GMW: New USAID briefing - full text - recommended reading

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GMW: New USAID briefing - full text - recommended reading!

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Mon, 25 Apr 2005 09:23:14 +0100

 

 

 

 

 

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Here's the full text of the new briefing in full.

 

Highly recommended!

 

Best read online, if possible, for formatting of tables etc.

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USAID: Making the world hungry for GM crops

http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=191

 

This briefing examines how the US government uses USAID to actively

promote GM agriculture. The focus is on USAID's major programmes for

agricultural biotechnology and the regions where these programmes are

most

active in parts of Africa and Asia[1]. These USAID programmes are part

of a multi-pronged strategy to advance US interests with GM crops.

Increasingly the US government uses multilateral and bilateral free trade

agreements and high-level diplomatic pressure to push countries towards

the adoption of many key bits of corporate-friendly regulations related

to GM crops. And this external pressure has been effectively

complimented by lobbying and funding from national and regional USAID

biotech

networks.

 

Introduction

 

In 1990, two Monsanto executives got in touch with Joel Cohen, the

Senior Biotechnology Specialist for USAID (the US Agency for

International

Development).[2] Monsanto wanted USAID to help develop a GM crop for

Africa that would give GMOs a good name. Cohen, who had come to the

agency from the US seed industry, turned to USAID's most trusted research

institute in Africa-- the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (KARI).

The three men set up a meeting with KARI and began to put their plan

into action.

 

They decided to work on sweet potato, a crop neglected by seed

companies and scientists but for which there were some promising GM

applications being developed in the US. KARI had the perfect person

for Monsanto

to collaborate with - Florence Wambugu [3], a KARI scientist who had

just completed a PhD programme on sweet potatoes.[4] Monsanto immediately

hired Wambugu to work in the United States on a GM sweet potato

resistant to the Sweet potato feathery mottle virus. Fourteen years

later, it

is pretty clear that Wambugu's sweet potatoes are far from ready for

the fields of Kenya's farmers; in recent field studies the GM crop failed

to resist the virus and underperformed the non-GM local varieties.[5]

 

But getting the GM sweet potato out to farmers was not the real

intention anyway. The overriding goal was to open doors to GM, and in

this it

was a great success (see the box The Trojan Sweet Potato). Most

importantly, the project served as a vehicle for driving forward a

regulatory

framework conducive to GM crops. And this is where USAID is making it's

mark - getting Southern countries to set up the regulatory frameworks

and the technical capacity that US corporations require to build-up

global markets for their GM crops.[6]

***

Box: The Trojan Sweet Potato

 

There were multiple advantages to working with a specific GM crop like

sweet potato. It opened up a long-term, direct collaboration between

Monsanto and a Southern public research centre, in this case KARI, in

which several scientists would be trained at Monsanto 's US headquarters.

These scientists would end up forming a vocal domestic lobby with a

personal stake in the GM debate. It was also an obvious source of public

relations for Monsanto and other GM corporations. Here was a company

" donating " its technology to African scientists in order to improve a

subsistence crop in which it clearly had no financial interest.

 

Most important, though, was getting the relevant regulations on GM

implemented. Before you can commercialise GM sweet potatoes, you have to

field-test them, and for this you need regulations, or so the argument

goes. The project thereby provided a way to side-step the larger question

of whether there should be any introductions of GM crops and the

critical questions about the merits and risks of the GM crop in

question to

proceed to the technical matter of how to " manage risk " in field tests.

Who cared if the GM sweet potatoes actually worked; what mattered was

that Kenya and other countries became places where Monsanto can sell its

GM seeds and have its patents enforced.

 

Whatever the fate of GM sweet potato, what is certain is that Monsanto

now has the green light to start field trials of its Bt cotton in

Kenya.

***

Box: What is USAID?

 

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been the

principal U.S. agency for providing economic and humanitarian

assistance to

developing and " transitional " countries since 1961, though it spends

less than 0.5% of the federal budget. It is " an independent federal

government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the

Secretary of State " . US foreign assistance has always had the

furthering of

America 's foreign policy interests, which includes supporting the US

economy, US agriculture and US trade, as a key part of its remit.

 

The USAID website candidly states, " The principal beneficiary of

America 's foreign assistance programs has always been the United States.

Close to 80% of the USAID contracts and grants go directly to American

firms. Foreign assistance programs have helped create major markets for

agricultural goods, created new markets for American industrial exports

and meant hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans. "

 

The head of the agency Andrew Natsios has aggressively attacked critics

of GM, accusing environmental groups of endangering the lives of

millions of people in southern Africa by, he claimed, encouraging

governments

in the region to reject the US 's GM food aid. " The Bush administration

is not going to sit there and let these groups kill millions of poor

people in southern Africa through their ideological campaign, " he said.

 

Promoting GM is an official part of USAID 's remit - one of its roles

is to " integrate GM into local food systems " . USAID launched a $100m

programme for bringing biotechnology to developing countries. USAID 's

" training " and " awareness raising programmes " will, its website reveals,

provide companies such as " Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred and Monsanto " with

opportunities for " technology transfer " . Monsanto, in turn, provides

financial support for USAID.

 

Source : Text from GMWatch

***

ABSP

 

This Kenyan GM sweet potato initiative has become the template for

USAID's overall biotechnology[7] strategy. In 1991 USAID launched the

Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Productivity project, later

renamed as the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP). The

Project, run by a consortium of private companies and public research

institutions under the direction of Michigan State University (MSU), was

mainly interested in identifying more GM sweet potato-like projects from

amongst the ongoing research projects at US university and corporate

labs.

These could then be used as entry points for US companies to

collaborate with public research institutions in the South and to

promote US

models of biosafety and IPR legislation. During the anticipated six-year

project life, the project was supposed to move its targeted GM crops from

the research and development stage to field-tests.[8]

 

As explained by former ABSP Director, Catherine Ives:

 

" We will be working with countries to assist them in developing

biosafety regulatory systems and intellectual property management

systems that

will promote access to, and development of, agricultural

biotechnology. " [9]

 

The ABSP, as USAID's first major biotechnology programme, signalled a

change in US foreign agricultural policy.

 

In the post WWII era, the US government was primarily concerned with

opening markets to its surplus agricultural commodities. With

globalisation, however, the policy context changed. US food

corporations are now

interested in flexibility and substitution; they want free access around

the globe to source and sell their products wherever they face the

least costs and make the most profits.[10] The US government has

generally

embraced these changes and has looked to protect and consolidate its

dominance in the global food system by expanding the monopoly control of

its corporations over key sectors of the food system, thereby ensuring

that profits and royalties continue to flow back to the US. In this new

global context, GM crops are not just another technology for US

agriculture; they are the front and centre in US foreign policy and

critical

to control over seeds (see Box: The US Model).

 

The ABSP projects were the early components of what has become a

multi-pronged strategy to advance US interests with GM crops.

Increasingly

the US government uses multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements

and high-level diplomatic pressure to push countries towards the

adoption of many key bits of corporate-friendly regulations related to GM

crops. But this external pressure must be complimented by internal

pressure

to be effective. You need people within the countries with strong

connections to the levers of power making the same push and you need

domestic structures that can bring the GM crops to farmers' fields and

peoples' stomachs.

 

" The principal problem we've had in the [Cartagena Protocol]

negotiations is that the voices speaking on behalf of developing

countries have

largely been voices that: a) are completely uninformed about

agriculture; b) have little or no information regarding biotechnology and

products; and c) are from scripts that have been written in the

industrial

nations of the world by those who are adamantly opposed to biotechnology

for reasons that have nothing to do with environmental safety or impacts

or human health. " - Val Giddings, Vice-President, Biotechnology

Industry Organization

 

This is where the ABSP projects and their consortium partners are so

important. Through the ABSP research and development projects they

channel funds and support to domestic players, typically scientists

close to

or involved in policy-making, who serve as the basis for a domestic

lobby that can articulate and indirectly push the US agenda and help open

the doors to GM agriculture.

 

Technology transfer or policy implementation?

 

ABSP I ran for 12-years, from 1991 to 2003, at a cost to USAID of US$13

million. In the first phase of ABSP I (1991-1996), around a dozen

projects were initiated, involving national research centres in at least

seven developing countries.[11] ABSP I's original objective was to bring

these GM crops to farmers' fields by supporting its collaborators with

the research and development and eventually the commercialisation,

including support in regulatory and intellectual property issues. But

few of

these phase I projects produced potential commercial GM crops.

