[Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 7

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

> Namaste Sada-ji,

> The vritti (mental modification) cannot be a

> representation of the sense data that is collected for the simple reason

> that we could in that case never be said to know the object.

> The knowledge of the object would be mediated to us by the mental

> modification. The mental modification *is* the object because it is the

> same pure consciousness that has taken form internally and externally.

> " Without the interior and the exterior " (Brh.Up. II.v.19)

 

Michael – PraNAms.

 

The second part I agree. And that is basis for the consciousness of the object

is the

same as the consciousness of the subject – the unity is emphasized and will be

explained

further.

 

Regarding the senses – Here is my understanding which does not violate the

above. The

object is nothing but attributes + Brahman - which is termed limiting

consciousness of

the object. The limits are provided by the naama and ruupa (ruupa standing for

all

attributes - shbda, ruupa, rasa, gandha etc). Of the two that constitutes the

object

(attributes + Brahman) sense can only gather attributes of the object since

Brahman is

attribute-less. The gathering capacity depends on the sense capability and not

on the

object per se (although VP talks later about imperceptible objects like dharma

and

adharma, etc).

 

Conventional understanding is mind going out with the senses and grasping the

object.

This is common understanding in all Indian darshaNas – But we know that I see

the image

coming from the scatted light from the object and this is carried via senses to

the

brain. VRitti is therefore is representative of the sense data that is gathered

– that

forms the foundation for error as well, if the sense input is not true to the

object due

to defects in the senses or defects in communications.

 

I feel the essential requirement of VP is not violated – as will be discussed

more when

he talks about perceptibility of an object. – the requirement is the objects

perception

as seen by the senses is what constitutes the vRitti which by reflecting

consciousness

subject becomes conscious of. VRitti is as seen by the senses than what it is –

since

defects in the senses and/or in communication are all inclusive in the VRitti

formed.

 

From my understanding – the direct and immediate knowledge arises since VRitti

has the

attributes of the object – Since object is attributes + Brahman – vRitti is also

attributes + Brahman – hence unity is established. I do not think the essence

of

perception is violated.

 

Personally I do not think mind going out along with senses to envelop is

essential for

the direct perceptibility – As VP says later the perceptibility is the

consciousness of

the object is the same as the consciousness of the subject. That is not violated

since

Object is attributes + Brahman and vRitti is attributes (as gathered by senses)

+

Brahman. Subject is chidAbhAsa (notion of this + Brahman). Consciousness of the

subject

is the same as the object is retained for perceptibility, since attributes are

superficial , no identity of subject and object is implied as per VP.

 

Personally I do not see any logical fallacies in the presentation.

 

There is no

> matching up of one against the other to see if they are congruent. How

> could we possibly know that they were? It has to be a matter of

> identity.

 

Michael – sense input need not be identical to the attributes of the object. If

so there

will not be any disparities in the perception of object from one seer to the

other. That

there is an object – that is-ness comes form Brahman – the rest depends on the

capabilities of the individual senses.

I feel what mind can see is what it gets not necessarily what it is. If

everybody can see

what it is, the life would have been so simpler! – This does not violate the

direct and

immediate perception of what it gets – that is how one perceives the world, what

they see

not necessarily what it is.

 

A thing is only the same in all respects as its very own self.

> Otherwise 'That thou art' makes no sense.

 

Michael – I do not think identity is implied in – tat thou art – it rests on

bhAga

tyAga lakshaNa – it is not identity in all respects – it is identity in its

essence – one

has to discard all the contradictory attributes of that and thou to make sense

out of

that thou art. It is only the identity in their essence.

 

>How then does it happen that mistakes are made?

 

Errors arise in the sense data input or incomplete sense data due to other

factors not

favorable for correct sense input. In fact errors are better explained. I will

be

addressing that when we come to that.

 

Does that fact not tempt

> us to discern in the possibiltity of error a certain structure. We find

> lack of congruence between what is and what we took it to be. The short

> answer in the spirit of VP would be that confusion is not a perception and

> ought to have more the status of a memory.

 

As long as senses can report correctly the sense data, there should not be any

confusion.

If the sense data is defective then we have more fundamental problem at the

individual

level. If everybody has the same problem then it becomes an objective error –

like

bending the pencil when it is half way in water.

 

> But perhaps I am mistaking your purport or I have gone astray myself,

 

Sorry Michael – That is why I keep informing that it is my understanding of VP

that what

exactly what VP states. I of course do not want to violate the fundamental

issues

involved from the advaita.

 

Michael - please keep questioning to make sure I am not doing injustice to the

text. I

must say I am really enjoying the book.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda