Expose on Nepal's Maoist Conspiracy

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"(The very Western origin of Maoist ideological beliefs is regularly

on display at the CPN-M's public gatherings, where place of honor is

occupied by the pantheon of "white gods plus one" – Karl Marx,

Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong)."

"There is insurgency in Nepal due to shortcomings of the system that

evolved during the democratic era. Those most responsible are the

same individuals who have cut the present deal with the Maoists - not

just the same parties but the same individuals."

 

Between illusion and reality in Nepal

By Thomas A Marks

12/7/05

With the issuing of a 12-point letter of understanding between the

Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M, or "the Maoists") - and the

agitating seven-party alliance, the conflict in Nepal has entered a

dangerous period. This is recognized by all sides. Which way matters

will swing is being portrayed as dependent on decision-making in the

palace, but of equal moment is what few seem inclined to discuss: the

Maoists' "real game".

 

The general secretary of the legal (parliamentarian) Marxists,

Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), Madhab

Kumar, the public face of the agreement for the political

 

 

 

parties, has put forth his belief that the Maoists have "developed a

new maturity" in concluding that they are unable to complete

their "capture of state power through the barrel of the gun".

Consequently, they are willing to do this peacefully, which means "if

the Maoists resort to arms again, those in power will have to take

the blame".

 

This would hardly seem a stable platform for bargaining with the

palace, particularly given Madhab's astonishing rider: "If the well-

equipped Shah of Iran was uprooted by unarmed people, there is no

reason why it can't happen in Nepal." Why the monarch would be even

slightly interested in holding a discussion based on such terms,

apparently, is because the most important thing is "peace".

 

Waving this flag, the political parties have, indeed, stormed back

onto center stage, making a bargain that is altruistic, Machiavellian

or simply suicidal, depending on how the cards fall. However, this

may be, their long-running battle with the palace has caused them to

play "peace" as the hand that will gain them both power and breathing

room from their mortal foes, the Maoists.

 

There is no "peace", goes the stated logic, because there is

no "democracy"; and there is no "democracy" because "the palace"

insists on violence. That this is historical falsification of the

first order would be apparent to anyone who has even notional

familiarity with the political history of Nepal.

 

There is insurgency in Nepal due to shortcomings of the system that

evolved during the democratic era. Those most responsible are the

same individuals who have cut the present deal with the Maoists - not

just the same parties but the same individuals.

 

That this well-documented reality could somehow be blamed on the

palace was a position that emerged in vibrant form only with

the "royal massacre" that replaced the previous monarch, Birendra,

with his less-popular brother, Gyanendra. The latter's missteps have

served to elevate the parties to the position they now hold as

advocates of a "democracy" they never practiced, either in power or

within their own ranks.

 

In reality, it is the nature of "democracy" that has been the issue

all along in the present struggle. For the Maoists, the choice has

never been between "absolute democracy" and "autocratic monarchy",

the terms used in the 12-point agreement. It has been between

parliamentary democracy and "people's democracy".

 

The former is portrayed as a Western concept. The latter is certainly

also a Western concept, but in Nepal it is portrayed as "Maoist".

(The very Western origin of Maoist ideological beliefs is regularly

on display at the CPN-M's public gatherings, where place of honor is

occupied by the pantheon of "white gods plus one" – Karl Marx,

Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong).

 

What "absolute democracy" means for the Maoists, operationally, is

the ability to knock from the battlefield their only tangible

obstacle, the monarchy. What it means strategically is the ability to

move beyond the gun to the ballot at this particular juncture in the

struggle.

 

It is what the Sandinistas did so adroitly, moving rapidly

within "democracy" to solidify what they had been after all along - a

people's democracy. Apologists go to some lengths to avoid discussing

this aim, but it is the concrete manifestation of the "dictatorship

of the proletariat". It turned out so badly for the Chinese that the

Maoism espoused by the CPN-M is now completely rejected, alive only

in South Asia and isolated pockets of Western anarchism.