 

When ABSP moved into its phase II programme in 1998, all of the phase I

projects except for two, Bt potato and virus-resistant cucurbits, were

dropped, in order to focus the programme on " product development " . Yet,

as one retrospective study points out, in phase II:

 

" … no provision was made in the ABSP budget for contributing to the

costs of complying with the necessary regulatory procedures for the risk

assessment complex of the 'near market' technologies, even though the

ABSP Annual Impact Report dated July 2000 acknowledged that '… depending

on the stringency of the commercialization procedures, it will be

difficult for a public-funded effort to meet the regulatory costs'. " [12]

 

With its private sector partners not showing any interest in seeing the

projects through to market, ABSP eventually backed away from its last

two remaining projects, leaving the IPR and regulatory issues

unresolved.[13]

 

During its two phases, ABSP I accomplished little in the way of

" technology transfer " . But through its projects and its many workshops

and

exchanges, scientists from the South learned how to collaborate with US

companies. They learned how to respect material transfer agreements, how

to breed GM traits into local varieties and how US companies perform

field tests. All of this " training " and " capacity-building " helped pave

the way for US corporations to bring in their patented GM varieties.

Moreover, even though the ABSP crops never made it to farmers' fields,

the

projects went far enough to initiate and influence political processes,

for both biosafety and IPRs, as the case of Egypt illustrates.

 

ABSP in Egypt

 

Egypt was the main target of ABSP's work in the 1990s, a result of a

generous US$7 million funding for biotechnology from USAID's Cairo

office.[14] Its most significant project in the country was the Bt potato

project, which used a model that would be repeated again and again in

other places. The project brought together a US based university

(MSU[15]),

a US seed company (Garst Seeds - now owned by Syngenta), and an

Egyptian research centre - the Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research

Institute (AGERI). The aim was to genetically modify popular Egyptian

potato

varieties with Garst's patented Bt gene and release them to Egyptian

farmers. The potatoes were transformed in the US and the first three

years of field trials were carried out at MSU. In the meantime, ABSP

set to

work on other matters.

 

Egyptian scientists were flown to an ABSP biosafety workshop in Jamaica

and then to the US for an 8-week internship where they spent time

touring the US agencies responsible for biosafety policy and the

offices and

labs of Monsanto and Syngenta. The pay-off was immediate. According to

one ABSP official:

 

" One of these scientists assisted in drafting Egypt's biosafety

regulations and went on to become the first biosafety officer at

AGERI. Egypt

adopted biosafety guidelines in January 1995 and by Ministerial decree

the Egyptian National Biosafety Committee was established in 1995. To

date, several biosafety officers at AGERI, the primary institutions

charged with biosafety in Egypt, have continued to receive training by

ABSP. " [16]

 

In 1997, after the construction of a greenhouse at AGERI, supervised

and financed by ABSP, MSU sent over a batch of its GM potatoes and AGERI

began field tests. AGERI would continue field tests for another six

years until the project was shelved, having come up against what should

have been a foreseeable barrier: AGERI simply did not have the resources

to bring the potatoes through the regulatory system.[17]

***

Table: Some of the ABSP GM crop projects

 

Country / GM crop / Project status

 

Egypt

 

Bt potato

Successful development of local GM variety. No application for

commercial release due to concerns over loss of export markets,

regulatory

costs and IPRs

 

Tomato yellow leaf curl virus (TYLCV) resistant GM tomato

Project ends in 2001. In 2004, Egyptian government imports $1.5 worth

of conventional tomato seed resistant to TYLCV from Israel.

 

Virus resistant GM cucurbits

Project ends in 2001. Successful development of several local GM

varieties, but regulatory and IPR issues for commercial release

unresolved.

 

Indonesia

 

Bt potatoes

Research abandoned due to lack of local interest in the project.

 

Bt maize

Project abandoned due to issues over patent rights.

 

Kenya

 

Sweet Potato

No application for commercial release. GM sweet potatoes fail to

perform.

 

Source : Bhavani Pathak 2002; Caroline Brenner 2004; and ABSP final

reports

***

Despite the failure to develop a feasible GM crop for Egypt, ABSP saw

its work in the country as a success. According to one ABSP official:

 

" Having policy decisions driven by technologies of national importance

and practical experience results in development of regulatory

frameworks that are more implementable and permissive towards technology

development and deployment. The [bt potato] project was successful in …

building capacity in policy and regulatory issues surrounding the use

of this

technology that will facilitate entry of other agricultural

biotechnology products into Egypt. " [18]

 

In reality, these " other biotechnology products " boil down to GM

varieties from US corporations. The GM crop with the best chance of

making it

to Egyptian farms is Monsanto's Bt cotton, and, if it does, Monsanto

will have ABSP to thank.[19] On top of its Trojan horse GM projects, ABSP

intervened directly to keep Egypt's GM regulations " permissive " . In

2001, it parachuted consultant Hector Quemada into Egypt at a critical

moment to work with key USAID contractor Development Alternatives Inc

(see

Box: Development Alternatives Inc) in ensuring that the country's draft

biosafety regulations stayed on the right track. For Quemeda, a former

regulatory affairs officer for a leading US biotech corporation,[20]

his role was to support " food and feed safety testing guidelines and

environmental safety testing guidelines to enable commercialization of

genetically engineered crops in Egypt " (emphasis added).[21]

 

Yet perhaps of more value to Monsanto were the ties that ABSP helped

forge between the corporation and key Egyptian scientists and biosafety

officials by way of joint projects and visits to corporate headquarters.

As noted by Josette Lewis of USAID:

 

" There is also an indirect benefit from such collaborations through the

introduction of private sector culture to public sector research

institutes in developing countries. " [22]

 

The full implications of this cultural exchange recently came to light

in Indonesia (See Box: Cultivating Corruption in Indonesia)

***

Box: Cultivating Corruption in Indonesia

 

Thanks to the public records of a recent case brought against Monsanto

by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the US we now know a

little more about the corporate culture that Monsanto brought to

Indonesian 's public sector. In its complaint[1], the SEC details how, in

1998, Monsanto hired an American working with a Jakarta-based

investment-consulting firm to lobby for Indonesian legislation and

ministerial

decrees favourable to GM crops. From 1997 to 2002, the SEC found that

Monsanto's Indonesian affiliates made at least US$700,000 of illicit

payments

to at least 140 current and former Indonesian government officials and

their family members. According to the SEC: " when it became clear that

the lobbying efforts were having no effect on [a] Senior Environment

Official, the Senior Monsanto Manager told the Consulting Firm Employee

to 'incentivize ' the Senior Environment Official with a cash payment of

US$50,000. " On 5 February 2002, Monsanto 's lobbyist handed an envelope

to the Senior Environment Official containing an agreed US$50,000 in

$100 bills. Although Monsanto has admitted liability, this same " Senior

Monsanto Manager " is now president of the American Chamber of Commerce

in Beijing, a privately financed organisation promoting US companies in

China.[2]

 

Throughout this period of rampant corruption documented by the SEC and

prior to it, ABSP worked extensively in Indonesia with US companies and

local officials to facilitate the introduction of GM crops. ABSP began

working directly with the Central Research Institute for Food Crops

(CRIFC) in drafting biosafety guidelines in 1995. ABSP 's principal

collaborators in the country were selected to sit on the committee

writing

the first draft of national biosafety guidelines under the Minister of

Agriculture. ABSP then organised a workshop where a new draft was

produced that became the basis for the national biosafety guidelines

brought

into law by decree of the Minister of Agriculture in September 1997.

Similarly, ABSP " assisted " in the preparation of draft plant variety

protection legislation, which was approved by the Indonesian

parliament in

December 2000.[3]

 

The Indonesian " collaborators " that ABSP brought to the US for

workshops and internships designed to build a " pool of well-trained

people " [4]

include two of Indonesia 's national focal points for biosafety

legislation, Sugiono Moeljopawiro and Muhammed Herman of the CRIFC.[5]

Herman

was the national coordinator of ABSP from 1996-2002 and he has

coordinated Indonesia 's Plant Group of Biosafety and Food Safety

Technical

Team since 1997.[6] ABSP 's partner organization, ISAAA, which receives

funding from both Monsanto and USAID, brought Joko Budianto, another

national focal point for biosafety legislation on a two-week study

tour of

the EU and North America for six " senior policy makers " from ISAAA 's

" client countries " . Budianto, who, as director of the Agency for

Agricultural Research and Development , was the lead person

responsible for

biosafety regulations within the Ministry of Agriculture, met with

Monsanto Europe, Monsanto Canada, and eight representatives of

Monsanto USA

during his two-week study tour.[7] ABSP proudly notes that its

collaborators were not only involved in ABSP GM crop projects; they

also oversaw

field trials of Monsanto 's GM crops in the country.

 

1 http://www.grain.org/research/?id=252

 

2 Smith, R, 2005, Monsanto 's Bad Seed, The Motley Fool (fool.com)

 

3 ABSP, Annual Impact Report 1999-2000.

 

4 Karim Maredia and Bruce Bedford, " Team Building in Biosafety: The

ABSP Internship Program " BioLinks, Vol.1, No.4, p.7

 

5 ABSP, BioLink, v.2, n.2-3; ABSP, Annual Technical Report and 2000

Workplan; and ABSP, Annual Impact Report 1999-2000.

