Lies led to pro-Pak bias
Attlee's reminder: how lies led to pro-Pak bias
Secret papers say US backed India, it didn't fit into UK minister's plans
C DASGUPTA
AS British Prime Minister Tony Blair prepares to exercise a ``calming influ=
ence'' in New Delhi and Islamabad, he would do well to reflect on the lesson=
s to be drawn from the role played by Britain when clandestine warfare first=
made its appearance in Kashmir.
Beijing backing: Pak
``All the concessions are being asked from India while Pakistan concedes li=
ttle or nothing. The attitude still seems to be that it is India which is at=
fault whereas the complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan.'' — Attlee=
to his minister, Baker, on the 1947 tribal invasion
In 1947, when Pakistani tribesmen invaded Kashmir, Britain decided to adopt=
a pro-Pakistan tilt — not because of any merit in the case but strictly in =
pursuit of British global interests in the belief that this was essential fo=
r her Middle Eastern policy. Unfortunately for India, the British minister i=
n charge of executing this policy, Philip J Noel Baker, had few scruples in =
exceeding his instructions.
As newly-researched material (recently declassified) in the just published =
new book, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48 (Sage) by this author reveals=
, Noel Baker decided to take a totally anti-India stand in the UN instead of=
leaning in its favour as instructed by his government. He deliberately misr=
epresented India's position to his own government.
He was reprimanded by Prime Minister Clement Richard Attlee in a remarkable=
Top Secret and Personal telegram. Attlee wrote: ``I find it very hard to re=
concile the view which you express as to the attitude of the Indian delegati=
on with the representations I have received through the High Commissioner fr=
om India here. It appears to me that all the concessions are being asked fro=
m India while Pakistan concedes little or nothing.
The attitude still seems to be that it is India which is at fault whereas t=
he complaint was rightly lodged against Pakistan.''
Noel-Baker misled his government on the US position too. In 1947-48, Washin=
gton accepted (at the level of the Secretary of State George Marshall) the f=
act that Kashmir legally belonged to India by virtue of the Maharaja's acces=
sion. In February 1948, the Americans informed Noel-Baker that they were dis=
turbed by the implications of the resolution that he wanted to move in the U=
N which would have allowed Pakistan to deploy its troops in Kashmir.
When the British side argued that Kashmir was a ``territory in dispute'', t=
he Americans disagreed, stating that they ``found it difficult to deny the l=
egal validity of Kashmir's accession to India''. Under pressure from Noel-Ba=
ker, the US finally agreed to float a draft resolution which would have perm=
itted entry of Pakistani troops but only if India concurred. When his cabine=
t colleagues objected that India would never accept this, Noel-Baker chose t=
o conceal his own hand in prompting the US move.
In November 1948, the acting leader of the US delegation in the Security Co=
uncil, John Foster Dulles, complained to the State Department that the ``pre=
sent UK approach (to the) Kashmir problem appears extremely pro-GOP (Governm=
ent of Pakistan) as against (the) middle ground we have sought to follow.''
In 1947-48 Britain chose to ignore the implications of the clandestine war =
launched by Pakistan. This led to an increasing Pakistani appetite for such =
actions, resulting ultimately in the massive terrorist campaign unleashed by=
the ISI.
If Blair seriously wants to play a calming role in the sub-continent, he mu=
st do everything in his power to ensure that the terrorists are rooted out f=
rom Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied territory. If the terrorists are not brou=
ght to justice, India will be left with no other choice than to ``bring just=
ice'' to them, to borrow President Bush's felicitous phrase.
(C Dasgupta, one of India's most distinguished diplomats, was Ambassador to=
China and Brussels before retiring recently)
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