The China Doctrine -- INDIA SECULAR

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The China Doctrine - II

- Saikat Datta,OUTLOOK

 

India has woken up to China’s new army capabilities. A

major overhaul is needed.

 

On a visit on December 2 to the Sino-Indian border,

Union defence minister A.K. Antony gave voice to a

concern that has been getting reiterated for long by

his country’s military. “It’s an eye-opener,” said a

shocked Antony, as he toured forward posts in Nathu

La.

 

“There is no comparison between the two sides.

Infrastructure on the Chinese side is far superior.

They have gone far in developing their

infrastructure,” he told journalists who had flown in

with him on the trip.Even as Antony was expressing his

shock and dismay, the Indian army was putting the

finishing touches to a new operational doctrine, also

known as the conventional war-fighting doctrine, which

has made a dramatic new assessment of Chinese

capabilities.

 

The ‘two seasons’ build-up theory is passe. The new

doctrine says the Chinese can mobilise in just 30

days.

 

Prepared by the military along with the Integrated

Defence Headquarters in consultation with various

institutes of the Indian army, the document gives a

fair idea of how military India’s posture needs to be

shaped to take on the new Chinese challenge.A

significant departure from earlier assessments has

been made vis-a-vis China’s military capabilities and

its ability to mobilise troops.

 

So far, Indian military planners were of the view that

it would take the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

(PLA) at least “two seasons” (three to four months) to

fully mobilise for a war against India. While this

would mean a “high-intensity conflict” that could

involve strategic weapons, the conventional wisdom was

that India had the edge in terms of manpower on the

border.But moving away from the “two seasons” build-up

theory, the new doctrine concludes that the Chinese

could mobilise in just thirty days.

 

This capability is the result of decades of meticulous

planning and strategic perception of the Chinese

leadership. It built roads and a strategic railway

across the Tibetan plateau. The 1,140-km Qinghai-Tibet

line, considered the highest railway in the world at

16,640 ft, has come as a wake-up call for military

planners in Delhi.

 

The Qinghai-Tibet link with its capacity to carry over

900 troops—that’s a battalion strength—in each train

has reshaped the way the Indian military looks at

Chinese capabilities.India’s planners have always

based their estimate of the mobilisation time required

by China on the Taiwan factor. China has all along

concentrated the bulk of its forces against Taiwan and

kept itself in readiness for any “superpower

intervention”—that is by the US.

 

Should there be any large-scale operation against

India, it would have to divert its troops from Taiwan.

The improved infrastructure—roads and the railway

line—have rendered earlier Indian estimates outdated.

The Chinese can deploy its troops faster than ever

before.

 

Says Brigadier Arun Sahgal (retd), a long-time

China-watcher and presently deputy director of

research at Delhi’s United Services Institution: “As

per our estimates, the PLA has over 40 divisions, out

of which seven are armoured divisions. Of these, we

expect China will be in a position to deploy 20 to 22

divisions against India in quick time.”

 

In addition, China has been building up its rapid

reaction forces along with its airborne corps. “The

greater strategic mobility capability of the Chinese

in terms of rapid reaction forces as well as build-up

of special forces is what we have to look at very

closely,” says Sahgal.

 

The Chinese military has traditionally divided its

military into seven designated military regions (MRs),

of which two are of concern for India. The Chengdu MR,

which primarily faces Arunachal Pradesh, the sensitive

Siliguri corridor, Nepal and Bhutan, has nearly

1,80,000 troops on the borders. In the west, the

Lanzhou MR faces India’s Jammu and Kashmir, and

controls Aksai Chin, under Chinese occupation since

1962.

 

This region has nearly 2,20,000 troops. Both MRs have

been strengthened by the modernisation drive of the

Chinese military and have added rapid reaction forces

as well as specialised units known as the Quantou and

Kuaisu units which can launch deep attacks into enemy

territory.Points out Srikant Kondapalli, a professor

of China studies at jnu’s School of International

Studies: “So far India has managed to retain a

conventional troop superiority that ranges from 5:1 in

certain sectors to as high as a 10:1 ratio.”

 

He is quick to point out that this “conventional

superiority” is mostly on paper and can be quickly

nullified by quick troop mobilisation and with China’s

missile strength. “The Chinese artillery has a

considerable strategic as well as tactical arsenal.

However, China does have a “No First Use’ policy, and

in the event of hostilities, it is likely to replace

its nuclear warheads with conventional warheads.

Either way, this could prove to be to our

disadvantage,” he feels.

 

However, with the coming of the new doctrine,

Kondapalli feels that the Indian military has taken a

significant step. “A decade ago, the Indian military’s

doctrine was built around deterring Pakistan and

merely dissuading China. With the new doctrine, it has

taken a significant step towards deterring China. The

success of the Agni-III missile programme has added to

this new posture significantly and the sooner we

operationalise the missile, the better,” he says.

 

But while the Indian army has conventional superiority

on paper, there are other worrying factors. Under the

Calcutta-based Eastern Command, the army has three

corps which are severely depleted of troops. Most

fighting units have been moved to the Kashmir sector

over the last 15 years. “In 1990,” an army official

told Outlook, “we had finalised the Dual Task and

Relocation Plan for our fighting formations and

decided that it would be relevant for only ten years.

But it has been there for nearly two decades. This

needs to change.” This means that the Kalimpong-based

33 Corps, Tezpur-based 4 Corps and the Dimapur-based 3

Corps will have to increase their troop strengths.

 

At present, most of 3 Corps is tied up in

counter-insurgency operations, while the 27th Division

is just returning to the 33 Corps. This division was

moved out for Operation Parakram and has been in Jammu

and Kashmir ever since. Similarly, the 8 Mountain

Division that was moved out in early 1990 continues to

be in Kargil as a part of the Leh-based 14 Corps.

 

While these deployments have to be reconsidered, the

new doctrine is a critical update on where the army

must position its firepower and its troops. On the

whole, it is now left to the ministry of defence to

operationalise the doctrine and ensure that India’s

borders with China are adequately fortified.source:

http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20071231 & fname=Defence+%28F%29 & sid=\

1 & pn=2

 

 

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