Consequences of Global Wahhabism

[Guest guest]

By Alexander Ignatenko, Member of the Central Asia and the Caucasus Editorial Board, Doctor of Philosophy, specializes in Islam, leading expert, Social Systems Research Institute, Moscow State University.

Ordinary Wahhabism. Conclusion

Social and political consequences of the spread of Wahhabism around the world.

 

Publication date: 27 December 2001

If Wahhabism had remained inside Saudi Arabia, I think there would be no serious problems. But in the early 1970's, Wahhabis began deliberately and actively spreading their principles outside the peninsula. Meanwhile, the United States, while trying to find a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and communism in the countries of Near and Middle East during the Cold War, actively encouraged Wahhabi pervasion into different countries. Over a period of three decades, Wahhabism spread in three directions:

70's - early 80's - Arabic countries (Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other regions of the Middle East).

80's - Afghanistan.

90's - the territory of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, etc.), South East Asia, Western Europe, both Americas, Australia, Africa.

Wahhabism first began to manifest as an ideology among antigovernment extremist groups in Arabic countries during the 70's and 80's. Thus, Islamic extremism in the form of terrorist groups and illegal armed formations in Egypt, Algeria and other Arabic countries took form as a result of Wahhabi pervasion into the Muslim environment of these states.

The logic of Wahhabi takfir and jihad fully manifested itself in Algeria (however complex and contradictory were the events of the civil war, which claimed 100 thousand lives and ultimately destroyed the society and the state). According to the fundamentalist ideas of Algerian Wahhabi groups, all rulers who deviated from Islam were subject to death, as were all those who executed their rulers' orders. Nor did Wahhabi doctrine spare those who merely made no resistance to such rulers, nor those who did not agree with Wahhabis. Naturally, they didn't call themselves Wahhabis, but instead rather referred to themselves as Salafi or Muslims.

Ultimately, a complex network of Wahhabi groups, outposts, footholds, training camps, educational institutions and coordinating centers had been created worldwide. There is hardly a country in the world today that is not a host (whether it knows this or not) to one of this network's cells - consider Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Great Britain, Algeria, Germany, Nigeria, Switzerland, the United States, Palestine, Uruguay, the Philippines...

Wahhabism also became the main ideology of the Arabic task groups during the war in Afghanistan, in which they fought not only against the Soviet "infidels" but also against Afghan Muslims, who were proclaimed "infidels" as well. Today, Wahhabism is also rampant among the so-called "Afghans of the second generation" - extremists of various nationalities currently being trained in Wahhabi camps on the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, an ally of the Wahhabi movement. The new "Arabic Afghans" have spread around the world.

In the 90's Wahhabis launched a series of attacks against Russia, a nation that, the Wahhabis felt, kept Chechnya from becoming an Islamic state. The most dramatic manifestation of armed Wahhabi aggression was the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen and Arabic Wahhabis from the territory of Chechnya in 1999. Prior to this, they had invaded Chechnya - officially Russian territory - and committed a massacre in the Yarysh-Mardy ravine in April 1995. At that time, a column of the 245th vehicular regiment was annihilated (there are video recordings of the fighting and the summing-up scene, confirming that it was Arabic Wahhabis who laid the ambush and made the onslaught). Before this, there were also fights between the newly converted Dagestan Wahhabis and traditionalist Muslims in Chabanmakhi (May 1997).

Armed aggression was combined with ideological aggression - the spreading of Wahhabi ideas, which started even earlier and resulted (and still results) in the creation of Wahhabi units and footholds on the territory of Russia.

The spreading of Wahhabism, judging from the experience of its 30-year worldwide expansion, has always had negative results, as far as social stability and national security are concerned. These results include:

- split in the Muslim society of the affected country;

- conversion of a part of the nation's Muslim society (however small it might be) into an active anti-social or anti-government group or groups;

- spreading of the ideology of national intolerance and hostility, discrimination and segregation in the areas where Wahhabism has managed to take footing;

- theoretical justification of violence, extremism and terrorism in respect to those who are proclaimed "infidels;"

- active armed struggle or performance of terrorist acts against "infidels."

According to judicial inquiry and court proceedings, 1999's acts of terrorism in Moscow (where a block of residential buildings exploded), Buinaksk and Volgodonsk were performed by Wahhabi extremist groups. While in Chechnya Wahhabis kill imams, sheikhs and any Muslims who don't accept Wahhabism, many Russian towns were also swept by a wave of Wahhabi terror. Behind every act of violence, every incident in which weapons are involved, and every terrorist act, there are particular purposes and motives. It is the Wahhabi preaching of jihad, understood as obligatory armed fighting against "infidels," whom Wahhabis call "the worst of Allah's creatures" and whom "Allah hates," that has lifted the common Islamic ban on killing innocents.

