Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:


> Just curious - Am I wrong in assuming that the bulk
> of your arguments about the reality of the world rest
> on Shankara's refutation of Buddhist arguments in
> Ch II of BS. Baashya and not so much on other bhaashya-s
> of Shankara related to principle Upanishads.


I feel I need to say a little more on the subject of why Advaita
refutes Buddhism when it is itself saying that the world is unreal.

There is an element in the argument against the Madhyamika doctrine
which suggests to us the status of the world in Advaita. Shankara
says that the unreality of the world as held by the Buddhists is not
reasonable because the world, according to their doctrine, doesn't
have a substratum. Advaita also says the world is unreal, but this
unreality is somehow justified because there is a substratum. What is
it that the substratum brings to the argument here?

In Advaita, Brahman is the substratum of the world. Therefore, all
things, in substance, are Brahman. It is Brahman that ensouls the
world. When the world is seen divested of Brahman – as seen by the
Madhaymikas – then it has no reality, for Reality has been removed
from the world. Therefore Advaita refutes the 'world of vacuity' that
the Madhyamikas speak about. Advaita takes a stand against the
Buddhists that the world is not without a substratum, and since it
has a substratum it is indeed real -- because it is in substance
Brahman, and is ensouled by Brahman.

But strangely, Advaita iself says that the world is unreal. The world
that is unreal is here actually the world as seen in vyavaharika.
This is because people in vyavaharika do not see the soul of the
world – they see only the inanimate, the shell and not the kernel.
This is 'the world' that is unreal. But when one sees into the heart
of the world, one sees Brahman as the immanent existential core of
the world, and then the world is real only.

It is significant that Shankara says (in the bhashya) that it is
Samkhya that is the doctrine closest to Advaita. If we carefully go
through the arguments against Samkhya, we find that the
differentiating line between Advaita and Samkhya lies in the
assignation of the ultimate material and efficient causes of the
universe. Once both these causes are placed in Brahman, instead of in
pradhana, Samhkya becomes the same as Advaita (in this respect).


Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@...> wrote:

> There is an element in the argument against the Madhyamika doctrine
> which suggests to us the status of the world in Advaita. Shankara
> says that the unreality of the world as held by the Buddhists is not
> reasonable because the world, according to their doctrine, doesn't
> have a substratum. Advaita also says the world is unreal, but this
> unreality is somehow justified because there is a substratum. What is
> it that the substratum brings to the argument here?
>
> In Advaita, Brahman is the substratum of the world. Therefore, all
> things, in substance, are Brahman.

Chttaranjanji - Interesting point. Taking Brahman as substratum, if the
reality of the world is the reality of the substratum, then I fully
agree with you. Brahman as substratum goes with the statement that
Brahman is the material cause for the universe. However, one cannot
perceive Brahman, since he is not an object of perception. Besides what
I perceive through senses are only attributes but not substantive.
Hence to say that what I perceive is real becomes a problem, since what
I perceive is not necessarily Brahman. Since I perceive, it is cannot
be unreal since unreal cannot be perceived. I have not yet studied your
next part related to the ontological issue.

When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism) say world is
real, ontologically they are not referring to the substratum Brahman
since for them Brahman is not the material cause of the universe. They
rest their reality on the account of perception of the world. When
VishishTadvaitin says the world is real, their arguments are different
too.


>
> But strangely, Advaita iself says that the world is unreal. The world
> that is unreal is here actually the world as seen in vyavaharika.
> This is because people in vyavaharika do not see the soul of the
> world – they see only the inanimate, the shell and not the kernel.
> This is 'the world' that is unreal. But when one sees into the heart
> of the world, one sees Brahman as the immanent existential core of
> the world, and then the world is real only.

Yes indeed. I would say what one perceives through the senses are only
attributes and mind has to provide a locus for the attributes to
complete the cognition process to say that object with those attributes
is there that I am perceiving. Mechanics of the perception process along
with the assesment of reality becomes important in the correct
analysis of the issue involved.


> Once both these causes are placed in Brahman, instead of in
> pradhana, Samhkya becomes the same as Advaita (in this respect).

I agree with your parathetical statement, although my knowledge of
sankhya is bare minimum.

Hari OM!
Sadananda

>
>
> Warm regards,
> Chittaranjan
>
>
>
>


=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

I think you raise some vitally imprtant points in your post, and I
take the liberty of writing a bit freely on the topic.

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:

> Chttaranjanji - Interesting point. Taking Brahman as substratum,
> if the reality of the world is the reality of the substratum,
> then I fully agree with you. Brahman as substratum goes with
> the statement that Brahman is the material cause for the
> universe. However, one cannot perceive Brahman, since he is
> not an object of perception. Besides what I perceive through
> senses are only attributes but not substantive. Hence to say
> that what I perceive is real becomes a problem, since what
> I perceive is not necessarily Brahman. Since I perceive, it
> is cannot be unreal since unreal cannot be perceived. I have
> not yet studied your next part related to the ontological
> issue.

> > But when one sees into the heart of the world, one sees
> > Brahman as the immanent existential core of the world,
> > and then the world is real only.

> Yes indeed. I would say what one perceives through the senses
> are only attributes and mind has to provide a locus for the
> attributes to complete the cognition process to say that
> object with those attributes is there that I am perceiving.
> Mechanics of the perception process along with the assesment
> of reality becomes important in the correct analysis of the
> issue involved.


This brings us to the topic of 'substance', or 'ousia' as it was
known to the Greeks. One does not perceive the substance as susbtance
bare. What one perceives of the substance, by the very fact of
being 'of the substance', is a predicate. Anything that is said, or
seen, or thought, about the substance is the attribute of the
substance. And, as attributes they are not existentially different
than the substance; they are the descriptions of the very substance.
Substance and its attributes cannot be separated as is clear from
Shankara's commentary. I believe this was the way substance was known
to the ancients and the early-medievals until somewhere in the middle-
ages the meaning of substance became lost in the obscurations of
analysis wherein the analysis itself seems to have abstracted
the 'substance' out of things. Today, it is Descartes that is known
as the turning point when Scholastic Philosophy gives way to Modern
Philosophy. Descartes has been hailed as a new beginning in
philosophy, and has also been decried as the philosopher responsible
for spoiling everything. I think it is a bit unfair to blame
Descartes for being merely the pivotal point of a historical
unfolding. The complete loss of meaning of substance may be detected
in the British Empiricists - Locke, Berkeley and Hume. But it is
interesting that, while the meaning of 'substance' was almost lost by
this time, Descartes had almost - but not quite - reached back to its
original meaning, and I would like to quote a passage from
Descartes' 'Meditations' to bring out this point.

Descartes:

"Take for example, this piece of wax; it has been but recently taken
from the hive; it has not yet lost its sweetness of the honey it
contained; it still retains something of the odor of the flowers from
which it has been gathered; its color, its shape, its size, are
manifest to us; it is hard, cold, ....

"But behold! While I am speaking let it be moved toward the fire.
What remains of the taste exhales, the odor evaporates, the color
changes, the shape is destroyed, its size increases, it becomes
liquid, it becomes hot and can no longer be handled, and when struck
upon emits no sound. Does the wax, not withstanding these changes,
still remain the same wax? We must admit that it does; no one doubts
that it does, no one judges otherwise. What then, was I comprehending
so distinctly in knowing the piece of wax? Certainly, it could be
nothing of all that I was aware of by way of the senses, since all
the things that came by way of taste, smell, sight, touch and
hearing, are changed, and the wax none the less remains.

"... As we find, what then alone remains is a something extended,
flexible and movable. But what is this 'flexible', this 'movable'?
What am I then imaging? That the piece of wax from being round in
shape can become square, or from being square can become triangular?
Assuradly not. For I am apprehending that it admits of an infinity of
similar shapes, and am not able to compass this infinity by way of
images. Consequently this comprehension of it cannot be the product
of the faculty of imagination.

"... I must therefore, admit that I cannot by way of images
comprehend what this wax is, and that it is by the mind alone that I
apprehend it.

"... For I now know that, properly speaking, bodies are cognized not
by the senses or by the imagination, but by understanding alone. They
are not thus cognized because seen or touched, but only in so far as
they are apprehended understandingly."


Sadanandaji, you have rightly pointed out the importance of the
mechanics of perceptions as a key factor in understanding this
subject. As per my understanding of the Advaita theory of cognition,
perception takes place by means of the mind going out alongwith the
senses to grasp the object -- what the senses grasps is the sensible
attributes while the mind grasps attributes like smallness, etc, and
the comprehension of the object taking place in the light of chit.

Unfortunately, Advaita has been interpreted in the last two centuries
through the colourations of Idealism. As pointed out by Michaelji in
an earlier post, this is probably due to the fact that this period
was the great period of Idealism in the West. The matter was made
worse I think due to a confounding of Buddhist Vijnanavada doctrines
with those of Advaita Vedanta.


> When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism)
> say world is real, ontologically they are not referring to
> the substratum Brahman since for them Brahman is not the
> material cause of the universe. They rest their reality on
> the account of perception of the world. When VishishTadvaitin
> says the world is real, their arguments are different too.

Yes, I have gathered that in Dvaita the material cause is prakriti
which is dependent on Brahman, whereas in both Vishistadvaita and
Advaita, the existential core of the world is Brahman Itself. The
language of Advaita does often create confusion though. I believe
that when Brahman is hidden, the world seen through avidya 'becomes'
a limiting adjunct in so far as the substratum is not seen as the
substratum, and when avidya is 'removed', the same world is seen as
nothing but Brahman - as features of the non-dual Brahman. But
Advaita does not stop at this vision of the world, but goes to the
heart of attributes itself in its doctrine of word-meanings.

Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

Our beloved SHANKARA BHAGVADAPADA says in his Gita Bhashya

" avyakto paro narayana "

Narayana is beyond Maya (which is Vyakta).

can some learned member in this satsangha fully explain what this
means in the context of the present discussion.

in ever-lasting gratitude

ps yaduji, btw thank you for your explanation regarding my query....

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@...> wrote:

>
> Sadanandaji, you have rightly pointed out the importance of the
> mechanics of perceptions as a key factor in understanding this
> subject. As per my understanding of the Advaita theory of cognition,
> perception takes place by means of the mind going out alongwith the
> senses to grasp the object -- what the senses grasps is the sensible
> attributes while the mind grasps attributes like smallness, etc, and
> the comprehension of the object taking place in the light of chit.

> Unfortunately, Advaita has been interpreted in the last two centuries
> through the colourations of Idealism. As pointed out by Michaelji in
> an earlier post, this is probably due to the fact that this period
> was the great period of Idealism in the West. The matter was made
> worse I think due to a confounding of Buddhist Vijnanavada doctrines
> with those of Advaita Vedanta.

Chittaranjanji

Thanks for your prompt response. Yes, in the analysis of the cognition
process (Advaita also follows the prevailing tArkika's view), the mind
goes out along with the senses to grasp the object. That was the
understanding at that time, based on their understanding of the
mechanics of the perception process. Here, we are now entering into
the realm of not Vedanta or philosophy but objective sciences. So I
only examine from that perspective rather than from any western
philosophical perspectives that I have no knowledge of. I strongly
believe that philosophy has to accommodate scientific discoveries that
include the space-time concepts as well as quantum mechanical concepts
of matter. The beauty of Advaita is that not only it accommodates the
new discoveries of science without compromising the essential Advaita
nature of the truth or reality, but in fact endorses them. So my
understanding of Advaita has nothing to do modern advaitins adoptation
of western philosophical thoughts during the past two centuries. I
embarked on Advaita purely as a student of science rejecting
VishisshTaadvaita that I grew up with, since childhood.

Let us examine the perception as it occurs. This is my understanding.
When I see a pot there, what do I really see? Eyes can only see forms
and colors, as the input arrives to the senses (hence senses going out
is only metaphorical). Similarly other sense input such as sound, if it
is a singing pot, etc. Each sense input is independent of other and all
feed in the information. The information from different senses has to
be integrated by the mind to a common locus. Senses being maatra-s can
only measure the degrees and magnitudes of the attributes.
Surprisingly, in the volition process, where the integration occurs,
there is an inherent assumption involved that there cannot be attributes
without a locus. The mind perceives only the attributes and not the
substantive. Hence a locus for the attributes is provide by the mind
with an image of the object in the mind taking all the inputs from the
senses and locussing on that image. In the perception of the form, due
to the presence of two eyes with the 7-deg separation between the two,
we have stereographic projection with 3-Dimensional perspective of the
forms as well as the spatial location of the object in relation to the
perception of other surrounding objects. The cognition of the object by
the mind therefore involves the perception and volition along with
spatial relations surrounding the object. Space being too subtle, is not
perceived by the senses but inferred due to stereographic projection of
the 3-D nature of the world. Time is again inferred by the mind due to
movement of the objects in space, and the relation between the
space-time and more importantly the cognition of both space and time
through the mind become inherent process in these perceptions. (Dvaitins
bring in Saakshee for cognition of time and space beyond the senses and
mind, and frankly make a mess of the cognition process)

The cognition process is complete with the attributes measured by the
senses and mind providing a locus for the attributes with space-time
superimposed on it. " I see a pot, right there, right now"- is the
so-called perceptional knowledge. I am not seeing the object as it is
(as Dvaitins claim as yathaartham pramaanam), but always as presented by
the sense input and limited by the mind's capacity for volition and
cognition. If the mind is absent, the whole process does not
materialize. Recognition occurs by comparing the cognized object with
the images from the memory, which are based on past cognitions. Here we
enter the arena of vyakti and jaati aspects.

