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Natya-Sastra: The Performing Arts as Cognitive Theory

Creativity: Dance

 

 

Binding Experiences for a First-Person Approach

 

Looking at Indian Ways of Thinking (Darsana) and Acting (Natya) in

the Context of Current Discussions on 'Consciousness'

by Sangeetha Menon, PhD, National Institute of Advanced Studies,

Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bangalore, India 560 012

 

By following the current discussions on consciousness in the West,

firstly, one gets to think that the understanding of consciousness is

dependent on the understanding of if not brain, physical processes

guided by a mechanism and having the capabilities for replicating the

phenomenon in vitro with the help of controlled experiments; secondly

there is not a consensual definition of the problem, method and the

major goals of enquiry itself; and thirdly there is insufficient

recognition of the very complexity and subjective nature of the

phenomenon. All the three features have jointly contributed towards

generating vast literature, dialogues and discussions about a variety

of issues relating to consciousness, the primary being empirical

research and medical possibilities, especially in the area of

'abnormalities'.

1. Introduction

 

Binding experiences has been the single most issue in the center of

focus in the last decade of discussions on 'consciousness' crossing

disciplines: neurobiological, quantum mechanical, computational,

theoretical, psychological etc. Though the details of what constitutes

'experience' differ from method and perspective, a consensus has

emerged that (i) to explain 'consciousness' is to explain

'experience'; (ii) to explain experience is to explain its unity and

binding nature. Following this preliminary consensus, however implicit

it was, many discussions took place/are taking place from the first,

second and third-person perspectives, though the main stream

discussion is still dominated to a greater extent by third-person

approaches.

 

Given the complexity of 'experience' as a phenomenon for

investigation, or as involved in our understanding, it is helpful to

look at alternative views about what constitutes an 'experience'. I

hope to do this with the help of instances from Indian epistemology

and Indian dramaturgy. I will be looking at two different traditions

of thinking and experiencing: Indian epistemology in the classical

systems of Indian thought and Indian dramaturgy as dealt with in the

classical text Natya Sastra. By doing this I hope to resurface the

importance of 'experience' as lying in its nuances and juxtapose it

with as it is conceptualized now in the 'consciousness' discussions

(which is reduced to third-person physical data, deprived of

first-person intimacy, and also the depth and breadth of meaning). The

attempt is to present the thesis that if consciousness cannot be

understood without looking at 'experience', certainly experience

cannot be reduced for convenient reductive (physical, psychoanalytic

and cultural) methods of understanding but will have to be open for a

variety of meanings validated from first-person perspectives. This

will definitely take away the reductive scientific monopoly of

explaining consciousness in a singular way, but will encourage

scientific methods to reexamine the normative criteria for 'truth' and

'reality'.

2. The One Puzzle

 

I think there is an interesting and serious turn taking place in the

current discussions on consciousness. This turn is based on and

compelled by the intractable relationship of 'consciousness' with

'experience'. The nearest empirical idea for the unity and subjective

nature of consciousness is 'experience'. Hence the scientific focus on

'experience'. The interesting part of the discussions is that though

there is a recognition of experience as vital in the study of

consciousness, the attempt itself is to strip 'experience' off the

qualities which would make it of experiential nature (unitary and

subjective) and study it on the basis of empirical standards such as

causal connections, neural influences, neural locations etc. I am not

suggesting that brain research is not needed or even less important.

Certainly, it is very significant in its own right. But if our

guidelines and methods are not based on our basic premise to study

consciousness (experience, which is unitary and subjective) then

certainly we cannot make a claim that brain studies apart from giving

new knowledge about brain functions would also lead to a complete

theory of consciousness. The puzzle in the current discussions on

consciousness is that of the persistent conflict between epistemology

and phenomenology.

 

If we look at the major semantic trends in the current discussions,

the views which are discussed and debated no more fall into the

classical division of reductionistic and non-reductionistic, or

empirical and non-empirical approaches. However third-person the

approach is, when it comes to the descriptive definition of

consciousness, the ideas are based on qualitative features of

consciousness. The discussions on empathy1, meaning2 meme3, and mirror

neurons4 are some instances. On the other side, the growing amount of

discussions on meditation5 and altered states of consciousness6 give

third-person references, however subjective the discussed experience

is. A possible reason for this trend to interrelate and bridge

first-person experience and third-person definition is the recognition

of a distinct characteristic of 'consciousness', namely, that it is

not completely defined by empirical standards and completely

understood by first-person experience7.

3. Self and Meaning

 

The extent of the meanings imputed to 'consciousness' most often

crosses the empirical limits and sometimes even becomes diffused to

qualitative experiential descriptions. The one major problem in

consciousness studies is the semantics of 'consciousness'.

Unfortunately this prominent meta-analysis of the discussions is

dismissed in recent discussions8. It is very important that there is

not only a well laid out definition for the problem but also a

methodological consistency. This does not mean that even before the

enquiry a complete theory of consciousness is anticipated. To have the

semantics of consciousness given importance in the start itself means

that the theory will not be drawn based on the limitations of the

methods, but on the original contention about 'consciousness'.

 

What exactly are we trying to understand by the study of

consciousness? The answers could range from neural functions to

subjective experience. It is again interesting to see that the

meanings we give for 'consciousness' is much larger conceptually than

the strict semantic (in current discussions) definition of

consciousness. This is even clear at the starting point of discussion

when the immediate reference is to 'experience'.

 

It is in this context, I wish to juxtapose the idea of 'self' as an

alternative to the discussions of consciousness. The word 'self' is

more comprehensive than the word 'consciousness' since it includes

connotations at different levels of experience and also of the

subjective identity which is important to understand unity of experience.

 

The discussion about consciousness is discussion about experience. The

discussion about experience is discussion about the 'self'.

'Experience' and 'self' certainly relates to something which is more

than what is happening in the brain, more than abnormal conditions,

more than ordinary conditions, more than transcendental states9.

4.1. Indian Thinking

 

There are two key ideas in classical Indian philosophical thinking

which would strike the attention of any student. These are 'atma' and

'darsana'. These words perform a major double function, which is also

the distinctive feature of the whole of Indian thinking, of combining

epistemology and phenomenology. For this reason, 'atma' could mean

either the 'self' who is engaged in a particular act, or the self

which is untouched by any act; darsana could mean discursive thought

or intuitive thinking. The basic reason for such a foundational trend

in the whole of Indian philosophical thinking goes beyond the felicity

of a strict structural language (Sanskrit). It is an attempt not to

break apart, and define, 'self' into identities based on the context;

experience into ordinary and extraordinary; at the same time give

thinking and understanding a depth which would be inclusive and

open-ended but not divisive and hierarchical.

