India and Russia-I

12-16-2000, 03:01 PM

India and Russia-I
November 28, 2000
By Lieutenant Colonel Thakur Kuldip S Ludra (Retd.)

No other country has ever attracted the strong sentiments that have
been aroused in India with regards to India's relationship, first
with Soviet Russia and now with Russia. Both the proponents as well
as the antagonists are, even till date, evenly matched. While the
opponents were and still are eloquent over repressive nature of the
communist regime and how Soviet Russia considered India as a
vicarious colony, they now talk of Russia as a decaying giant who
cannot even feed its own people and betrayed India in connection with
a signed agreement to supply to India seven cryogenic engines which
she reneged on under pressure from the United States of America.

The proponents, on the other hand swear by the helpful attitude of
the Russian regime and how Soviet Russia had supported India on the
Kashmir issue. The unflinching support during the 1971` Operations
against Pakistan, as compared to the infamous pro-Pakistan tilt by
the Nixon's United States of America is invariably highlighted.

Again the opponents talk of how Shastri was coerced to return all the
territorial gains made during the 1965 Operations and how India's
case was dumped, virtually overboard by Kosygin, in his attempt to
woo Pakistan. They also talk of the bugging of Shastri's apartment at
Tashkent. The controversy rages on, to and fro unendingly. Most of
these contenders forget that inter-nation relationships depend
entirely on perceptions about their interests and policy aims derived
from these interests. Ethics and sentiments do not have any place in
such relationships.

Historically speaking, India was ignored completely by Stalin, who
considered Nehru and his non-alignment as unacceptable and pro-West.
His perception was that Nehru was too much under the influence of the
British. He had written off India. India was to be dealt under the
classical communist approach of instigated labour revolution of the
proletariat.

However, as the Cordon Sanitaire, as envisaged by the Dullesian
concepts tightened, Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, did a volte face
and started wooing India.. Reservations, however, continued and just
when India did need the delivery of the MiG21, in 1962, which had
already been paid for, the delivery was delayed. Though they were
eventually delivered, it was too late and well after the immediate
need was over.

Subsequently, as Bhuttonian concepts gained ground in Pakistan and
their ties with the United States of America got put on the back
burner, the Russian leaders, particularly Kosygin, felt that the
Russians had a chance to get Pakistan into the Russian fold. Soviet
Russia started wooing Pakistan. This , probably, was one major
factor, though still not talked off, which encouraged Pakistan to
launch its adventure in Kutch and again later in Jammu and Kashmir.
The Russian, though ostensibly even handed, had a positively pro
Pakistan tilt, which eventually led to the Tashkent Agreement, where
India had to surrender all the territorial gains achieved during
these operations.

Between'65 and '71 the relationship between China and Russia
deteriorated, while China was able to successfully woo Pakistan. Even
more important China and United States of America also started coming
closer. Suddenly the Cordon Sanitaire started tightening around
Soviet Russia. This forced Soviet Russia to improve her relations
with India once again. In addition, facing a severe crunch in the
consumer industry she found India an ideal source of western type of
goods and technology. India was also desperate for opening up new
markets and found Russia an ideal solution to her quandary. She
walked into the Russian arms by signing the 20 Years Friendship
Treaty.

This signing of the Treaty with Soviet Russia also secured India's
Northern Flank, when the clouds of war were looming large over the
Indo-Pakistan horizon. In addition, this increased the trade between
the countries all payable in Rupees. Thus Russia got a wide range of
consumer goods at exchange rate extremely favourable, while India got
arms and equipment for which she paid in Rupees, an extremely weak
currency in the international market. In spite of an extremely
unfavourable exchange rate India was successful in maintaining a
favourable balance of trade.

This mutual Economic Advantage led to further improvement in
relations and India started taking Russian help, in practically all
spheres, for granted. Ostensibly, India found that all kinds of
assistance, technological, scientific, commercial, diplomatic, as
well as military equipment and supplies forthcoming. The situation
was such that even the Indian Foreign Policy started getting
influenced by the continued Russian support of the Kashmir Problem.
In fact India had stared losing her Freedom of Action as Russia
insidiously kept on spoon feeding India.

For Russia the situation was very favourable indeed. Apart from her
equipment getting tested under combat conditions she was also getting
in puts and feed back that led to her improving the capability and
the quality of her military equipment. She also benefited in geo-
political terms. As Russia advanced into Afghanistan, in her final
gamble threatening to strangulate the oil shipping lanes emanating
through the Persian Gulf, she needed some one who could continue
putting pressure on Pakistan.

That Pakistan would be a base for any opposition and possible
retaliation against Russia from the Western or rather American camp,
was obvious to any perceptive analyst. Thus since 1971 India's
relations with Russia had been cemented by the Mutual Economic
Advantage, as well as the Russian need for assistance in her advance
into Afghanistan. It is not that the assistance provided by India was
active or material. However, the fact that India did not condemn or
react adversely to the Russian move, forced Pakistan to keep looking
over her shoulder towards India, all the time she was involved in
Afghanistan.

Thus we see that as Soviet Russia's antagonism against United States
of America was the prime factor in her policies she had roped in
India as her man Friday. This need for her was further accentuated
when her relations with China soured. For India who, all this while
needed a crutch to counter the faulty policies, economic, geo-
political military, initiated by the Nehruvian set up, Russia was an
important even a vital prop.