Here, I need to emphasize one important aspect. Complete perceptual
process, involving that there is an object out there and thus the world
out there, cannot be fully established without the mind being active.
This is unavoidable in the perception process. Does the world exists
without the mind present, is a philosophical question; but I would say
it remains as a unanswerable question, since mind is required even to
answer it, yes or no. To me this is truly an indeterminate problem and
there is no way to get around this. Hence I put this under the category
of anirvacaniiyam only, whether original Advaita concepts directly
implied anirvachaniiya khyaati in this way or not.

In the perception of the world- the mind's role being unavoidable, we
have an inherent problem in establishing the reality of the world
independent of the mind. Personally I am not concerned if there is some
parallelism to Vijnaanavaada. This becomes a problem in the science too
- the investigation of the matter independent of an observer.

Coming back to the philosophical aspect, if the Brahman is
existence-consciousness-infiniteness and thus the material cause for the
universe, there is an inherent problem of the cognition of the world,
which is inert. If what are cognized are only attributes and not
substantive which is Brahman as the above cognition process indicates,
then I have no problem in accounting the world out there. I am not
negating the world as such but negating the attributes as just
superimposition, which includes the forms and therefore names for the
forms. The substantive is myself as my mind. Is the world real, yes
from the substantive point- but from the point of names and forms as the
Upanishads declare - vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - It is only
transformation in names and forms - It is only apparent? Hence we have
differentiation of vyavahaara satyam and satyasya satyam. Since the
Upanishads say I am Brahman, the subject-object (dRik-dRisya)
distinctions are only the play of the mind - In the deep sleep state,
when the mind folds - so is the projection of the subject-object
relationships. Identified the world as names and forms, if the question
is asked whether the world real - no - the names and forms are only
superimpositions. But identified from the substantive part - is the
world real - yes, that is Brahman; but when I do identify the world with
Brahman, I have to also recognize that I am that Brahman and therefore
there is no separate world 'out there' since they are nothing but
Brahman that I am - so the concept of 'out-there' with space-time
continuum itself dissolves into I.

So what is real - Brahman alone is real and 'tat twam asi' is the
teaching to a Vedaantic student. Everything else is superimposition on
Brahman. If 'consciousness is Brahman' is the scriptural definition
of Brahman, inert cannot be Brahman and if one see inert (the world)
then what is seen is not real but only apparent. Mind's role in seeing
or experiencing the world therefore requires proper analysis and
understanding in view of the scriptural declaration. As I have
discussed above the current understanding of the mechanics of perception
process are not in violation of adviatic concepts. To me this is pure
Advaita to the core and nothing to do with the idealism Philosophy the
West or Vijnaana vaada of Buddhism of the East, even if there are some
agreements with their concepts. The dream analogy only endorses these
concepts, hence the importance I give to Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s
than his commentary on poursheya Brahmasuutra related to Ch.II.

Hari OM!
Sadananda



> Yes, I have gathered that in Dvaita the material cause is prakriti
> which is dependent on Brahman, whereas in both Vishistadvaita and
> Advaita, the existential core of the world is Brahman Itself. The
> language of Advaita does often create confusion though. I believe
> that when Brahman is hidden, the world seen through avidya 'becomes'
> a limiting adjunct in so far as the substratum is not seen as the
> substratum, and when avidya is 'removed', the same world is seen as
> nothing but Brahman - as features of the non-dual Brahman. But
> Advaita does not stop at this vision of the world, but goes to the
> heart of attributes itself in its doctrine of word-meanings.


The confusion actually is the use of the word in the Vedanta itself-
asat - it is used for both non-existent in the naasato vidyate bhaavo
and sometime used as in the vyavahaarika satyam as asatoma sadgamaya. I
have not seen any confusion in the Advaita - but yes in Brahmasuutra-s.
If ten daarshanika’s claim that their darshana-s which do not agree with
each other but all claim their darshana-s are in tune with B.Suutra-s,
there is an inherent problem in the suutra-s. Agreement with B.Suutra
therefore cannot form basis for the validity of a darshana. Hence I go
by the Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s which are based on Upanishads than
on his B.Sutra commentary. Adhyaasa bhaashya, of course, is the
quintessence of Advaita Vedanta and is independent of B. Suutra-s.

Hari OM!
Sadananda


>
> Warm regards,
> Chittaranjan



=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

I feel a bit hesitent to write this message because it may appear
provocative (due to its rather radical stand), but Sir I believe that
one must speak one's convictions, and therefore I make myself bold to
write these words.


--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:

> That was the understanding at that time, based on their
> understanding of the mechanics of the perception process.
> Here, we are now entering into the realm of not Vedanta or
> philosophy but objective sciences. So I only examine from
> that perspective rather than from any western philosophical
> perspectives that I have no knowledge of. I strongly
> believe that philosophy has to accommodate scientific
> discoveries that include the space-time concepts as well
> as quantum mechanical concepts of matter.

.........

> Let us examine the perception as it occurs. This is my
> understanding. When I see a pot there, what do I really see?
> Eyes can only see forms and colors, as the input arrives
> to the senses (hence senses going out is only metaphorical).
> Similarly other sense input such as sound, if it is a
> singing pot, etc. Each sense input is independent of other
> and all feed in the information. The information from
> different senses has to be integrated by the mind to
> a common locus.


There is adequate reason to believe that science is illogical at its
most basic foundations. Science is a set of mathematical equations
that work. Its theories and models are not the truth of what the
world is, but are analogous constructs of the mind devised to predict
phenomena and use it for constructive utilitarian purposes. All
scientific models are predictive models and nothing more. The basic
paradigm of science is to devise 'theories that work', and its
propositions, especially those of modern science, are not
linguistically sound statements (they do not abide by word-meanings)
and hence they do not speak of the world as it is in its nature, but
are, more often than not, merely symbolisms that only have a
correspondence to the dynamism of things. Meaning must embody the
propositional form, otherwise the proposition is strictly not a
proposition i.e., it is not a valid sentential form. Most
propositions of modern physics relating to the 'Theory of Relativity'
and 'Quantum Physics' are not meaningful sentential forms. With all
due respects to Einstein, space is not curved; neither is
simultaneity indeterminable. Again, space is not Euclidian 'space'
nor 'Reimannian space', these being only notions superimposed on the
visually formless space.

The case with Quantum Mechanics is similar. Electrons and quantum
orbits are 'nonsensical' propositions. The structure of the atom was
necessitated by certain observations of spectral bands, but when the
nuclear atomic structure entailed that electrons occupy quantum
orbits (in between which there are no spaces), it was time to abandon
the nuclear model and shift to the electron as a 'property' of the
atom rather than as an orbiting particle. The electron itself is a
logically meaningless conception because an electron cannot have a
form and can hence not be a particle. According to the scientific
theory, a form is seen when light rays coming from the thing is
differentiated from the light rays coming from beyond the periphery
of the thing so that the boundary stands out as its form. But is it
possible for light rays to come from an electron? The light ray is
itself nothing but electromagnetic radiation that emerges when an
electron jumps orbits or energy levels. So how can there be a SET OF
RAYS from an electron as apart from the rays that come from beyond
its periphery? How can there be those innumerable rays from an
electron so that its boundary (and form) may be defined? The theory
of the electron and the nuclear model of the atom are both illogical.

What again is the relationship between 'parts' and 'whole' in
science? How can the atomic conception of the world be sustained when
it is not explained in the first place how disparate parts give rise
to an entirely new thing viz, the whole? It is because the foundation
of science is weak in this respect that it resulted in the EPR
paradox. It was only then that Neils Bohr came up with a hypothesis
that the whole is somehow contained in the parts. But even that
hypothesis does not have a logical explanation.

Again, if we look at the theory of cognition, where do the light rays
come from? Do they come from the surface of the visible objects? But
if the scientific theory is true, then aren't the objects that we see
mere phenomena - mere representations? Are the light rays then
rightfully in the phenomenal world? But yet they can't be, because if
the scientific theory is true, they would necessarily be prior to the
activations of the mind? Are they in the noumenal world? - then how
are we able to conceive of them, let alone measure and conduct
experiments on them? And what are these experiments that we conduct
on the mere appearances of objects which are already the
presentations of the brain? When analysed, the scientific theory of
cognition leads to a logical circularity and is not sustainable (as
shown in Part VI).

I need to clarify here that I am not against science. I am only
against accommodating Vedanta to the 'discoveries' of science when
the paradigm of science itself is vulnerable to the shifting sands
of 'agreements' as reached from time to time by the scientific
community (called paradigm shifts according to Kuhn). I believe that
science, as it has evolved, is actually 'techne' or technology – it
is a set of analogous constructs to predict phenomena and utilize it
for human ends. Its greatness lies in this alone, and not in its
capacity to point to the truth of the essential nature of things. I
believe that Advaita is not in need of a 'science' that has not
examined its own foundations. I am of course deeply impressed by the
work done by the geniuses of science – those great men and women who
have contributed to the tremendous developments of classical and
modern science - but despite all that, physics is only about
provisional pragmatic models and not about the truth of things. We do
not respect truth because it is what science postulates. We respect
science because we believe it represents truth. If science fails the
test, then it is reasonable to depart from its sanctuary.

The Advaita theory that the mind and senses reach out to objects is
not merely a metaphorical statement, it is the only logical answer to
the mechanism of cognition.

Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

Namaste.

>When dvaitins (who consider adviata as prachhanna Buddhism) say
world is
>real, ontologically they are not referring to the substratum Brahman
>since for them Brahman is not the material cause of the universe.
They
>rest their reality on the account of perception of the world.

As I understood, the reality of world is not just based on perception
of the world, but on many folds such as logically and scripturally ;

Logically :

All aastika schools holds that Brahmn can be known only from Veda-s,
no exceptions. Whether that Brahmn is 'I' or not is decided only
after Veda-s are analyzed and siddhAnta-s are built. But concept
of "Brahmn" as such is from Vedas to begin with. Having said that, if
at all one were to hold that Brahmn is "real", it automatically
presupposes the source of such concept (Vedas) must also be real. Not
only that, the cognition process from which such source is grasped,
must also be real. Not to mention, the mind & senses behind such
cognition process is necessarily be real. Also, the agent behind such
cognition process (because mind & senses are jada and can't act on
themselves) must also be real. As said earlier, whether this
agent 'I' itself is Brahmn or not is something comes into picture
later.

All these different things (except 'I') involved in knowing "Brahmn
is Real" i.e "source of knowledge of Brahmn " (i.e Vedas), "cognition
process", "mind" , "senses" etc are collectively called "the world".

As I understood, in Advaita it is held that 'I' is appramEya and does
not need any sources (pramANa) to know that it is real. No doubt "I"
is real, but "I am Brahmn" (which is not so appramEya but known only
thru Vedas) can be real only if "Brahmn" part is also real. This is
because, otherwise we can not equate real 'I' with not-real 'Brahmn',
otherwise we'll be left with "I" and not "I am Brahmn".

So, logically speaking, if knowledge of "Brahmn is Real" or "I am
Brahmn" are to be real, "the world" must necessarily be real as well.


Scripturally :

Once scriptures are established as real as noted above, it is just a
matter of education to learn about what Vedas are endorsing about
reality of this world.

Just to mention few ;

- 'satyamenamanu vishve' (RV 4.17.5)
- 'vishvaM satyam.h' (RV 2.24.12).
- 'yAthAtathyato arthAn.h vyadadhAt.h (I.U. 8).
- 'mithashcha jaDa-bhedo.ayam prapaJNcho bheda-pa.nchakaH '
paramashruti.

...etc

Regards,
Srinivas.

praNAm Sri CN prabhuji
Hare Krishna

I've read your reply to Sri Sadananda prabhuji's mail on perception &
brahma yEkatva... I searched..searched a lot in your reply where you shared
your understanding on philosophical aspects discussed in detail by Sri
Sadananda prabhuji. Instead of that I've found only your profundity in
explaining science & its limitation, protons, electrons, atoms etc. etc.
which anyway I am not able to understand a bit being a commerce student
:-)). My humble request to you to make an attempt to share your thoughts
on Sri Sadananda prabhuji's following paragraphs :

//quote //
Coming back to the philosophical aspect, if the Brahman is
existence-consciousness-infiniteness and thus the material cause for the
universe, there is an inherent problem of the cognition of the world,
which is inert. If what are cognized are only attributes and not
substantive which is Brahman as the above cognition process indicates,
then I have no problem in accounting the world out there. I am not
negating the world as such but negating the attributes as just
superimposition, which includes the forms and therefore names for the
forms. The substantive is myself as my mind. Is the world real, yes
from the substantive point- but from the point of names and forms as the
Upanishads declare - vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - It is only
transformation in names and forms - It is only apparent? Hence we have
differentiation of vyavahaara satyam and satyasya satyam. Since the
Upanishads say I am Brahman, the subject-object (dRik-dRisya)
distinctions are only the play of the mind - In the deep sleep state,
when the mind folds - so is the projection of the subject-object
relationships. Identified the world as names and forms, if the question
is asked whether the world real - no - the names and forms are only
superimpositions. But identified from the substantive part - is the
world real - yes, that is Brahman; but when I do identify the world with
Brahman, I have to also recognize that I am that Brahman and therefore
there is no separate world 'out there' since they are nothing but
Brahman that I am - so the concept of 'out-there' with space-time
continuum itself dissolves into I.