 

4.1.1.What constitutes darsana and what does not

Before I get to the details of the epistemology of darsana, I would

briefly look at what constitutes darsana, and what does not. The word

'darsana' connotes the philosophical enterprise to think and to delve

with ideas so as to:

 

i) ascertain what is true knowledge,

ii) to understand new ideas, and,

iii) to understand the nature of the enquirer himself.

 

Jnana is a complex concept in classical Indian thinking. It not only

refers to logical and epistemological methods and answers but also

states of mind which are important in the discussion about the primal

nature of self. Hence, the discussions on jnana and pramana are always

interrelated to understanding ethical, axiological, aesthetic and

spiritual issues. There is a constant attempt to reconcile and

integrate different experiences, and the existence of contradictions

so as to generate world views based on an understanding of life with

answers for fundamental questions about self-identity, nature of

world, creation, purpose of life, value systems etc. There is a

wide-spread criticism that darsana does not have teleological value

and does not extend its scope for change and modification. This

perception might have been influenced by the complex method used by

the schools using a variety of epistemological tools such as

metaphors, imageries and stories, as equally valid, along with logical

analysis, anticipating counterpositions and affiliation to definite

theories of what constitutes right knowledge. Not strictly adhering to

a definite pattern of enquiry could lead to the thinking that what is

offered is a closed philosophical position to save the proponent and

the follower of that particular tradition. What the darsanakara-s are

interested in is to give a new place for emerging ideas in the

worldview and allow a new understanding crossing structural rigidity

in thinking. Clearly, what is not the feature of darsana is an

empirical haste to explain away things.

4.2. Epistemology of Darsana

 

4.2.1.Epistemological openness

Indian epistemology is constituted by complexes more than singular

concepts. I will list a few such complexes, without going into the

technical details, to demonstrate that Indian epistemology is an

open-ended and integral enterprise.

 

4.2.2.Guidelines for discourse

Concepts and categories are vital to any kind of discourse. The school

which perfected the art of discourse in Indian thinking was Nyaya.

Tarkasamgraha which is the foundational text of logic and discourse is

also the text followed, for that reason, by later schools in

developing their own theories. What makes Tarkasamgraha so very

interesting and foundational is the way in which it defines and

elucidates the necessary components for a discourse from both an

epistemological and subjective point of view. Both definition

(laksana) of an entity or idea, and the guidelines for discourse

(anubandha catustaya) are discussed with equal importance in the text.

The meaning of the word tarka also is specific, in that it does not

imply a pure logical analysis but a complex activity of discourse

guided by strict definitions and goals so as to have " …a compendious

elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and such other

ontological categories… " .10

 

There are sixteen padartha which one studies inorder to master Nyaya

dialectics. A padartha is defined as a " …knowable thing (jneya) or as

a validly cognizable thing (prameya) or as a nameable or denotable

thing which corresponds to a word (abhidheya) " . 11 These categories

are means of knowledge (pramana), objects of valid knowledge

(prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (prayojana), instances (drstanta),

established conclusions (siddhanta), members of syllogism (avayava),

analysis (tarka), decisive knowledge (nirnaya), arguing for truth

(vada), arguing constructively as well as destructively for victory

(jalpa), destructive argument (vitanda), fallacious reasons

(hetvabhasa), quibbling (cala), specious and unavailing objections

(jati), and vulnerable standpoints (nighrahasthana). 12 The discussion

on padartha is an elaborate one in classical thinking.

 

The concept of 'definition' (laksana) is another complex, which

according to Nyaya tells what an entity 'is' by saying what it 'is

not'. Definition is " …not merely an explication of the connotation of

a term; but it is a proposition specifying the differentia or the

differentiating feature of the species or the thing defined " .13

Laksana is defined as a specific feature (asadharana dharma) which is

free from the three faults of a definition such as over-applicability

(ativyapti), partial inapplicability (avyapti) and total

inapplicability (asambhava). A definition will be faulty by ativyapti

when it refers to certain qualities which is characteristic of the

entity defined as well as of something not intended to be defined. A

definition will be faulty by avyapti when the definition does not

refer to some of the characteristic features of the entity defined. A

definition will be faulty by asambhava when the definition refers to

qualities which are totally non-characteristic of the entity defined.

 

4.2.3.Guidelines for teleology

Another important complex which is considered in almost all schools of

Indian thinking is the notion of anubandha catustaya (four-fold

preliminaries) though this is well specified as a part of dialectics

in Tarkasamgraha. The four-fold preliminaries for any discourse is

visaya (theme of discourse), prayojana (major goal), sambandha

(relation between the theme of discussion and the treatise), and

adhikari (for whom a discourse is designed). 14 The trend of

specifying the objective and subjective guidelines of a discourse is

also found in the foundational texts of Vedanta and Mimamsa. The

starting verse of the text specifies the nature of enquiry such as for

brahman, dharma etc.15 The defining characteristic of a discourse

clarifies any doubt which would ensue later in the discourse about

what the discourse is guided by. The thematic specification of the

discourse would also help the student to have a clear picture about

what the discourse would not talk about or to what theme it would

restrict to. Even if the theme of the discourse is given prior to

entering into the discourse the discussion could at some point raise

the question of teleology in the mind of the student. Hence the theme

as well as the purpose of a discussion on such a theme is specified

initially. Though it could be a meta-question outside the scope of the

discourse it is essential also to anticipate atleast to some extent

the relation between the discourse and the theme of the discourse

itself which would enable to understand how far the treatise or

discourse is representative of the theme. The final and the most

important preliminary factor for any discourse is to specify who is

qualified to enter into such a discourse. This is a major rule for

meta-discourse, which I think, is almost forgotten in the current

discussions on a complex theme like 'consciousness'. The recognition

of the aptitude of the person as playing a vital role in the success

of discourse and understanding implies the subjective factor involved

in epistemological enterprises. It also implies that understanding is

always finally related to the basic aptitude of the student, which

once again anticipates the essential relation between epistemology and

phenomenology, knowledge of something and experience. One instance of

expounding the nature of adhikari could be seen in the primal text of

Advaita 'Tattvabodha' where Sankaracarya talks about 'sadhana

catustaya'. 16

 

4.2.4.Guidelines for validation

The issue of validation (pramanya) is a very important complex

extensively dealt with by the schools of Indian thinking. The

discussion on validating knowledge ranges from theories of knowledge

to theories of reality. The word 'pramana' etymologically means 'means

of measurement' or 'that which produces knowledge'.17 The concept of

pramana though initially could be interpreted as a theory of

knowledge, of ascertaining knowledge, its function will not be

completely understood without taking into consideration two of the

characteristic features of pramana as perceived by most of the

classical schools of Indian thinking. These two characteristics

'abhadhitatva', of non-contradiction, and 'anadhigatatva', of novelty,

lays down the condition for validating knowledge.18 A knowledge

statement is out of validation to be true or false if there could be

another knowledge statement which contradicts the claim of the

previous statement. Being non-contradicted by another statement alone

does not perform the role of validation. The characteristic of

non-contradiction is to be also followed by the feature of novelty.

