Century, " published in September 1999. The report warned that, in the

course of the next quarter century, terrorist acts involving weapons of mass

destruction were likely to increase. " Americans will likely die on American

soil, possibly in large numbers, " it said.

 

Hart says that private industry won't spend what it takes to make adequate

security changes. " I don't think many companies are going to disturb their

bottom line, " he says, " unless they are ordered to by the federal government, or

if the President goes on national TV and tells them to do so. " Those orders have

not yet been given.

 

Bush has given primary responsibility for overseeing security improvements in

the chemical industry to the EPA. At first, the EPA appeared eager to take on

the task. In fact, then-EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman even prepared a

speech announcing a new security initiative, according to papers Greenpeace

obtained through an EPA leak and a Freedom of Information Act request.

 

A June 11, 2002, document labeled, " Draft--Pre-decisional--Do Not Cite or

Quote, " concerns a " Rollout Strategy for Chemical Facility Site Security. "

According to the documents, Whitman and Tom Ridge, head of Homeland Security,

were to announce the new policy at the White House.

 

" I am pleased to join Governor Ridge today to announce a series of new

initiatives by the Environmental Protection Agency to advance security at

facilities that handle hazardous chemicals, " Whitman's speech begins.

" Particularly in the post-9/11 era, it should be clear to everyone that

facilities handling the most dangerous chemicals must take reasonable

precautions to protect themselves and their communities from the potential

consequences of a criminal attack. "

 

EPA was going to get right on it. " Starting in July, EPA representatives will

begin visiting high priority chemical facilities to discuss their current and

planned security efforts, " the speech read. " These visits will allow EPA to

survey security and, if appropriate, encourage security improvements at these

facilities. "

 

Despite the detailed preparations, Whitman never gave the speech, and the new

policy was never issued.

 

What happened?

 

Industry weighed in.

 

" We heard from industry, " says a former EPA official who declines to be named.

The chemical lobby insisted that the agency did not have authority to go after

companies that did not adequately safeguard their plants, the official says.

 

Also hearing from industry was Bush's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),

which has a sympathetic ear. The CEQ is located across the street from the White

House and is headed by James Connaughton, who formerly worked as a lobbyist for

power companies.

 

Industry lobbying groups such as the American Chemistry Council and the American

Petroleum Institute were in repeated contact with the CEQ during the summer and

fall of 2002, according to the documents Greenpeace obtained.

 

The American Petroleum Institute vehemently opposed EPA regulation of plant

security under the Clean Air Act. " EPA's existing authority to regulate

'accidental releases' from chemical facilities . . . does not encompass

authority to address terrorist attacks, " reads one document (bold in original)

that the petroleum lobby submitted to the CEQ. The EPA's claim that it has the

" authority to require plant operators to implement counter-terrorism measures

goes far beyond the plain language of the statute and would impose new legal

obligations without the proper legislative authority. "

 

Aware of this argument, the EPA considered introducing legislation that would

have explicitly expanded its authority under the Clean Air Act. Section 112®

assigns chemical plants in this country the general duty of preventing dangerous

accidents. The draft legislation would have broadened this responsibility to

require the chemical industry to take measures to reduce the potential danger of

criminal attacks, including terrorism.

 

A draft of the new general duty clause said, " All chemical facilities handling

extremely hazardous chemicals have a general duty to identify hazards that may

result from releases caused by terrorist or other criminal activity using

appropriate assessment techniques, to design and maintain a secure facility, and

to minimize the consequences of releases that do occur. " EPA Deputy

Administrator Linda Fisher discussed this draft in a May 2002 presentation

entitled " Proposal for Chemical Security Legislation, " according to the

documents.

 

Fisher's presentation included a slideshow that revealed how dire the situation

is. One slide, which explained why the legislation was necessary, asked, " Is

industry safe? No way to answer under current law. "

 

But the EPA backed off on the legislative route as well.

 

While the chemical and petroleum industries were busy putting the skids on the

EPA, they also were working on Congress.

 

Senator Jon Corzine, Democrat of New Jersey, had attempted to attach an

amendment to the Senate's Homeland Security bill that would have granted the EPA

authority to regulate security at plants housing dangerous chemicals. It also

would have required those facilities, when possible, to decrease the amounts of

dangerous substances they store on site.

 

A modified version of Corzine's bill, the Chemical Security Act of 2001, had

received unanimous approval from the Senate's Environment and Public Works

Committee on July 25, 2002.

 

An alarmed chemical industry sprang into action, " mounting daily assaults on the

Republican members of the [Environment and Public Works] committee throughout

August, " reported John Judis in The New Republic last January. An August 29,

2002, letter, signed by thirty members of the chemical and oil industry lobby

and sent to Republican members of the committee, deplored the new bill,

particularly its proposal to " grant sweeping new authority to EPA to oversee

facility security. " The lobbyists objected strongly to a particular provision

that would have required plants to use " inherently safer technologies. " This

would " allow government micromanagement in mandating substitutions of all

processes and substances, " the letter stated, adding that it could " result in

increased security risks. "

 

By September 10, seven out of the nine Republican members on the committee bowed

to the pressure, issuing a letter against the Corzine bill, claiming it

" severely misses the mark " (emphasis in the original).