So what is real - Brahman alone is real and 'tat twam asi' is the
teaching to a Vedaantic student. Everything else is superimposition on
Brahman. If 'consciousness is Brahman' is the scriptural definition
of Brahman, inert cannot be Brahman and if one see inert (the world)
then what is seen is not real but only apparent. Mind's role in seeing
or experiencing the world therefore requires proper analysis and
understanding in view of the scriptural declaration. As I have
discussed above the current understanding of the mechanics of perception
process are not in violation of adviatic concepts. To me this is pure
Advaita to the core and nothing to do with the idealism Philosophy the
West or Vijnaana vaada of Buddhism of the East, even if there are some
agreements with their concepts. The dream analogy only endorses these
concepts, hence the importance I give to Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s
than his commentary on poursheya Brahmasuutra related to Ch.II

//unquote//

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

hence the importance I give to Shankara's prakarana Grantha-s
than his commentary on poursheya Brahmasuutra related to Ch.II.


praNAm Sri Sadananda prabhuji
Hare Krishna

Infact, shankara in sUtra bhAshya 2-2-29 (??) just refuting the claims of
vijnAna vAdin who does not accept the existence of chaitanya in sushupti.
This stand of buddhist is purely avaidhik & in total contradiction with
shruti purports. Hence here shankara's special emphasis on waker & waking
world as against dream...But he clears his stand that in avasthA world is
existing & its not otherway round to the shAstra jignAsu (vaidika-s) when
he comments on mAndukya shruti & kArikAs & at various other places in
prasthAna trayi bhAshya itself . So prabhuji, for siddhAnta nirNaya we
have to strictly adhere to shankara's prasthAna trayi bhAshya which have
been unanimously endorsed as genuine shankara's work by advaita
traditionalists. It is a well known fact that sometimes some major
prakaraNa grantha-s give a wrong picture of shankara's mUla siddhAta of
Atmaikatva vAda. For example, mumukshu must attain nirvikalpa samAdhi to
realise his ultimate svarUpa is the central theme of vivEka chUdAmaNi which
shankara categorically refuted in sUtra bhAshya & bruhadAraNyaka up.
bhAshya. If at all we consider this work is from the pen of shankara then
shankara must have had ashtAnga yOga sAdhaka-s of patanjali yOga school in
his mind. Nevertheless, its a fact that this is an important prakaraNa
grantha & a must read for all advaita sAdhaka-s.

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!
bhaskar

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@...> wrote:

> Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,
>
> I feel a bit hesitent to write this message because it may appear
> provocative (due to its rather radical stand), but Sir I believe that
> one must speak one's convictions, and therefore I make myself bold to
> write these words.


Chittaranjanji - Pranaams. There is no need to be hesitent to express
one's convictions while respecting that of others. That is the purpose
of this list serve. We are fortunate to have this forum to share our
understanding with mutual respect. We can agree to disagree.

Also, my humble request is that when we share our understanding of
'Advaitic Doctrine' then we should be fully aware of the demarcation
lines between the what is true advaitic doctrine and what our
convictions are related to the doctrine. 'Brahma satyam jaganmityaa
jiivo brahmaiva naaparaH' -is from my understanding the essential
doctrine of Advaita. Obviously the word mithya is specially used to
separate from satya and asatya.

If we claim that ' the world is unreal' is the infiltration from the
influence of the western philosophy into Advaita Vedanta then, I would
say one has to be careful. That statement requires substantial
justification to show exactly how and when the infiltration occurred.
As for as I know, H.H Swami Satchidanandendra swaraswati is main one who
has done extensive research in terms of infiltration into Advaita
Vedanta in the post-Shankara Period some of the concepts that were not
there in Shankara's bhaashya - the case in point is the baava ruupa
ajnaana. Shree Bhaskarji, Stigji, Saraswatiji and there was another
swamiji in the list (I forgot his name), are (were) some who are
familiar with the H.H. Swamiji's works.

In 'Advaita Siddhi' Madusuudhana Saraswati has done exhaustive analysis
of the falsity in response to Dwaitins criticism. He was the 16th
Century sage and I do not think we can claim that he was influenced by
the Western philosophy. Shree Anand Hudli has provided some translation
of this which was published in this list and is stored in the archives.
There are five definitions of falsity by Madusuudhana Saraswati that fit
in to describe the ontological status of the world. It is a very
difficult book to read.


> There is adequate reason to believe that science is illogical at its
> most basic foundations. Science is a set of mathematical equations
> that work. Its theories and models are not the truth of what the
> world is, but are analogous constructs of the mind devised to predict
> phenomena and use it for constructive utilitarian purposes. All
> scientific models are predictive models and nothing more. The basic
> paradigm of science is to devise 'theories that work', and its
> propositions, especially those of modern science, are not
> linguistically sound statements (they do not abide by word-meanings)
> and hence they do not speak of the world as it is in its nature, but
> are, more often than not, merely symbolisms that only have a
> correspondence to the dynamism of things. Meaning must embody the
> propositional form, otherwise the proposition is strictly not a
> proposition i.e., it is not a valid sentential form. Most
> propositions of modern physics relating to the 'Theory of Relativity'
> and 'Quantum Physics' are not meaningful sentential forms. With all
> due respects to Einstein, space is not curved; neither is
> simultaneity indeterminable. Again, space is not Euclidian 'space'
> nor 'Reimannian space', these being only notions superimposed on the
> visually formless space.
>
> The case with Quantum Mechanics is similar. Electrons and quantum
> orbits are 'nonsensical' propositions. The structure of the atom was
> necessitated by certain observations of spectral bands, but when the
> nuclear atomic structure entailed that electrons occupy quantum
> orbits (in between which there are no spaces), it was time to abandon
> the nuclear model and shift to the electron as a 'property' of the
> atom rather than as an orbiting particle. The electron itself is a
> logically meaningless conception because an electron cannot have a
> form and can hence not be a particle. According to the scientific
> theory, a form is seen when light rays coming from the thing is
> differentiated from the light rays coming from beyond the periphery
> of the thing so that the boundary stands out as its form. But is it
> possible for light rays to come from an electron? The light ray is
> itself nothing but electromagnetic radiation that emerges when an
> electron jumps orbits or energy levels. So how can there be a SET OF
> RAYS from an electron as apart from the rays that come from beyond
> its periphery? How can there be those innumerable rays from an
> electron so that its boundary (and form) may be defined?

Chittaranjanji -Enjoyed the reading and frankly (if you don’t mind my
saying so) quite amused. As you pointed out earlier we cannot negate
the experience (data) but need to analyze and understand it. In the
above statements up to this point, your questions pertain to quantum
mechanical model of an atom based on the experimental observations of
spectral lines - which are data (or experiences). Excited electrons
radiate a quantum of electromagnetic energy are the data. Quantum
mechanics provides a model. I am trying here to demark the data, the
model, your questions about the model, your conclusions about the model
based on your questions, and extension of your conclusion on the whole
of scientific investigations and analysis!

The last two lines above are your questions on the model. Beautiful.
Just as a reminder, questioning of the Rutherford model only led to
Bohr's quantum mechanical model. Questioning is the essence of
Scientific investigations and what one is doing by modeling is the
coming closer to reality of the world's behavior or response to
stimulus. That my friend is part of the science and not away from
science. Scientific investigation only improvises the theory that can
account unexplained facts better than previous theories. That is why a
student of physics studies Rutherford model before he studies Bohr's
quantum mechanical model and Classical mechanics before he embarks on
quantum mechanics. Each is an improvisation of the previous ones. If
you come up with further improvised model to account for the questions
you have raised, you can come closer to reality . Essentially these
models are working hypothesis for understanding the nature and the
world. Electromagnetic wave behavior with probabilities (diffraction of
electron beam) and the particle theory with determinism are both
embedded in the electron behavior as observed by data and to be
accounted by the models. Interestingly behavior of electrons or matter
shifts from probabilistic regime to deterministic regime with the
interference of conscious entity, the observer. Probabilities do not
make factual but only observer with observation makes the world
deterministic and factual - that is the data from scientific
observation!

Hence Scientific models do two things - one to explain the experimental
observations and two to provide some predictions purely based on the
models for experimental verification. Adoption of any scientific model,
including Einstein theory of relativity, are based on additional
experimentations and proofs that are consistent with the model
predictions. Questioning therefore forms a basis for better evolution of
the models but not negation of the scientific approach. That is the way
I look at your questioning.


>The theory
> of the electron and the nuclear model of the atom are both illogical.

Probably - you are welcome to propose a better model to account for the
additional observations without negating the observed data (or
experiences). Secondly Chittaranjanji, if you notice carefully, you are
using logic to negate something as illogical, since in your opinion the
questions you have raised are not accounted for by the current model.
Philosophically speaking you are using what you are negating, namely the
scientific approach, to dismiss the approach. This is what I noticed as
amusing in your note; indirectly you are essentially endorsing what you
are negating – please do not dismiss my arguments but closely
retrospect your analysis.

> What again is the relationship between 'parts' and 'whole' in
> science? How can the atomic conception of the world be sustained when
> it is not explained in the first place how disparate parts give rise
> to an entirely new thing viz, the whole? It is because the foundation
> of science is weak in this respect that it resulted in the EPR
> paradox. It was only then that Neils Bohr came up with a hypothesis
> that the whole is somehow contained in the parts. But even that
> hypothesis does not have a logical explanation.

Chittaranjanji - While I plead ignorance for not understanding the
illogical parts and the parts and the whole concepts, I think your
questions are not different from Neils Bohrs questions he needed to face
at that time and as I suggested you can come up with a better model to
account for the experimental data or the experiences. If you have a
better model (this may not the forum) to account the spectral
observations, production of quantum radiations, and dualistic nature of
matter as probability waves or particles etc which are all experiences,
please do so by all means. Please do not think I am being sarcastic. I
am only amazed at your questions. Although I can provide answers to all
your questions (to my satisfaction), I would not venture into it. We
may loose half of the readers of these posts.

But the point I am making it is not the limitation of the science but
limitation of our tools to come up better predictive models. Science
only progresses by these questionings but not get eliminated by it.


> Again, if we look at the theory of cognition, where do the light rays
> come from? Do they come from the surface of the visible objects? But
> if the scientific theory is true, then aren't the objects that we see
> mere phenomena - mere representations? Are the light rays then
> rightfully in the phenomenal world? But yet they can't be, because if
> the scientific theory is true, they would necessarily be prior to the
> activations of the mind? Are they in the noumenal world? - then how
> are we able to conceive of them, let alone measure and conduct
> experiments on them? And what are these experiments that we conduct
> on the mere appearances of objects which are already the
> presentations of the brain? When analysed, the scientific theory of
> cognition leads to a logical circularity and is not sustainable (as
> shown in Part VI).


Chittaranjanji - please carefully study the questions you have posed. I
am not dismissing them. But one thing I observe in the above is shifting
from questing to conclusions. I emphasize again inadequacy of a model to
account some observations is not due to the inadequacy of the scientific
approach. I think one needs to separate this clearly. You are only
pointing out the inadequacy of the model (or should I say more
accurately if you forgive me, the limitations in your understanding of
the model since these questions are based on your understanding of the
models).

If you look back to my previous post - what I presented was what I think
is better model than the previous model - that involved the senses and
the mind to go out and grasp the object. Remember the later one is also
a scientific model based on the understanding at that time developed by
tarkikas. The point is both are models.

Now in your questing - you are bring the mind and prior existence (of
light or matter) before mind cognizes. That is important point that
need to be addressed, at least philosophically. It is the same statement
that pillar has to be there for me to see- which is different from
seeing the snake where there is a rope. That is the experimental fact.
Need to be analyzed and understood.

Now the models, which are explanations for the above observations.

In accounting these data we are considering the following additional
observations as well as axioms.

1. Existence of the pillar cannot be established independent of the mind
- now is that true or not? If the mind is absent I cannot see the pillar
even if you bring 10,000 watt bulb to illumine the pillar. I cannot see
you or the pillar or the light without my mind present. Is that true or
not. You can video tape it and show me latter that pillar was existing
when my mind took leave. But again - my mind has to be awake to see the
video and conclude seeing the picture that the pillar was there when I
went to sleep. Essentially my mind has to be there to prove the
existence of the pillar in the past. Proving is done in the present- In
fact, my mind has to be there to prove the concept of time and space or
any jadam for that matter.