Discovery of new knowledge is as important as ascertaining of it.

Validation also has to look into the possibility of newness whether it

is epistemological or ontological. The feature of 'novelty' implies

once again the epistemological openness evident in Indian thought.

 

A major distinction in the Indian theories of knowledge is regarding

the position on the origin (utpatti) and ascertainment of validity

(jnapti). The validity of a cognition is decided, to some schools, by

the presence of certain characteristics intrinsic to knowledge, and to

some other schools, by the presence of certain characteristics

extrinsic to knowledge. Following the same line of thinking, the two

positions about invalidity of knowledge are that it is decided by

extrinsic characteristics or intrinsic characteristics. Validity

itself is ascertained to some schools by its very intrinsic nature

(svatapramanah), and to some schools by its extrinsic nature

(paratapramanah).

 

4.2.5.Two paradigms

There are two paradigms in the classical schools, inspite of the

differences in their metaphysical and epistemological positions. These

are i) what we see and experience, which is constituted by the given

and the immanent, ii) what we can see and experience which is

constituted by the possibilities and the transcendent. It is within

these two paradigms that the elaborate and detailed discussion on

fundamental experiences such as pain and pleasure, sorrow and

happiness, selfishness and selflessness, freedom and bondage, the

given and the possible etc. takes place. Darsana is an attempt to

bridge the seemingly two contradicting paradigms through an

exploration of the self based on systematic discussions on i)

theoretical, ii) experiential, and iii) transcendental issues.

 

4.2.6.What falls under theoretical issues

Theoretical problems are envisaged by the building of tools for

thinking such as abstraction, generalization and conceptualization

guided by the question of meaning, certainty and new knowledge. The

factorization of 'new knowledge' in epistemology gives importance to

intuitive thinking all through the discussion. A general division can

be made of the theories the darsanakara-s debate on, such as:

 

i) theory of what is given: which relates to ontological questions

about the nature of the world, the nature of the self, the nature of

life and death,

 

ii) theory of the what and how of knowledge which relates to

epistemological questions about meaning and validity,

 

iii) theory of what is beyond the given (if any) which relates to

metaphysical and teleological questions about the nature of God, the

nature of ultimate causes, the nature of self and the nature of reality,

 

iv) theory of spiritual, mental and physical discipline which

relates to questions about ethical issues, value systems, duty,

responsibility, selfishness, transcendences and new perceptions about

self-identity.

 

4.3. Experience of Darsana

 

4.3.1.Metaphysical openness

If we examine the classical schools of Indian thought, we find that

though each school allows elaborate discussion on the epistemology of

its philosophy, the foundational thought is metaphysical. But the

metaphysical foundation is not be mistaken for dogmatic and closed

ideas. The metaphysical openness of ideas is evident from the fact

that they are based on certain teleological assumptions. Discussions

on the nature of (self) is juxtaposed with the physical (as in Carvaka

system), ethical or spiritual guidelines as in almost all schools. To

understand the given nature of self and its transcendent possibilities

the understanding of self is important. The key feature of such an

understanding is that it is not an epistemological exegesis but a

first-person phenomenological examination. The concept of jnana is a

complex concept and is not be merely translated as 'knowledge' as we

understand it in popular fashion. The discussion on the given and the

transcendent self (jiva and atma) is guided by the continous and

rigourous distinguishing of the one from each other at every instance

of experiencing. The conflict between the near and given nature of

self, and the distant and transcendent nature of self forms the focus

of attention for the darsana. The attempt of darsana is to solve the

conflict in such a manner that the duals involved in it are integrated

than segregated. The idea of liberation hence is not a singular event

in time but a constant understanding and experiencing of the

complexity of the contradiction of the given and the transcendent. The

distinguishing of the atma and anatma (the real nature and the given

nature of self), atma anatma vyaparah, is the singlemost exposition

for which the rest of the epistemological, ethical and

phenomenological theories are expounded. It is the metaphysical

openness which is the hallmark of Indian thinking.

 

4.3.2.Spiritual and ontological openness

In recent discussions the word 'spiritual' has gained new meanings

many of which emphasize the role of personal growth, ecological

awareness, empathy, intersubjective transactions, emotional well

being, efficiency in expressions, creative living. The distinct

feature of the philosophical traditions of Indian thinking is its

spiritual openness, by which I mean, not just a liberal philosophy,

but the facility to integrate new experience and new understanding

into an evolving scheme of ideas all leading and pointing to

self-exploration. The ideal of spiritual living is given foremost

importance than to moral and epistemological theories. It is not to

say that the ethical guidelines and practices are less important in

these traditions but to suggest that all such theories and discussions

are addressed from a spiritual platform which discusses the nature of

self and the world of experience and the relationship between them.

Liberation is the key concept however radically different the

guidelines for it suggested by different schools are. Identity and

self are the key problems addressed to with the help of metaphysical

positions, epistemological theories and ethical guidelines. The

breadth and length of discussions in darsana is interestingly just not

different discussions on what exactly the nature of self is, but

mutually reinforcing dialogues on the consensus view that all

discussions are to be guided by the co-coordinating concept of 'self'.

Invariably the discussions in darsana are discussions leading from the

recognition of 'self' and 'identity' as larger categories for

thinking. It could be of this reason that epistemology (tarka) does

not have the supremacy in deciding the course of events and

validation, but only with equal participation of reflective thinking

(vicara) in discourse. Analytical thinking could be delivering its

goods only if it is accompanied by reflective (vicara) and intuitive

(nidhidhyasana) thinking.

 

4.3.3.What falls under experiential and transcendental issues

An interesting characteristic in the classical systems of Indian

thinking is the overriding issue above all issues to connect and

catapult from what would be considered as the given to what is

possible. The conception about experience is not strictly what is

caused by an extraneous factor/s but what could be possible by the

distinctive and unique nature of the individual. Therefore, experience

is not merely a theme for understanding based on its immediate context

such as cause, or results, but a tool for further exploration of the

self. The ordinariness and extra-ordinariness of an experience is

understood from the standpoint of the self than from the standpoint of

what causes it. This trend also impels the understanding of the self

along with the understanding of the object of experience. The object

of experience, result of experience and the experiencer constitutes

the triad of the complex phenomenon of experience, each one of which

is significant in the understanding of each other.