 

During that same summer, members of the American Chemistry Council (ACC) " gave

more than $1 million in political contributions, most of it to Republicans.

Eight Senators who were critical of the Corzine bill have received more than

$850,000 from the ACC and its member companies, " according to a Common Cause

report dated January 27, 2003.

 

Frederick Webber, then head of the American Chemistry Council, was a prominent

donor to President Bush's 2000 campaign, having agreed to raise $100,000 in

funding for it and recruiting " more than twenty-five chemical industry

executives to be Bush fundraisers, " said Common Cause.

 

In addition to the industry efforts to lobby the Senators, the American

Petroleum Institute was again in close contact with the CEQ, repeatedly sending

copies of its " talking points " on the Corzine amendment to CEQ staff.

 

A September 6, 2002, fax from Red Cavaney, president and CEO of the American

Petroleum Institute, to James Connaughton, chairman of the CEQ, includes a

handwritten message, " Urgent--Please deliver. Hard copy to follow. " The letter,

which begins " Dear Jim, " says that if the EPA gains authority to oversee the

anti-terrorism measures of industry, " a year's worth of close cooperation and

partnership between industry and a wide variety of qualified federal security

experts may well be marginalized. "

 

When Corzine attempted to introduce his legislation as an amendment to the

Homeland Security bill, the Republican Senators blocked a vote, effectively

killing the bill. On November 19, the Homeland Security bill passed the Senate.

The bill did not include Corzine's amendment.

 

Nor did the bill include any other binding provisions for security at chemical

plants.

 

The industry is proud of the role it played in nixing the plans for heightened

security.

 

" The reason we're organized is to tell the government what would work well to

take care of certain problems, " says Bill Hickman, spokesman for the American

Petroleum Institute, in response to questions about whether the organization

pressured the government on security issues. " We always are talking to the

government. We always are telling them what will work best. We're familiar with

these issues and think we're pretty good advisers to the government. "

 

When I approached the American Chemistry Council for comment, Kate McGloon, a

spokeswoman for the organization, asked, " Is there anyone you need to talk to? "

She instantly offers to put me in touch with people inside the Department of

Homeland Security and the EPA.

 

Marty Durbin, director of federal relations and team leader for security at the

American Chemistry Council, says his organization had some problems with

Corzine's bill because it would have given primary jurisdiction over chemical

plant security " to EPA rather than to the Department of Homeland Security. " EPA

officials, he says, " are not the right folks to be doing security. "

 

Although Corzine reintroduced his bill this year, a bill by Senator James

Inhofe, Republican of Oklahoma, is also under consideration. The Inhofe bill,

which the American Chemistry Council says is more to its liking, would remove

chemical plant security oversight from the EPA and place it in the hands of the

Department of Homeland Security. Gary Hart has criticized the Inhofe bill for

including " virtually no oversight or enforcement of safety requirements. "

 

Corzine is incredulous at the lack of government oversight and the risk that

entails. " Our chemical facilities represent a clear vulnerability in our war

against terrorism, " he says. " Yet, as common-sense security measures continue to

stall in Congress, this appears to be a classic instance of the special

interests trumping the public interest. More than two years after the attacks on

the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, we have not taken the first step in

setting national security standards for our chemical infrastructure. " Corzine is

blunt about who is at fault: " The Administration is putting the interests of

industry ahead of the safety of the American people. "

 

Chemical companies depend on the rails to transport hazardous chemicals, and the

Department of Transportation has also buckled under industry pressure.

 

If chemical security is the weak link in homeland security, says Rick Hind,

legislative director for the Greenpeace Toxics Campaign, " railroad shipping is

the weak link within that. In order to make a dangerous chemical plant

dangerous, you have to ship dangerous chemicals. And that goes right through the

backyard of America. "

 

Like the EPA, the Department of Transportation initially moved to tighten things

up. On May 2, 2002, it issued notice that it was preparing a new rule governing

security requirements for those who sell or transport hazardous materials. One

requirement said, " Routes should minimize product exposures to populated areas

and avoid tunnels and bridges, where possible. "

 

The DOT's announcement resulted in almost 300 responses, nearly all of them from

affected industries, particularly chemical, petroleum, and fertilizer companies,

including the Chlorine Institute, Formosa Plastics, Monsanto, Phillips

Petroleum, Dupont, Dow Chemical, BASF, the American Petroleum Institute, the

American Chemistry Council, the Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, the Fertilizer

Institute, and the Institute of Makers of Explosives.

 

" About ten to twenty " of the comments on the rulemaking asked that the language

about routes " be removed because it would have locked them in or restricted what

they could do in setting up their individual security plans, " says Joe

Delcambre, a public affairs representative in the Research and Special Programs

Administration at the Department of Transportation. " To give the industry more

latitude in how they were going to set up their security plans, " he says, " we

backed off on the wording. "

 

The department's final rule, issued in March of this year, completely omits the

language about preferable routes.