Western civilization hasn't fully understood what has happened. The historic challenge that humankind has had to face in the last quarter of the previous century was interpreted as a clash of civilizations. From the point view of liberal humanism, the enemy was regarded as an equal (a civilization was thought to come into collision with another civilization). Moreover, Wahhabi teaching and Wahhabi ways were incorrectly interpreted as a manifestation of Islam.

But to put it realistically, world civilization (including its important Islamic constituent) has collided with barbarity. It has clashed with a new totalitarianism, which is trying to bring down all humankind - whether in Kabul and Grozny, New York and Moscow, Jerusalem and Djakarta, Algiers and Paris - and rule over people in accordance with the principles developed to suit only the aims of the 18th-century Arabic tribal aristocracy.

Ordinary Wahhabism, Part 1

A heretic movement in Islam

After the acts of terrorism that were performed in New York and Washington on Sept. 11, the world will never be the same. But terror and pain, anguish and dismay will give place to clarity - not only in respect to the question of who committed the crime, but also to whence the people who committed this crime against humanity sprung.

It is naive to reduce the motives to financial reasons (large sums of money were said to have been promised to suicide bombers' relatives). All these people must have had a powerful common motivation that couldn't have spontaneously developed in two dozen different perpetrators who directly participated in the acts, nor in the number of those who helped organize them.

It isn't strange that Islamic extremists immediately fell under suspicion of being connected with these terrorist acts. Experts in Islamic studies know that Islamic extremists have cherished the idea of a terrorist act involving an airliner for a long time. They tried to realize their dream in France in December of 1994 when they hijacked an airliner in Algeria in order to aim it at some object in Paris like the Eiffel Tower. But French special services managed to suppress the attempt.

Meanwhile, at the very time of the attacks on New York and Washington, Moscow and Russia still mourned for the victims of the terrorist acts on residential buildings in the capital two years ago. And in France, as well as in Russia, it was known that the above-mentioned acts of terrorism, as well as many others, were performed by Wahhabis.

Judicial inquiry will likely isolate who directed the airliners at the targets in America. But judging, at least, from the preliminary data of Sept. 13 and 14, Wahhabis certainly have something to do with it. Note that Osama bin Laden, allegedly connected with those terrorists already identified by the FBI, is a Wahhabi.

So what does the Wahhabi teaching consist of? It is impossible to answer this question without an excursus into religious history. Moreover, because the Wahhabi expansion is at the same time well-protected and controversial, with explanations ranging from statements that there is no Wahhabism at all to claims that Wahhabism is merely true Islam.

What Is Wahhabism?

The word Wahhabism most often denotes religious and political extremism related to Islam. In its narrowest and most precise sense Wahhabism is a teaching that was formulated in the 18th century by Arabic religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This teaching later became and still remains an official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis are either supporters of the ideas, constituting the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, or members of organizations that are guided by this teaching. In 1999 the Badr publishing house, registered and located in Moscow, issued the third edition (5 thousand copies) of The Book of Monotheism by M.S.Tamimi (Muhammad ibn Suleyman at-Tamimi), a student and follower of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

Why Do Wahhabis Not Want to Be Called Wahhabis?

And yet, followers of Wahhabi principles abstain from relating the word Wahhabism to the religious teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as well as to the official doctrine of the modern Saudi Arabia and to the ideology of movements and groups that accept and disseminate Wahhabi ideas and implement Wahhabi principles throughout the world, Russia included.

The main reason why Wahhabis don't want to be called Wahhabis is that otherwise they would implicitly acknowledge the accusations that many Muslims bring against them. These are claims that Wahhabis are Islamic heretics (mubtadi'ah), or people who follow a specific religious teaching that was developed by a particular man (Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) at a particular time (18th century), a teaching that hadn't existed before in this form. The Arabic word heresy (bid'ah) is derived from bada'ah (to introduce something new) and means a condemned and rejected innovation.

That's why Wahhabis don't call themselves Wahhabis but rather refer to themselves as just Muslims (Muslimun), monotheists (Mowahhidoon) or Salafi, "followers of the pious forefathers" (Salafiyyun).

Is It Admissible to Call Wahhabis Wahhabis?