 

The major experiential issues which are discussed in the classical

schools are also interconnected with the major transcendental issues.

Thus the experience and understanding of pain and pleasure are

connected with guidelines for transcending pleasure and pain;

experience and understanding of freedom and bondage are connected with

the guidelines for transcending self-identities and rigid perceptions

about the context; experience and understanding of different states of

mind are connected with the guidelines for transcending words, verbal

structures and attributed meanings.

 

4.3.4.Junctions and meeting points

The junctions and meeting points between the discussions on

theoretical, experiential and transcendental issues are quite unique

to darsana. For instance: ethical and spiritual discipline is

necessary for new experiences and knowing self differently; knowledge

of self could change the way the nature of the given is understood;

knowledge of self could reorient experience; knowledge of self could

allow for new responses to the situation/context. What distinguishes

the Indian way of thinking from what we today call as the Western way

of thinking is the curious connection present in darsana between

theoretical, experiential and transcendental issues. It is also this

distinguishing feature of Indian thinking which is often

misappropriated as 'mystic' and 'other-worldly'. The important point

missed here is that we fail to recognize that what interested Indian

thinking was not the linearity and immediate conveniences through

rigid structures of knowledge but an open-endedness where experience

and reflection could together bring about a re-orientation of how we

construe our self-identities and how we respond to the given.

 

The foundational issues, crossing the rigidity of being theoretical,

experiential or transcendental, which are embedded in the darsana are

i) about human mind, consciousness and experience, and ii) about

self-identity. The guidelines for the exploration of these embedded

issues are i) abstraction: to identify the unitary in the discrete,

ii) placeablity: to have an ontological meaning for any experience,

its object and its experiencer, iii) practise: to have values and

discipline as essential guidelines for self-exploration.

5.1. Indian Dramaturgy

 

The foundational text of Indian dramaturgy is 'Natya Sastra' authored

by Bharatamuni. The available form of the text is comprised of 5600

verses coupled with prose though the original version is said to have

had more than 30,000 verses. It is a complete treatise on Indian

dance, drama and music. The text has an exhaustive thematic structure

since it deals with a complex conception of drama (natya) constituted

by what could be described as objective and subjective features. There

is elaborate discussion, on one hand, on the characteristics of

playhouse, different kinds of plays, different and complex gestures

and movements, rules of prosody, metres and music, use of languages,

style of characters, costumes and ornaments. On the other hand, there

is discussion on emotions and mental states which are their causes,

mutuality of emotions and mental states, rapport between actor and

spectator, mental and physical nature of the actor and spectator,

preliminary mystic rituals for effective representation and final

goals of drama. At the same time there is a structural rigidity as to

the epistemological structure, and openness about the subjective

expression, relationship between the actor and the spectator, goals of

drama etc.

 

The complexity of the text could be seen at three levels:

 

i) in addressing the representation of different kinds of

characters (mostly

mythical) with different states of minds through a joint

participation of physical

gesture and movements, mental states and emotions, ritualistic

preliminaries,

costumes, music and space configuration,

ii) in addressing the unique relationship between the actor and

the spectator, of the

actor invoking a specific state of emotion in the spectator's mind,

iii) in making possible a spontaneous and self-evolving nature of

enjoyment for

the audience inspite of the structured and specified composition.

 

The rigorous and specified rules of natya together with an integral

approach to emotions, first-person experience of the actor and the

spectator make Natya Sastra an insightful treatise as well as what

could be conceived of as belonging to a higher order of cognition and

experience, namely a wholesome re-representation of human emotions

through the complex act of external body (physical body gestures,

costumes, music and plot) and the spiritual body ( emotions, states of

mind and unique relationship between the one who is presenting the

re-representation and one who is enjoying it).

5.2. Epistemology of Natya

 

The word 'natya' does not have a one-word English equivalent. Before

we get to the meaning of 'natya' it is important to keep in mind the

distinction between 'natya', nrtta and nrtya (natya nrtya nrtta

vivekah) 19 which is the introductory theme discussed in Natya Sastra.

Natya is a combination of nrtya (acting) and nrtta (dance). Nrtya is

the visual and pantomimic representation of emotions and ideas. Nrtta

refers to movements of the body with gestures which are regulated by

tala (musical time interval). Though the text continues to give a

complex definition of what constitutes natya the categorical statement

made about it is that natya has primarily to do with rasa. 20 Later

natya is explained using two key ideas which are abhinaya and bhava.

Natya means visual representation (abhinaya) in its fourfold forms

such as using parts of the physical body (angika), verbal utterances

(vacika), costumes and ornaments (aharya) and physical signs of mental

states (satvika). 21

 

5.2.1.Poise of expression

Abhinaya is defined as the expression through the actor of the meaning

of the words of a literary (poetical) work with the help of vibhava

(emotions and states of mind physically represented) so as to invoke

an uninterrupted flow of rasa (enjoyment) for the audience. The scope

of abhinaya is extended beyond the rigidity of planned gestures and

emotions by differentiating it to be of two distinct types: lokadharmi

and natyadharmi. Lokadharmi represents the objects and characters as

they are portrayed in the mythical literature, and, natyadharmi

represents the objects and characters through suggestive movements

from the setting of stage. An example of natyadharmi is a suggestive

movement of the eye or suggestive gesture by the hands to indicate

something else through the imagination of the spectator. 22

 

The fulfillment of natya is achieved through the effective and joint

performance of different kinds of abhinaya and mudra (representation

of objects, emotions and ideas through single hand and combined hand

gestures), the theme of the play, music and the involvement of the

spectators. The role of spectators is considered to be an active event

and mutually influencing the performance of the actor in terms of the

representation of feelings.

 

It is not directly relevant to this paper to describe the technical

details of the themes of various chapters of the text. But it is

necessary to keep in the background of the reading of the forthcoming

discussion that the elaborate description in the text mainly follows

two patterns:

 

i) discussion and detailed description of the different kinds of

gestures of different parts of the body and their nuances; different

kinds and features of plays and poetry; kinds of metres;

characteristics of the actors, judges and spectators; use of

languages; costumes and ornaments; and different kinds of musical

instruments,

 

ii) discussion and description of rasa (emotions) and bhava

(mental states which produces emotions); the mental rapport between

the actor and the spectator; the types of characters and mental and

physical temperament suitable for their portrayal; the goals of drama

and how they are fulfilled; and preliminary rituals and settings to

invoke the conducive environment before the start of natya.

 

The concept of natya evolves in the text through the development of

both the above patterns which I would like to describe as third-person

and first-person approaches. The prescribed set of rules for abhinaya

exists along with the spontaneity of the actor in representing the

structured, and in evoking the rasa in the spectator. The visual and

the character-oriented together with the subjective and self-oriented

produces the aesthetic experience which could be further described as

a spiritual experience. The act of representation, the preliminary

settings and rituals etc. is connected with the cosmogony that the

physical world is the angika abhinaya of Siva, his vacika abhinaya is

the world of language, his aharya abhinaya consists of the universe

and his satvika abhinaya is ultimate happiness itself. 23 The

complexity of representing human emotions and at the same time

invoking empathy in the spectator is brought out through natya in a

comprehensive manner using a rigorous epistemology and first-person

experience for both the actor and the spectator.

5.3. Experience of Natya

 

Natya is though presented following a structured design about it

through the portrayal of characters, the primary nature of natya is

experiential and first-person-oriented. This is evidenced by the

detailed discussion on rasa, bhava and preksakatva. The word natya has

its origin from the root 'nat' which means 'to act'. Nata is one who

performs the act through different styles of abhinaya. Natya is the

art of 'nata'. 24 The importance given to natya as a dramatic art has

its origins in the 'act' itself of the actor. It is the nata who is

responsible for natya and not vice versa. This is a significant

feature since it emphasises the first-person oriented approach to a

complex event such as natya.

 

5.3.1.Tasting the flavour

Rasa is a complex concept which is the central idea on which the

experience of natya is founded. The word rasa is variously translated

as 'relish', 'enjoyment' 25 and related to mean the object of relish

or relish itself. According to Bharatamuni rasa emerges out of the

combination of three basic components such as vibhava, anubhava and

vyabhicari. They are also the (karana, karya and sahakari)

determinant, consequent and auxiliary conditions of rasa. All three

taken together is called the sthayibhava which is directly responsible

for the production of rasa. Bhava is that which makes something

happen. 26 In Natya Sastra 'bhava' is used as a technical word to

relate to the mental states as responsible for producing rasa for the

spectator through a combination of kinds of (abhinaya) gestures.

Whether rasa is produced through bhava or vice versa or whether they

are mutually influenced is a debate which is prominent in the

literature on Natya Sastra by various commentators. For the discussion

in this paper, I will deal only with the detailed presentation of

kinds of rasa and bhava, one instance of abhinaya which is that of

eyes (dhrsti), and nature of effectiveness of natya (natya siddhi

nirupana), to show the importance given to the nuances and details of

mental states, basic nature of experience and their physical

representations, with an attempt to give a third-person account of

first-person experience.

 

Bharata enlists eight rasa-s as the primary rasa-s27 and a total of

fortynine bhava-s which are classified as sthayibhava (eight in

number), vyabhicaribhava (thirtythree in number) and satvikabhava

(eight in number). This classification refers to an evolution of

mental states from its intense and pure states (sthayi), to

manifestation of the pure states in feelings and leading them to rasa

(vyabhicari), and to their physical signs (satvika). Another

classification is of the cause and effect of bhava such as vibhava and

anubhava respectively. The sthayibhava of soka is produced by the

vibhava such as separation from the beloved, loss of dear ones and

assets etc. Soka is represented by the anubhava such as tears, deep

sighs etc. It is the sthayibhava which plays the key role in creating

the rapport between the actor and spectator through the production of

rasa.

 

Bharata enlists eight fundamental sthayibhava, thirty three

vyabhicaribhava, eight satvikabhava and eight rasa28 according to the

sthayibhava. These are29:

 

RASA

Rati (happiness)

Hasa (laughter)

Soka (mental pain)

Krodha (anger)

Utsaha (enthusiasm)

Bhaya (fear)

Jugupsa (disgust)

Vismaya (amazement) STHAYIBHAVA

Srngara (charm)

Hasya (humour)

Karuna (compassion)

Rudra (fury)

Vira (heroic)

Bhayanaka (terrifying)

Bhibhatsa (despicable)

Adbhuta (surprise)

 

The thirtythree vyabhicaribhava (all these are given their

corresponding vibhava and anubhava in the Natya Sastra) are:

 

VYABHICARIBHAVA

Nirveda (disinterest)

Glani (tiredness)

Sanka (apprehension)

Asuya (insecurity)

Mada (intoxication) 30

Srama (exhaustion)

Alasya (lethargy)

Dainya (pity)

Cinta (anxiety)

Moha (delusion)

Smrti (recollection)

Dhrti (steadfastedness)

Vrida (shame)

Capalata (impulsiveness)

Harsa (sudden delight)

Avega (excitement)

Jadata (stupor)

Garva (arrogance)

Visada (depression)

Autsukya (longingness)

Nidra (sleep)

Apasmara (epilepsy)

Supta (dreaming)

Vibodha (awakening)

Amarsa (restrained anger)

Avahittha (deception)

Ugrata (ferocious)

Mati ( analytic understanding)

Vyadhi (ailment)

Unmada (temporary loss of sanity)

Marana (death)

Trasa (panic)

Vitarka (argumentativeness)

 

The eight satvikabhava are:

 

SATVIKABHAVA

Stambha ( paralysis)

Sveta (perspiration)

Romanca (horripilation)

Svarabheta (change in the tone of voice)

Vepathu (tremble)

Vaivarnya (change in the color of face)

Asru (tearful)

Pralaya (fainting)

 

 

5.3.2.Through the corners of the eyes

Expression through the physical body, angika abhinaya, is further

classified into that falling in three types such as i) sariraja

(bodily), ii) mukhaja (facial), and iii) cestakrta (through

movements). There is another division of anga and upanga. Anga

constitutes the abhinaya through head, hand, chest, sides, hips and

feet. Upanga constitute abhinaya through eyes, eyebrows, nose, lips,

cheeks and chin. The one instance of abhinaya through upanga I will

list here in detail is that of dhrsti (glances) since these are

considered to be more visually representative of the rasa.

 

What I wish to imply through this listing is, the analysis and

observation given to the detailed study of empirical features of inner

mental states and feelings belonging to another person as represented

by the actor. The two levels of third-person reporting and

first-person experience are interesting to note at this point. Through

the bhavabhinaya the actor represents the feelings of a person with a

particular state of mind through the larger setting of stage, space,

costumes and gesture (first instance of third-person reporting), and

all the while undergoes the same state of mind so that the

corresponding rasa is conveyed to the spectator (second level of

third-person reporting). The enactment of the feelings are based on an

understanding of the bhava (pure states of mind) and identifying with

them (second level of first-person experience) which was earlier

experienced by another person (first level of first-person experience).