 

6 ABSP website: http://www.absp2.cornell.edu/ absp2team/bios/

hermanm.cfm (Checked Janaury 12, 2005).

 

7 J.E. Van Zanten, A.F. Krattiger and R.A. Hautea, " Food Biotechnology:

European and North American Regulatory Approaches and Public

Acceptance: A Traveling Workshop, " ISAAA Briefs No. 18. ISAAA: Ithaca,

NY, 2000.

 

8 ABSP, Annual Technical Report, September 1 – December 31, 1998.

***

Box: Development Alternatives Inc (DAI)

 

DAI[1] is a leading contractor for USAID 's agricultural policy

implementation activities and the biggest contractor for the US

agricultural

reconstruction program in Iraq,[2] with a contract worth US$101 million.

It is also a member of the ABSP II consortium and was a regular

collaborator with the former ABSP programme.

 

ABSP and DAI 's work typically came together in USAID efforts to

encourage and steer countries in the implementation of plant IPR

regimes. In

Morocco, DAI worked directly with private companies and the Moroccan

government in drafting plant variety protection (PVP) legislation that

was passed by parliament in 1996.[3] ABSP was then brought in to organise

workshops and train Moroccan officials for the operation of the PVP

office.[4] In the Philippines, DAI lobbied Congress and worked with the

Department of Agriculture, " redrafting PVP legislation to make it

compliant with UPOV standards " . DAI says " it took key officials and

congresspersons to Argentina and the United States to learn about PVP

programs

and legislation and, in anticipation of the Act being passed, helped the

Department of Agriculture to develop rules and regulations, and

establish a PVP board responsible for registration and enforcement of

breeders

' rights " .[5]

 

USAID uses DAI to work behind the scenes with ministries and

influential private sector figures whom it has cultured relations with

through

its development projects. It tries to avoid public debate as much as

possible and, with PVP, tries to move governments towards compliance with

UPOV. For instance, in Egypt in 1998, when Parliament was considering a

law on intellectual property rights, DAI worked with the Ministry of

Agriculture and the government to move quickly in bringing into

legislation a PVP decree that would pre-empt parliament from legislating

anything that might impede compliance with UPOV. According to DAI: " In

1999,

DAI and the Ministry of Agriculture developed a detailed decree for PVP

and shared drafts with the UPOV Secretariat in Geneva until it was

judged to meet that organization 's exacting standards… DAI and the

government decided to address the details of PVP through a ministerial

decree,

which is relatively easy to issue, and to address the broader issues of

PVP in a short chapter of a more comprehensive law on intellectual

property rights. This strategy allowed the People 's Assembly to support

PVP without being able to introduce changes in the detailed decree that

could threaten its conformance with UPOV standards. "

 

DAI 's lead employee on the PVP file was Lawrence Kent. He has since

moved to the Donald Danforth Plant Science Centre, another member of the

ABSP II consortium, where he is the head of international programs. In

the new USAID biotech configuration, the Donald Danforth Plant Science

Centre is the agency responsible for " assistance with regulatory

packages " under USAID 's PBS.

 

1 http://www.dai.com/ about/operating_ companies.php

 

2 http://www.zmag.org/content/ showarticle.cfm?

SectionID=15 & ItemID=6159

 

3 Lawrence Kent and King Bash, " DAI a Top Banana in Securing Plant

Breeders ' Rights " , Developments (quarterly newsletter of DAI), Spring

2000

: http://www.dai.com/pdfs/ Developments_Spring_2000.pdf

 

4 Andrea Johanson and Catherine L. Ives, " Development and

Implementation of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Legislation in

Morocco " in Reed

Hertford and Susan Schram, Editors, " Food: The Whole World's Business, "

Association for International Agriculture and Rural Development (AIARD),

February, 2001

 

5 Lawrence Kent and King Bash, " DAI a Top Banana in Securing Plant

Breeders ' Rights " , Developments (quarterly newsletter of DAI), Spring

2000

: http://www.dai.com/pdfs/ Developments_Spring_2000.pdf

***

The US government changes gear

 

During the 1990s, USAID's biotechnology activities mainly served to

channel technical and financial support to national biotechnology

scientists and officials within the Ministries of Agriculture. These

people

were likely to favour GM crops and were well placed to influence, if not

determine, relevant political processes. But near the end of the decade,

with phase I of the ABSP completed, it was clear that things were not

going entirely as planned. USAID's activities were influencing the

political processes but increasingly these were escaping its control,

with

growing public pressure, awareness and opposition. USAID was struggling

to get its ABSP target countries to take the final steps onto the GM

train, and some of these countries were even thinking of jumping off.

 

By 2000, only four countries were growing GM crops, with nearly 70% of

the world total still grown in the US.[23] Europe was in a state of de

facto moratorium while it revisited its regulatory system and many

countries of the South, including some of those countries where USAID was

heavily investing, having realised what was at stake, were clamouring

for a more precautionary approach. The new dividing lines came to a head

in the negotiations for an international regulatory framework on the

transboundary movement of GMOs under the Convention on Biological

Diversity. In these negotiations, the US took a beating. The Biosafety

Protocol that emerged from the negotiations in 2000 recognised the

precautionary principle and gave countries a green light to set up

strong national

biosafety frameworks for the regulation of GM crops across

environmental, health and socio-economic concerns. In Africa, the

negotiations

provided the African Union with the impetus to produce its own Model Law,

designed to help African countries implement and harmonize biosafety

legislation suited to their conditions. The Model Law embraced the

precautionary principle, laid out the essential elements for a

liability and

redress regime, and recognized the sovereign right of every country to

require a rigorous risk assessment of any GM crop for any use before any

decision regarding a GM crop is made.[24] These were not the kind of

developments that the US wanted to see.

 

The Protocol was a setback but not a complete disaster for the US.

While it opened up the political space for biosafety discussions and

decisions, giving weight to more Ministries and encouraging public

participation, this space was constrained by the Protocol's ambiguous

relation to

other agreements. For instance, it is not clear if the Protocol takes

precedence over the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures.

Moreover, although the Protocol gives momentum and support to the

development and implementation of national biosafety frameworks, it

does not

offer any guarantees as to where these national processes will go. The

situation is similar with the international standard setting body CODEX

Alimentarius, the reference point for WTO SPS measures. The guidelines

developed by its Task Force on Food Derived from Modern Biotechnology

support pre-market safety assessments of GM foods, a practice at odds

with US regulations. While the guidelines could shield countries

trying go

beyond the US-model from attack at the WTO, they are only

recommendations to governments and ultimately, as with the Biosafety

Protocol, they

offer little protection from bilateral pressure, which is increasingly

where the US is focussing its efforts.[25]

 

The US is responding to this new international context with the heavy

hands of bilateral trade and aid politics. On the trade side, the US

offers bilateral trade agreements to those that cooperate and threatens

trade sanctions on those that dare venture outside of what the US

considers to be a " science-based " regulatory framework. On the aid

side, the

US has shifted from funding long-term research projects to focus on

" near-market " GM projects and " policy change " in key countries. In this

regard, USAID took ABSP into phase II in 1998 and then, at the FAO's

World

Food Summit: Five Years' Later in 2002, it launched the Collaborative

Biotechnology Initiative (CABIO), bringing in new programs, new money

and a new structure.

 

Box: The US Model

 

One of the main reasons for the explosive growth of GM crops in the US

is the lax system of regulations. US regulations are based on the

concept of substantial equivalence,[1] in which a GM crop is assumed

to be

safe if the applicant can demonstrate, through a coarse chemical

analysis, enough compositional similarity between their GM varieties and

non-GM varieties to satisfy the regulators. Complicated assessments of

immunological and biochemical effects or ecological and socio-economic

impacts are not required.[2] For the pesticide and pharmaceutical

corporations that dominate the global GM industry, securing approval

for their GM

crops in the US is relatively cheap and easy - approximately 100 times

less costly than for pesticides and 500 times less costly than for

pharmaceuticals.[3]

 

Risk management in practice: Field trials in the US

 

From 1987-2002, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

authorised 15,461 field releases of genetically engineered organisms on

39,660 field test sites spanning 482,226 acres. Only 3.5% of applications

were denied, and these for reasons such as incomplete applications or

other minor paperwork errors. Over 300 of these field test sites were

for crops engineered to produce pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, or

other so-called biopharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, the percentage of field

tests conducted with introduced genes considered to be Confidential

Business Information increased nearly every year, from 0 percent in 1987

to more than 69 percent in 2002.[4]

 

There is always the risk that GM crops that are field-tested will enter

into the food supply by way of contamination. US regulators have

responded to this risk by looking for ways to authorise possible

contamination. In November 2004, the US Food and Drug Administration

(FDA) issued a

draft plan to allow experimental GM crops grown on " test " sites to

legally enter the food chain. According to Friends of the Earth:

 

" The new policy sets out loose 'safety assessment ' guidelines under

which a company may voluntarily consult with the FDA to have its

experimental GM crop material deemed 'acceptable ' as a contaminant in

food.