 

That the Maoists have no intention of abandoning their strategic goal

was made clear to cadres in the recent CPN-M leadership meetings in

Rolpa. Whether they operationally will go the route of the

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Ulster, actually

decommissioning their arms, remains to be seen.

 

There are too many unknowns, not least the nature of the Maoists'

links with the newly formed Communist Party of India-Maoist, CPI-

Maoist, created through a merging of the two principal Maoist

insurgencies in India, and aggressively committed to violence as the

only route to political power and social justice. In their

statements, the two Maoisms have stated clearly that peaceful means

are useful only so long as they facilitate the violent end.

 

Ironically, an important role in the emerging Maoist-UML alliance

(with the remaining six parties figuring in as necessary) apparently

has been played by members of the Indian "legal left", a catch-all

term for those Marxists who participate in parliamentary democracy

while disclaiming its ultimate legitimacy - the same position taken

by the UML in Nepal.

 

One the one hand, Indian left participation offers some grounds for

optimism, since the legal left does not engage in insurgency (which

is not the same thing as eschewing violence, something PIRA has

demonstrated well in the Catholic ghettos of Ulster). On the other

hand, it is also grounds for profound disquiet, since the "terms of

reference", as reflected in the 12-point agreement, are vague and

contingent on the surrender of the current Nepali royal government.

This only heightens Nepali nationalist suspicions that what is being

set in motion is a "Sikkim solution".

 

In fact, prisoners taken by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and

documents captured clearly state that the present Maoist course

is "tactical", that the CPN-M will not compromise its ultimate goals:

political power and "people's democracy".

 

Even a "peaceful" solution, then, depends on the monarch and RNA

being willing to accept a transition as witnessed in Cambodia under

UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority), with the tremendous

difference being the position of the monarchy. In Cambodia, the

monarch became constitutional, but the 12-point agreement mentions

only "absolute democracy" (which means a departure of the monarchy,

not just the monarch). This is not a minor discrepancy, and the

manner in which the 12-point agreement appears to claim there is

nothing for Gyanendra save exile, guarantees that it will not be

considered seriously.

 

All eyes seem glued to the palace to see the next move. It is not

hard to discern. In a situation where the political parties have

committed themselves to obstruction, the royal thinking should go,

political forces must be allowed an outlet in new political parties.

This is easier said than done. The scheduling of local and national

elections is a first step; ensuring their success is the second;

providing local security for the winners is the third. Absent local

security, it will all be a paper drill.

 

If, as seems likely, the conflict continues, counterinsurgency will

proceed by using the local elections to restore local connections to

the center. Restoration of local democracy must occur behind a

security shield and be the means for proper governance. Proper

governance must include restoration of local democratic decision-

making, micro-development and local security. In this campaign, the

political parties have adamantly refused to participate, seeing it as

but a thinly disguised means to restore the previous and reviled

panchayat system (absolute monarchy).

 

That the government's approach should be considered controversial

demonstrates the degree to which polarization and mistrust have

poisoned the Nepali polity. Thus the Maoists have emerged as

advocates of "peace", and "negotiations" are held up - not least by

elements within the foreign presence in Nepal - as an alternative to

waging counterinsurgency.

 

In reality, as stated directly in the RNA's campaign plan, the goal

is that counterinsurgency restores legitimate government writ in such

fashion and to such extent that the Maoists ultimately agree to

reincorporation within the political system. The constant saw

that "there is no military solution" is just a demand for inaction.

In reality, negotiations are always on the table but must be used as

part of an overall approach to the conflict.

 

Unfortunately, it does not appear that the Maoists accept the common

understanding of "negotiations". To the contrary, evidence supports a

conclusion that the point of the current ceasefire is to further the

armed struggle. Maoist exhortations to combatants continue to state

that the old-order can only be addressed with violence.

 

Fellow-travelers, continues the party line, will be accepted as long

as they are useful, but they will not have a meaningful role in the

shaping and execution of "New Democracy". Nevertheless, it is felt by

the party that the political parties can play an important

role, "with all forces against the autocratic monarchy centralizing

[focusing] their assault against the autocratic monarchy from their

respective positions, thereby creating a nationwide storm of

democratic protest".