 

" There's nothing really in there that says anything about restricting transport

at any time, " says Hind. He expected the rule at least to require constraints on

dangerous chemicals in heavily populated areas during orange alerts. " But they

didn't even do that, " he says.

 

In September, the Sierra Club photographed a rail tank car carrying chlorine

near the U.S. Capitol. Greenpeace took notice. " We are formally requesting

immediate action by the Secret Service to address a near and present danger to

the President, Vice President, Speaker of the House, and all other national

leaders living and working in Washington, D.C., " Hind wrote to the Secret

Service. By the EPA's own worst-case estimates, a leak from one ninety-ton rail

car of chlorine could kill or injure " people in the Congress, the White House,

and any of 2.4 million local residents within fourteen miles, " Hind wrote.

 

Greenpeace isn't the only one raising alarms. On June 20, FBI Special Agent Troy

Morgan, a specialist on weapons of mass destruction, addressed a chemical

security summit in Philadelphia. " You've heard about sarin and other chemical

weapons in the news, " he said, according to the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. " But

it's far easier to attack a rail car full of toxic industrial chemicals than it

is to compromise the security of a military base and obtain these materials. "

 

Jerry Poje is a member of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation

Board. This government organization was formed in the wake of the December 2,

1984, Union Carbide disaster that killed thousands of people in Bhopal, India.

He, too, is worried about chlorine. " It's a chemical whose use is very common in

the country, " says Poje. " There are many, many, many rail cars " filled with it.

 

Industry says it can adequately monitor itself. The American Chemistry Council,

for one, has adopted a " Security Code of Management Practices. " Member companies

are supposed to conduct vulnerability assessments using methodologies designed

by approved organizations, implement a security plan, and submit their security

measures to outside verification.

 

However, the organization is not specific in its security requirements. For

instance, it doesn't require background checks on guards. It doesn't require

companies to minimize the dangerous chemicals they store on site. It doesn't

require companies to fix holes in their fences. " You can't really have a

cookie-cutter approach " to different plants, says Durbin. He also says that each

chemical facility gets to choose the person who verifies that it has actually

carried out a security plan.

 

The GAO studied industry's voluntary efforts. Its March 2003 report is entitled

" Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities but the Extent of

Security Preparedness Is Unknown. " The title pretty much sums up the problem

with security in the chemical industry. We don't know what's going on.

 

" To date, no one has comprehensively assessed the security of chemical

facilities. No federal laws explicitly require that chemical facilities assess

vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard their facilities against

terrorist attack, " says the report. " No agency monitors or documents the extent

to which chemical facilities have implemented security measures. Consequently,

federal, state, and local entities lack comprehensive information on the

vulnerabilities facing the industry. "

 

The GAO report reveals that the EPA is worried about the voluntary initiatives,

which " raise an issue of accountability, since the extent that industry group

members are implementing voluntary initiatives is unknown. "

 

In the end, voluntary security initiatives collide with the need to save money.

" According to industry officials, chemical companies face a challenge in

achieving cost-effective security solutions, noting that companies must weigh

the cost of implementing countermeasures against the perceived reduction in

risk, " the GAO report says.

 

The GAO's observation that money is getting in the way of security at our

chemical plants is borne out by a research report by the Conference Board, a

business organization. Entitled " Corporate Security Management: Organization and

Spending Since 9/11, " the research found that " the median increase [from October

2002 to February 2003] in total security spending is only 4 percent. "

 

The reason for the overall lack of spending on security, concluded the

Conference Board, was economics. " The perceived need to upgrade corporate

security has clashed with the perceived need to control expenses until the

economy recovers, " it reported.

 

The American Chemistry Council says it does not yet have figures on what its

member companies are spending on security.

 

Gary Hart has not stopped issuing warnings. In 2002, he co-chaired another

report, this one sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. Entitled

" America Still Unprepared--America Still in Danger, " the report cautioned, " A

year after September 11, 2001, America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent

and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In all likelihood,

the next attack will result in even greater casualties and widespread disruption

to American lives and the economy. "

 

On August 11, Hart published an op-ed in The Washington Post. " The government

has failed to plug a gaping hole in homeland security: our vulnerable chemical

plants, " he wrote. Those plants " are among the potentially most dangerous

components of our critical infrastructure. Securing them requires urgent

action. "

 

Hart blames the Administration's inaction on " coziness with the private sector,

their campaign contributions, their political alliances. " This Administration,

he tells The Progressive, has a tendency to " put those political alliances ahead

of national security. "

 

Saying he is " very frustrated " at the Bush Administration's negligence, Hart

warns: " We will be attacked again. "

 

Anne-Marie Cusac is an investigative reporter for The Progressive.

 

 

 

© 2003 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.

 

 

 

 

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