The 'safety assessment ' is based on paperwork and two inadequate tests

that the FDA estimates will take companies just 20 hours to complete.

The proposed review also excludes testing for unintended effects caused

by genetic modification. This inadequate review would grant biotech

companies the legal cover to allow their experimental GM crops to

enter the

American food supply. " [5]

 

A country 's right to precautionary principles

 

While the US, by far the world 's largest producer of GM crops and the

financial base for the GM industry, has a clear interest in exporting

this model, there is growing international consensus on the need for an

alternative approach that considers the full complexity involved in

assessing the risks from GM crops. Such an approach would go beyond the

now discredited assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between genes

and proteins, which the US model is built upon, towards a more elaborate

analytical system of risk assessment involving the emerging sciences of

genomics, proteomics and metabolomics.[6] It would also assess the

agronomic, social, cultural and ecological impacts of GM crops, already

evident from the limited experience with GM crops to date, on a

country-by-country basis, taking into account the different ecologies,

agricultural systems and cultural practices. Evidently, such an

approach is much

more costly and demanding, for both the companies trying to bring their

GM products through the regulatory system and the authorities carrying

out the assessments, but it is well within the rights afforded to

countries under international agreements - the Biosafety Protocol,

CODEX and

even the WTO SPS Measures.[7]

 

" The attractiveness of Africa for the commercial use of transgenic

crops will to a large extent be determined by the cost of the regulatory

procedures that are put in place. Structures that parallel US regulatory

structures may keep costs low. " - Abt Associates, " Mali Seed Sector

Development Plan, Initiative to End Hunger in Africa: Agricultural

Policy Development Program, " Prepared for USAID, March 2003.

 

1 Definition available here: http://www.grain.org/jargon/?id=33

 

2 Erik Millstone, Eric Brunner and Sue Mayer, " Beyond 'substantial

equivalence, " Nature, October 7, 1999.

 

3 Erik Millstone, Evaluating the acceptability of GM crops: the scope

for autonomy in developing countries, SciDev.Net, January 2005:

http://www.scidev.net/ dossiers/index.cfm?fuseaction=

policybrief & policy=55 & dossier=6

 

4 Philip Mattera, " USDA Inc.: How Agribusiness has hijacked regulatory

policy at the US Department of Agriculture, " Agribusiness

Accountability Initiative and Corporate Research Project, Good Jobs

First, July 23,

2004: http://www. agribusinessaccountability.org/ page/325/1

 

5 FOE Press release, " Anger over US plans to allow GM contamination of

food, " 23 Nov 2004: http://www.foe.co.uk/ resource/press_releases/

anger_over_us_plans_to_all_23112004.html

 

6 Erik Millstone, Evaluating the acceptability of GM crops: the scope

for autonomy in developing countries, SciDev.Net, January 2005:

http://www.scidev.net/ dossiers/index.cfm?fuseactio

n=policybrief & policy=55 & dossier=6

 

7 Erik Millstone, Evaluating the acceptability of GM crops: the scope

for autonomy in developing countries, SciDev.Net, January 2005,

http://www.scidev.net/ dossiers/index.cfm?fuseaction

=policybrief & policy=55 & dossier=6;

Phil Bereano and Elliott Peacock, " To eat or not to eat: An obscure UN

agency tries to provide an answer, " Seedling, April 2004:

http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=282

***

CABIO: The New USAID Biotech Machine

 

CABIO splits the former ABSP program into two main components: ABSP II

and the Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS). ABSP II is responsible for

the research side of the old ABSP programme but its focus is now on

clearly defined " product commercialisation packages " and it is no longer

interested in long-term research and development projects of GM crops

that risk not making it to the field trial stage. PBS, a five-year, US$15

million program, continues with and deepens USAID's work at the policy

level, which was formerly handled through ABSP. Its goal is to set up

" systems " in target countries that can bring GM crops to market. This

means orchestrating public relations and crafting GM crop approval

processes, regulations, and IPR regimes.

 

After many assessments, USAID decided that ABSP II and PBS would focus

on a few target countries: the Philippines in Southeast Asia,

Bangladesh and India in South Asia, Kenya and Uganda in East Africa

and Mali and

Nigeria in West Africa - a region where the former ABSP program was

rarely active. These are countries where the USAID presence is strong or

where the biotech lobby has already made some inroads - in the words of

USAID where the process is " demand driven " .[26] As with the ABSP II's

chosen crops, USAID is no longer interested in wasting its time on

countries that may not toe the line. The idea is to work on a few

countries,

even if they are not the most critical markets, and build from there.

 

The activities of ABSP II and PBS compliment and reinforce each other.

PBS puts in place the systems that facilitate ABSP II's GM crops, while

ABSP II serves as a local reference point for the system that PBS

advocates. Moreover, both PBS and ABSP will look to USAID partners with

established local networks in order to help move their projects forward,

partners such as Development Alternatives Inc (see Box: Development

Alternatives Inc) or Chemonics International[27] (see section on Uganda

below).

 

ABSP II

 

ABSP II is headquartered at Cornell University, USA. The project has

been fine-tuned to operate much like one of its corporate consortium

partners. It goes into target countries and looks for promising GM crops

for commercialisation. Then it puts a scientific team together, works out

the relevant IPR and regulatory issues and, in the meantime, invests

heavily in public relations ( " communications " ). But, unlike Monsanto and

Syngenta, it's not in these countries for the money, and this is its

big advantage. ABSP II can position itself on the middle road, an

organisation interested in making GM crops work for the poor, even as it

builds up and finances networks of local scientists, policy-makers and

spokespeople to ensure GM policies work for its US corporate consortium

partners.

 

Table. ABSP II priority GM crop projects

 

GM crop

Estimated timeline for field trials

Targeted countries / regions

 

Bt aubergine (eggplant/brinjal)

2005-2006

Bangladesh , India, Philippines

 

Late blight resistant potato

2007

Bangladesh , India, Indonesia

 

Papaya ringspot virus resistant papaya

2005-2006

Philippines

 

Cassava mosaic virus resistant cassava*

2005-2006

Kenya , Nigeria

 

Bt cowpea*

Not known

East and West Africa

 

*Projects not confirmed

***

The first step, then, is in identifying the priority crops.

 

In Asia, ABSP II plans to bring Bt aubergine to market for 2007. It is

developing the GM aubergines in collaboration with Monsanto's Indian

subsidiary, Mahyco, which is already conducting field trials in India and

working with scientists from the Institute of Plant Breeding in the

Philippines.[28] The other priority crops targeted for field trials in

the near future are a late-blight resistant GM potato and a

virus-resistant GM papaya, which has already wreaked havoc in

Thailand.[29] A

multiple virus resistant tomato project[30] may also be in the works for

Indonesia and the Philippines.

***

Box: GM Papaya

 

In 2004, papaya trees, contaminated with GM papaya from a local

research station were found to be growing in farmers' fields in

Thailand. The

controversy became big news as importers of papaya threatened to stop

all imports of Thai papaya and farmers crops were forcibly destroyed by

the government. This papaya scandal in Thailand is a good example of

field trials of GM crops - carried out in secrecy - contaminating local

non-GM production. It is also a clear rejection of USAID 's argument

that field trials are completely contained and necessary to determine the

potential of GM crops.

***

In Africa, ABSP II has yet to set its priority crops, though Bt cowpea

and virus resistant cassava seem to be the lead candidates. The Donald

Danforth Plant Science Centre has already imported GM cassava into

Kenya for field trials with KARI and has submitted an application for

field

trials in Nigeria.[31] For Mali and Uganda, USAID found that Bt cotton

is the only short-term possibility for field trials. However, ABSP II

cannot work directly with cotton as internal rules prevent USAID from

financing research on crops that compete with US exports. Therefore, ABSP

II is putting together longer-term research projects with local

scientists, such as multiple virus resistant tomatoes for Mali, whilst

working

with PBS to prepare the general groundwork for GM field tests. More

direct support for Bt cotton from the US will take place through the

funding instruments the US has mobilised to counteract international

efforts

to end its cotton dumping practices.[32]

 

ABSP II does not implement its projects alone; it is a consortium that

works through and with its various partners. One of its key consortium

partners is ISAAA[33], a pro-GM outfit funded by the GM industry, ABSP

II and USAID, which has become famous for its annual reports on global

production of GM crops. ISAAA is very active in supporting GM crop

projects for ABSP II and similar programmes:

 

* ISAAA brokers the IPR deals between US corporations and

participating public research centres in the South.

 

* ISAAA offers fellowships to scientists in its target countries

to train in GM techniques at US private and public labs.

 

* ISAAA carries out socio-economic impact assessments of the

potential GM crops and, most importantly.