 

Absent the "nonviolent" delivery of operational victory, however,

plans have been laid and are being implemented for the resumption of

the Maoist military assault within the overall strategy for the

seizure of power. The "nationwide storm" only has worth so long as it

delivers by "political means" that which can only be gained at

greater cost through violent means. If this is the strategy,

operational intent will include demonstrations in urban areas and

attacks in rural areas to force the government to fight on two

fronts. The RNA is aware of this to some extent, but it is unclear

how much is being done to prepare.

 

There are two pressing government failures that have contributed to

its present situation:

 

The failure to address the information warfare side of the equation

is causing serious problems. A key aspect of an information warfare

campaign should be to bring the Indian government back in the game in

a positive manner. The impression of "failure" and of "democracy

destroyed" that has gone unchecked has allowed the legal Marxists to

support the elements of the ruling coalition at Delhi that seek to

meddle in Nepal's affairs. The issue is rarely stated as such, but

there are left wing elements (within India) who see India's own

democracy as problematic, so they would like nothing more than

to "act out" against whatever force in Nepal can serve as a surrogate

target. To that end, bringing the monarchy to its knees serves their

immediate purposes.

 

This is not in India's best interests, keenly aware as it is that it

has a growing Maoist problem on its hands within its own borders. The

joint statements and activities of the Nepalese and Indian Maoists,

together with an upsurge of activities on the ground in India, has

led to the center becoming much more energized in its approach to the

lackluster State anti-militant campaigns.

 

It may be noted in passing that most analysts feel that India is

central to any solution in Nepal. The notion that a Nepali

relationship with China is an alternative to one with India is not

viable. China is not willing to extend itself in any manner that can

substantially assist in the present counterinsurgency, whereas India

wants to help. It is simply being mired in the same domestic

processes that are hampering Nepal itself.

 

The failure to implement some sort of solution to the local security

dilemma places the security forces in an impossible situation. The

invariable reason given in Kathmandu (a year ago, as now) for having

no local security in place is "the EU". The problem of foreign donor

objections to local security mechanisms is known, but local security

is as much a matter of C2 (command and control), transparency and

semantics as anything else.

 

The British, for instance, made local security the foundation of

their entire Ulster effort through the "national guard" mechanism of

the Royal Irish Regiment (RIR). Likewise, the Colombians, facing the

most profound legal challenges to local security in recent memory,

have found an effective and sustainable way to protect areas through

local forces.

 

Further, local security is indispensable. There is no way to proceed

in its absence. As has been discussed time and again, the precise

form of local security must be determined - it need not even be armed

capacity. But it must be the capacity to inform and/or resist,

pending reinforcement by the security forces.

 

These, it bears observation, have improved, led by improvement in the

quality of RNA junior and middle-grade officers. In many ways, in

fact, the senior service, the RNA, is not the same force it was

several years ago. Tactical and operational improvement, however, can

make no headway in the absence of a strategy for victory.

 

This highlights the heart of the matter: there still is no

articulation of "why we fight", much less a comprehensive state

(national) plan for counterinsurgency. There is an RNA plan, and this

does bring along elements of the state at times, but there is no

designated command authority that can bring together all facets of

state power - much less the actual application of those assets. This

cannot be the job of the monarch.

 

Democracy is the issue - on that there is agreement. Regrettably,

none of the contenders in the current struggle have demonstrated

convincing commitment to a reality that moves beyond the word. Since

the 12-point agreement is not "the answer", either, the prospects -

absent what would be (for Nepali politicians) an uncharacteristic

willingness to move beyond generalities to specifics - are for a

resumption of violence at the end of the current extension of

ceasefire.

 

Dr Thomas A Marks, political risk consultant, Honolulu, Hawaii.

 

Published with permission from the South Asia Intelligence Review of

the South Asia Terrorism Portal

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GL07Df01.html