I am arriving at the fundamental Vedantic conclusions:

That which is not self-existing is not self-conscious and therefore not
self-proven. That is jadam - anya adhiina prakaashatvam tat jadam – anya
adhiina satvatvam is jadam - anya being the chaitanya vastu- That is a
conscious entity has to illumine and prove the existence of a inert -
therefore a pramaana is required for knowledge. Only thing that does
not require a pramaana is - self-conscious entity and it is called
aprameyam.

Now let us go back to pillar - where did the pillar come from when my
eyes see – it is not from my mind like the snake that I see.

What actually happens during the perception is what I described as the
mechanics. Chittaranjanji, what I noticed is that you have not
dismissed the model as something wrong with it, you have only provided a
general thesis of what you feel are the limitations of the scientific
models. I understand that we both agree that Brahman is the substratum
of the universe and hence substantive of the pillar, and one cannot
‘see’ or perceive Brahman. Am I right up to this point. My arguments
are only that senses perceive only the attributes since they cannot
perceive the substantive Brahman. ‘There is the pillar’ is the thought
in the mind based on the sense in put and that is how the world is
recognized. My statement is without the mind present, ‘there is a
pillar’ thought is not there and therefore the existence of the pillar
is not confirmed.
Hence existence of pillar cannot be established without mind perceiving
it – please note the statement – my statement is existence of pillar is
not established – I did not say it does not exist. My next statement is
- does it really exists or not is an indeterminate problem since mind
has to be there to determine it and without the mind it cannot be
established. This is the same problem in quantum mechanics – the
probabilistic nature of the matter becomes deterministic only with
observer present. This is an observation not a theory. Michael once
said that my repeating this many times does not make it a fact – but the
fact of the matter is I am repeating it because it is a fact.
Unfortunately or fortunately, the problem – weather the pillar exists or
not before the mind perceives– will remain as indeterminate problem like
the Schrodingers cat problem in physics.

When you ask the question – for the sense to perceive the attributes of
the pillar – the attributes and the locus of the pillar are not created
by the mind – therefore we INFER that pillar has to be preexisting with
those attributes before the mind perceives. That is a valid conclusion
– or inference. And like all conclusions, subject additional
examination. This is where we go to higher pramaaNa for resolving the
issue – the ontological status of the pillar.

That is where I left in my last mail – if Brahman is consciousness, and
he is the substantive for the pillar as we agreed upon based on Vedanta
pramaaNa, then how did the inert pillar comes into existence. Since
that which is not existence cannot come into existence and what which
exists is only a conscious entity – and further since inert pillar is
experienced and non-existence cannot be experienced – all these can only
lead to mityaatva aspect of the pillar. Hence I concluded with
philosophical aspect of the pillar based on Vedanta pramaaNa.

Anyway, I have no intension of rubbing my convictions on you. I am only
providing different perspective. These are all various approaches to
address the problem and one has to discover that one is Brahman which is
one without a second, in spite of the experience of many. When we all
agree there is only Brahman that is absolutely real – the rest is only
relevant within its sphere.

Forgive me I stop my discussion with this on this topic, unless I have
to add something to clarify my statements.

Please continue with your posts – I will try to follow at my pace.

Hari OM!
Sadananda





=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

--- bhaskar.yr@... wrote:

Bhaskar-I cannot disagree with you. The point was referring to the
dream analogy to dismiss the reality of the world - It was well brought
out in many Shankara's prakarana Granthaas. Hence one cannot say that
analogy is not valid and that analogy is not correct shankara's
position. Anyway the point was made.

Hari OM!
Sadananda

=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

Wonderful Sadaananda-ji:

What you have said is wonderfully summarized in giitaa as I
understand it:

j~naanaM te.ahaM savij~naanamidaM vaxaamyasheShataH |
yajj~naatvaa neha bhuuyo.anyajj~naatavyamavashiShyate ||7.2 ||

j~naana is the end of vi~jnaana because it ends (merges) in the
j~naana. vij~naana is a refining process, which is capable of
obtaining the of such refined knowledge "j~naana" for further
refinement.

Now if we apply this principle to giitaa 4.24 things become clearer.

brahmaarpaNaM brahma havirbrahmaagnau brahmaNaa hutam |
brahmaiva tena gantavyaM brahmakarmasamaadhinaa || 4.24 ||

Thus it is recommended to use the principles of expansion (knowledge)
to expand by making it the j~naana yaj~na where agnii - is j~naana;
samidhaa - j~naana and the outcome of that yaj~na - is j~naana as
well. Thus the principle is expansion "brhma" is used here for the
oblation.

These principles can be universally applied to all the processes from
yoga, to salvation to material sciences to the materials and whatever
that can be imagined, perceived or materialized.

I hope I am not trying to impart further "diffusion of any confusion".

Regards,

Yadunath

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:
> --- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@y...> wrote:
>
> > Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,
> >
> > I feel a bit hesitent to write this message because it may appear
> > provocative (due to its rather radical stand), but Sir I believe
that
> > one must speak one's convictions, and therefore I make myself
bold to
> > write these words.
>
>
> Chittaranjanji - Pranaams. There is no need to be hesitent to
express
> one's convictions while respecting that of others. That is the
purpose
> of this list serve. We are fortunate to have this forum to share
our
> understanding with mutual respect. We can agree to disagree.
>
> Also, my humble request is that when we share our understanding of
> 'Advaitic Doctrine' then we should be fully aware of the demarcation
> lines between the what is true advaitic doctrine and what our
> convictions are related to the doctrine. 'Brahma satyam jaganmityaa
> jiivo brahmaiva naaparaH' -is from my understanding the essential
> doctrine of Advaita. Obviously the word mithya is specially used to
> separate from satya and asatya.
>
> If we claim that ' the world is unreal' is the infiltration from the
> influence of the western philosophy into Advaita Vedanta then, I
would
> say one has to be careful. That statement requires substantial
> justification to show exactly how and when the infiltration
occurred.
> As for as I know, H.H Swami Satchidanandendra swaraswati is main
one who
> has done extensive research in terms of infiltration into Advaita
> Vedanta in the post-Shankara Period some of the concepts that were
not
> there in Shankara's bhaashya - the case in point is the baava ruupa
> ajnaana. Shree Bhaskarji, Stigji, Saraswatiji and there was another
> swamiji in the list (I forgot his name), are (were) some who are
> familiar with the H.H. Swamiji's works.
>
> In 'Advaita Siddhi' Madusuudhana Saraswati has done exhaustive
analysis
> of the falsity in response to Dwaitins criticism. He was the 16th
> Century sage and I do not think we can claim that he was influenced
by
> the Western philosophy. Shree Anand Hudli has provided some
translation
> of this which was published in this list and is stored in the
archives.
> There are five definitions of falsity by Madusuudhana Saraswati
that fit
> in to describe the ontological status of the world. It is a very
> difficult book to read.
>
>
> > There is adequate reason to believe that science is illogical at
its
> > most basic foundations. Science is a set of mathematical
equations
> > that work. Its theories and models are not the truth of what the
> > world is, but are analogous constructs of the mind devised to
predict
> > phenomena and use it for constructive utilitarian purposes. All
> > scientific models are predictive models and nothing more. The
basic
> > paradigm of science is to devise 'theories that work', and its
> > propositions, especially those of modern science, are not
> > linguistically sound statements (they do not abide by word-
meanings)
> > and hence they do not speak of the world as it is in its nature,
but
> > are, more often than not, merely symbolisms that only have a
> > correspondence to the dynamism of things. Meaning must embody the
> > propositional form, otherwise the proposition is strictly not a
> > proposition i.e., it is not a valid sentential form. Most
> > propositions of modern physics relating to the 'Theory of
Relativity'
> > and 'Quantum Physics' are not meaningful sentential forms. With
all
> > due respects to Einstein, space is not curved; neither is
> > simultaneity indeterminable. Again, space is not
Euclidian 'space'
> > nor 'Reimannian space', these being only notions superimposed on
the
> > visually formless space.
> >
> > The case with Quantum Mechanics is similar. Electrons and quantum
> > orbits are 'nonsensical' propositions. The structure of the atom
was
> > necessitated by certain observations of spectral bands, but when
the
> > nuclear atomic structure entailed that electrons occupy quantum
> > orbits (in between which there are no spaces), it was time to
abandon
> > the nuclear model and shift to the electron as a 'property' of
the
> > atom rather than as an orbiting particle. The electron itself is
a
> > logically meaningless conception because an electron cannot have
a
> > form and can hence not be a particle. According to the scientific
> > theory, a form is seen when light rays coming from the thing is
> > differentiated from the light rays coming from beyond the
periphery
> > of the thing so that the boundary stands out as its form. But is
it
> > possible for light rays to come from an electron? The light ray
is
> > itself nothing but electromagnetic radiation that emerges when an
> > electron jumps orbits or energy levels. So how can there be a SET
OF
> > RAYS from an electron as apart from the rays that come from
beyond
> > its periphery? How can there be those innumerable rays from an
> > electron so that its boundary (and form) may be defined?
>
> Chittaranjanji -Enjoyed the reading and frankly (if you don't mind
my
> saying so) quite amused. As you pointed out earlier we cannot
negate
> the experience (data) but need to analyze and understand it. In the
> above statements up to this point, your questions pertain to quantum
> mechanical model of an atom based on the experimental observations
of
> spectral lines - which are data (or experiences). Excited electrons
> radiate a quantum of electromagnetic energy are the data. Quantum
> mechanics provides a model. I am trying here to demark the data, the
> model, your questions about the model, your conclusions about the
model
> based on your questions, and extension of your conclusion on the
whole
> of scientific investigations and analysis!
>
> The last two lines above are your questions on the model.
Beautiful.
> Just as a reminder, questioning of the Rutherford model only led to
> Bohr's quantum mechanical model. Questioning is the essence of
> Scientific investigations and what one is doing by modeling is the
> coming closer to reality of the world's behavior or response to
> stimulus. That my friend is part of the science and not away from
> science. Scientific investigation only improvises the theory that
can
> account unexplained facts better than previous theories. That is
why a
> student of physics studies Rutherford model before he studies Bohr's
> quantum mechanical model and Classical mechanics before he embarks
on
> quantum mechanics. Each is an improvisation of the previous ones.
If
> you come up with further improvised model to account for the
questions
> you have raised, you can come closer to reality . Essentially these
> models are working hypothesis for understanding the nature and the
> world. Electromagnetic wave behavior with probabilities
(diffraction of
> electron beam) and the particle theory with determinism are both
> embedded in the electron behavior as observed by data and to be
> accounted by the models. Interestingly behavior of electrons or
matter
> shifts from probabilistic regime to deterministic regime with the
> interference of conscious entity, the observer. Probabilities do not
> make factual but only observer with observation makes the world
> deterministic and factual - that is the data from scientific
> observation!
>
> Hence Scientific models do two things - one to explain the
experimental
> observations and two to provide some predictions purely based on the
> models for experimental verification. Adoption of any scientific
model,
> including Einstein theory of relativity, are based on additional
> experimentations and proofs that are consistent with the model
> predictions. Questioning therefore forms a basis for better
evolution of
> the models but not negation of the scientific approach. That is the
way
> I look at your questioning.
>
>
> >The theory
> > of the electron and the nuclear model of the atom are both
illogical.
>
> Probably - you are welcome to propose a better model to account for
the
> additional observations without negating the observed data (or
> experiences). Secondly Chittaranjanji, if you notice carefully, you
are
> using logic to negate something as illogical, since in your opinion
the
> questions you have raised are not accounted for by the current
model.
> Philosophically speaking you are using what you are negating,
namely the
> scientific approach, to dismiss the approach. This is what I
noticed as
> amusing in your note; indirectly you are essentially endorsing what
you
> are negating – please do not dismiss my arguments but closely
> retrospect your analysis.
>
> > What again is the relationship between 'parts' and 'whole' in
> > science? How can the atomic conception of the world be sustained
when
> > it is not explained in the first place how disparate parts give
rise
> > to an entirely new thing viz, the whole? It is because the
foundation
> > of science is weak in this respect that it resulted in the EPR
> > paradox. It was only then that Neils Bohr came up with a
hypothesis
> > that the whole is somehow contained in the parts. But even that
> > hypothesis does not have a logical explanation.
>
> Chittaranjanji - While I plead ignorance for not understanding the
> illogical parts and the parts and the whole concepts, I think your
> questions are not different from Neils Bohrs questions he needed to
face
> at that time and as I suggested you can come up with a better model
to
> account for the experimental data or the experiences. If you have a
> better model (this may not the forum) to account the spectral
> observations, production of quantum radiations, and dualistic
nature of
> matter as probability waves or particles etc which are all
experiences,
> please do so by all means. Please do not think I am being
sarcastic. I
> am only amazed at your questions. Although I can provide answers
to all
> your questions (to my satisfaction), I would not venture into it.
We
> may loose half of the readers of these posts.
>
> But the point I am making it is not the limitation of the science
but
> limitation of our tools to come up better predictive models.
Science
> only progresses by these questionings but not get eliminated by it.
>
>
> > Again, if we look at the theory of cognition, where do the light
rays
> > come from? Do they come from the surface of the visible objects?
But
> > if the scientific theory is true, then aren't the objects that we
see
> > mere phenomena - mere representations? Are the light rays then
> > rightfully in the phenomenal world? But yet they can't be,
because if
> > the scientific theory is true, they would necessarily be prior to
the
> > activations of the mind? Are they in the noumenal world? - then
how
> > are we able to conceive of them, let alone measure and conduct
> > experiments on them? And what are these experiments that we
conduct
> > on the mere appearances of objects which are already the
> > presentations of the brain? When analysed, the scientific theory
of
> > cognition leads to a logical circularity and is not sustainable
(as
> > shown in Part VI).
>
>
> Chittaranjanji - please carefully study the questions you have
posed. I
> am not dismissing them. But one thing I observe in the above is
shifting
> from questing to conclusions. I emphasize again inadequacy of a
model to
> account some observations is not due to the inadequacy of the
scientific
> approach. I think one needs to separate this clearly. You are only
> pointing out the inadequacy of the model (or should I say more
> accurately if you forgive me, the limitations in your
understanding of
> the model since these questions are based on your understanding of
the
> models).
>
> If you look back to my previous post - what I presented was what I
think
> is better model than the previous model - that involved the senses
and
> the mind to go out and grasp the object. Remember the later one is
also
> a scientific model based on the understanding at that time
developed by
> tarkikas. The point is both are models.
>
> Now in your questing - you are bring the mind and prior existence
(of
> light or matter) before mind cognizes. That is important point that
> need to be addressed, at least philosophically. It is the same
statement
> that pillar has to be there for me to see- which is different from
> seeing the snake where there is a rope. That is the experimental
fact.
> Need to be analyzed and understood.
>
> Now the models, which are explanations for the above observations.
>
> In accounting these data we are considering the following additional
> observations as well as axioms.
>
> 1. Existence of the pillar cannot be established independent of the
mind
> - now is that true or not? If the mind is absent I cannot see the
pillar
> even if you bring 10,000 watt bulb to illumine the pillar. I cannot
see
> you or the pillar or the light without my mind present. Is that
true or
> not. You can video tape it and show me latter that pillar was
existing
> when my mind took leave. But again - my mind has to be awake to
see the
> video and conclude seeing the picture that the pillar was there
when I
> went to sleep. Essentially my mind has to be there to prove the
> existence of the pillar in the past. Proving is done in the present-
In
> fact, my mind has to be there to prove the concept of time and
space or
> any jadam for that matter.
>
> I am arriving at the fundamental Vedantic conclusions:
>
> That which is not self-existing is not self-conscious and therefore
not
> self-proven. That is jadam - anya adhiina prakaashatvam tat jadam –
anya
> adhiina satvatvam is jadam - anya being the chaitanya vastu- That
is a
> conscious entity has to illumine and prove the existence of a
inert -
> therefore a pramaana is required for knowledge. Only thing that
does
> not require a pramaana is - self-conscious entity and it is called
> aprameyam.
>
> Now let us go back to pillar - where did the pillar come from when
my
> eyes see – it is not from my mind like the snake that I see.
>
> What actually happens during the perception is what I described as
the
> mechanics. Chittaranjanji, what I noticed is that you have not
> dismissed the model as something wrong with it, you have only
provided a
> general thesis of what you feel are the limitations of the
scientific
> models. I understand that we both agree that Brahman is the
substratum
> of the universe and hence substantive of the pillar, and one cannot
> `see' or perceive Brahman. Am I right up to this point. My
arguments
> are only that senses perceive only the attributes since they cannot
> perceive the substantive Brahman. `There is the pillar' is the
thought
> in the mind based on the sense in put and that is how the world is
> recognized. My statement is without the mind present, `there is a
> pillar' thought is not there and therefore the existence of the
pillar
> is not confirmed.
> Hence existence of pillar cannot be established without mind
perceiving
> it – please note the statement – my statement is existence of
pillar is
> not established – I did not say it does not exist. My next
statement is
> - does it really exists or not is an indeterminate problem since
mind
> has to be there to determine it and without the mind it cannot be
> established. This is the same problem in quantum mechanics – the
> probabilistic nature of the matter becomes deterministic only with
> observer present. This is an observation not a theory. Michael once
> said that my repeating this many times does not make it a fact –
but the
> fact of the matter is I am repeating it because it is a fact.
> Unfortunately or fortunately, the problem – weather the pillar
exists or
> not before the mind perceives– will remain as indeterminate problem
like
> the Schrodingers cat problem in physics.
>
> When you ask the question – for the sense to perceive the
attributes of
> the pillar – the attributes and the locus of the pillar are not
created
> by the mind – therefore we INFER that pillar has to be preexisting
with
> those attributes before the mind perceives. That is a valid
conclusion
> – or inference. And like all conclusions, subject additional
> examination. This is where we go to higher pramaaNa for resolving
the
> issue – the ontological status of the pillar.
>
> That is where I left in my last mail – if Brahman is consciousness,
and
> he is the substantive for the pillar as we agreed upon based on
Vedanta
> pramaaNa, then how did the inert pillar comes into existence. Since
> that which is not existence cannot come into existence and what
which
> exists is only a conscious entity – and further since inert pillar
is
> experienced and non-existence cannot be experienced – all these can
only
> lead to mityaatva aspect of the pillar. Hence I concluded with
> philosophical aspect of the pillar based on Vedanta pramaaNa.
>
> Anyway, I have no intension of rubbing my convictions on you. I am
only
> providing different perspective. These are all various approaches
to
> address the problem and one has to discover that one is Brahman
which is
> one without a second, in spite of the experience of many. When we
all
> agree there is only Brahman that is absolutely real – the rest is
only
> relevant within its sphere.
>
> Forgive me I stop my discussion with this on this topic, unless I
have
> to add something to clarify my statements.
>
> Please continue with your posts – I will try to follow at my pace.
>
> Hari OM!
> Sadananda
>
>
>
>
>
> =====
> What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-
effort. Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present
action. You are not only the prisoner of your past but master of your
future. - Swami Chinmayananda