 

* ISAAA handles much of the " communication and outreach " work,

through its network of Biotechnology Information Centres.

 

This makes for a lot of crossover between ABSP II, PBS and ISAAA.

 

When Mali became a target country for USAID'S biotechnology programmes

under the ABSP II and PBS, ISAAA was there to set up a Biotechnology

Information Centre with the national agricultural research centre (the

Institut d'Économie Rurale) that re-distributes a French version of

ISAAA's electronic biotech news digest in the sub-region. ISAAA also

launched operations in India shortly after it became an ABSP II and

PBS target

country.

 

In Southeast Asia, the relation between ABSP II and ISAAA is seamless.

They organise joint workshops and work together on various projects

including, late blight resistant potato, fruit and shoot borer resistant

aubergine, ringspot virus resistant papaya (see Box: GM Papaya) and

multiple virus resistant tomato. All of these are being developed for the

Philippines and Indonesia. Where ABSP II focuses on biotechnology

research, ISAAA promotes " safe and effective " biosafety regulatory

procedures

in Southeast Asia and as such compliments both ABSP II and PBS.

 

Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS)

 

PBS is run by a consortium of groups, under the direction of IFPRI

(International Food Policy Research Institute),[34] which brings together

the bulk of the groups and people involved in USAID's biotechnology

policy work.

 

Many of these groups are also involved with the UNEP/GEF Initial

Strategy on Biosafety,[35] which assists countries in establishing

national

biosafety frameworks. Josette Lewis of USAID says that PBS compliments

the UNEP/GEF programme by providing technical assistance that goes

beyond what UNEP/GEF provides.[36]

 

Lewis also concedes that PBS allows the US to pursue " bilateral

responses " through one-to-one dialogues with " target countries " .[37]

This form

of " bilateral response " therefore furnishes the US with far more

influence over national processes than multilateral processes, such as

those

run by UNEP/GEF or CODEX, or even the African Union's efforts to

translate the Model Law on Rights of Local Communities, Farmers,

Breeders and

Access[38] into national legislation.

 

This does not mean that the US has reverted to a simple

country-by-country approach. PBS's bilateral activities are the basis

for regional

agendas. The biosafety systems that PBS helps to build in target

countries

are to serve as " templates " for the region.[39] The eventual goal is to

harmonise legislation across regions, creating regional markets for GM

crops with uniform regulatory processes. PBS therefore coordinates

several USAID-initiated regional processes, such as the South Asian

Biosafety Program, the West African Biotechnology Network (WABNET) and

the

South African Regional Biosafety Program (SARB).[40] USAID states that

SARB's " specific objective is laying the regulatory foundation to support

field testing of genetically engineered products in four [southern

African] countries by 2003. " [41] PBS now also manages USAID's biotech

collaboration with CORAF (le Conseil Ouest et Centre Africain pour la

Recherche et le Développement Agricoles), the Association for

Strengthening

Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA) and the Common Market for

Eastern and Southern Africa.

 

PBS people see themselves as biosafety " capacity-building providers " -

the intermediaries between donors (in this case the US government) and

" client countries " . In their words, providers offer client countries:

 

-policy advice, assistance in drafting new laws or regulations,

-assistance in building the capacity of regulatory institutions,

-and assistance in communications. (in which they refer to " educating

stakeholders " , " identifying target audiences and trusted sources of

information " , " developing key messages " and " training public

spokespersons. " [42])

 

But the providers must, of course, respond to the donors' agendas.

USAID launched PBS to steer countries towards the US model (see Box:

The US

Model), which it portrays as the only practical approach for poorer

countries. According to PBS, " modelling biosafety systems for developing

countries, based on the complex and resource-intensive approaches for

developed countries [i.e. Europe], is inappropriate " .[43] Developing

country policy makers have to understand the " consequences of

policy-choice " and the " costs of regulatory complexity " .[44]

 

So PBS proposes to help policy-makers make regulatory " trade-offs " ,

sacrificing comprehensive risk assessments in order to access the

" benefits " of introducing GM crops into their countries, and to backup

these

decisions with " communications strategies " that will reassure the

public.[45]

 

With GM crop field trials, for example, PBS advocates an " enabling

environment " , akin to the US approach, where the " regulatory issue is

risk

management not comprehensive risk assessment " (see Box: The US

Model).[46] As explained by Lawrence Kent of PBS:

 

" If developing countries want the benefits of transgenic products

developed for their needs, they will need to make it possible, if not

easy,

to conduct field tests under local conditions … [PBS] is an important

and essential initiative that must become effective as soon as possible

to provide an alternative to the anti-technology 'precautionary

principle' being disseminated widely by the United Nations Environmental

Program and nongovernmental organisations throughout the developing

world. " [47]

 

In Africa, PBS's efforts to facilitate field trials are connected to

Monsanto's on-going attempts to deploy its Bt Cotton. In its proposal for

a PBS contract, the IFPRI-led consortium said one of the " documented

milestones " of its work would be field trials of Bt cotton in Kenya,

Uganda and Tanzania in the first two years of the PBS project.[48] PBS is

well on its way: Kenya approved the import of Bt cotton seeds for field

trials in 2004 and in February 2005 the Daily News of Dar es Salaam

cited a government official as saying that GM cotton trials are to be

carried out in Tanzania's Southern Highland regions. Both countries have

yet to implement national biosafety frameworks.[49]

 

PBS does have a programme component that provides funds to support

research for risk assessments. The 5-year, US$7.5 million Biotechnology

Biodiversity Interface (BBI) Grants Program specifically funds research

into the environmental risks to " wild biodiversity " of GM crops in order

to " provide new knowledge upon which to conduct/complete a risk

assessment or devise risk management options " . This programme also fully

supports ABSP II regulatory packages by providing research and addressing

possible environmental concerns. Indeed, applicants for BBI grants are

encouraged to consider questions journalists might ask in their project

proposals and to describe how their research project will build

" collaborations between the agricultural and environmental or

conservation

communities. " [50] Ultimately, BBI cannot provide for independent risk

assessment when USAID controls the purse strings and decides which

risks are

worthy of research and who will do the research.

 

USAID: a complex web

 

USAID's activities to promote GM crops go well beyond CABIO. It's a

giant web and difficult to document in its entirety. With all of the

names

and the acronyms it is hard to see the whole web, especially if you

include links with the US Department of Agriculture, the US Department of

State, the Office of the US Trade Representative and the other US

government agencies making the world hungry for GM crops.

 

The web in Africa is particularly complex. But if we stick to the PBS

categories of " donors " , " providers " , and " clients " , things become a

little clearer. Have a look at the accompanying diagram (see Diagram: The

USAID Biotechnology Web in Africa).

 

Diagram: The USAID Biotechnology Web in Africa

 

On the donor side, USAID, the Rockefeller Foundation, the GM industry

and the World Bank can be lumped together. They are the key patrons and

advisors to the groups within USAID's biotechnology web. They often

fund the same groups and are regularly at the same conferences and

gatherings.

 

On the providers' side, the front line includes USAID's core programs:

ABSP II and PBS. Then there are the pro-GM advocacy groups funded by

the donors, including the African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum

(ABSF), AfricaBio[51], A Harvest, the African Agricultural Technology

Foundation (AATF) and ISAAA. In addition we have the centres of the

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR),

such as the

International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). Add to this mix a

couple of national agricultural research centres, such as KARI, which

is heavily financed by all the donors. These front line groups carry out

the work on the ground - they organise the workshops and dialogues,

they handle the media communications, they meet with government

officials,

they influence national and regional processes and they are almost

always involved, one way or another, with any attempts to bring GM crops

into African countries. They also employ the key people that the donors

trust to carry out their agendas, such as Florence Wambugu of A Harvest,

Jennifer Thomson of AfricaBio, and Walter Alhassan, the African

coordinator for ABSP II and PBS.

 

The secondary providers are also funded by the same donors and always

have a few people from the front line participating in or managing their

activities. The difference between the two is that the secondary

providers keep a less clear pro-GM agenda and bring in wider

participation.

These secondary providers include: the Forum for Agriculture Research in

Africa (FARA), which has Florence Wambugu on its Executive Board; the

South African Regional Biosafety (SARB) Program, managed by AfricaBio;

the West African Biotechnology Network (WABNET), coordinated by ABSP

II; and the National Agricultural Biotechnology Project (NABP) of

Nigeria, run by IITA.

 

The donors and providers often come together to establish their agendas

within more general initiatives focussed on Africa such as the

Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa. This partnership was

launched

in 2001 by a group of high profile US and African people. This included

the Presidents of Mozambique, Ghana, Uganda and Mali on the Executive

Committee and a Working Group on Capacity Building for Science and

Technology [52] that is dominated by people from the USAID biotechnology

web. This latter working group has organised several high-profile

workshops on GM agriculture, including one at the 2003 summit of the

African

Growth and Opportunity Act in Mauritius.