According to Islamic tradition, particular branches of Islam that existed in the past or exist at present (schools of jurisprudence, branches of theological thought, Sufi Tariqat orders, sects, etc.) can be named after their founders, regardless of what theological, religious and juridical views those branches convey. There are numerous examples. The eponym of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence is Ahmad ibn Hanbal; of the Qadiri Sufi Tariqat, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani; of the Asharis theological school, Abu'l-Hasan al-Ashari, etc. So there is nothing disparaging or depreciating in the word Wahhabi itself.

Members of the Saudi clergy also call followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, including themselves, Wahhabis (Wahhabiyyun). When asked if it is admissible to refer to past and present followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as Wahhabis, Saudi Arabia's Religious Affairs Minister Abdallah at-Turki said, "It is really a great honor for Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its ulama, when one who acts according to the Scripture and Sunnah and exhorts to [follow] them is characterized as one who follows the practice and path that Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab kept and called to and that imams of the House of Saud upheld" (Al-Muslimun, November 7, 1997).

However ornate the language is, one can see that it is admissible to call Wahhabis Wahhabis. Or consider a fatwa of the late Saudi mufti Abd al-Aziz bin Baza, who didn't hesitate to use the word Wahhabis: "Wahhabis are not heretics; they are those who follow the path of the pious forefathers" (Al-Muslimun, January 17, 1997). Note that this fatwa is the mufti's answer to the claims of Muslims that Wahhabis disseminate condemned innovations, i.e. heretic views.

Wahhabism as Wahhabis See It

So much has been written about Wahhabis and so much controversial material exists that it's high time to come to know how Wahhabis themselves understand Wahhabi teaching, considering that they continually strive to propagate their ideas among Russian readers. It is worth noting that the Wahhabi books published in Russian are among the millions that have been distributed in Arabic countries, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, and North America, including the United States.

Let us consider a number of Wahhabi texts, including the books and booklets in Russian distributed on the territory of Russia and among Russians in Saudi Arabia (for example, during the hajj) by Saudi authorities and public institutions. This will help us, first, to find out how these sources set out Wahhabi teaching and, second, to check on the accuracy of the widespread explanation of Wahhabi ideas.

Wahhabism is the result of the selection and adaptation of the Quran and Sunni postulates to Wahhabi views and ideas. Here is what a Wahhabi author writes about a typically Wahhabi approach to the Quran and the Sunnah. "In this book I gave answers to all questions relating to postulates of Islam and, as far as it was possible (!), backed my answers with quotations from the Quran and the authentic Hadith to convince readers of the truth of my words." (Muhammad ibn Jamil Zinu. Islamic Akida - Belief, Conviction, Outlook - as Stated in the Holy Quran and the Authentic Sunnah. Moscow: Badr, 1998, p.4).

In fact, the great majority of works written by Wahhabi authors are based on the following principle. A postulate is stated followed by a quotation from the Quran or the Sunnah that proves the postulate. If the authors cannot find an appropriate quotation, they do without citing the Quran or the Sunnah.

Although this method produces the illusion that the stated postulates agree with the Quran and the Sunnah, it violates the traditional Islamic belief that the Quran and the Sunnah are recorded divine revelation. The goal of Islamic ulama (learned people) is to understand what Allah chose to impart upon people in the Quran and the Sunnah, given to the divine envoy Muhammad - and not to use quotations from the Holy Scripture as a confirmation of their own ideas. Moreover, even when quotations from the Quran or the Sunnah are used, the meaning of Wahhabi postulates often partially or completely diverges from what the quotations really imply.

The postulates of the Quran and Sunnah that don't agree with the ideas given in Wahhabi literature are just ignored as if they don't exist. As a result, Wahhabi teaching attributes great importance to the concept of infidelity, Jews and Christians being reckoned among the infidels (more about this later). But none of the Russian translations of Wahhabi texts that ground the infidelity of Jews and Christians include the following quotation from the Quran: "Verily! Those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and do righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (The Quran, 2:62).

Here is one more example. Wahhabi teaching attributes great significance to jihad. No attention, however, is paid to the words of the Prophet about the greater and the lesser jihad. On return from the battle of Badr (year 624), in which Muslims defeated polytheists, Muhammad said, "We are finished with the lesser jihad; now we are starting the greater jihad." But these words are traditionally interpreted in Islam as follows: armed fight is the lesser jihad, whereas peaceful, constructive labor is the main, greater jihad.

Thus, Wahhabism is the result of the selection of a few applicable Islamic postulates. One who has set to analyze and evaluate this doctrine should, on the one hand, not regard the Islamic postulates not included in Wahhabi literature as Wahhabi, and on the other hand, keep oneself from referring to the ideas that are conveyed in Wahhabi texts as truly Islamic.

Translated from Russian by Olga Yurchenko