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji (and Shri Bhaskarji),

Since I have been admonished by Shri Bhaskar Prabhuji for not
commenting on an important part of your post, and since Bhaskarji is
quite right in pointing it out, I would like to make amends for the
lapse with the following comments. :-)


> Coming back to the philosophical aspect, if the Brahman is
> existence-consciousness-infiniteness and thus the material
> cause for the universe, there is an inherent problem of the
> cognition of the world, which is inert

I would like to approach this in a slightly different manner.
Firstly, I think we should investigate what it means when we say that
the inert cannot be real? If the Self of the inert is Real, then how
can it be that the inert is unreal when it is nothing but it-Self?
For this is what the Chandogya Upanishad says (VI.xiii.3): "Now that
which is the subtle essence – in it all that exists has its self.
That is the True. That is the Self. That thou art, Svetaketu".


> If what are cognized are only attributes and not
> substantive which is Brahman as the above cognition
> process indicates, then I have no problem in accounting
> the world out there.

Attributes are never cognized by themselves. Attributes are always
cognized as predicating something, and that 'something' is what is
called 'substance'. We never see merely 'red' or 'round'; we see a
red chair or a round ball. Cognition always takes the form of
substance-attribute, and it is this feature that appears in language
as the subject-predicate form of a sentence. Now in Advaita these
attributes are existentially non-different from the substance i.e.,
attributes are coterminous with the substance. But the substance in
which the attributes inhere is never perceived in its capacity as
pure substance. Apart from the redness, roundness, sweetness, and all
the other attributes that may be predicated of it, what indeed is it
that is perceived of an apple? When even the predication
of 'appleness' is removed from it, it is completely bare – it is
imperceptible. This bareness is what is pointed out as the Self by
Svetaketu's father to Svetaketu when the nyagrodha fruit and its seed
is broken (Ch.Up). The Self is not merely within the body; the Self
pervades all these things. This pervasion is liable to be missed out
when we approach the problem of ontology from merely the distinctions
of 'drik-drisya'. The Self is the indivisible Substance beneath the
names that point to 'substances' as distinct unities. This
differentiation of Substance into 'many' because of names is false.
Substance is indivisible.


> Is the world real, yes from the substantive point- but
> from the point of names and forms as the Upanishads declare -
> vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - It is only
> transformation in names and forms - It is only apparent?

Is the pot false when the earth is true? If that should be the case,
then any piece of earth should suffice for the purpose of cooking
food. But such is not the case. If we analyse the thing that is
denied when it is said that the transformation of the cause to effect
is by name only, it would be seen that the target of the denial
is 'transformation' and not the effect that is pre-existent in the
cause. 'Vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam' denies the
transformation of earth to pot; it does not deny the pot itself that
is pre-existent in the earth. It is nothing but a statement of
vivarta – that there is no generation of anything new in the material
cause. This is what the Acayrya says: "Milk, but not clay, has some
special potency for curds, and clay, but not milk, has some potency
for a pot. But then as a result of this possession of potency by the
state preceding origination, the theory of the non-existence of the
effect before creation will fall through, and the theory of the pre-
existence of the effect will stand confirmed. Again, when some
potency is assumed in the cause, to determine the effect, that
potency cannot influence the effect by being different (from the
cause and effect) or non-existent (like the effect) since (on either
supposition) non-existence and difference will pertain to that
potency as much as to the effect. Therefore the potency must be the
very essence of the cause, and the effect must be involved in the
very core of the potency. Besides, we do not have any such idea of
difference between cause and effect, substance and qualities, and
such other pairs, as (we have) between as horse and a buffalo."
(BSB.II.I.vi.18).

Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

Namaste:

Namaste Sri Chittaranjan, Sri Sadananda and Sri Bhasker:

I find these discussions quite interesting and thought provoking. At
the same time, they also provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate
our inability to explain and understand "What is real?" All
available words and intellectual frameworks with detailed logical
structure can only provide little glimpse of the Brahman. This is
more than evident from the many years of discussions in this list
and the volumes of materials available through the Vedas, the
Upanisdhads and Gita.

This puzzle may never be resolved until we merge with the Brahman.
This doesn't mean that we shouldn't discuss nor will it mean that we
should not disagree on one or more of the intellectual frameworks.
On the other hand it reminds and strenthens our belief that
intellectual discussions alone will not be sufficient for us to
recognize our True-Self!

Warmest regards,

Ram Chandran

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, "Chittaranjan Naik"
<chittaranjan_naik@y...> wrote:
> Namaste Shri Sadanandaji (and Shri Bhaskarji),
>
> Since I have been admonished by Shri Bhaskar Prabhuji for not
> commenting on an important part of your post, and since Bhaskarji
is
> quite right in pointing it out, I would like to make amends for
the
> lapse with the following comments. :-)
>
>
> > Coming back to the philosophical aspect, if the Brahman is
> > existence-consciousness-infiniteness and thus the material
> > cause for the universe, there is an inherent problem of the
> > cognition of the world, which is inert

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@...> wrote:



>
> I would like to approach this in a slightly different manner.
> Firstly, I think we should investigate what it means when we say that
> the inert cannot be real? If the Self of the inert is Real, then how
> can it be that the inert is unreal when it is nothing but it-Self?
> For this is what the Chandogya Upanishad says (VI.xiii.3): "Now that
> which is the subtle essence – in it all that exists has its self.
> That is the True. That is the Self. That thou art, Svetaketu".

>
Chittaranjanji - we are now coming to crux of the matter where there is
no matter!

When we say the crux of the inert is real and that real is in essence is
the existence-consciousness-infiniteness, therefore it cannot be
perceived either - it has to be understood - that thou art Svetaketo -
Svetaketu cannot perceive himself the self that pervades the self in the
inert. Chittaranjanji -one can UNDERSTAND the reality IN the inert
without assigning the reality TO the inert, and that is the essence of
the teaching too.


>
> Attributes are never cognized by themselves. Attributes are always
> cognized as predicating something, and that 'something' is what is
> called 'substance'. We never see merely 'red' or 'round'; we see a
> red chair or a round ball. Cognition always takes the form of
> substance-attribute, and it is this feature that appears in language
> as the subject-predicate form of a sentence.

Sorry Chittaranjanji - I beg to differ from your thesis. Senses can only
cognize the attributes - the rest is the inference that goes with
habitual experience. 'Attributes should have a locus' is the subtle
inference that the mind makes since redness, form, taste, the smell and
hardness - are all properties and not substatives - Let us take Red
Lotus - what exactly is this red-lotus? red is an attribute we both
agree and should have a locus says our intellect. What is this lotus
that the senses grasp - the flowary form, perhaps with a smell if it not
Japanese? - Is the form lotus?

Your statement 'attributes are always predicating something - who makes
that statement that it is so? - Believe it or not, we are now making a
scientific inquiry of the lotus. Can you please define me what a lotus
is that the senses grasp as the predicate?