 

USAID - carrots, sticks and workshops

 

" There is a lot of pressure to accept biotechnology from the countries

with big biotechnology interests. This is manifested in a number of

different ways – political, economic, and scientific. Political pressure

is the biggest – accepting biotech is now often a condition for

qualifying for other aid money. But most African countries have enough

technology to deal with the food production problems they face. "

-Professor

Johnson Ekpere [53]

 

The case of Uganda

 

" Unless someone or some group in the country where policy reform is

being pursued feels that the changes are something that they want to see

happen, and are willing to contribute to realizing them, externally

initiated change efforts, whether at the local or national level, are

likely to fail. " [54]

 

Excerpt from USAID's Implementing Policy Change Project, March 1996

 

Uganda was one of the most important African countries pushing for a

strong Biosafety Protocol. At the WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle

in 1999, it helped defeat a US and Canadian effort to pre-empt the

Protocol through the creation of a 'Working Party on Biotechnology'. In

November 2001, it became one of the first countries to ratify the

Protocol

and it is one of eight countries currently participating in the

UNEP/GEF Project on the Implementation of National Biosafety

Frameworks that

began in December 2002. This active international presence on GMO issues

and the imminent establishment of a national biosafety framework,

combined with USAID's established presence in the country, makes

Uganda an

important target for the US biotech push.

 

The main US strategy for influencing Ugandan GM policy is to flood the

country with money and expert advice. USAID is the main purveyor of

both. It has put forward at least US$200,000 for a Rockefeller Foundation

supported biotechnology lab for bananas, which USAID describes as a

" high-visibility " project popular with Ugandan scientists.[55] It has

also

recently started funding the National Biosafety Committee Secretariat

at the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) - the

country's major decision-making body on GM policy. While the Council

was once a blockage point for the entry of GM crops, refusing to

authorise Monsanto's application for field tests of Bt cotton, USAID

feels that

it now has a " leadership that has an aggressive agenda for implementing

biotechnology in the country " and the agency expects the UNCST " to

approve field-testing [of Bt cotton] in the near future. " [56]

 

One of USAID's most trusted tools for " implementing policy change " is

the workshop and there has been a slew of USAID supported workshops on

GMOs and biosafety in Uganda in recent years.[57] The main conduit for

the workshops is USAID's local contractor Chemonics, which manages the

Agency's Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program (APEP). APEP has

a biotech component directed by ABSP II's regional coordinator that is

" designed to absorb biotechnology earmark funding from USAID. " [58] The

Agency uses this programme to channel funds to UNCST.[59] In 2002,

Chemonics received a US$200,000 budget to organise " dialogues " on

biosafety

among " government and private stakeholders " . In February 2004, it

teamed-up with PBS and ABSP II to hold a national workshop, bringing 24

" biotechnology and biosafety stakeholders " together to " discuss the draft

annual work plan, to identify national, regional and international key

partners and determine their roles, and discuss the implementation

modus. " USAID also finances workshops organised under Monsanto and CABI

Biosciences' Uganda Biotechnology Initiative " that specifically look to

trail-blaze a number of existing, near-to-the-market crop-related GM

technologies. " [60]

 

In 2003, Ugandan authorities produced a first set of draft national

biosafety regulations that drew heavily from the African Model Law - a

clear setback for GM proponents.[61] USAID's team was immediately on the

scene to redress the situation. PBS and GM industry people, such as Pat

Traynor of IFPRI, Thomas Carrato of Monsanto and Greg Jaffe[62] of the

Center for Science in the Public Interest, came in, some through the

UNEP/GEF process, as " international experts " to comment on the draft and

make recommendations. Their efforts were backed by high-level

diplomatic actions. President Bush brought up GM crops during his

visit with

President Museveni in 2003, as did the US State Department's Special

Negotiator for Biotechnology. The Minister of Agriculture, Kisamba

Mugerwa

was flown to Sacramento in 2003 for the USDA/USAID Ministerial

conference on biotechnology. Soon after, Mugerwa left the ministry for a

directorship with IFPRI - the lead institute of the PBS program.

 

According to Mariam Mayet of the African Centre for Biosafety, at an

October 2003 national workshop convened to consider the draft regulations

and the comments received by the " international experts " , the draft was

" completely torn apart " .[63] Responsibility for a new draft was put in

the hands of ACODE - an NGO connected to USAID and Rockefeller

Foundation programmes.[64] Shortly thereafter, the Uganda National

Council for

Sciences and Technology announced the completion of a new draft

biotechnology regulatory framework. This time, as Mayet points out,

" most of

the previous drafting based on the African Model Law appears to have

been lost. " It now looks like PBS could reach its objective to have field

trials of Monsanto's Bt cotton underway in Uganda in 2005.[65]

 

US[tr]AID

 

At the end of his presentation to the January 2004 conference of the

UNEP/GEF project, Joel Cohen, the Director of PBS, spoke about the

possibility of PBS not succeeding. He noted that, even with the " decision

tools " that PBS provides, things can still " fall apart " : trade concerns

may trump GM approvals; GM-free policies may remain effective even if

they're no longer explicit; and countries might even slide back into

moratoriums (!).[66]

 

In Egypt

 

Indeed, this sort of thing happened recently in Egypt. After all of the

money and time USAID spent supporting GM agriculture in the country,

the Egyptian government doublecrossed the US in 2003 by backing-out of

its complaint to the WTO over EU regulations on GMOs. But, as Cohen

surely knows, when the carrots that USAID provides stop working, the

US can

start using sticks.

 

The US's immediate response to the Egyptian decision was to suspend

negotiations on a possible US-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Officials

from the Office of the US Trade Representative made it clear that

Egypt's decision to walk away from the WTO complaint was to blame.[67]

" When

you're given a direct commitment by a government and they do an

about-face, that has to have an effect in terms of who you do a

free-trade

agreement with, " said one official.[68]

 

The US government accused Cairo of denying US textile exporters' access

to its market. Given that the US has little business interest in

Egypt's textile market, the move was locally viewed as political. " I can

relate all of these problems to Egypt's decision to withdraw its support

for the US challenge on the ban of imports of genetically modified foods

to the EU, " said Mostafa Zaki, of the Egyptian Federation of Chambers

of Commerce.[69]

 

A year later, toward the end of 2004, US officials started dangling the

FTA carrot to Egypt again. In US trade policy logic, Egypt was showing

better progress on economic reforms (read overall liberalisation and

deregulation) and might be ready for that exclusive trade pact. The

possible hold-ups this time? Complaints about Egypt's intellectual

property

law (and frozen chickens). The US Biotechnology Industry Organisation

had just produced a scathing review of Egypt's IPR rules, bitterly

complaining that it was way out of line with the WTO TRIPS Agreement

as far

as patenting biotechnology products goes.[70]

 

And in other countries

 

Similar tactics have been used against other countries. In 2001, the US

threatened to launch complaints against both Bolivia and Sri Lanka when

they proposed new regulations on GM foods.

 

A US trade delegation to Thailand threatened trade sanctions if the

government went ahead with proposed labelling requirements.[71] Thailand

has been under new pressure from the US to align its economic and

agricultural policies with those of the WTO in the latest round of

US-Thai

FTA negotiations. This includes eliminating " unjustified trade

restrictions that affect new US technologies " .[72] Monsanto has also been

lobbying the US trade negotiators[73] - either by itself or as part of

the

broader US-Thai FTA Business Coalition[74] - to pressurise Thailand into

ending its moratorium on large-scale field trials of GM crops. Under

pressure from heavy lobbying, the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra

issued a decision lifting the ban GMO field trials and allowing entry of

GM crops in Thailand. " The FTA was the main motive for Thaksin to

reverse the 2001 decision. We know that the weekend before the policy was

made, Monsanto sent its people over to lobby the government, " according

to Witoon Lianchamroon, director of a local NGO Biothai and convenor of

FTA watch. [75] However, within 10 days, the Thai cabinet retracted his

decision due to spontaneous public opposition.

 

The US government has a large number of instruments it can use to

arm-twist the target countries of USAID's ABSP II and PBS programmes.

One of

these instruments is the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)[76],

which may eventually provide assistance of up to US$5 billion per year to

a select group of countries.

 

Mali, for instance, is one of eight African countries now eligible for

this funding. In order to touch this money, Mali has to submit a

proposal that details how it will commit to and implement " sound

policies "

that promote " economic freedom " . The proposal is then assessed by the

Millennium Challenge Corporation, which brings together the US Secretary

of State, the USTR,[77] the US Secretary of the Treasury, and the USAID

Administrator. If the corporation selects the proposal it then

negotiates and signs a compact (a contract) with Mali, laying out the

expected

outcomes and the benchmarks that Mali must achieve before funds are

released.