 

The glances which total to thirtysix in number are of two kinds: i)

rasadhrsti, representative of the kind of rasa (relish), and ii)

bhavadhrsti, representative of the kind of bhava (pure state of mind).

Apart from the dhrsti there is a detailed description of the kinds of

movements of the pupils, eyelids, and that of eyebrows.31

 

The eight rasadhrsti32 are:

 

RASADHRSTI RASA

NATURE OF GLANCE

Kanta (loving glance) Srngara eyebrows moved, glance through the

sides of the eyes, and eyes with the intense look of as if drinking

the object33

Hasya (humorous glance) Hasya eyelids are contracted one after

the other, wandering pupils 34

Karuna (compassionate glance) Karuna upper eyelid droops down

with tears, wandering pupils, nose ends intense35

Raudri (ferocious glance) Raudra both eyelids tremble, still

pupils, red and dry eys, strained eyebrows36

Vira (heroic glance) Vira steady pupils, fully opened and

glowing eyes, ends of the eyes contracted37

Bhayanaka (terrifying glance) Bhayanaka raised and motionless

eyelids, restless pupils38

Bibhatsa (disgusting glance) Bibhatsa eyelids come together with

restlessness, unsteady pupils, eyeballs at the corners of the eye39

Adbhuta (surprising glance) Adhbuta moist eyes, pupils go in and

out alternately, eyelashes slightly contracted, bright corners of the

eyes40

 

The twentyeight bhavadrsti are:

 

SHTAYIBHAVA DHRSTI41 NATURE OF GLANCE

Snigdha (tender glance) fully opened eyes, eyebrows held up,

pupils in the corners of the eye42

Hrsta (joyous glance) slightly contracted pupils which are

restless, eyelids close alternately43

Dina (piteous glance) drooping upper eyelids, restrained movement

of pupils, with tears44

Kruddha (glance with anger) motionless eyelids, dry eyes,

agitated pupils, bent eyebrows45

Drpta (glance with pride) fully opened eyes and still pupils46

Bhayanvita (glance with fear) fully opened eyes, eyeballs

standing out and agitated47

Jugupsita (glance with disgust) contracted eyelids, look away

from the object, indefinite look48

Vismita fully open eyelids, steady look to a distance, pupils

held up49

 

 

 

VYABHICARIBHAVADHRSTI50 NATURE OF GLANCE

Sunya (vacant look) steady eyes, but not clear, look vacantly

without an object51

Malina (depressed look) pupils directed away from the object,

eyelids slightly closed, clear corners of the eyes, throbbing eyelashes52

Sranta (tired look) pupils directed to a short distance, moist

eyes, tired eyeballs, slightly contracted corners of the eyes53

Lajjita (glance with shyness) eyelashes come together, tired

pupils, drooping upper eyelids54

Sankita (glance with suspicion) eyes are alternately steady and

restless, turn towards the sides

outward and upward, alternate intense looks and looking away55

Mukula (fully closed look) united and throbbing eyelashes,

resting pupils56

Ardhamukula (half opened look) half opened eyes and slightly

throbbing, half closed eyelids57

Glana (languid look) deeply sunk pupils, move very slowly,

eyelashes, eyebrows and

eyelids appear like that of a blind person58

Jimha (looking distrustfully) slightly contracted eyelids, tired

and concealed pupils, look slowly59

Kuncita (contracted look) eyelids and eyelashes are slightly

contracted, pupils are well contracted60

Vitarikta (look of indecision) raised eyelids, flushed and

downward pupils61

Abhitapta (extreme painful look) gentle movement of eyeballs,

upward and downward moving

eyelids, all the parts of eye indicate extreme pain 62

Visanna (grievous look) corners of the eye are sunk, eyelids wide

apart and open and close frequently, motionless pupils63

Lalita (charming look) corners of the eyes contracted, eyebrows

go up and down, and sweet look64

Akekara (half closed) eyelids at the corner of the eye are

slightly contracted, half closed look, pupils are repeatedly turned65

Vikosa (wide open look) fully open eyelids and never close,

unsteady pupils66

Vibhranta (distracted look) occasional disturbed and undisturbed

look, moist and wide open eyes, moving pupils67

Vipluta (floating look) steady and drooping eyelids in succession68

Trasta (fearful look) extremely unsteady pupils, eyelids quickly

moving up and down69

Madira (intoxicated look)

Is classified into three kinds such as the early (taruna), middle

(madhyama) and extreme (adhama) stages

---Taruna corners of the eye are wide and the rest of the eye is

contracted, pupil move about in a circle70

---Madhyama slightly contracted eyelids, unsteady pupils71

---Adhama pupils move downward and eyelids are almost closed72

 

5.3.3.Twilight space of the real and the virtual

Bhava and rasa are the two key concepts according to Bharata. Though

he considers natya to be effective as a result of performance, he

makes a detailed analysis of how the performance which is not

realistic and identical with the world of reality for both the actor

and spectator are made real in a virtual manner. The sthayibhava

enlisted are pure states which can exist and together with

vyabhicaribhava and satvikabhava produce the necessary anubhava, only

if the actor could form an identity with the sthayibhava. The

performance of the character is dependent on this preliminary

identification of the actor with the state of mind of the role which

is portrayed. The sthayibhava are made to exist (bhavayanti iti

bhavah) by the actor so that it would be produced in the mind of the

spectator (bhavanti iti bhavah) to produce the related rasa. The

sthayibhava together with rasa could be considered as causing

self-transcendence for the actor as well as the spectator, and complex

cognitive structures for both the actor and the spectator to be in

communion in a space where both transcends their self-identity. It is

an enactment (by the actor through natya) which is spontaneous than

the simple mimicry of an event or object. It is at one time physical

and transcendental.

 

One of the unique features of natya is that the epistemological and

the experiential, the theory and technique are co-ordinated to form a

mutually benefiting factor of the whole. Though the source of the

following text is not authentically traced, it is said in both Natya

Sastra and later in Natyadarpana, and is also popular to be the

synoptic definition of natya, that 'the body should follow the tune,

the hands must explain the meaning, eyes must speak the emotion and

the feet must beat the time-measure; where the hands go there should

go the eye, because where the eye goes there the mind goes with it,

where the mind goes there follows the mental state, where the mental

state is there is the feeling'. 73 These two verses represent the

coordinated physical, mental and transcendental nature of natya. Equal

importance is given to detailed and specific physical and mental

factors involved, and each of their transcendence is specified, at the

same time, to broaden the scope of experience both for the actor and

the spectator.