At the most you have to come up with a circular definition - Lotus is
that which has lotus-ness, and what is that lotus-ness? - It is that
which the lotus has. We are not any wiser.

In the knowledge accumulation, when the child sees first time - If
mother shows a white cow - and teaches 'that is a cow' - cognition of
the form, color if it is a white and any other attributes through the
senses are imaged as mental picture and stored with info in the memory.
Next when the child sees a red cow, and mother says that is also cow-
which is now not white - With the second, third,.. perceptions, child
picks up the generic attributes called jaati of the cow - which does not
involve red, white etc which are individual qualities (vyakti). Naming
of the form and cognitions and re-cognitions all are part of mental
operations. If we say Brahman is the substantive of the object, no way
the senses can grasp Brahman - if they can grasp, it ceases to be
Brahman.

The rest of the analysis below as I see only deductive and therefore
subject to reinterpretation. What can be perceived by the senses only
the forms, colors, sounds, smells, tastes, hardness - these can be
measured depending on the sensitivity to grasp and measure by the
senses.


Hari OM!
Sadananda



Now in Advaita these
> attributes are existentially non-different from the substance i.e.,
> attributes are coterminous with the substance. But the substance in
> which the attributes inhere is never perceived in its capacity as
> pure substance. Apart from the redness, roundness, sweetness, and all
> the other attributes that may be predicated of it, what indeed is it
> that is perceived of an apple? When even the predication
> of 'appleness' is removed from it, it is completely bare – it is
> imperceptible. This bareness is what is pointed out as the Self by
> Svetaketu's father to Svetaketu when the nyagrodha fruit and its seed
> is broken (Ch.Up). The Self is not merely within the body; the Self
> pervades all these things. This pervasion is liable to be missed out
> when we approach the problem of ontology from merely the distinctions
> of 'drik-drisya'. The Self is the indivisible Substance beneath the
> names that point to 'substances' as distinct unities. This
> differentiation of Substance into 'many' because of names is false.
> Substance is indivisible.
>
>
> > Is the world real, yes from the substantive point- but
> > from the point of names and forms as the Upanishads declare -
> > vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - It is only
> > transformation in names and forms - It is only apparent?
>
> Is the pot false when the earth is true? If that should be the case,
> then any piece of earth should suffice for the purpose of cooking
> food. But such is not the case. If we analyse the thing that is
> denied when it is said that the transformation of the cause to effect
> is by name only, it would be seen that the target of the denial
> is 'transformation' and not the effect that is pre-existent in the
> cause. 'Vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam' denies the
> transformation of earth to pot; it does not deny the pot itself that
> is pre-existent in the earth. It is nothing but a statement of
> vivarta – that there is no generation of anything new in the material
> cause. This is what the Acayrya says: "Milk, but not clay, has some
> special potency for curds, and clay, but not milk, has some potency
> for a pot. But then as a result of this possession of potency by the
> state preceding origination, the theory of the non-existence of the
> effect before creation will fall through, and the theory of the pre-
> existence of the effect will stand confirmed. Again, when some
> potency is assumed in the cause, to determine the effect, that
> potency cannot influence the effect by being different (from the
> cause and effect) or non-existent (like the effect) since (on either
> supposition) non-existence and difference will pertain to that
> potency as much as to the effect. Therefore the potency must be the
> very essence of the cause, and the effect must be involved in the
> very core of the potency. Besides, we do not have any such idea of
> difference between cause and effect, substance and qualities, and
> such other pairs, as (we have) between as horse and a buffalo."
> (BSB.II.I.vi.18).
>
> Warm regards,
> Chittaranjan
>
>
>
>
>


=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:

> Also, my humble request is that when we share our understanding of
> 'Advaitic Doctrine' then we should be fully aware of the demarcation
> lines between the what is true advaitic doctrine and what our
> convictions are related to the doctrine.

Sir, isn't this discussion about finding out that very demarcation? I
believe that we often assume something to be the demarcation without
culling out the meaning of the word 'mithya' as used in Advaita.


> 'Brahma satyam jaganmityaa jiivo brahmaiva naaparaH' -is from
> my understanding the essential doctrine of Advaita. Obviously
> the word mithya is specially used to separate from satya and
> asatya.

Yes, I agree that 'Brahma satyam jaganmityaa jiivo brahmaiva
naaparaH' is the essential doctrine of Advaita, but what is
that 'satya' and 'asatya' as meant therein? In what manner is it said
that the world is asatya?


> If we claim that ' the world is unreal' is the infiltration
> from the influence of the western philosophy into Advaita
> Vedanta then, I would say one has to be careful.

I never said that the doctrine of 'world is unreal' is an
infiltration from the influence of Western philosophy. It is an
Advaitic doctrine and it was there before Western philosophy came to
India - Advaitins have been called crypto-Buddhists long before we
were exposed to Western thought. But when Advaita says that the world
is unreal, it does not mean that the world is simply a false thing -
that falsity of the world is conditional on a certain way in which we
see the world.


> That statement requires substantial justification to show
> exactly how and when the infiltration occurred.

Advaita is not idealism. Objects are not 'idea'. It is this
conception of objects as idea or mind - as conceived in European
idealism - that has influenced the modern interpretation of Advaita.
That is all that I am saying.


> As for as I know, H.H Swami Satchidanandendra swaraswati is
> main one who has done extensive research in terms of
> infiltration into Advaita Vedanta in the post-Shankara
> Period some of the concepts that were not there in Shankara's
> bhaashya - the case in point is the baava ruupa ajnaana.
> Shree Bhaskarji, Stigji, Saraswatiji and there was another
> swamiji in the list (I forgot his name), are (were) some
> who are familiar with the H.H. Swamiji's works.

Bhava-rupa ajnaana is very much there in Shankara bhashya - there are
two nuances to the word 'ajnyana' in Advaita and one of them is bhava
rupa. But this a very controversial topic which I would not like to
enter upon here because it has the potential to divert from the main
thread of the discussion.


> In 'Advaita Siddhi' Madusuudhana Saraswati has done
> exhaustive analysis of the falsity in response to
> Dwaitins criticism. He was the 16th Century sage and I
> do not think we can claim that he was influenced by
> the Western philosophy.

As I've mentioned above, there is a misunderstanding here of what I
said with regards to Western philosophy having influenced the modern
interpretation of Advaita.


> Chittaranjanji -Enjoyed the reading and frankly (if you don't
> mind my saying so) quite amused.

That is okay Sir. When I first brought up this point in the on-line
discussion board of 'The Philosophers Magazine', people thought I was
one of those loony types that didn't believe that man landed on the
moon and things like that. But after 15 months of discussion on the
board - which included scientists and philosophers from the academia
(the group was moderated by Jeremy Strangroom, one of the editors of
the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy) I can only say that I came
back with a healthy respect for philosophy, and in particular for the
doctrines of Advaita, as against those of science. But I have also
realised that I walk this path almost alone.


> Just as a reminder, questioning of the Rutherford model only led to
> Bohr's quantum mechanical model. Questioning is the essence of
> Scientific investigations and what one is doing by modeling is the
> coming closer to reality of the world's behavior or response to
> stimulus. That my friend is part of the science and not away from
> science. Scientific investigation only improvises the theory that
> can account unexplained facts better than previous theories.
> That is why a student of physics studies Rutherford model before
> he studies Bohr's quantum mechanical model and Classical mechanics
> before he embarks on quantum mechanics. Each is an improvisation
> of the previous ones. If you come up with further improvised
> model to account for the questions you have raised, you can
> come closer to reality .

What you mention is the positivist approach of modern science, and it
is based on the fond hope that these improvisations will lead us one
day to the truth. But Sir, the problem is not in the approach but in
the foundations on which that approach stands - it is in making
improvisations while standing on foundations that are not examined
with the rigour that they should have been examined with. Advaita is
not based on a positivist approach, but on the most rigorous
examination of each concept, and not merely of the concept but the
very structure of the concept, as also of the semiotic relations
between concepts and the objects that concepts point to.


> Essentially these models are working hypothesis for
> understanding the nature and the world. Electromagnetic
> wave behavior with probabilities (diffraction of
> electron beam) and the particle theory with determinism
> are both embedded in the electron behavior as observed
> by data and to be accounted by the models.

What is the data that is observed in scientific experiments? That
data is itself an interpretation derived by the interpretive
framework of science that colours the measurement set-up i.e., the
data is theory-laden by the symbolic framework of the problem
definition. This is the problem that the logical positivists were
grappling with before they gave up their endeavour to define
a 'verifiability criteria' for science.


> Interestingly behavior of electrons or matter shifts from
> probabilistic regime to deterministic regime with the
> interference of conscious entity, the observer.

Probabistic and deterministic regimes are epistemological and not
ontological. Science mixes up the two, and it is the paradox
resulting from this mixing up that made a perplexed Einstein remark
that 'God does not play dice!'.


> Probabilities do not make factual but only observer with
> observation makes the world deterministic and factual - that
> is the data from scientific observation!

Science is confused as to what the observer is. Most scientists think
that the observer lies in the measurement set-ups. Some scientists
have however taken to spirituality due to the paradoxes of modern
sciences acting on them like a Zen Koan.


> Hence Scientific models do two things - one to explain the
> experimental observations....

What is this explanation? It is only an analogous model of the
dynamics of things. The maths is okay, but not the explanations of
the maths.


> and two to provide some predictions purely based on the
> models for experimental verification.

Exactly, scientific models are based on their capabilities for
prediction. A model that predicts reasonable accurately is accepted
as a scientific theory. But if we say that science tell us that the
world is like what it says it is, then there is a problem.


> Adoption of any scientific model, including Einstein theory of
> relativity, are based on additional experimentations and proofs
> that are consistent with the model predictions. Questioning
> therefore forms a basis for better evolution of the models
> but not negation of the scientific approach. That is the way
> I look at your questioning.

The questioning in science is based on the premise that knowledge is
acquired through scientific construction i.e., model building.
Advaitic knowledge is about revelation - the revealing of truth - and
not about construction.


> > The theory of the electron and the nuclear model of the
> > atom are both illogical.
>
> Probably - you are welcome to propose a better model to
> account for the additional observations without negating
> the observed data (or experiences).

Sir, I am not interested in proposing scientific models. I am only
saying that bringing in science into the study of Advaita is
dangerous. The data of science is not data because that data is
already theory-laden with the theories of science.


> Secondly Chittaranjanji, if you notice carefully, you are
> using logic to negate something as illogical, since in
> your opinion the questions you have raised are not
> accounted for by the current model.

No, the questions I raised were not against scientific models, but
against the scientific method and paradigm. The questions I raised
were only examples of what happens when the foundations are weak. It
is not merely scientific models that are in question here; the
problems with these models are merely the symptoms of something more
serious that lies at the foundations of the scientific approach. It
is because scientific theories work that we do not question its
logical basis. Scientific models are like nets that are laid out over
the world, but they are not the way the world is. Most scientists
today accept the fact that science is only a map of reality, but few
question why it should be that way. Most people are content with the
assumption that reality is n-dimensional and that our minds can
conceive only upto the 4-th dimension, and so on. What is required
here is to investigate these very statements, and the structure of
thought that makes these statements. We do not do that, but still we
accept the contradictions in science, or worse still, we do not even
see these contradictions because we don't go deep enough in our
questioning. We are so spellbound by science today that it opiates
our minds.


> Philosophically speaking you are using what you are negating,
> namely the scientific approach, to dismiss the approach.

No, I am not using the scientific method here. The scientific method
starts with a speculative hypothesis which it then seeks to validate
through so-called empirical observation through its measurement
systems. I am saying that science is in need of a logical examination
of the very structure of its hypothetical statements themselves. Such
a scheme for validations is not built into the paradigm of science -
because such validations is not within the realm of science but is in
the domain of metaphysics or linguistics. Thus, while the scientific
approach begins with a hypothesis (a scientific proposition), what I
am saying is that this beginning is itself suspect in terms of its
logical structure. Many scientific hypothesis are 'nonsensical'
propositions, which is the reason that it reaches paradoxical
conclusions like space being curved, etc.


> This is what I noticed as amusing in your note; indirectly
> you are essentially endorsing what you are negating – please
> do not dismiss my arguments but closely retrospect your
> analysis.