 

Burkina Faso, Kenya, the Philippines, Tanzania and Uganda are

considered " threshold countries " , which " are committed to undertaking the

reforms necessary to improve policy performance and eventually qualify

for

MCA assistance. " It is not explicitly listed in the criteria, but

according to one senior MCA official, a country's GM policies will

definitely

be taken into account.[78]

 

The US's bilateral measures, in the form of both aid and trade

politics, are self-serving actions that exploit the vulnerabilities of

poor

countries. Even if governments are fully within their international

rights

to protect their people by pursuing biosafety regimes that go beyond

the US model of so-called " science-based " regulations, in practice, these

US bilateral actions can effectively keep them from doing so.

 

Conclusion

 

It is not easy for poor countries to resist this pressure from the

world's superpower. Few governments have the stomach to stand up directly

to the US and those that do are always at risk of caving in under the

constant pressure. In Mali, for example, one of the world's poorest

countries, the US has put a significant amount of money on the table,

which

the country risks jeopardising if it does not open the door to GM

crops. Governments end up going against the desires of their

populations in

order to appease the US, or worse, to get their share of the crumbs

that the US hands out. In this corrupt game of give-and-take among

elites,

the livelihoods of millions of farmers are at stake.

 

At the grassroots, however, once people understand what is happening

and what is at stake, there is a much greater will to resist.

 

In Mali, it is more or less clear that if the US is to ever reduce its

subsidies to its cotton producers, Mali had better think carefully

about its upcoming decisions on field-tests for Bt cotton. Yet, even as

scientists and policy-makers take the bait, there is a rising-tide of

Malian farmers calling on their political leaders to stand firm

against US

pressure and to reject GMOs. Mali's National Coordination of Farmers'

Organisations (CNOP) spelled things out forcefully in an October 2004

Declaration: " The CNOP affirms that it is aware of the pressures and

threats that countries that sell GMOs are imposing on a small, poor and

unarmed African country and that it will vigorously support the

Government

of Mali as long as it acts responsibly and with strength to protect the

interests of its toiling masses - the farmers. " In Thailand, this

resistance to GM has been shown by the emphatic rejection of GM

agriculture

and imports. And this picture of the grassroots rejecting GM has been

replicated around the world.

 

An increasing number of people are no longer tolerant of the biotech

industry's, and particularly the US government's, aggressive push of GM

crops and their government's acquiescence. In its haste to force-feed

the world with its GM crops, the US government may be seriously

miscalculating the explosive force of the social movements that its

policies are

helping to unleash.

 

Annex

 

ABSP II Staff and their background

 

Key people within PBS

 

PBS Regional Coordinators:

 

Acronyms

 

AATF: African Agricultural Technology Foundation

 

ABSF: African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum

 

ABSP: Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project

 

AGERI: Agricultural Genetic Engineering Research Institute

 

APEP: Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program

 

Bt: Bacillus thuringiensis

 

CABIO: Collaborative Biotechnology Initiative

 

CRIFC: Central Research Institute for Food Crops

 

DAI: Development Alternatives Inc

 

FARA: Forum for Agriculture Research in Africa

 

FDA: US Food and Drug Administration

 

IDEA: Investment in Developing Export Agriculture

 

IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute

 

IITA: International Institute of Tropical Agriculture

 

ISAAA: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech

Applications

 

ISNAR: International Service for National Agricultural Research

 

KARI: Kenya Agricultural Research Institute

 

MCA: Millennium Challenge Account

 

MSU: Michigan State University

 

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development

 

PBS: Program for Biosafety Systems

 

PVP: Plant variety protection

 

SARB: South African Regional Biosafety Program

 

SEC: Security and Exchange Commission

 

UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme

 

UPOV: International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants

 

USAID: US Agency for International Development

 

USDA: US Department of Agriculture

 

Going Further

 

GM Watch, website focusing on the use of hype, propaganda and spin to

promote GM, and on exposing the role played by corporate-friendly

scientists, industry front groups, PR companies, lobbyists, and political

groups: http://www.gmwatch.org/

 

Caroline Brenner, " Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons from

the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) Experience, " ISAAA

Briefs No. 31. ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2004: http://www.isaaa.org/kc

 

Mariam Mayet, " Africa: the new frontier for the GE Industry, " Third

World Resurgence, Issue NO. 159-160, Feb 2004:

http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/briefing_papers.htm

 

Herbert Docena, " Silent Battalions of 'Democracy', " Middle East Report

232, Fall 2004: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer232/mer232.html

 

Greenpeace, " USAID and GM Food Aid, " October 2002,

http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/ MultimediaFiles/Live/ FullReport/5243.pdf

 

Noah Zerbe, " Feeding the Famine? American Food Aid and the GMO Debate

in Southern Africa, " The GE Information Bulletin, No. 31, March 2005:

http://www.geinfo.org.nz/032005/03.html

 

--

 

[1] The paper does not cover, in any detail, USAID's biotechnology

activities in Latin America or Central and Eastern Europe, or its role in

the shipment of US food aid containing GMOs. These important areas of

research are beyond the scope of this briefing.

 

[2] The two Monsanto executives were Robert Horsch and Earnest

Jaworski.

 

[3] Florence Wambugu - more details available from the GMWatch pages:

http://www.gmwatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=131

 

[4] F. Wambugu, " Biotechnology Seminar Paper: Control of African Sweet

Potato Virus Diseases through Biotechnology and Technology Transfer, "

ISNAR Biotechnology Service, April 1995:

www.isnar.cgiar.org/ibs/papers/wambugu.pdf

 

[5] Gatonye Gathura " GM technology fails local potatoes, " The Daily

Nation, Kenya, Online, Thursday January 29, 2004

 

[6] Bhavani Pathak, " The process of biotechnology development and

dissemination in developing countries: Experience of USAID's agricultural

biotechnology program " , Presentation to the 6th International ICABR

Conference Ravello, Italy, July 11-14, 2002

 

[7] Biotechnology. In this report we have referred to biotechnology or

biotech which refers specifically to agricultural biotechnology, unless

otherwise stated.

 

[8] Bhavani Pathak, " The process of biotechnology development and

dissemination in developing countries: Experience of USAID's agricultural

biotechnology program " , Presentation to the 6th International ICABR

Conference Ravello, Italy, July 11-14, 2002

 

[9] ABSP News Linkages, June 1999.

 

[10] Philip McMichael, " Global Development and the Corporate Food

Regime, Presented at the Sustaining a Future for Agriculture Conference,

Geneva, 16-19 November 2004: http://www.agribusinessaccountability.org/

page/332/1

 

[11] Caroline Brenner, " Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons

from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) Experience, "

ISAAA Briefs No. 31. ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2004

 

[12] Caroline Brenner, " Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons

from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) Experience, "

ISAAA Briefs No. 31. ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2004

 

[13] Josette Lewis maintains that the Bt potato work has now moved to

South Africa, where USAID is supporting regulatory studies. She

estimates that the Bt potatoes will be commercialised within 5 years

(Personal

communication, February 25, 2005).

 

[14] Caroline Brenner, " Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons

from the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) Experience, "

ISAAA Briefs No. 31. ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2004

 

[15] Michigan State University

 

[16] Bhavani Pathak, " The process of biotechnology development and

dissemination in developing countries: Experience of USAID's agricultural

biotechnology program " , Presentation to the 6th International ICABR

Conference Ravello, Italy, July 11-14, 2002

 

[17] In a detailed study of the ABSP, Caroline Bremmer writes: " No

provision was made in the ABSP budget for contributing to the costs of

complying with the necessary regulatory procedures for the risk

assessment

complex of the 'near market' technologies, even though the ABSP Annual

Impact Report dated July 2000 acknowledged that '…depending on the

stringency of the commercialization procedures, it will be difficult

for a

public-funded effort to meet the regulatory costs'. " ( Caroline Brenner,

" Telling Transgenic Technology Tales: Lessons from the Agricultural

Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP) Experience, " ISAAA Briefs No. 31.

ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2004.)

 

[18] Bhavani Pathak, " The process of biotechnology development and

dissemination in developing countries: Experience of USAID's agricultural

biotechnology program " , Presentation to the 6th International ICABR

Conference Ravello, Italy, July 11-14, 2002

 

[19] Joseph Krauss, " Egypt develops GM, others fight, " Ellinghuysen, 4

April 2004

 

[20] Carol Kaesuk Yoon, " Reassessing Ecological Risks of Genetically

Altered Plants " New York Times, November 3, 1999:

http://www.biotech-info.net/ reassessing.html

 

[21] Hector Quemeda' s Résumé : http://www.croptechnology.com/

pages/912975/ page912975.htm? refresh=1101605552929

 

[22] Josette Lewis, " Enhancing Agricultural Technology Transfer in the

Developing Countries: the ABSP Experience, " Presentation to the

Association for International Agriculture and Rural Development 35th

Annual

Meeting, Washington D.C., June 1999, ed. Julie A. McDaniels, Dec. 1999.