 

5.3.4.The metanarrative

That natya is taken a wholesome event is evident from the fact that

apart from the detailed account of the content of natya Bharata also

devotes separate chapters74 for looking at the effectiveness of natya

(natya siddhi nirupana), detailed description of the nature of actors,

judges and spectators, and the goals of natya. There is even a mention

about the seating arrangement to be followed. 75 It might be keeping

the complex nature of natya that Bharata enlists for male and female

characters: i) three classes of personality (uttama, adhama and

madhyama prakrti), and , ii) the kinds of roles they could play. 76

 

The spectator of natya is not a passive recipient, but a preksaka,

'one who views in a unique manner'. It is evident that Bharata

included the active and important participation of the spectator for

natya to be a successful enterprise. There is a list of physical

representations of the responses of the spectator to natya by making

certain words77, sounds78 and physical and facial expressions.79 There

is also a description about who is the genuine spectator (preksaka).

He who is " …one who has unruffled senses, is pure, clever in

discussing and weighing pros and consciousness, devoid of faults and

fond of merits. He who attains gladness on seeing another glad, sorrow

on seeing another sorry and experiences wretchedness on seeing the

wretchedness of another is considered fit to be a spectator… " .80 It is

also said that all these qualities may not be present in one single

individual, but the different individuals as spectators could have

them and together make an effective appreciation of the natya.

 

The goals of natya pertain to both objective and subjective features.

Through the composite of external and physical enactment, and

subjective states of mind and feelings representative of them, what is

achieved for the i) actor and ii) spectator are: For the spectator, in

the secondary level an appreciation of the characters and the theme,

and in the primary level a temporary detachment with his/her

self-identity is experienced. For the actor, in the primary level it

is the complex task of representing a character, an idea or a nuance

of a particular feeling through abhinaya and producing the

corresponding rasa for the preksaka. In the secondary level a

temporary detachment from his/her self-identity and identity with the

particular character's self as a whole and various mental states which

the character would have in the story narrated. The transcendence

experienced by the actor is both transphysical and transmental since

there is the combined use of body and mind. The transcendence

experienced by the spectator is transmental.

 

5.3.5.And finally it is experience and transcendence

For both the actor and the spectator it is a complex experience since

there is the co-existence of his/her own dominant and real

self-identity, and the identity with the mental states of the

character portrayed. It is the co-existence, of the real

self-identities of the actor and the spectator, and the identities

with 'another-self', which determines the effectiveness of natya. The

interesting and intriguing feature is the existence of a

contradiction. For the effective transference of a particular bhava to

the spectator the actor has to have an identity formed with it

transcending the artificiality of enacting it. At the same time the

actor has to be detached from any specific bhava of the character

since what he/she is primarily concerned with is the narrating of the

story. The actor has to play the twin role of 'being the character

portrayed' and also the narrator of the story. It is this twin and

contradictory role played by the actor which enables the spectator to

have the experience of rasa which also involves an interesting

contradiction. Unless the spectator can be one with the mental state

of the character portrayed he/she will not be able to appreciate the

story and the specific nuance. At the same time unless a continous

detachment is maintained he/she will not be able to integrate the

experience of that nuance in relation to his/her self-identity.

6. Re-Placing Consciousness [in Indian Thought]

 

By presenting two different instances of epistemology and experience

from darsana and natya, what I wish to suggest is that:

 

i)contrary to the much popular and published view that Indian

philosophy is 'other worldly', there is detailed and careful

presentation of what could be considered as the two primary signs of

consciousness namely (a) generation of meaning and its validation (b)

intensity of experience and broadening its scope through its own

transcendence,

 

ii)the discussion on 'consciousness' in Indian thought is not a

word-oriented (namely 'consciousness') but an experience-oriented task

which looks at empirical, experiential, epistemological and

teleological facets of consciousness.

 

Present approaches to understanding of consciousness though to some

degree gives importance to epistemology and to some degree gives

importance to first-person experience what is missing is an attempt to

resist untimely classification of events and meanings of

'consciousness' under empirical/medical/ordinary and

transcendental/psychoanalytic/mystical groups and their segregated and

non-dynamic explanations. To be in the context of particular

experiences, and to integrate them to a transcendence which will least

look unfamiliar and 'other-worldly', cannot be the result of

classificatory understanding or solipsistic transcendental experiences

alone.

 

First and foremost we need to recognize 'consciousness' as a complex

phenomenon and thereby dissuade from secluded and segregated analysis.

Complexity of consciousness more and more looks like the delicate

togetherness of understanding and being. The understanding of

'consciousness' is more an understanding of its ontology, which needs

the focus of epistemology to be shifted from normal and ordinary

experiences, abnormal and transcendental experiences, to the holistic

definition of the problem, method, and goals of enquiry. This would

facilitate breaking 'habitual' ways of event or object oriented

analysis by experience or first-person oriented understanding. The

categories of thinking formed by the analyst and his/her worldview

will be specific as well as potential for widening the scope of

understanding.

 

The two questions which are important, if we are 'really' interested

in understanding consciousness are: (i) What are we really looking

at?, and (ii)What do we really want to look at? Our notions about

'real', 'truth' and 'self' are to be continuously questioned, but at

the same time, integrated with personal growth, values, spiritual

understanding and self-exploration.

 

Acknowledgment

 

My Pranam to Swami Bodhananda* for his Blessings without which the

completion of this paper would not have been possible. Thanks to Leela

Ramanathan (President, Karnataka Nrtakala Parishat) for discussions

and comments. Thanks also to Rajiv Malhotra for encouraging me to

write this paper. Thanks to The Infinity Foundation** for supporting

the presentation of this paper at the international conference held at

Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India, on " Approaches to

mind and consciousness " from 9-11 January 2002.

 

* See http://www.sambodh.org & http://www.sambodh.com/

** See http://www.infinityfoundation.com

Notes and References:

 

1. Thompson, Evan (2001). " Empathy and Consciousness " . Journal of

Consciousness Studies. 8 (5-7) 1.

 

2. Churchland, Patricia (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified

Science of the Mind Brain. Cambridge: Bradford Books.

 

2. Blackmore, Susan (1999). The Meme Machine. Oxford University Press.

 

3. Gallese,V. (2001). " The shared manifold hypothesis " . Journal of

Consciousness Studies. 8(5-7) 46.

 

4. Andresen, Jensine (2000) . " Meditation meets behavioural

medicine:The story of experimental research on meditation " . Journal of

Consciousness Studies. 7(11-12) 17-73.