No Sir, I am not dismissing it, particularly as I have given it
considerable thought for over twenty years now. We are characterised
by primordial avidya in this world, in everything that we do, and
that includes scientific enquiry. This avidya is there even in the
theories that we build, because we habitually try to BUILD to know.
We thereby build through the knots of the deep-seated avidya that
lies within us. The true answer that Vedanta shows to us is not in
building, but in unravelling. It is in dispossessing ourselves of the
webs of illogical notions and constructs of the mind. This includes
disabusing the mind of even scientific constructs, and such
dispossession can only happen if we question even the foundations of
science. I am not saying that it is necessary to question science
when we are on the path of Vedanta, but when we become inclined to
accommodate science into our explanations of Advaita, then it is
mandatory to examine science itself. Therefore if I am to retrospect,
then this is what comes to my mind:

1. Science violates the law of identity. It confuses identity
with correlates. For example, colour is not electromagnetic radiation
of a certain frequency. It is colour – that quality that stands to
consciousness as colour and is designated by the word `colour'. But
in science, colour becomes a mere qualia in the mind whereas
electromagnetic radiation are said to be the objective truth. Now,
what are these electromagnetic radiations if not mere postulates of
the mind to account for things like colour that we directly perceive?
We have placed our faith here in a mere conception of the mind to
which we give the notion of `objectivity' whereas we have demoted the
actually perceived qualia to an inferior position. Isn't this
somewhat like the primary and secondary qualities of Locke, and isn't
the thing called the `objective reality' here nothing but the belief
in some conception of electro-magnetic radiation as having reality? I
am not disputing the efficacy of electro-magnetic radiation as a good
analogous model for depicting the behaviour of the world, but I am
questioning its intrusion into Vedantic enquiry which calls us back
to the immediacy of experience rather than to the propensity to build
constructs. Sir, we have lost our innocence through science – we have
isolated ourselves from the pristine purity of what things are to a
kind of ersatz reality.

2. We must look at the manner in which scientific propositions
are formulated. The basic language of science is mathematics. The
words of this language (or its signs) are the variables which point
to magnitudes. The grammar of the scientific language is the
structure of its equations – the operators that bind the equations or
the functions. Thus the core verifiable statements of science are
mathematical statements that can only point to magnitudes and their
relationship with one another, but they do not tell us anything about
the thing or the attribute of which the variables are magnitudes.
This transformation is in the mind only.

3. The scientific model when expressed in spoken language must
abide by the rules of semantics and grammar. I'm afraid that science
has taken leave of the basic principles of language usage. A
proposition must by embodied by meaning, otherwise it is not a
proposition. Much of the paradoxes of modern science lies in this
basic violation of language structure.



> Chittaranjanji - While I plead ignorance for not understanding
> the illogical parts and the parts and the whole concepts, I
> think your questions are not different from Neils Bohrs
> questions he needed to face at that time and as I suggested
> you can come up with a better model to account for the
> experimental data or the experiences.

The atomic model logically requires that the relationship between
parts and whole is first examined before we go about speculating that
it is these small building blocks that make up the universe. Why did
science have to wait till it came up with the EPR paradox? Wasn't it
only after the EPR paradox stared science in the face that science
(Neils Bohr) began asking the question about parts and whole? What is
the logical basis on which Neils Bohr went about resolving the
problem?


> But the point I am making it is not the limitation of the
> science but limitation of our tools to come up better
> predictive models.

No Sir, IT IS the limitation of science (as science is today).


> Chittaranjanji - please carefully study the questions you
> have posed. I am not dismissing them. But one thing I
> observe in the above is shifting from questing to conclusions.
> I emphasize again inadequacy of a model to account some
> observations is not due to the inadequacy of the scientific
> approach. I think one needs to separate this clearly.

I am speaking about separating what science explains from what many
scientists say it explains. It does explain something of the world -
there is no doubt about that - but it does not explain something else
that it purports to explain. It speaks very accurately about the
dynamism of things, but it does not speak rightly about what things
are.


> You are only pointing out the inadequacy of the model (or
> should I say more accurately if you forgive me, the limitations
> in your understanding of the model since these questions
> are based on your understanding of the models).

Maybe it is my limitation in understanding the scientific theory,
especially as it has something new to say every now and then, but I
have not seen any logical argument to sustain the stimulus-response
theory of cognition which it continues with.


> If you look back to my previous post - what I presented was
> what I think is better model than the previous model - that
> involved the senses and the mind to go out and grasp the
> object. Remember the later one is also a scientific model
> based on the understanding at that time developed by
> tarkikas. The point is both are models.

No, the Advaita tenet is not a model. It is an articulation of the
apperception of seeing by sinking into the state of being a witness.


> 1. Existence of the pillar cannot be established independent
> of the mind - now is that true or not? If the mind is absent
> I cannot see the pillar even if you bring 10,000 watt bulb to
> illumine the pillar. I cannot see you or the pillar or the
> light without my mind present. Is that true or not.

That is true.


> You can video tape it and show me latter that pillar was existing
> when my mind took leave. But again - my mind has to be awake to
> see the video and conclude seeing the picture that the pillar
> was there when I went to sleep. Essentially my mind has to be
> there to prove the existence of the pillar in the past. Proving
> is done in the present- In fact, my mind has to be there to
> prove the concept of time and space or any jadam for that matter.

True as far as proving is required.


> I am arriving at the fundamental Vedantic conclusions:
>
> That which is not self-existing is not self-conscious and
> therefore not self-proven. That is jadam - anya adhiina
> prakaashatvam tat jadam – anya adhiina satvatvam is jadam
> - anya being the chaitanya vastu- That is a conscious entity
> has to illumine and prove the existence of a inert -
> therefore a pramaana is required for knowledge. Only thing
> that does not require a pramaana is - self-conscious entity
> and it is called aprameyam.

That is also true.


> Now let us go back to pillar - where did the pillar come
> from when my eyes see – it is not from my mind like the
> snake that I see.
>
> What actually happens during the perception is what I
> described as the mechanics. Chittaranjanji, what I noticed
> is that you have not dismissed the model as something wrong
> with it, you have only provided a general thesis of what
> you feel are the limitations of the scientific models.

No Sir, I have dismissed the model itself as it necessarily leads to
a logical circularity.


> I understand that we both agree that Brahman is the substratum
> of the universe and hence substantive of the pillar, and one cannot
> `see' or perceive Brahman. Am I right up to this point.

Yes Sir.


> My arguments are only that senses perceive only the attributes
> since they cannot perceive the substantive Brahman.

The substantive is never perceived. We don't perceive a tree in
substance (as pure substance) but only through its attributes.
Otherwise there would not be anything that is called a tree. But
substance is in the very constitution of the tree because the tree is
seen as an existing unity. That existence of the tree is the
substantive, Brahman.


> `There is the pillar' is the thought in the mind based on the
> sense in put and that is how the world is recognized.

The moment we assume a sense input, it leads to primary and secondary
qualities as there has to be an as yet unperceived `thing' from which
the sense inputs originate. But this leads to a logical circularity
because the mechanism that is said to transform the sense inputs to
perceptible sensual imagery is actually what is said to lie within
the realm of this imaged world.


> My statement is without the mind present, `there is a
> pillar' thought is not there and therefore the existence
> of the pillar is not confirmed.

I think this is a vitally important point for understanding Vedanta.
The existence of the pillar is determined in accordance with how our
epistemological faculty determines things. That the pillar is
existent is seen – the perception takes the form that what is
perceived is existing. Now the question here is whether it also
exists when it is not seen. What is the criteria for the existence of
a thing? Is it that it should exist in itself or that it should
exist in whatever way it exists? The problem lies in our supposition
that a thing should be by itself for us to say that it exists. But a
thing's existence is Brahman Itself. To ask for the existence of a
pillar apart from Brahman is like asking to prove the existence of a
thing apart from its Existence. When the pillar is not seen, it
resides in Brahman where it is eternally resident. This according to
me is vivartavada.

> Hence existence of pillar cannot be established without mind
> perceiving it – please note the statement – my statement is
> existence of pillar is not established – I did not say it
> does not exist. My next statement is - does it really
> exists or not is an indeterminate problem since mind
> has to be there to determine it and without the mind it
> cannot be established.

The existence of the pillar is established through material
causality – the effect is pre-existent in the cause whether it is
perceived or not.


> This is the same problem in quantum mechanics – the
> probabilistic nature of the matter becomes deterministic only with
> observer present.

The Observer is eternal and is always present. Quantum mechanics has
many problems in the very manner in which it is formulated.


> This is an observation not a theory. Michael once
> said that my repeating this many times does not make it a
> fact – but the fact of the matter is I am repeating it
> because it is a fact.

Its factuality here is based on the assumption that 'to exist is to
be perceived'.


> Unfortunately or fortunately, the problem – weather the pillar
> exists or not before the mind perceives– will remain as
> indeterminate problem like the Schrodingers cat problem
> in physics.

No, it is resolved when the matter of change and causality is
properly understood.


> When you ask the question – for the sense to perceive the
> attributes of the pillar – the attributes and the locus
> of the pillar are not created by the mind – therefore we
> INFER that pillar has to be preexisting with those
> attributes before the mind perceives. That is a valid
> conclusion – or inference. And like all conclusions,
> subject additional examination. This is where we go to
> higher pramaaNa for resolving the issue – the ontological
> status of the pillar.

> That is where I left in my last mail – if Brahman is
> consciousness, and he is the substantive for the pillar
> as we agreed upon based on Vedanta pramaaNa, then how did
> the inert pillar comes into existence. Since that which
> is not existence cannot come into existence and what which
> exists is only a conscious entity – and further since inert
> pillar is experienced and non-existence cannot be experienced
> – all these can only lead to mityaatva aspect of the pillar.
> Hence I concluded with philosophical aspect of the pillar
> based on Vedanta pramaaNa.

The mithyatva is the pillar bereft of satyatva which is Brahman. The
satyatva of the pillar is it-Self.

It appears to me that I am quite a bit of a loner here, and that my
insistence that the darshana of Advaita is actually realism has not
many takers. That is quite okay with me, for I am comforted in this
this interpretation of Advaita not only by reason but from the
following words of Shri Ramana Maharshi:

"Shankara was criticised for his views on Maya without understanding
him. He said that (1) Brahman is real, (2) The universe is unreal,
and (3) Brahman is the universe. He did not stop at the second,
because the third explains the other two. It signifies that the
universe is real if perceived as the Self, and unreal if perceived
apart from the Self. Hence Maya and Reality are one and the same."


> Anyway, I have no intension of rubbing my convictions on you.
> I am only providing different perspective. These are all
> various approaches to address the problem and one has to
> discover that one is Brahman which is one without a second,
> in spite of the experience of many. When we all
> agree there is only Brahman that is absolutely real – the
> rest is only relevant within its sphere.

Yes Sir.


> Forgive me I stop my discussion with this on this topic, unless
> I have to add something to clarify my statements.

Forgive me too for this long post Sir, but I felt I had to say these
words as I feel that they have a bearing on the interpretation of
Advaita Vedanta.


Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

Namaste Sri.Sadananda-ji,

>Sorry Chittaranjanji - I beg to differ from your thesis. Senses can
only
>cognize the attributes - the rest is the inference that goes with
>habitual experience. 'Attributes should have a locus' is the subtle
>inference that the mind makes since redness, form, taste, the smell
and
>hardness - are all properties and not substatives

Sir, can you clarify, where this subtle inference 'attributes should
have a locus' came from to begin with?

For that matter, can any inference, be it subtle or gross, possible
without being as established by pratyksha somewhere in the past along
the line?

Regards,
Srinivas.

Namaste Shri Sadanandaji,

--- In advaitin (AT) yahoogroups (DOT) com, kuntimaddi sadananda
<kuntimaddisada@y...> wrote:

> Chittaranjanji - we are now coming to crux of the matter
> where there is no matter!
>
> When we say the crux of the inert is real and that real is
> in essence is the existence-consciousness-infiniteness,
> therefore it cannot be perceived either - it has to be
> understood - that thou art Svetaketo - Svetaketu cannot
> perceive himself the self that pervades the self in the
> inert. Chittaranjanji -one can UNDERSTAND the reality IN
> the inert without assigning the reality TO the inert, and
> that is the essence of the teaching too.

One may or may not assign reality to the inert, but one cannot deny
that the inert is seen. If what is seen is something to be denied
while affirming the Self as the Real, then there is duality in so far
as there is something to be denied. How is this duality removed as
long as this inert thing that is seen is something that is to be
denied? The question is: Where does the knot get loosened to leave no
duality at all?


> > Attributes are never cognized by themselves. Attributes are
> > always cognized as predicating something, and that 'something'
> > is what is called 'substance'. We never see merely 'red'
> > or 'round'; we see a red chair or a round ball. Cognition
> > always takes the form of substance-attribute, and it is this
> > feature that appears in language as the subject-predicate
> > form of a sentence.

> Sorry Chittaranjanji - I beg to differ from your thesis. Senses
> can only cognize the attributes - the rest is the inference
> that goes with habitual experience.

The proposition that the `rest is inference' is itself an inference.
When a thing is seen as a cow or horse, and no process of inferring
the cow is actually experienced in seeing a cow or horse, where does
the idea of an inference or habit come in without the presence of
such a supposed inference itself being an inference? Inference is
anumana, and perception is pratyaksha, and pratyaksha is a separate
pramana than inference. There is no anumana in pratyaksha because the
thing seen is a unity.