 

[23] Clive James, " Global Status of Commercialized Transgenic Crops:

2000, " ISAAA Briefs No. 21. ISAAA: Ithaca, NY. 2000.

 

[24] Mariam Mayet, " Why Africa Should Adopt the African Model Law on

Safety in Biotechnology, " African Centre for Biosafety:

http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/ biosafety_laws_and_comments.htm

 

[25] Phil Bereano and Elliott Peacock, " To eat or not to eat: An

obscure UN agency tries to provide an answer, " Seedling, April 2004:

http://www.grain.org/seedling/?type=39

 

[26] Josette Lewis, Personal communication, February 25, 2005

 

[27] http://www.chemonics.com/

 

[28] Personal communication from James Shanahan (ABSP II), February 16,

2005 and ABSP website : http://www.absp2.cornell.edu/ newsroomarchives/

dsply_news_item.cfm?articleid=120

 

[29] http://www.grain.org/research/?id=167

 

[30] http://www.isaaa.org/Regional_centers/

SEAsiacenter/ABSPII/tomato/mvr.htm

 

[31] Lawrence Kent, " Moving Transgenic Cassava from the Lab to the

Field: Early Experiences and Observations of the Danforth Plant Science

Center, " Presentation to the Sixth International Scientific Meeting of

the Cassava Biotechnology Network (CBN), 8-14 March 2004, CIAT, Cali,

Colombia :www.ciat.cgiar.org/biotechnology/cbn/sixth_

international_meeting/pdf_presentations/Lawrence_Kent.pdf

 

[32] World Trade Organization, " Implementation of the development

assistance aspects of the cotton-related decisions in the July Package:

First Periodic Report by the Director-General " , 3 December 2004.

 

[33] International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech

Applications http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=137

 

[34] http://www.isnar.cgiar.org/ibs.htm

 

[35] UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) and GEF (Global

Environmental Facility) http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/

 

[36] Personal communication with Josette Lewis, USAID, February 25,

2005

 

[37] Personal communication with Josette Lewis, USAID, February 25,

2005

 

[38] African Union's Model Law on Rights of Local Communities, Farmers,

Breeders and Access available online: http://www.grain.org/brl/

?docid=798 & lawid=2132

 

[39] Joel Cohen, Presentation to meeting of the UNEP-GEF Projects on

Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks, 26–30 January 2004,

Geneva Switzerland: www.unep.ch/biosafety/ Implementation/

GenevaMeetingJanuary2004/Cohen.pdf

 

[40] http://www.gmwatch.org/profile1.asp?PrId=271 & page=K

 

[41] USAID Fact Sheet, " SARB: Southern African Regional Biosafety

Program " : http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030623_7.html

 

[42] Patricia L. Traynor, " Beyond Cartagena: Collaboration in Biosafety

Implementation " in M.A Mclean, R.J. Frederick, P.L. Traynor, J.I.

Cohen, and J. Komen (eds), " A Framework for Biosafety Implementation:

Report

of a Meeting organized by ISNAR Biotechnology Service " , July 2001,

Washington, DC : www.doylefoundation.org/ icsu/ISNAR%202003%20

bioframework.pdf

 

[43] PBS Website: http://www.ifpri.org/themes/

pbs/components-print-all.htm

 

[44] Joel Cohen, Presentation to meeting of the UNEP-GEF Projects on

Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks, 26–30 January 2004,

Geneva Switzerland: www.unep.ch/biosafety/ Implementation/

GenevaMeetingJanuary2004/Cohen.pdf

 

[45] PBS Website:

http://www.ifpri.org/themes/pbs/components-print-all.htm

 

[46] Joel Cohen, Presentation to meeting of the UNEP-GEF Projects on

Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks, 26–30 January 2004,

Geneva Switzerland: www.unep.ch/biosafety/ Implementation/

GenevaMeetingJanuary2004/Cohen.pdf

 

[47] Lawrence Kent, Donald Danforth Plant Science Center, " What's the

holdup? Addressing constraints to the use of plant biotechnology in

developing countries, " AgBioForum, Vol 7, No. 1 & 2, October 29, 2004

 

[48] PBS website: http://www.ifpri.org/themes/

pbs/outcomes-print-all.htm

 

[49] " Tanzania to grow GM cotton for trial this year, " Angola Press,

February 8, 2005

 

[50] PBS, " Tips on Developing and Describing Fundable Research

Projects " :

 

www.ifpri.org/themes/ pbs/pdf/BBI_proposaltips.pdf

 

[51] http://www.gmwatch.org/ profile1.asp?PrId=170

 

[52] http://www.africanhunger.org/ ?location=front & aid=10

 

[53] Interview, Seedling, July 2003:

http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=244

 

[54] Derick W. Brinkerhoff, " Implementing Policy Change: A Summary of

Lessons Learned, " Research Notes No. 4, A publication of USAID's

Implementing Policy Change Project, March 1996

 

[55] USAID, " Uganda Assessment Report: Assessment of Biotechnology in

Uganda, " Strategic 07 Document: http://www.usaid.or.ug/

so7%20List%20of%20documents.htm

 

[56] USAID, " Uganda Assessment Report: Assessment of Biotechnology in

Uganda, " Strategic 07 Document: http://www.usaid.or.ug/

so7%20List%20of%20documents.htm

 

[57] Derick, Brinkerhoff, " Using Workshops for Strategic Management of

Policy Reform, " USAID Implementing Policy Change Project, Technical

Note No. 6, June, 1994.

 

[58] USAID, " Agriculture Productivity Enhancement Program: Statement of

Work and Illustrative Budget " : http://ane-environment.net/Regulations/

language/ SOW%20Uganda%20APEP.doc

 

[59] APEP website: http://mail.apepuganda.org/

apep/test/ver1.1/htm/rhs_biotechnology.htm

 

[60] USAID, " Uganda Assessment Report: Assessment of Biotechnology in

Uganda, " Strategic 07 Document: http://www.usaid.or.ug/

so7%20List%20of%20documents.htm

 

[61] Muffy Koch of SARB calls the Model Law " a poor working model,

designed to impede rather than promote safe and useful technology " , while

Florence Wambugu wants FARA to develop an alternative

" pro-biotechnology " African Model Law.

 

[62] http://www.gmwatch.org/ archive2.asp?arcid=4862

 

[63] Mariam Mayet, " Comments on the Ugandan National Biosafety

Framework, " African Centre for Biosafety, September 2004:

http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/uganda.htm .

 

[64] Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)

receives project funding from USAID and is involved in the

USAID/Rockefeller

Foundation initiated and financed African Agricultural Technology

Foundation.

 

[65] PBS website: http://www.ifpri.org/themes/pbs/

outcomes-print-all.htm

 

[66] Joel Cohen, Presentation to meeting of the UNEP-GEF Projects on

Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks, 26–30 January 2004,

Geneva Switzerland: www.unep.ch/biosafety/ Implementation/

GenevaMeetingJanuary2004/Cohen.pdf

 

[67] Yasser Sobhi, " In a jam over GM foods, " Al-Ahram Weekly Online :

10 - 16 July 2003 (Issue No. 646)

 

[68] Edward Alden, " US beats Egypt with trade stick, " The Financial

Times, UK, Jun 29, 2003

 

[69] Merzaban, " U.S.-Egypt tug-of-war over WTO textiles rules " ,

American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, www.amcham.org.eg/publications/

BusinessMonthly/ february%2004/reports

(usegypttugofwaroverwtotextilesrules).asp

 

[70] Giddings L, 2004, Biotechnology Industry Organization, Letter to

the office of the United States Trade Representative,

www.bio.org/ip/action/3012004.pdf

 

[71] Greenpeace, " The US War on Biosafety: Renewed Aggression by a

Rogue State, " June 2003.

 

[72] US Trade Representative Robert Zoelick notification letter he

submitted to the US Congress to initiate free trade agreement

negotiations

with Thailand

 

[73]In its letter to Ms Gloria Blue, Office of the US Trade

Representative dated 08 April 2004 http://www.bilaterals.org/

article.php3

?id_article=93 & var_recherche=monsanto+letter

 

[74]In its letter to Ms Marilyn R Abott, Secretary, United States

International Trade Commission, dated 14 May 2004

 

[75]'Reversal of Ban on GM crops Incenses Activists "

http://www.ipsnews.net/internal.asp?idnews=25181

 

[76] http://www.mca.gov/

 

[77] Office of the United States Trade Representative -

http://www.ustr.gov/

 

[78] PowerPoint presentation by Felipe Manteiga, Managing Director,

Markets and Sectoral Assessments, Millennium Challenge Corporation, to

the

USDA Agricultural Outlook Conference, February 24, 2005, Crystal City,

VA : www.usda.gov/oce/forum/speeches/manteiga-ppt.pdf

 

 

 

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