 

5. Tart, Charles. (1992). Ed. Altered States of Consciousness. 3rd ed.

Harper Collins.

 

7. Menon, Sangeetha (2001). " Binding experiences: looking at the

contributions of Adi Sankaracarya, Tuncettu Ezuttacchan and Sri

Narayana Guru in the context of recent discussions on consciousness

studies " .

Paper presented at the 12th annual national conference of National

Academy of Psychology.Kollam.October 22-24, 2001.

 

8. Antony, Michael V. (2001). " Is 'consciousness' ambiguous? " . Journal

of Consciousness Studies. 8(5-7) 19.

 

9. Menon, Sangeetha (2001). " Towards a Sankarite approach to

consciousness studies " . Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical

Research. XVIII(1) 95-111.

 

10. Sastri, S.Kuppuswami (1932). A Primer of Indian Logic: According

to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha. Mylapore: Madras Law Journal Press.pg.4

 

11. Ibid. pp.5-6

 

12. Ibid. pg.6

 

13. Ibid. pg.12

 

14. Ibid. pg.3

 

15. Brahmasutra begins with the sutra 'adhato brahma jijnasa' and

Mimamsasutra begins with the sutra 'adhato dharma jijnasa'.

 

16. The introductory theme in Tattvabodha is 'sadhanacatustaya' which

talks about the fourfold qualifications needed for a student

interested in the enquiry of moksa. The fourfold qualifications are:

(i) nitya anitya vastu viveka (discriminatory understanding of the

real and the unreal) (ii) iha amutra artha phala bhoga viraga

(dispassionate towards the objects of pleasure) (iii) sama adi satka

sampatti (observance of the seven values) (iv) mumuksutvam ca iti

(earnest desire for liberation).

 

17. prama karanam pramanam

Sastri, S.Kuppuswami (1932). A Primer of Indian Logic: According to

Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha. Mylapore: Madras Law Journal Press.pg.189

 

18. Hiriyanna, M. (1975). Indian conception of values. Mysore:

Kavyalaya Publishers.pg.43

 

19. caturtha abhinaya upetam laksanavrttito buddaih

nartanam natyamityuktam sa tvatrabhinayo bhavet

Sastri, K. Vasudeva and Nagaraja Rao G.(1990). Ed. Tr. Natya Sastra

Samgraha.3rd ed.vol.1. Tanjavaur: Saraswati Mahal Library.pg.20

henceforth denoted as Natya Sastra Samgraha

 

20. natyasabdo rase mukhyo rasa abhivyaktikaranam

Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.20

 

21. caturthabhinaya tatra angiko angaidarsito matah l

vaca viracitah kavyanatakadistu vacikah ll

aharyo harakeyurakiritadivibhusanam l

satvikah satvikairbhavaih bhavukena vibhavitah ll

Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.20

 

22. In vacika abhinaya speech is lokadharmi and singing is

natyadharmi. In aharya abhinaya wearing of ornaments is lokadharmi and

suggesting objects by mere gestures is natyadharmi. In satvika

abhinaya shedding tears is lokadharmi and suggesting tears by gesture

is natyadharmi.

Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.25

 

23. angikam bhuvanam yasya vacikam sarva vangmayam l

aharyam candratarati tam namah satvikam sivam ll

Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.1

 

24. The Natya Sastra of Bharatamuni: Translated into English by a

board of scholars. (2000). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. 2nd

revised ed.pg.528

henceforth denoted as Natya Sastra

 

25. rasa iti kah padarthah

ucyate asvadhyatvat

Tarlekar, G.H. (1991). Studies in the Natya Sastra: With special

reference to the Sanskrit drama in performance. Delhi: Motilal

Banarsidass Publishers pvt.ltd. 2nd revised ed.pg.54

henceforth denoted as Studies in Natya Sastra

 

26. bhavayanti iti bhavah

Natya Sastra: pg.86

 

27. srngara hasya karuna raudra vira bhayanakah l

bibhatsa adbuta samjnau cetyastau natye rasah smrtah ll

Studies in Natya Sastra: pg.56

 

Bharata talks only about eight rasa. It is Abhinavagupta who

introduced the ninth santa rasa, and also as the most important rasa,

which was essential to portray the unique spiritual nature of Buddha.

Studies in Natya Sastra: pg.60

 

28. Translations of the terms are of the author.

 

29. Natya Sastra: pp.86-113

 

30. Three kinds of mada are mentioned according to their instensity.

See Natya Sastra: pg.95

 

31. Natya Sastra: pp.123-126

 

32. Natya Sastra Samgraha: pp.483-491

Natya Sastra: pp.118-119

 

33. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.483

 

34. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.484

 

35. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg. 485

 

36. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.486

 

37. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.487

 

38. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.488

 

39. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.489

 

40. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.490

 

41. Natya Sastra Samgraha: pp.492-499

Natya Sastra: pp.119-120

 

42. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.492

 

43. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.494

 

44. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.494

 

45. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.495

 

46. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.496

 

47. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.497

 

48. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.497

 

49. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.498

 

50. Natya Sastra Samgraha: pp.500-524

Natya Sastra: pp.120-122

 

51. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.500

 

52. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.501

 

53. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.502

 

54. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.503

 

55. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.504

 

56. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.506

 

57. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.507

 

58. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.508

 

59. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.509

 

60. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.510

 

61. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.511

 

62. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.512

 

63. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.513

 

64. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.514

 

65. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.515

 

66. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.516

 

67. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.517

 

68. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.519

 

69. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.520

 

70. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.521

 

71. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.521

 

72. See for the Sanskrit verse Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.521

 

73. angena alambayet gitam hastena artham pradarsayet l

netrabhyam darsayet bhavam padabhyam talamacaret ll

 

yato hasta tato drstih yato drstih tato manah l

yato manah tato bhavah yato bhavah tato rasah ll

Natya Sastra Samgraha: pg.31

 

74. Natya Sastra: Chapters.27,34,35

 

75. Natya Sastra: Chapter.27, pg.381

 

76. See Natya Sastra: Chapters.34,35, pp.514-530

for a detailed description of the classes and kinds of role.

 

77. See Natya Sastra: pg.376

Words like 'kastam' for the pathetic feelings portrayed.

 

78. See Natya Sastra: pg.376

Words like 'aho' for implying 'how wonderful' the portrayal is.

 

79. See Natya Sastra: pg.375

Appreciation of humour is implied with smile and laughter;

appreciation of joy is expressed through horripilation.

 

80. Natya Sastra: pg.380