How can inference again make a unity out of diversity? A cow is seen
as having various attributes, and this diversity of attributes is not
a unity. How can even habit make a unity out of the diversity of
attributes unless some abiding unity is seen in the thing itself? We
do not take half the attributes of a cow and some attributes of
another thing that is beside it and make it into a unity. No mere
habit can do that. Again it cannot be said that such habit comes out
of experiential association because the kaleidoscope of floating
qualities can never in the first place fall into patterns of unities
unless there be fixities in the patterns themselves wherein diverse
qualities adhere together in a manner that repeats itself over and
over again. That fixity of qualities adhering together into a unity
is indeed the thing – not the qualities that adhere together, but the
unity whereby the adherence of qualities is denoted as a thing. Thus
what is inferred as an inferred thing cannot even be inferred unless
it has some basis to stand on, and that basis is the thing, or
substance, which is not merely the qualities sensed, but the unity
wherein qualities conjoin into a thing. And this substance-attribute
nature of things is part of the Advaita doctrine.

> 'Attributes should have a locus' is the subtle inference that
> the mind makes since redness, form, taste, the smell and
> hardness - are all properties and not substatives - Let us
> take Red Lotus - what exactly is this red-lotus?

Sir, it is a red lotus.

> red is an attribute we both agree and should have a locus
> says our intellect.

The locus is already perceived before our intellect says anything
about it. Our intellect may question the locus of redness and ask as
to how it comes to be in the lotus, but that very questioning of
redness in the lotus cannot take place if the lotus was not already
seen as red in colour – otherwise why should it be only a lotus that
should come into the question as the locus of the redness and not a
cow or a horse.

> What is this lotus that the senses grasp - the flowary form,
> perhaps with a smell if it not Japanese? - Is the form lotus?

What the senses grasps is not the lotus but the qualities of the
lotus. The senses never grasp substance, but the senses are not alone
in grasping, the mind goes with it to grasp, and the chit
participates to provide the comprehension. What is grasped is a
composite unity, and not disparate things.

> Your statement 'attributes are always predicating something -
> who makes that statement that it is so? - Believe it or not,
> we are now making a scientific inquiry of the lotus. Can you
> please define me what a lotus is that the senses grasp as the
> predicate?

It is a lotus. That is the true answer to the question. The
scientific answer would be anything but that 'it is a lotus'. :-)
Why indeed should we analyse and abstract what we see and then wonder
how it falls into place when it was always already in place? The
problem is in the mind that has not learnt to be at rest. The lotus
is already known, and the problem is only in not recognising that
what is already known is somehow mysteriously hidden. This is the
mystical nature of reality.


> At the most you have to come up with a circular definition -
> Lotus is that which has lotus-ness, and what is that lotus-ness?
> - It is that which the lotus has. We are not any wiser.

Lotus is not that which has lotusness – lotusness cannot be `had'
because it is not a separate thing. If it were separate, it could
never come into conjunction with the lotus without a relation like
the nyaya inherence and then that would lead to an infinite regress.
The circular definition arises from splitting what is not inherently
two into two.

> In the knowledge accumulation, when the child sees first time -
> If mother shows a white cow - and teaches 'that is a cow' -
> cognition of the form, color if it is a white and any other
> attributes through the senses are imaged as mental picture
> and stored with info in the memory.

But how did the child recognise the mother in the first place when
the mother is nothing but diverse qualities? How did the child
recognise the sounds and gestures as the actions of the mother? How
did the child recognise the diverse qualities such as horns and
dewlap, etc as being of one thing in the first place? How did the
child relate the sounds the mother uttered as pertaining to the cow
and not to any other qualities that were seen? Knowledge is already
within and what we call learning is only the invoking of what is
already within. The knowledge of substance and attributes too is
within the Self, and there is no need to give more reality to the
qualities seen than to the substance when both are composite to the
things seen in experience.

> If we say Brahman is the substantive of the object, no way
> the senses can grasp Brahman - if they can grasp, it ceases to be
> Brahman.

The senses do not grasp Brahman and yet what they grasp is not other
than Brahman because everything is not other than Brahman.


Sir, I have not been able to structure my posts properly for the last
two days because of acute pressures of work, and moreover my PC has
been giving problems since the last one week and I've not found the
time to get it repaired. If my responses appear a bit shoddy or
sharp, I seek your forgiveness.

Warm regards,
Chittaranjan

Dear all,

I have been travelling quite a lot and have squeezed some time
tonight. Right now I am at Dallas at my company's HQ and thought I
might take some time to read my yahoo mails and these group mails.
Once again my pranams to everyone and love for all...

I was particularly interested when I read a few responses to this
subject, and I must say I have been away... I am no authority on
any subject, but shall place my humble opinions in front of you all,
in as humble and mild a language as I can. For simplifying the matter,
I have split it into sections. Please bear with me if I don't reply
frequently, I am rather tied up and will be required to move around
the globe more frequently. So kindly do not take pains in writing
strongly to my posts.

WHAT IS REAL/UNREAL?
=====================

While we say, the body (or universe) is unreal, we also say that the
universe, essentially is Brahman. Does it mean that "Brahman is
essentially unreal" or "all that is unreal is essentially Brahman."
Either way reality of Brahman is jeopardized! I am sure you have a
good arguement against this, but this is not set as a contention. I
shall try to explain things in my capacity.

Brahman is beyond the definition of real or unreal. We cannot say
anything about the self right now, nor can we ever hope to do so.

We think the body exists. But that is just a concept. The body exists
alright, but temporarily. Existence is in itself temporary. Brahman
does not exist for, if it did, there will be a concept assoc. with it
and hence a phase when it will cease to exist. What I mean is
summarized as:

Q. Is Brahman existent?
A. That would not apply.

Q. Is Brahman non-existent?
A. That would not apply.

Q. Is Brahman both existent and non-existent?
A. That would not apply.

Q. Is Brahman neither existent nor non-existent?
A. That would not apply.

Q. Then what is it?
A. It is 'anirvacanIya'!

Q. How is it?
A. If a wind extinguished a flame and I ask you if the flame went
North, South, East or West, what would you say?

EXISTENCE IS TEMPORARY
=======================

The the subject of existence should be looked at as a relative concept
and hence "all matter or phenomena in this Universe are unreal" is to
be understood as such:

1. Their existence is temporary.
2. Their birth is sure to end in death.
3. All phenomena are unreal with respect to the self, for the self is
beyond existence or non-existence, and has neither birth nor death.
4. Birth in itself is a concept and hence is but temporary. So is
death. When the cycle of birth and death is seen to have no reality
(for birth is but another death and death is but another birth,) the
difference between existence and non-existence is blurred (they cease
to have meaning). It is then that one attains Mukti, for one sees he
self as beyond the existent or non-existent.

UNIVERSE IS UNREAL
===================

a. If the body has essentailly the nature of Brahman, then why not
pray to the body?

b. Is the body but a figment of our imagination?

It is not an imagination per say, but that "this is MY body" is a
complete imagination and is unreal.

The body is temporary and hence has no meaning in posession. It is by
virtue of being temporary, a sorrow-bearing and sorrowful element.
This is not the Self. (neti, to be understood through anubhUti) How
can even the ego ever claim the body - that which can never be
claimed, by virtue of its ever-changing character? Which body is mine,
that of the new-born baby, or that of a youth or that of an old-man?

Where is the I? Is ego the nature of self? Then why does it have one
form now and another later. Why does a mistake commited ten years ago
appear as folly now, while a folly right now is best justified
rightaway? Clearly, the ego has changed. The ego is temporary and
hence not the self. (neti, to be understood through anubhUti)

This Self that realizes the bliss in non-posession is called Brahman
for convenience. It is already clear to us, but we are ignorant of it!

While I have dealt with Jaganmithya above, I shall NOT talk about
Brahma satyam under any circumstances since it is anirvacanIya.

ALL IN UNIVERSE IS BRAHMAN (The mundaneness of science)
================================================== ======

This is a matter to be dealt with very carefully. While scientific
research is based on a lot of assumptions and mathematics, we cannot
call it completely mundane. If that were the case all shastras of
debate and philosophical propositions like mAna and anumAna
(deduction) are baseless.

If we are to take only pratyaksha as our source of knowledge, we can
then say that scientific research is not a source of knowledge. But
many want to take mAna, anumAna and even texts as source of knowledge.
(eg: we make the assumption that the body is not the self. What
prompts us to do so? Then we 'deduce' the theory of the self.) Beware,
apophatic teaching prohibits such mAna or anumAna - it relies on
anubhUti.

Ok. Suppose that we take only pratyakshAnubhUti as source of
knowledge, will a statement like "Poison kills" be tested by anubhUti?
We see another person dying of the poison and hence deduce that poison
kills. But it is also rather possible that it was not so much the
effect of poison as it was that of a sudden heart attack! So will we
test the poison on ourselves? We must be careful while saying "all
deductions are baseless".

In scientific research we make deductions based on certain
observations and we really take lots of pains to confirm that our
deduction is right, by testing it many times over. If we call all this
mundane, it would do no justice to the hard work of scientists all
over the world.

In spite of this, while I do agree that not all scientific
observations or theories need be agreed upon when lots of doubt
persists, I will not criticize scince, but only the observations.
Science is defined as "knowledge of truth". It is not just
observations/technological gadgets, that you can criticize left and
right. Each time you criticize science, beware you are criticizing
knowledge of the truth, not mundanness of Newton or Einstein.

That the Universe in itself is essentially Brahman means that all the
simple truths of this universe (like "oil floats on water" or "poison
kills") are essential to the Supreme truth. An Advaitin should have as
much love for science as he has for any phlosophy or convictions or
deities. I am not trying to preach, but am appealing to the stalwarts
of advaita here.

Balaji

Chittaranjanji - By mistake I pressed the send button before I typed -
my apologies to the members.

It looks to me that we are getting to vicious circle to arguments. For
example -

--- Chittaranjan Naik <chittaranjan_naik@...> wrote:

>
> The proposition that the `rest is inference' is itself an inference.

Yes and I may point out the last statement is also another inference
too.


Precisely, because of these problems involved in the perception or in
the so called 'knowledge of...'

The concept of samavaayu or the inherence as well as theories of how to
account the inseparability of the attributes and the substantive are
again based on different axiomatic theories -The mind going out to
grasp the substantives to me is not much different from any other
scientific theories and space-time curvatures, and geometries you felt
are limited.

This is the precisely the reason why, the analogy of the dream objects
and the perception in the dream becomes extremely relevant - the pillars
and the red lotuses in the dream for dreamer are as real as the things
for the waker. True, it is a red lotus or white pillar, which are
different from the seer whose mind 'is going out and grasping the
attributes and by inherence the substantives' and feels they are real.

The relevance of the dream analogy - becomes more obvious to me after
these discussions in unraveling the assumptions or inferences the mind
makes about the reality of the world.

As I see it, we are now back to square 1 - I know you would not agree
with it. At least we agree to disagree.

> Sir, it is a red lotus.

Yes, indeed - that is how I felt in my dream too.


> Lotus is not that which has lotusness – lotusness cannot be `had'
> because it is not a separate thing. If it were separate, it could
> never come into conjunction with the lotus without a relation like
> the nyaya inherence and then that would lead to an infinite regress.
> The circular definition arises from splitting what is not inherently
> two into two.

Yes - Splitting arose out of the analysis of the perceptual process to
inquire attributive knowledge from the knowledge of the substantive of
the locus. Circular definition is inherent in this invalid problem since
substantive being Brahman cannot be independently grasped by the mind,
which is also Brahman.


>
> But how did the child recognise the mother in the first place when
> the mother is nothing but diverse qualities?

Beautiful question -one can raise the same question to a dream child in
the dream.

> The senses do not grasp Brahman and yet what they grasp is not other
> than Brahman because everything is not other than Brahman.

Very good. That applies to the mind going out to grasp the object too.
The self-evident world is not self-evident until the self is evident to
oneself. Till then we are only explaining the unexplainables- And that
is the inherent problem in the reality assigned to the world as much as
the reality assigned to the dream world by a dreamer –both are
anirvacaniiyam with circular definitions to the respective subjects.


Chittaranjanji, I may be dreaming in my own world, but frankly I am
getting more and more convinced of the nature's way of providening us a
beautiful analogy - the dream world - to precisely unravel about the
reality of the world in correct perspective.

I fully aware that you do not give that much importance to the dream.
That is O.K. since you are convinced about your approach. We both agree
ultimately the essential truth is Advaita - or realty is only one. With
that emphasis I should stop.
>
>
> Sir, I have not been able to structure my posts properly for the last
> two days because of acute pressures of work, and moreover my PC has
> been giving problems since the last one week and I've not found the
> time to get it repaired. If my responses appear a bit shoddy or
> sharp, I seek your forgiveness.

Chittaranjanji- no need for that. You have the great capacity to
articulate your ideas - my admiration for that. God bless you.
It is only some of the concepts that I do not agree. It is equally
important that I point out those. I am fully aware that these
disagreements are only on the relative plane and its importance is only
relative.

Truth is one but sages have sung in many ways. That is the spirit of
Advaita.

My pranaams

Hari OM!
Sadananda







>
> Warm regards,
> Chittaranjan
>
>
>
>


=====
What you have is destiny and what you do with what you have is self-effort.
Future destiny is post destiny modified by your present action. You are not only
the prisoner of your past but master of your future. - Swami Chinmayananda